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The Future of International Human Rights:
An Introduction to the Conference Papers
Frederic L. Kirgis*
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration).' The Universal Decla-
ration sets forth a number of civil and political rights within the genre familiar
to Americans under the United States Constitution.2 It adds some economic
and social rights that are less familiar to Americans, at least at the level of
constitutional norms.3 Nevertheless, when it was adopted it did not purport
to be a statement of legal obligation.4 Instead, it was to be "a common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples of all nations."
5
The first three introductory paragraphs of the preamble are worth recall-
ing as statements of moral principle and pragmatic necessity:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice, and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people, [and]
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse,
as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human
rights should be protected by the rule of law ....
* Law School Association Alumni Professor, Washington and Lee University School
of Law.
1. Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. Id.
3. Id. For a discussion of the rights covered, see THE UNIvERsAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARYpassim (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
4. Mrs. Franldin D. Roosevelt, GeneralAssemblyA dopts Declaration ofifuman Rights,
19 DEP'T ST. BULL. 751, 751 (1948). Eleanor Roosevelt was the Chairperson of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights and the leading force behind the preparation of the
Universal Declaration.
5. id.
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, preamble paras. 1-3.
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Thus, from the early days of the United Nations, protection of basic human
rights was regarded not only as a moral imperative, but also as an essential
ingredient of a stable world order.
Gradually over the past fifty years, several of the Universal Declaration's
articles, particularly those within the category of civil and political rights,
have come to be regarded as statements of binding international law. For
example, in 1968 at the International Conference on Human Rights, eighty-
four governments adopted the Proclamation of Teheran, which says, inter alia,
that the Universal Declaration "constitutes an obligation for the members of
the international community."' In the well-known Filartiga v. Pena-Irala9
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that the
prohibition against torture "has become part of customary international law,
as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."'"
Hurst Hannum, a leading scholar in the field and a participant in the Washing-
ton and Lee Conference on The Future of International Human Rights, con-
cludes after a thorough study of the matter: "Given the central importance of
the Universal Declaration in the international human rights firmament, it is the
first instrument that should be consulted when attempting to identify the
contemporary content of international human rights law.""
Despite the Universal Declaration's ascent up the ladder of international
obligation, it obviously could not by itself provide an effective international
system of human rights protection. Its principles needed to be elaborated with
greater precision and needed to be extended specifically to newly-appreciated
areas of concern such as those stemming from racial discrimination and from
restraints on the legitimate aspirations and physical well-being of women.
Moreover, processes had to be devised to determine the extent to which
encroachments on elaborated rights have occurred, and to supply some form of
deterrence or relief. Multilateral treaties (conventions) becamethe instruments
for rule elaboration, and they established mechanisms designed to help assess
official conduct and to impose pressures to comply with the relevant norms.
7. Explanationsvary asto howseveral ofthenonbinding instrument'sprovisionsbecame
binding. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 29-33
(1988); Bruno Simma&PhilipAlston, TheSources ofHumanRightsLaw: Custom, Jus Cogens,
and General Principles, 12 AUsTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 107 (1992); see also OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 335-42 (1991).
8. Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, 2, at 4 (1968).
9. 630 F.2d 876,(2d Cir. 1980).
10. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Hurst Hannum, The Status ofthe UniversalDeclaration ofHuman Rights in National
and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 353 (1995/96). The Annexes to his
article contain an extensive bibliography of national constitutional provisions, cases, and
international instruments that refer to the Universal Declaration. Id at 355-97.
INTRODUCTION
As is well known, two comprehensive treaties, global in reach, flesh out
the Universal Declaration. Together with the Universal Declaration, these
treaties-the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 3 - form what is
known as the international bill of rights. They have been complemented by
similarly comprehensive regional treaties and by specialized global ones. The
most prominent of the regional treaties are the American Convention on
Human Rights 4 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 5 The specialized global treaties include,
inter alia, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 6 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 7 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women," and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. 9 Some of the treaties include mechanisms by which persons may
petition an impartial body for relief.2" Others rely primarily or exclusively on
12. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,993
U.N.T.S. 3. The United States is not a party.
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171. The United States is a party, subject to several reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions.
14. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The
United States is not a party.
15. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, as revised by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994,
Europ. T.S. No. 155. The revised Convention eliminates the European Commission offHuman
Rights and consolidates its work in a reconstituted European Court of Human Rights. Id It
entered into force on November 1, 1998. The United States is not a party.
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The United States is a party.
17. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. The United States is a party.
18. Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms offDiscriminationAgainst Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. The United States is not a party.
19. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989). The
United States is not a party.
20. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at 179-84;
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 14, at 153-57; Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 15, at 234-42; International
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 17, at 224-32.
The procedure is optional for states parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 13, at 182, and the International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms
of Racial Discrimination, supra note 17, at 226. It is mandatory for states parties to the
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 14, at 155, and the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 15, at 238.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 661 (1998)
self-generated reports by states parties and review by a treaty-monitoring
body.
2
These treaties, like the Universal Declaration, have generated a consider-
able amount of practice interpreting, applying, and enforcing the principles
and the rules they contain. A conference of human rights experts could
usefully look back over the fifty years since the Universal Declaration was
adopted and try to synthesize the very great strides in human rights law that
have been taken in that time. Our aim was different. We thought it would be
more useful to look to the future. Consequently, we decided to jump start the
150th anniversary year of the Washington and Lee School of Law (and the
250th anniversary year of the University) with a conference on The Future of
International Human Rights. We assembled experts in several fields, some
with vast overall knowledge of international human rights law and others with
more specialized expertise, to come to the picturesque college town ofLexing-
ton for two days of public discussion and a half day of informal, private
discussion to try to map out the primary directions human rights substance and
procedure are likely to take in the foreseeable future. Of course, this required
some consideration of what has gone before in order to examine what is likely
to come next. But the focus was on the future, and the papers emanating from
the conference - the papers published in the ensuing pages - reflect that
forward-looking approach. We could not hope to cover all of the important
issues, but we were able to deal with many of them on three levels - global,
regional, and domestic.
We were extremely fortunate to be able to assemble a multinational cast
that included not only generalists and specialists, but also presented a mix of
academics, international officials, and private practitioners. Professor Dinah
Shelton served as our generalist from academia, although she is anything but
an ivory tower academic. She has impressive activist credentials to go with
her more traditional academic curriculum vitae. Professor Shelton displayed
her versatility with presentations on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and on the Inter-American human rights system. She noted
particularly the current and future importance of the intersection between
technology and human rights.
21. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 12,
at 9-10; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 18, at 21-22; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 19, at 1451-52. Draft
optional petitioning procedures have been proposed for the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, supra note 16, has neither a petitioning procedure nor a treaty-monitoring
body.
INTRODUCTION
Elsa Stamatopoulou and Andrew Drzemczewski shared with us their
expertise as international officials vastly experienced in human rights sys-
tems - Ms. Stamatopoulou with the United Nations and Dr. Drzemczewski
with the Council ofEurope. Ms. Stamatopoulou noted that the UnitedNations
is becoming increasingly objective in its efforts to bring about an increasing
level of respect globally for human rights. Dr. Drzemczewski discussed the
details of the newly-redesigned European human rights system.
Steven Schneebaum and Susan Karamanian presented the thoughtful,
reflective practitioners' approach to the protection of human rights in the
domestic legal system of the United States. They explained several of the
practical and ethical difficulties practitioners face in this country.
To complement all this, we were favored with presentations by three of
the leading specialists in important human rights sub-fields-Professors Hurst
Hannum on self-determination, Hilary Charlesworth on women's rights, and
William Schabas on capital punishment. They assessed the current and fore-
seeable issues in their fields. All the panelists joined in discussing each
others' papers.'
The conference produced what might best be called cautious optimism
for the future development of human rights protections. Regionally, the Inter-
American system no longer needs to focus so much on heavy-handed govern-
mental tactics to stifle dissent. Instead, it will increasingly focus on issues
akin to those faced in the European human rights system - due process in the
courts, freedom of expression, and the like. In Europe, there is great promise
in the new procedures that entered into force on November 1, 1998. The
reconstituted European Court of Human Rights, functioning without a sepa-
rate Commission, gives individuals direct access to international judicial
determination of their rights. In the United Nations, there is also promise for
the future, as United Nations organs like the Commission on Human Rights
become increasingly confident and effective. The conference produced rather
less optimism regarding the role of international human rights in the courts of
the United States, where judges (and their law clerks) often seem oblivious to
the arguments of international lawyers unless a federal statute, such as the
Alien Tort Claims Act" or the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,24
specifically incorporates human rights norms.
22. It has proved impractical to transcribe and to publish the exchanges among the
panelists and with the audience that followed each principal presentation. Videotapes of the
conference proceedings, however, are on file with the Washington and Lee University School
of Law Library.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
24. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994)).
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Recent and future development of the international law of self-determina-
tion revolves significantly around the claims of ethnic, regional groups to have
a right of secession to form new states. Hurst Hannum does not find any such
right, in international law, but neither does he find a prohibition against seces-
sion. This is an area in which the international law-creating process of claim,
counterclaim, and acquiescence will be very much at work in the foreseeable
future.
The future of women's rights may be seen as a continuing response to
what Hilary Charlesworth calls the mid-life crisis of the male-oriented Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. The task will be to take norms that are
facially gender-neutral, yet often insensitive to women's needs, and to create
a more gender-sensitive normative system.
The future development of international norms relating to capital punish-
ment, in William Schabas's view, may well be passing the United States by.
The international community is increasingly unwilling to accept capital punish-
ment, yet he sees the United States as remaining resolute in its tolerance or
approval of individual states' use of it.
A development in Virginia just after the conclusion of our conference
raised a host of issues about capital punishment and respect for international
legal systems in this country. During our conference, the clock was approach-
ing midnight for Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national then being
held on death row in Virginia under a conviction for a capital crime. Even
though the important last-minute developments in his case occurred too late
to be discussed at the conference, they are so relevant to the current and future
development of international human rights in this country and respect for
international processes in criminal cases - especially in capital cases - that it
is appropriate to outline them here.
On April 3, 1998, Paraguay brought a proceeding in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States, challenging the Common-
wealth of Virginia's failure to advise Breard of his right under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations to consult Paraguayan consular officers
before he was tried and convicted of capital murder in a Virginia court.'
25. International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M. 810 (Interim Protection Order of Apr. 9, 1998) 1-2.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states:
[I]f [a foreign national] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its con-
sular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner... The said authorities shall inform
the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 101
(entered into force for the United States, Dec. 24, 1969).
INTRODUCTION
Breard was scheduled to be executed on April 14.26 Paraguay asked the ICJ to
declare that the United States should restore the situation as it existed before
the violation of the Vienna Convention occurred.27 Meanwhile, Breard sought
a writ of habeas corpus in a United States district court, and Paraguay sued
several Virginia officials alleging that its rights under the Vienna Convention
had been violated.28 By early April, the United States Supreme Court had been
asked, by various applications and petitions, to hear both Breard's and Para-
guay's cases.29 On April 9, the ICJ ordered provisional measures of protection
calling on the United States to prevent the execution pending final judgment
in the international proceedings." On April 13, U.S. Secretary of State Mad-
eleine Albright wrote a letter to the Governor of Virginia asking that he stay
the execution in order to prevent what could be seen as a denial of the signifi-
cance of international law by the United States." On April 14, the Supreme
Court, relying on procedural grounds, declined to intervene. 2 The Governor
refused the stay, and the Commonwealth executed Breard on schedule.
Much could be said about the international law and the United States
foreign relations law aspects of the Breard case, and much, no doubt, will be
said in law reviews in the coming months. Suffice it to say here that there are
issues relating not only to the death penalty as such, but also to the binding or
nonbinding nature ofICJ provisional measures; the respect owed to them even
if they are nonbinding; the appropriate remedy for the conceded violation of
the Vienna Convention in a capital case; the propriety of the Supreme Court's
refusal on procedural grounds either to stay the execution (in order to give
itself adequate time to deliberate) or to face squarely the international law and
the foreign relations law issues; the effect of Secretary of State Albright's
letter as a statement of current American foreign policy; the accuracy or lack
thereof in the Supreme Court's dictum that "nothing in our existing case law
allows us to make [the Governor of Virginia's] choice for him;"33 the likeli-
26. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 25, 3.
27. Id. 4.
28. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1354 (1998) (per curiam).
29. Id.
30. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 25, 41.
31. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Execution ofForeigner, N.Y. TMviEs, Apr. 14,
1998, at A14.
32. The Supreme Court, per curiam, stated that Breard could not maintain ahabeas corpus
petition because he had failed tor raise the violation of the Vienna Convention in the state
criminal proceedings (although he apparently was unaware of his rights under the Convention
and the state had violated its duty under the Convention to notify him of his rights) and that
Paraguay lacked standing to raise the issue. Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1355-56.
33. Id. at 1356.
667
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hood that the Governor's decision to go ahead with the execution would
interfere with the exclusive federal role in the conduct of foreign relations; the
propriety of the Governor's denigrating statements about the role of the ICJ;34
the post-execution scenario in the ICJ, given Paraguay's apparent determina-
tion to pursue the proceedings in that forum; and the implications of this case
on other foreign nationals who are being held on death row despite having
been denied their right to be seasonably informed of possible consular assis-
tance.35
I would hazard a guess that had the Breard case come to light before our
conference, the answers of our panelists to these questions would have been
less than flattering to the United States Supreme Court and to the Governor
of Virginia. However that may be, the Breard case, for all its notoriety in
international law circles, hardly exhausts the list of highly significant human
rights issues facing the United States and the rest of the world. Our panelists'
presentations stand by themselves as important analyses of several of the most
crucial areas of international human rights law as it now is and as it is likely
to be in the foreseeable future. I am very pleased that the Washington andLee
Law Review is able to publish such an impressive compendium of scholarship
by such an outstanding group of international human rights experts.
34. Governor Gilmore stated that a stay would "have the practical effect of transferring
responsibility from the courts of the commonwealth and the United States to the international
court," and that the U.S. Department of Justice and Virginia's Attorney General made a com-
pelling case that "the International Court of [J]ustice has no authority to interfere with our
criminal justice system." Frank Green, Paraguay to Pursue Complaint, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Apr. 16, 1998, at B1.
35. According to Amnesty International, "[t]he vast majority of the more than 60 foreign
nationals under sentence of death in the USA were denied their rights under the Vienna Con-
vention." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Will the USA ExecuteAngel Francisco Breard in Defiance
of the International Court of Justice?, AI Index: AMR 51/25/98, Apr. 9, 1998.
Challenges to the Future of
Civil and Political Rights
Dinah Shelton*
I Introduction
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration)' and
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man2 first articulated
in 1948 the list of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Since that time, only a few new claims have emerged to add to the
list of basic rights, although subsequent treaty and soft law texts have further
defined and refined the stated rights.3 On the other hand, none of the rights
contained in the declarations seems to have been "de-certified" and denied
continuing normative value. As this century nears its end, it may be asked
whether the relative stability of the human rights catalogue will remain with
the existing guarantees deemed adequate to meet coming challenges to human
dignity and development, or whether, instead, new rights and obligations will
be claimed and recognized. A response to this question and any attempt to
predict the future of civil and political rights require evaluating present and
foreseeable threats to human dignity and well-being.
Law in general is responsive to emerging values, conflicts, fears, and
social problems. The initial articulation of international human rights norms
fifty years ago responded to the "barbarous acts" referred to in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.4 The Universal Declaration sees human rights
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. American Declaration ofthe Rights and Duties ofMan, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser.L.V./I.4
(1948).
3. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448;
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatmerit or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984,23 I.L.M. 1027; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
4. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, preamble para. 2
("Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
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instrumentally, as "the foundation" and the means to achieve "freedom,justice
and peace."5 Neither the barbarous acts nor the need for freedom, justice, and
peace has disappeared. In this regard, the demand for civil and political
rights, as part of the indivisible human rights canon, remains a fundamental
objective.
The task of drafting the canon of human rights is largely complete, and
international supervisory institutions are functioning more or less as intended,
however limited that intent may have been.6 Although improvement of
procedures and institutions is necessary, what currently demands attention is
perhaps best expressed in a series of conjunctive phrases - human rights and
democracy, human rights and technology, human rights and the environment,
and human rights and trade. These phrases reflect the need to consider civil
and political rights in the context of emerging social problems and values and
the need to integrate human rights into all areas of human activity in the light
of globalization, the increased interdependence of states, growth of trans-
boundary civil society, and deregulation. In some instances, new rights may
need to be articulated. In others, existing rights may be adequate to resolve
the perceived problems if adapted to the new contexts. In fact, it may be in
regard to obligations, not rights, that reformulation may be most needed in the
future.
II The Debate over New Rights
Not every social problem must result in the expression of a new human
right. Even the existing catalogue is not always met with consensus; states
and scholars occasionally challenge the concept and the content of rights from
freedom of the press to the right to development.7 There are legitimate fears
outraged the conscience of mankind .... ).
5. See id. preamble para. 1 ("Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world .... ).
6. The most frequently utilized supervisory mechanism is state self-reporting on compli-
ance with human rights norms. In general, any procedure that would allow victims to file com-
plaints regarding human rights violations is optional for states parties to the treaties. See, e.g.,
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note
3, arts. 9, 14.
7. See generally MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973) (discussing
various human rights); Louis Henkin, Economic-Social Rights as "Rights": A United States
Perspective, 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 223 (1981) (discussing U.S. commitmentto economic and social
rights); David M. Trubek, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human
Rights Law and Human Needs Programs, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205
(Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (exploring nature of protection of social, economic, and cultural
rights). For a debate over the existence of a right to environment, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
that expanding the list will not only create further dissension, but will under-
mine the very concept of fundamental and inalienable rights by devaluing or
trivializing core norms, taking time and energy away from the essential task
of implementing and enforcing those rights that are nonderogable and univer-
sally accepted.8
The concern is legitimate and must be taken seriously; at the same time,
the list can never be considered closed. It is impossible to predict future
threats to human dignity, the foundation of all human rights, although it may
be possible to identify current issues and developments that may require
reformulated or expanded rights. Some scholars attempt to establish criteria
that a claim must meet before it is included as a human right. Ramcharan
speaks of qualitative characteristics such as appurtenance to the human person
or group; universality; essentiality to human life, security, survival, dignity,
liberty, or equality; essentiality for international order; essentiality in the
conscience of mankind; and essentiality for the protection of vulnerable
groups.9 Jacobs argues that a human right must be fundamental, universal in
the sense that it is universally or very widely recognized and that it is guaran-
teed to everyone, and capable of sufficiently precise formulation as to give
rise to legal obligations on the part of the state.'o Another way to approach the
issue is to ask in each case whether existing norms, if fully implemented,
would provide the necessary protection against the threat posed. Ifthe answer
is yes, no new right need be recognized. If the answer is no, consideration
must be given to expanding the list of rights or to altering the scope of duties.
The remainder of this paper discusses some trends, problems, and issues that
arise in the context of civil and political rights.
III. Human Rights and Democracy
Considerable human rights efforts have been expended in recent years to
establish free elections and to achieve political rights by instituting democratic
electoral processes." For the most part, insufficient attention has been paid
eds., 1996) (presenting various articles on relationship between human rights and environ-
ment); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, andthe Right to Environment, 28
STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991) (discussing relationship between human rights and right to
environment).
8. See Philip Alston, Conjuringup New Human Rights: A Proposalfor Quality Control,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 614 (1984). See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITcAL DIsCOURSE (1991).
9. B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept ofHumanRights in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,
1983 CAN. HuM. RTS. Y.B. 267,280.
10. See F.G. Jacobs, The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to
Include Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3 HuM. RTs. REv. 166, 170-72 (1978).
11. In the Inter-American system, efforts to establish democratic pluralism can be seen
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to protecting human rights once a freely-elected government is in place. The
breakdown of order in many of the emerging, so-called democratic states and
the overreaching by democratic majorities demonstrate that the concept of
human rights has yet to take hold to create a human rights culture in many
regions of the world. A recent Newsweek article notes that most people now
have the right to vote freely and adds "[b]ut that's not enough if governments
then trample on basic rights."' 2
Free elections that bring to power racists, separatists, religious fundamen-
talists, and others intent on instituting a uniform belief system pose distinct
dangers to freedom, justice, and peace. Too often they lead to restraints on
speech, assembly, religion, and other basic liberties. The result is that coun-
tries without a tradition of peaceful political disagreement have disintegrated
into conflict and have divided along racial, religious, or ethnic lines. Democ-
racy, like respect for human rights, is not an end in itself, but a means to
individual and social development.
A major issue for the present and the near future will be to ensure that
democracy, representing one set of political rights, is not elevated to the detri-
ment or to the exclusion of other civil and political, or economic, social, or
cultural rights. It is not an easy matter to deny a political party or an individ-
ual the right to compete in the political arena because of a political agenda.
Events in Algeria demonstrate the dangers involved. No individual or group,
however, is entitled to use the political process to achieve power in order to
deprive others of basic liberties. As the last article of the Universal Declara-
tion states: "Nothing in th[e] Declaration may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
[t]herein."' 3 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights applied this
principle in denying that the political rights of-former Guatemalan dictator
Jose Efrain Rios Montt were violated when national law prohibited him from
being a candidate for president of the country.14 The Commission rightly
in resolutions such as OAS General Assembly, Representative Democracy, AG/RES. 1080
(XXI-O/91) (1991); Ninth International Conference of American States, The Preservation and
Defense ofDemocracy in America, Res. XXXII (1948); The Declaration ofSantiago, adopted
by the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, reprinted in 1 HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 134-41 (Thomas Buergenthal et al. eds., 1982). For
a discussion of the monitoring of elections, see generally W. Michael Reisman, International
Election Observation, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1992).
12. Fareed Zakaria, Doubts About Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 1997/Jan. 5, 1998,
at 57.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 30.
14. See generally Case 10.804, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 206, OEA/ser.L.N./II.85, doc. 9 rev.
(1994). Montt had participated in a military coup, suspended the constitution, and taken various
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perceived that the difficulties inherent in limiting political rights to preserve
political rights should not lead to a denial of efforts to preserve democratic
institutions that respect human rights.
Human rights precede, are inherent in, and flow from democratic pro-
cesses and institutions. Some preconditions for effective democracy are
protected as human rights - freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
association, and freedom of speech." In turn, democratic processes should
ensure meaningful participation of the governed in the establishment of rules
and structures of society. It requires periodic legitimation or revalidation to
demonstrate the continued consent of the people. Hence, the Universal
Declaration requires that the will of the people "be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage."' 6 It also
requires, however, the establishment and maintenance of an independent and
impartial judiciary, with all persons accountable for their actions 7 and with
respect for the rule of law, including the provision of remedies when rights are
violated.' As noted during the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe meeting in Copenhagen in June 1990, "democracy is an inherent
element of the rule of law," but pluralism is also important with regard to
political organizations. 9
Many of the measures needed to ensure civil and political rights in the
context of emerging democracies and dysfunctional countries are positive
measures similar to those required to achieve progress in economic, social,
and cultural rights. Institution-building and technical assistance to create an
independent and impartial judiciary and to build a competent and honest civil
service, as well as the provision of resources for educating police and military
forces, raise issues of capacity as well as willingness to achieve compliance
with international obligations. The positive measures required result in a
actions against "subversives." Id. at 206. The Guatemalan Constitutional Convention in 1986
approved article 186, which banned from holding office the "leader and chiefs of any coup
d'etat, armed revolution or similar movement that changes the constitutional order" as well as
those who became head of the government as a result of such actions. Id. at 207. For a
discussion of the Inter-American system and democratic rule, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL &
DNAH SHELTON,PROTCTGHumANRIGHTSiNTHEAmERiCAS494-559 (4th ed. 1995); Dinah
Shelton, Representative Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere, 12 HuM.
RTS. L.L 353 (1991).
15. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 19, 20; Thomas M.
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 61 (1992).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
17. Id arts. 7, 10, 11.
18. Id. art. 8.
19. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1308.
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blurring of the oft-stated distinction between state abstention to achieve civil
and political rights and state action to further economic, social, and cultural
rights. In this regard, it is perhaps appropriate to reiterate the indivisibility of
all rights rather than attempt to articulate any new rights. In terms of imple-
mentation, however, the issue of capacity means that the task of ensuring civil
and political rights may require international aid rather than condemnation in
respect to those countries that have the will, but lack the capacity without
international assistance, to build democratic institutions that respect human
rights. Thus, the obligation in article 2 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical"
to achieve the full realization of the guaranteed rights20 may need to be con-
sidered as applying to civil and political rights as well to economic, social,
and cultural rights.
IV. Technology and Human Rights
In contrast to issues of democracy and human rights, the problems arising
due to technological change may very well necessitate either further elabora-
tion of existing norms or development of new rights. Most significant,
perhaps, are the human rights concerns that are emerging from developments
in biotechnology, including reproductive technology, treatment of death and
dying, cloning, genetic transfers, and the emergence of new diseases and
resistant strains of formerly treatable or curable ailments. Some of these
scientific changes raise fundamental issues about the very concept of human
identity and questions concerning whether there is or should be a right to
genetic integrity, even to species integrity, that limits or prohibits manipulat-
ing the very code of human existence and personal identity, even with the
informed consent of the individual.2"
The Human Genome Project, a global network of genetic researchers, has
developed a systematic plan to coordinate the mapping of the human
genome.2 Genes contain the code to produce a protein, the material of cellu-
lar structure that determines most chemical reactions in the body. 3 With a
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 3, art. 2.
21. See generally HUMAN DNA: LAW AND POLICY (Bartha Maria Knoppers et al. eds.,
1997) (presenting various articles concerning human genetics).
22. See Kara H. Ching, Note, Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic
Patenting: Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687, 691
(1997). The human genome consists of a sequence ofnucleotide bases which contain approxi-
mately three billion pairs, some of which form the 50,000-100,000 genes found in human cells.
Id. at 690.
23. Id.
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map of the human genome, scientists may identify genetic markers and the
location of disease-producing genes.24 Mapping could make it possible to
diagnose a predisposition, cure, or preventative measure. 5 In a related pro-
posal, the controversial Human Genome Diversity Project seeks to collect and
to analyze genetic samples from indigenous groups throughout the world in
order to amass "a representative sample of human genetic variation."26
Researchers would have access to the resulting database.27 The Model Ethical
Protocol for Collecting DNA Samples28 contains extensive guidelines that
include measures on mandatory informed group and individual consent, bene-
fits for participating communities, privacy, and patenting.29
Genetic mapping and diagnostics raise the specter of eugenics. To take
an extreme example, one may suppose that geneticists might discover that
homosexuality is genetically determined and not only will become able to
identify the genes, but to alter them as well. Do we eliminate the "different?"
On the other hand, suppose one group has a natural defense to a disease that
decimates another group. Can the state require genetic sharing? Should
parents be permitted to choose the characteristics of their children? Or, do the
human species and each individual have a right to the natural diversity pro-
duced by thousands of generations of genetic transmission? Do humans have
a right to genetic privacy? Is it any more acceptable to manipulate the physi-
cal integrity of the individual than it is to manipulate the personality or the
intellect?
Unfortunately, too often the debate has centered on procedure and on the
requirement of free and informed consent. It may also be appropriate, and
even necessary, to question the need for substantive limits on what can be
done, even with the consent of the individual, because of the impact on society
as a whole. Just as the right to be free from slavery is inalienable and no
individual can choose to be a slave, it may be necessary to establish the limits
to genetic manipulation, the line beyond which individuals may not give
consent, however free and informed. Human dignity, and even human exis-
tence, may depend on it.
Commodification of human parts and genetic material is also an issue.
The patenting of human genetic information has been permitted, based on a
24. Id. at 691.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 692 (quoting Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic Research: Involving the
"Groups Between," 33 Hous. L. REV. 1397, 1415 (1997)).
27. Id.
28. TheNorthAmerican Regional Committee ofthe proposed Diversity Projectpublished
the Model Protocol. Id. at 693.
29. Id.
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desire to provide incentives for scientific research and development in the
genetics field." The United States has granted, and the Supreme Court has
upheld, life patents,3" something that needs to be scrutinized carefully by
human rights scholars and activists. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of
California has rejected the notion that property principles could be utilized to
protect the interests of an individual whose spleen was used for commercial
purposes.32 As Justice Arabian questioned: "Does it uplift or degrade the
'unique human persona' to treat human tissue as a fungible article of com-
merce?"33
A recent note describes one set of problems:
Genes and the information they contain are fundamental building
blocks of a people's identity. Genetic research on groups of people occa-
sionally results in lucrative biotechnology patents.... Researchers have
recently targeted indigenous peoples for genetic study because theirheight-
ened isolation may have resulted in unique genetic traits of increased
resistance or susceptibility to disease.
.... [I]ndigenous peoples have concerns about the procurement and
use of their genetic materials. Many are worried about researchers obtain-
ing genetic samples without the informed consent of their subjects. Some
of these peoples' religious or philosophic beliefs do not permit the patent-
ing of life. No avenues exist for these peoples to enjoin the patenting of
their genetic material. No mechanisms beyond private contract currently
ensure that the indigenous donors will be adequately compensated, or
compensated at all, for their contribution. Moreover, many indigenous
people may never have access to medical advances based on their own
genetic material because they do not live near medical facilities.34
The sum of all these considerations has led some to coin the term "molecular
colonialism," a fear that the DNA of indigenous peoples will be harvested for
genetic samples.35 The fear is based on experience.
30. See id. at 695.
31. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,318 (1980) (affirming earlier judgment
of Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that living things are patentable subject matter).
32. See Moore v. Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,487-97 (Cal. 1990) (sustain-
ing dismissal of cause of action based on conversion). For a discussion of the issues involved
in Moore, see generally Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality:
RecognizingProperty Rights in the Commercial Value ofHuman Tissue, 34 UCLAL. REV. 207
(1986); Jennifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership ofHuman Tissue: LifeAfterMoorev. Regents ofthe
University of California, 75 VA. L. REv. 1363 (1989).
33. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497-98 (Arabian, J., concurring).
34. Ching, supra note 22, at 687-88.
35. See id. at 697.
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As the note states:
In the early 1990s, the U.S. Department of Commerce submitted a patent
application on the cell line of a Guaymi woman[, a member of an indige-
nous group inhabiting Panama]. The cell line was believed to have anti-
viral qualities. Rural Advancement Foundation International ("RAF")
found the application while going through a database ofpatent applications
and contacted the Guaymi people. Neither the tribe nor the woman knew
anything about the development of the cell line or the patent application.
Rural Advancementand othergroups supportedthe Guaymi in theirdemand
for withdrawal of the patent application. The Guaymi tribal president
explained, "[i]t's fundamentally immoral, contrary to the Guaymi view of
nature, and our place in it. To patent human material ... to take human
DNA and patent its products ... violates the integrity of life itself, and our
deepest sense of morality." Later that year, due to international pressure,
the Center for Disease Control withdrew the patent application.36
Another case involved the Hagahai, an isolated 260-member tribe from
the Madang Province of Papua New Guinea.37 In 1984, some tribe members
sought outside help for illness that plagued the group.38 During diagnostic
efforts, researchers discovered that several members of the tribe were infected
with the human T-cell leukemia virus (HTLV-I) that usually produces severe
leukemia, but that is benign in the Hagahai.39 Scientists created an HTLV-
infected cell line of Hagahai DNA, the cell line was patented in the United
States, and the researchers were listed as the "inventors., 4' The Papua New
Guinea government questioned whether the patent claim violated that nation's
sovereignty.41 After considerable controversy, on October 24, 1996, the
National Institute of Health forfeited its rights to the U.S. patent.
42
It is important to consider whether the existing human rights protections
are adequate in the face ofbio-prospecting, commodification of human genetic
material and organs, and other biological developments. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights calls for free consent before medical or
scientific "experimentation." 3 It does notrequire "informed" consent, nordoes
36. Id. at 700 (quoting Philip L. Bereano, Patent Pending: The Race to Own DNA,






42. Id, at 702.
43. International Covenanton Civil andPolitical Rights, supra note 3, art. 7 ("No one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment orpunishment. In particular,
no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.").
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it extend to treatment that is not experimental. Perhaps the notion of inhuman
or degrading treatment" would be adequate to cover certain techniques, espe-
cially prolonged life support of someone in a persistent vegetative state. For
the indigenous, self-determination could be seen as encompassing "internal
self-determination," referring to their ability to control all aspects of their lives.
The right of indigenous peoples to decide whether, and to what extent, to
participate in genetic research could be recognized as within the scope of
self-determination. More broadly, the right to self-determination could secure
for all persons the right to control access to and use of genetic material.
TheDraftUnitedNations Declaration ontheRights ofIndigenous Peoples
acknowledges the urgent need to recognize the rights of indigenous peoples.4"
It explicitly states that indigenous peoples' genetic resources are entitled to
special protection. 6 More broadly, the UnitedNations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization adopted on November 11, 1997 the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (Declaration).47 The
Declaration relies upon human rights, intellectual property, and environmental
texts, including the Convention on Biological Diversity. In recognizing the
genetic diversity of humanity, the Declaration quotes from the Universal
Declaration's preamble to reaffirm "the inherent dignity, and... the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family."49 The Declaration is
positive toward research on the human genome, foreseeing "vast prospects for
progress in improvingthehealth of individuals and ofhumankind as awhole.""5
It calls for respect for human rights in regard to such research, and calls in
particular for nondiscrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics.5
44. Id.
45. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, preamble
para. 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541 (1994).
46. Id. art. 29. Article XX of the Proposed Amercian Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples similarly recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to control, develop and
protect their human and genetic resources. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Feb. 26,
1997, art. XX, reprinted in OAS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMIssION ON
HUMAN RIGHTs 1996, OEA/ser.L.IV./II.95, Doc. 7 rev., 633, 644 (1997).
47. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Universal Declara-
tion on the Human Genome and Human Rights (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://www.unesco.
org/ibc/uk/genome/projet/index.html>.
48. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
49. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, supra note 47,
preamble para. 4 (quoting Universal Declaration, supra note 1, preamble para. 1).
50. Id. preamble para. 6.
51. Id.
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The Declaration in general combines techniques and legal approaches
from both human rights and environmental protection.52 It demands that all
research, treatment, or diagnosis be preceded by rigorous assessment of the
potential risks and benefits and be based on the prior, free, and informed
consent of the person concerned. 3 Rather than declare a right to genetic
integrity, the Declaration places its focus on duties and provides in article 10
that "[n]o research or research its [sic] applications concerning the human
genome, in particular in the fields of biology, genetics and medicine, should
prevail over respect for the human rights, fundamental freedoms and human
dignity of individuals or, where applicable, of groups of people."'5 Article 11
specifically prohibits cloning and other "[p]ractices which are contrary to
human dignity."55 However, at the same time, article 12 identifies freedom of
research as part of freedom of thought. 6 Because the group of experts in-
volved in drafting the Declaration came from the scientific and research
community, it is incumbent on those concerned with human rights to examine
the Declaration carefully to determine whether its protections are adequate.
The Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(Convention), signed by twenty-two states on April 4, 1997,"7 goes further in
establishing that states parties shall protect the dignity and the identity of
human beings, referring to the latter as a human right to be respected along
with other rights and fundamental freedoms."8 This is reinforced by article 15,
which provides that scientific research in the field of biology and medicine is
subject to the provisions of the Convention and "the other legal provisions
ensuring the protection of the human being."59 This suggests that all existing
human rights norms govern research and treatment, whether undertaken by the
state or by private actors. Article 2 explicitly states that "[t]he interests and
welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or
science."6 Free and informed consent is the subject of chapter two of the
agreement, providing a basic principle for "intervention., 61 Unfortunately, the
52. See generally Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,
supra note 47.
53. Id. art. 5.
54. Id. art. 10.
55. Id. art. 11.
56. Id. art. 12.
57. Council of Europe: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997,
36 I.L.M. 817 (1997).
58. Id. art. 1.
59. Id. art. 15.
60. Id. art. 2.
61. Id. art. 5.
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Convention contains no definitions of terms. One problematic provision is
article 7, which concerns the mentally ill. 2 It allows nonconsensual treat-
ment, without substantive limits on the nature or the extent of the intervention,
when "without such treatment, serious harm is likely to result to his or her
health., 63 It would have been preferable if the treaty had imposed a require-
ment that the least harmful or dangerous treatment be utilized and had ex-
cluded permanently disabling or personality-crippling "treatments" such as
lobotomies and electroshock.
The provisions on the human genome are more progressive than those of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's text.
Article 13 provides that "[a]n intervention seeking to modify the human gen-
ome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic pur-
poses and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome
of any descendants. "'4 No tests or alterations are permitted for gender selec-
tion65 or for other preferences.6 "The creation of human embryos for research
purposes is prohibited, "67 and the human body and its parts are not to be used
for financial gain. 8 The treaty foresees enforcement through injunctions,
compensation, and punishment. There is no direct reference to the jurispru-
dence of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Convention also contains no direct ban on human cloning. 9 Because
of concerns over this omission, the European states negotiated a protocol to
this effect."0 The Committee of Ministers presented the draft, prepared at its
request by the Steering Committee on Bioethics, to the Parliamentary Assem-
bly, which prepared an opinion recommending adoption of the draft proto-
col.71 The preamble calls cloning "contrary to human dignity"' and in
article 1, its only substantive provision, the draft prohibits "[a]ny intervention
62. Id. art. 7.
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 13.
65. Id. art. 14.
66. Id. art. 12.
67. Id. art. 18(2).
68. Id. art. 21.
69. See generally id.
70. See generally Council of Europe: Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of
Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, Jan. 12, 1998, Europ. T.S.
No. 168.
71. Id. at 1415 n.*.
72. Id. at 1417.
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seeking to create a human being genetically identical to another human being,
whether living or dead."'73
It seems clear that procedural and substantive human rights issues are
emerging because of scientific developments in biology and medicine. These
necessitate careful consideration of several questions, including the issue
of whether there should be a right to genetic integrity and, if so, under what
circumstances that right should be limited in light of the needs of society.
V Environmental Protection
Technology and human activity in general have transformed our natural
surroundings, making some areas uninhabitable and creating risks for the
future survival of human life on the planet. Humans cannot be separated from
the natural environment on which all life depends. The complex ecological
web in all its diversity has intrinsic and instrumental value, comprising a vast
number of elements only partly known and understood. It has become clear
that serious environmental harm impacts human rights and that human rights
violations can lead to environmental degradation. The complex interplay of
the two has led to the widespread adoption of environmental rights and the
articulation, primarily in constitutional law, of a right to a safe, healthy, and
ecologically-balanced environment.
The environment has two characteristics that have broad implications for
human rights - interdependence and irreversibility. Environmental science
demonstrates that air and water know no boundaries, that climate change is a
global issue, and that the reduction in biological diversity impacts across
boundaries and regions.' Furthermore, much environmental harm is irrevers-
ible - extinct species are gone and dead lakes and rivers cannot be brought
back, at least in the short term.75 The problems can be demonstrated in regard
to freshwater. Less than one percent of the water of the earth is accessible for
human use.76 Any loss of water resources, especially pollution of under-
ground aquifers, poses dangers for future generations. According to the
World Health Organization, more than five million people die each year as a
73. Id. art. 1.
74. SeegenerallyALExANDREKIss&DNAHSHELTON, INTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (1991 & Supp. 1994).
75. See ALExANDRE Kiss & DiNAH SHELTON, MANUAL OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 9 (2d ed. 1997).
76. ComprehensiveAssessment ofthe FreshwaterResources ofthe World, U.N. Commis-
sion on Sustainable Development, 5th Sess., 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 17/1997/9 (1997) <gopher://
gopher.un.orgOO/esc/cnl7/1997/off/97-9.EN>.
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result of polluted drinking water." Severe water shortages exist in twenty-six
countries, and by 2025, two-thirds of the world's population could face water
shortages.78 Sixty percent of the world's drinking water is located in just ten
countries, and much of it is polluted. Freshwater shortages are already raising
tensions and threaten to be a cause of future interstate conflicts. Similarly,
virtually all the known commercial fish stocks are declining or are endan-
gered.
Interdependence and irreversibility mean, in the first place, that environ-
mental quality must be considered a common concern of humanity. Second,
the common concern is a human rights concern, linked to, but broader than,
life, health, political participation, culture, and standard of living. Civil and
political rights can be adapted to enhance environmental protection, which,
in turn, strengthens other rights. It has become common to speak of the right
to environmental information, the right to public participation in environmen-
tal decision-making, and the right to a remedy for environmental harm. These
procedural rights, however, are inadequate to protect the substance of the
biosphere. As with medical experimentation, there are certain actions that
should not be taken, regardless of the procedural regularity, because the
impacts extend temporally and spatially beyond those involved in taking the
action.
Existing human rights standards are not sufficient, even if fully imple-
mented, to safeguard a healthy and ecologically-balanced environment. Such
an environment can be seen as a necessary precondition to all other rights,
ensuring the present and future well-being of humankind, or as inextricably
intertwined with existing rights. In this light, states are increasingly incorpo-
rating a specific right to environmental quality in constitutional and regional
human rights texts. Virtually every constitution written or revised since the
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment has included a right
to environment in some form. The right is different in many regards from
other human rights because environmental harm is largely due to private
conduct, not state action. The articulation of the right seeks to ensure that the
state places a high priority on environmental protection and will take effective
action to prevent state and nonstate conduct that produces environmental harm
or serious risk thereof.
77. Id. 63. The Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states to take appropriate
measures to implement the child's right to health, including efforts to combat disease through,
inter alia, the provision of clean drinking water, "taking into consideration the dangers and risks
of environmental pollution." Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 3, art. 24.
78. Comprehensive Assessment ofthe FreshwaterResources ofthe World, supra note 76,
84.
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Most frequently in the European system, environmental protection has
been sought through the use of existing human rights norms.79 The primary
right invoked is article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which involves privacy and family
life." The European Court has accepted that environmental harm may inter-
fere with privacy and family life and has balanced the competing interests of
the individual and of the community as a whole. The result has been limited
environmental protection. However, the scope of protection remains narrow
because environmental degradation is not itself a cause for complaint, but
must be linked to an existing right.
In contrast, the 1994 United Nations draft principles on human rights and
the environment explicitly state that "[a]ll persons have the right to a secure,
healthy and ecologically sound environment."'" Subsequent principles detail
the contents of this right, including the right to freedom from pollution,
environmental degradation, and activities that adversely affect the environ-
ment; the right to preservation of environmental components; and the rights
of information, participation, and remedy. The United Nations Commission
on Human Rights has had the draft declaration under consideration for the
past three years and is divided over the text, with opposition coming primarily
from the United States and some of the European Union countries. The latter
position is not entirely consistent with a text of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development that states that the promotion of a "decent"
environment is recognized by many of its member states as a fundamental
human right.8"
In international human rights texts, the right to environment has been
included only in recently adopted regional texts. 3 The theoretical and practi-
79. See generallyHerrickv. United Kingdom, App. No. 11185/84,42 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 275 (1985); X v. Germany, App. No. 7407/76,5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
161 (1976); Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Fredin v. Sweden, 192
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); Powell v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
80. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, Council of Europe, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230.
81. Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report Prepared by Mrs. Fatma Zohra
Ksentini, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., Annex 1, at 74, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1994/9 (1994).
82. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Responsibilities and
Liability of States in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, reprinted in 13 ENvTL. POL'Y & L.
122, 122 (1984).
83. See African Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights, June 1981, art. 24, 21 I.L.M.
59 ("All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their
development."); AdditionalProtocolto the American Convention on Human Rights in theArea
ofEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, art. 11, 1, OEA/ser.A./44, No. 69
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cal problems involved in developing such a right have yet to be fully consid-
ered. In particular, both the temporal and spatial extent of environmental
harm raises problems about the scope of the right and remedy, in particular
whether there are duties owed to "future generations" and persons outside the
territory and the jurisdiction of the state. It seems likely that the jurisdictional
limit on human rights duties was included in treaties out of a belief that states
would be largely incapable of violating the rights of individuals in other
states. This is not the case with environmental harm, which is often trans-
boundary in scope. Thus, the appropriate extent of state obligations needs
careful consideration, as does the question of whether there is juridical con-
tent to the notion of rights of future generations.
VI. Trade, Globalization, and Human Rights
Globalization of civil society has led to the creation of powerful nonstate
organizations and entities, many of them capable of and engaged in violating
human rights. Globalization, coupled with trade liberalization and deregula-
tion, has produced high social costs, reflected in lawsuits against corporate
complicity in human rights violations in, inter alia, Burma,84 Ecuador,85 and
Nigeria.86 Economic globalization may undermine national and international
human rights protections as states make an effort to remain competitive and
to entice investment. The "race to the bottom" is a threat, as countries are
pressured to relax their standards for the treatment of workers, denying
collective bargaining, minimum wages, and, in some cases, the right to be free
from forced labor.
The growth of powerful nonstate actors poses a problem for human rights
law. International agreements were written to guarantee rights against the
state, and none of the instruments directly applies to nonstate actors. Corpo-
rate codes of conduct on worker rights and environmental protection are
inadequate because they use self-regulation and thus often aim at the lowest
common denominator and only after public pressure. State regulation is often
difficult or impossible, not for lack of will, but for lack of capacity. Interna-
tional human rights law in the future must address the problem of abuse of
power by nonstate actors.
(1988) (not in force) ("Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to
have access to basic public services.").
84. See generally Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
85. See generally Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated
sub nom. Jola v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
86. See generally Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (demand for jury trial).
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
One approach that has been suggested, but that poses enormous dangers,
is the notion of drafting a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities.
A group of former heads of state, joined in the InterAction Council, has
proposed such a text, to be adopted on the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization also has atext under consideration
that was drafted at a meeting of philosophers held March 25-28, 1997. The
responsibilities it discusses are little more than an extension of human rights
obligations to individuals and other nonstate actors. Rather than limiting or
"balancing" the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with a declaration of
responsibilities, which could provide a pretext for the state to limit existing
rights, it would perhaps be better to attempt to extend the possibility of
claiming human rights against nonstate entities as well as against state actors.
It must be emphasized, however, that the role of the state remains crucial.
Each state has an obligation not only to respect, but, to ensure human rights
and fundamental freedoms. Given the challenge posed by interdependence
and globalization and the resulting power shift from states to civil society,
state intervention remains necessary to protect the basic freedoms. As Gordon
Christenson states, "Neither human dignity nor voluntary transactions or
investments can thrive in world civil society without credible and legitimate
international and national legal systems in which participants may place at
least some trust in return for protection.""7 Legal systems, both national and
international, must cooperate to protect society's fundamental values and to
referee when there are competingvalues that require balancing and reconcilia-
tion. Market mechanisms alone will not provide the necessary protection and
are incapable of balancing and reconciling competing values, especially when
they themselves reflect one of the values in competition.
VII. Conclusion
The next century will bring new problems and new contexts for the pro-
tection of human rights. Some emerging issues can be seen in recent develop-
ments in governance, technology, and economics. They may require refining
existing human rights norms or invoking human rights protections against new
actors. In some instances, new rights may be necessary to respond to the most
serious threats to human dignity and to well-being, when existing norms do
not include the necessary guarantees.
87. Gordon A. Christenson, World Civil Society and the International Rule ofLaw, 19
HUM. RTS. Q. 724, 733 (1997).
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None of the emerging issues should lead to ignoring the ongoing need to
protect civil and political rights as they are currently formulated. From
Afghanistan to Zaire, gross and systematic violations remain around the
world. It is not necessary to formulate new rights to have enough to do well
into the next millennium. Regional and global systems should be strengthened
to monitor and to expose violations and to provide remedies to victims.
Prevention of violations through institution-building and support for human
rights nongovernmental organizations is also crucial to fulfilling the promise
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Development of United Nations
Mechanisms for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights
Elsa Stamatopoulou*
I Introduction
The development of human rights protection mechanisms at the United
Nations has been inextricably linked with the organization's efforts to pro-
mote human rights. The two approaches have been mutually reinforcing and
have created strong human rights constituencies. In fact, this process itself
has been gradually depoliticizing the international mechanisms in the area of
human rights.
The concept of human rights has always been dynamic, as has the entire
discipline of international law. Human rights concepts and mechanisms have
developed historically along with interventions by civil society and by states.
The right to self-determination is one of the most eloquent examples. The
development of international human rights mechanisms over the past five
decades since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has
been linked as much with the rise of pro-democracy and pro-human rights
movements around the world as with the end of the Cold War and the growing
interdependence of states, markets, and peoples.
I therefore discuss the development of United Nations human rights
protection mechanisms from this broader angle and try to explain the "whys"
and "why nots" accordingly. For the purposes of this discussion, I concentrate
on the human rights mechanisms of the United Nations proper without includ-
ingthe mechanisms of the UnitedNations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO).
I first discuss the treaty-based human rights mechanisms and their sig-
nificance in the protection and promotion of human rights. I then refer to the
extra-conventional system of protection of human rights. Third, I discuss the
contribution of the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 to the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights. Fourth, I discuss the United Nations
human rights field presences and their contribution. Fifth, I examine recent
efforts to mainstream human rights in the areas of peace and security, humani-
* Deputy to the Director of the New York Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights.
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tarian issues, and development. Finally, I outline some of the main challenges
ahead in protecting and promoting human rights.
II. A Treaty-Based System of Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
After the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Univer-
sal Declaration),' the United Nations faced the challenge of preparing binding
international human rights instruments. One day before the adoption of the
Universal Declaration on December 9, 1948, however, the General Assembly
had already adopted the first United Nations human rights treaty, the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.2 Initially,
the ascending Cold War ideological rift between civil and political rights on
the one hand and economic, social, and cultural rights on the other was bridged
by the inclusion of both families of rights in one unified document, the Univer-
sal Declaration. This was due in partto the overwhelming momentum after the
tragedies of World War II and in part to the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt
and her peers. Yet, this rift reemerged during the subsequent two decades
when it became obvious that the polarized world around the table was not
ready to allow the same fusion when preparing binding legal instruments.
Thus in 1966, the United Nations separately adopted the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights3 and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political RightS4 and its (First) Optional Protocol.5 The year
before, the United Nations had adopted the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.6
These three treaties corrected an omission of the earlier antigenocide
convention by establishing the first three human rights monitoring mecha-
nisms in the form of"treaty bodies," as this type of mechanism is now called.7
The first treaty bodies were later joined by three others under the following
subsequent human rights treaties: the Convention on the Elimination of All
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, openedfor
signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,993
U.N.T.S. 3.
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,1966,999 U.N.T.S. 17 1.
5. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
6. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
7. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 3, at
9-10; International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights, supranote4, at 179-84; International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 6, at 224-34.
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Forms of Discrimination Against Women,8 the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,9 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.'" The International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime ofApartheid" had also established
a treaty body, the Group of Three on Apartheid, which stopped meeting after
the change of regime in South Africa. The treaty bodies are composed of
independent experts elected in their individual capacities, although proposed
by governments. Their main mandate is to examine periodic reports of states
parties to the treaties on the measures taken by those states to implement their
treaty obligations. Moreover, the Human Rights Committee, which is the
treaty body under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Committee
Against Torture (CAT) also examine individual complaints submitted, respec-
tively, under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, optional article 14 of the
antiracism Convention, and article 22 of the antitorture Convention.
Under the above-mentioned treaties, the treaty bodies are expected to
make "general comments" as well, a task that during the Cold War era pre-
cluded any formal valuejudgments or conclusions by the treaty bodies regard-
ing the performance of specific governments after the examination of their
reports.' 2 The general comments thus consisted of authoritative interpreta-
tions by the treaty bodies of the articles of the human rights treaties. This,
however, changed in the early 1990s, and the treaty bodies, one after the other
(the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) was the last), started adopting conclusions and recommendations
after examining the specific country reports in additionto adopting interpreta-
tive statements to the articles of the conventions. This practice, along with
the increasing acceptance of the role of Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) as information-providers to the treaty bodies, has resulted in an objec-
tive system of treaty monitoring. The system has been further strengthened
by the adoption of some innovative working methods, including requests for
extraordinary or supplementary reports from governments when necessary and
especially including linking technical assistance to the areas of weakness
8. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 21-22.
9. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1031-36.
10. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1472-74.
11. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
12. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, supra note 8, at 22; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
4, at 182; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 3, at 10.
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identified in each country by the treaty bodies. The latter approach, initiated
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, is a fundamental step in the
operationalization of human rights. Not only is the United Nations's Pro-
gramme of Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights expected to
respond to areas identified by the treaty bodies, but other parts of the United
Nations also are gradually expected to do so.
III Extra-Conventional System for the Protection of Human Rights
For two and a half decades, the Commission on Human Rights restric-
tively interpreted the original words in article 1 of the UnitedNations Charter 3
that identify the promotion of human rights as one of the United Nations's
aims. The Commission definitely viewed "promotion" as softer than "protec-
tion," and, in a polarized ideological environment, the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights had no power to establish any monitoring mecha-
nisms protective of human rights.
The breakthrough came in the late 1960s when the situation in southern
Africa allowed the Commission to create the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Southern Africa, a group in charge of monitoring the situation in that part of
the world. At the same time, the Commission was able to gather adequate
political will to establish a procedure for considering, on a confidential basis,
gross and systematic violations of human rights. The procedure, which became
known as the "1503 procedure" from the number of the resolution of the
Economic and Social Council"4 which established it, received information
about human rights violations from victims, NGOs, and others in specific
countries. Since then, nongovernmental actors have received official standing
at the Commission on Human Rights as recognized information-providers
about human rights violations. Significantly for the United Nations, virtually
during the same period in the late 1960s, the Economic and Social Council
officially adopted a procedure for granting consultative status to NGOs that
was valid in the whole economic and social area, not only in the area of human
rights. This procedure, which has been significantly expanded since the global
United Nations conferences of the 1990s, 5 has allowed a significant input of
civil society in the development of international human rights norms and
13. U.N. CHARTER art. I ("The Purposes of the United Nations are: ... 3. To achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all .... ).
14. E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR, Resumed 48th Sess., Supp. No. IA, at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/4832fAdd.1 (1970).
15. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1996/31, E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N.
ESCOR48thplen. mtg., Supp. 1, at 53, U.N. Doc. E/1996/96 (1996), redefined the relationship
between the United Nations and NGOs.
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mechanisms and, consequently, the relative defusion of governmental politics
in the UnitedNations human rights bodies. I also believe that the very recogni-
tion of such consultative status for NGOs was obviously a result of the rising
strength and significance of the nongovernmental part of society and ofpower-
ful movements against colonialism and for democracy and human rights.
These first mechanisms of human rights monitoring and protection were
soon followed by the Working Group on Chile in 1974, after the coup against
President Salvador Alliente, and, in the late 1970s, by the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. The 1980s and 1990s were charac-
terized by the establishment of a series of protection mechanisms, both
country-specific and thematic. Currently, there are seventeen thematic man-
dates 6 (enforced or involuntary disappearances; arbitrary detention; summary
or arbitrary executions; independence ofjudges and lawyers; torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; internally displaced persons;
religious intolerance; use of mercenaries as a means of impeding the right to
self-determination; freedom of opinion and expression; racism, racial discrim-
ination, and xenophobia; sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornog-
raphy; violence againstwomen; effects oftoxic and dangerous products on the
enjoyment of human rights; protection of children affected by armed conflict;
impact of external debt on human rights; the right to education; and the right
to development) and sixteen country-specific mandates 7 (Israeli practices in
the occupied territories, Afghanistan, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Iraq,
Myanmar, Sudan, former Yugoslavia, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Cambodia,
Haiti, Somalia, and Nigeria). Additional country-specific or thematic man-
dates are occasionally given to the Secretary-General and to the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights.
The methods of work of the Commission's Special Rapporteurs/Repre-
sentatives and Working Groups consist of collecting and analyzing informa-
tion received by individuals, NGOs, church groups, opposition groups, and
others; conducting country visits; sending urgent action appeals to govern-
ments on individual cases; and presenting annual public reports with specific
conclusions and recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights as
well as, in many cases, to the General Assembly. This methodology of the
United Nations's extra-conventional human rights procedures allows for a
considerable depolitization of human rights mechanisms. The development
of specific technical and procedural tools places these procedures beyond the-
political whim of specific governments. Thus, it is not necessary for the Com-
mission on Human Rights to adopt a specific resolution on a country for that
16. Commission ofHuman Rights, Report ofthe Fifty-Fourth Session, U.N. ESCOR, U.N.
Doc. E/1998/23 (forthcoming 1998).
17. Id
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country to appear in the reports of the thematic mechanisms of the Commis-
sion on the basis of information received from NGOs and others.
IV The Contribution of the World Conference on Human Rights
Following are the main points of consensus at the World Conference on
Human Rights in 199318 that have added significantly to the international
protection and promotion mechanisms of human rights:
1. Human rights are universal. Human rights are a legitimate concern
of the international community; all human rights - civil, cultural, economic,
political, social-must be respected; human rights are interrelated and interde-
pendent (forty-five years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration, the
world again came to view human rights holistically); all states, irrespective of
their regional, cultural, or political particularities, must respect internationally
recognized human rights; all states should ratify human rights treaties (the
Child Convention by 1995, the Women's Convention by the year 2000)."9
2. The right to development is part of fundamental human rights, and
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, established at the end of 1993 at
the behest of the World Conference, is to promote the right to development.2 °
3. Women's rights are human rights and must be fully integrated in
human rights protection procedures. Violence against women, whether in the
public or private sphere, is a human rights issue, and states must eliminate
cultural or religious practices that violate the human rights of women.2'
4. Human rights are linked with peace and, thus, must be integrated as
appropriate in United Nations peace-keeping operations.'
5. Development, democracy, and human rights are inextricably linked.'
6. Human rights institutions must be strengthened, and the United
Nations should provide comprehensive assistance in this respect. Human
rights education is crucial and the United Nations should proclaim a Decade
for Human Rights Education (the General Assembly did so in 1993).24
7. The General Assembly was called upon to consider the establish-
ment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights and did so in 1993, thus
adding to the system of protection and promotion of human rights.'
18. WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMMNE
OF ACTION, U.N. Pub. DPI/1394-39339-August 1993-20M (1993).
19. Id. at 28-30, 35, 55.
20. Id. at 31-33, 49.
21. Id. at 33-34, 53-57.
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id. at30-31.
24. Id. at 66-67.
25. Id. at 49.
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8. The international community was called upon to expedite the estab-
lishment of an international criminal court. (The ICC mandate was adopted
in June 1998.)26
9. The United Nations should substantively increase its resources for
human rights.27
V Human Rights Field Presence
The peace and human rights areas of United Nations organizations have
had an uneasy relation over the years. Members of the Security Council
generally have been hesitant to formally recognize any role for the Council to
intervene and protect human rights. This, however, has not been absolute, and
in the last few years the Council was able to recognize such a role, for exam-
ple, in Iraq (regarding the Kurds in the north), El Salvador (establishment of
ONUSAL, the United Nations mission in El Salvador, a human rights field
presence), the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Georgia.
This tension regarding human rights issues in the Security Council has
been counterbalanced by other avenues for the United Nations to establish
human rights field presences through the General Assembly in Haiti and
Guatemala, through the Commission on Human Rights in Cambodia, former
Yugoslavia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, or through initiatives of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights in agreement with the governments
in, for example, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, and Colombia. Currently, apart
frc.m the human rights operations in Guatemala and Haiti, which do not fall
under the aegis of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, there are
twenty-two field presences of the High Commissioner in Rwanda, Burundi,
former Yugoslavia, Abhazia, Georgia, Cambodia, Colombia, Gaza, Malawi,
Mongolia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Additionally, there is a
recent trend to attach human rights advisors or units to the Special Representa-
tives of the Secretary-General in charge of political missions in affected areas
or in peace-keeping operations.
Until now, the work of the peace and security mechanisms of the United
Nations undoubtedly has not adequately included human rights elements.
Funding has been a major challenge for the human rights field presences.
With the exception of Cambodia, where the regular United Nations budget
funds some ten posts, voluntary contributions fund the rest of the field opera-
tions. Consequently, they suffer from financial precariousness. Moreover, the
United Nations has been unable to adequately protect the human rights of
populations in extreme situations, although United Nations human rights
presences sometimes have a dissuasive effect. The High Commissioner has
26. Id. at 16, 69.
27. Id at 42, 46-47.
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recently conducted an evaluation of human rights field presences in order to
improve their approaches.
The United Nations increasingly has been combining both protection and
promotion of human rights in almost all these human rights operations. The
United Nations has become aware that human rights institution-building,
human rights education and training, the creation of a civil society aware of
human rights, assistance to local human rights NGOs, and the creation of
human rights infrastructures must be addressed as early as possible.
V. Mainstreaming of Human Rights
Gender and human rights are now the two cross-cutting themes in the
four Executive Committees established by the Secretary-General.28 These
four committees, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), the
Executive Committee of the United Nations Development Group (EC-
UNDG), the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), and the
Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA), have been
functioning since April 1997. The ECPS, the ECHA, and the EC-UNDG are
the most challenging for human rights. The High Commissioner's position is
that in the area of peace, human rights should be part of the thinking from the
phase of prevention of crises to the phase of conceptualization of an operation,
whether in fact a peace-keeping presence will be decided or not. Also, human
rights should be an integral part of postconflict peace-building. Furthermore,
the potential of women in peace-building initiatives should be fully explored.
Moreover, there now is a push to incorporate human rights advisors in
the teams of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, and this is
happening increasingly. Human rights advisors could be covered by a budget
provided by the Security Council in the same way that military advisors can
be so funded. Another interesting issue in connection with the presence of
human rights observers and advisors within peace-keeping or political mis-
sions is the line of reporting, for example, whether the human rights observers
should report to the High Commissioner, the Special Representatives of the
Secretary-General, or in some other way. This is not yet clarified in the
system, but the desired solution would be for the human rights staff to report
to the High Commissioner through the Special Representatives of the
Secretary-General. This issue touches upon a core question: To what extent
is thefull integration of human rights in peace or political negotiations possi-
ble or even desirable? I would like to leave the question open for discussion.
For now, I contend that there definitely is merit in the United Nations having
28. The Secretary-General's reform proposals were presented to the General Assembly
in Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 168, U.N. Doc. A/51/950 (1997).
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different angles. The human rights angle, with its inherent, although relative,
independence, should continue to have an independent voice. Furthermore,
I believe at the same time that this may be quite useful not only for the cause
of human rights but for political reasons as well.
The human rights debate is of course entering the debates of the Security
Council in several areas, one of which is the area of sanctions. Currently,
discussions are taking place as to the limitation of sanctions so that they do
not infringe upon fundamental nonderogable rights. Of course, the area of
economic and social rights has been neglected over the decades, and the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action clearly stated that more work
needs to be done in this area.29 Protection mechanisms for economic and
social rights are little developed; however, this is not to criticize the Commit-
tee on Economic and Social Rights which has been doing excellent work in
the last few years. At its 1998 session, the Commission on Human Rights
focused on the matter. It decided to establish a Special Rapporteur on the
right to education as well as new mechanisms on the right to development, on
extreme poverty, and on the impact of structural adjustment on human rights."0
The right to development is a high priority of the High Commissioner,
and recently the EC-UNDG decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group on the
Right to Development mainly in order to incorporate this right in the United
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Our hope is that the
political debates over structural adjustment and social cost, which have
blocked agreement at the Commission on Human Rights Working Group on
this subject, will be, in a certain sense, mooted by the United Nations itself
adopting a very practical approach to give meaning to the right to develop-
ment in its operations. The UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP)
issued a very important policy paper at the beginning of 1998 on the integra-
tion of human rights in development.3 ' In the introduction, the paper states
that one-third of the United Nations's resources are devoted to governance
programs." The United Nations Children's Fund, UNICEF, on the other
hand, already is a human rights operational agency, conceptually restructured
around the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
29. See VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION, supra note 18.
30. See Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1998/45 <http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrres/1998.res/45.htm> (on education), 1998/33 <http://www.unhchr.
ch/htmllmenu4/chrres/1998.res/33.htm> and 1998/72 <http:llwww.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu4/
chrresf1998.res/72.htm> (on development), 1998/25<http:f/www.unhchr.ch/html1jmenu4/chrres/
1998.res/25.htm> (on extreme poverty), and decision 1998/103 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu4/chrres/54dece.htm> (on structural adjustment); supra note 15.
31. Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Development: A UNDP Policy Docu-
ment, United Nations Development Programme, January 1998.
32. Id.
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Obviously, the promotion and protection efforts of the United Nations are
intertwined. The High Commissioner has an important program of human
rights advisory services and technical assistance in place, precisely for institu-
tion-building.33 The program of advisory services, although present on paper
for decades, saw a true increase in quality and quantity since 1987 and has
now become a major part of the activities of the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
VII Some of the Main Challenges in the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights
Below are six major challenges to the promotion and protection of human
rights, some of which I have already mentioned above:
1. The core challenge of the implementation of international human
rights norms;
2. The full integration of economic and social rights in the United
Nations's human rights mechanisms and in all countries' approach to human
rights;
3. The full integration of the human rights of women in the human
rights mechanisms;
4. The integration of human rights in the peace and security areas of
the United Nations, as well as regionally and nationally;
5. The extremely serious challenge ofmaking private economic actors
in our global economy accountable for the violation of human rights. It is
hard, for example, to understand why it took human rights NGOs so long to
realize the importance of the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investments
(MAI) to the human rights of millions.
6. Finally, the civil society must continue to be mobilized.
VIII. Conclusion
Human rights movements around the world have led to the development
of international human rights mechanisms that now stand on their own, and
this trend must continue throughout civil society. Without solid constituen-
cies, even strong institutions fall into disarray and wither away. Human rights
education, in the largest sense of the term, must systematically penetrate each
society, whether at school, in the community, in professional settings, or
otherwise. The creation of a human rights culture beyond divisive ideologies
is the ultimate guarantor of human rights.
33. For the most recent report on the High Commissioner's activities in this area, see
Technical Cooperation in the FieldofHuman Rights, Report ofthe Secretary-General, Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Prov'I Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/92 (1998).
The European Human Rights Convention:
A New Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
as of November 1, 1998
Andrew Drzemczewski*
I. Introduction
Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
ratified by all Council of Europe member states - in other words, ratified by
all of the forty contracting states parties to the EC-R (Albania, Andorra,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, "the former Yugoslav
Republic ofMacedonia," Turkey, Ukraine and United Kingdom)- establishes
a full-time, single courtto replace the Convention's prior monitoring machin-
ery. It entered into force on November 1, 1998.1
This text, opened for signature on May 11, 1994, is one of the concrete
results of decisions taken by the Council of Europe's Heads of State and
Government at their first summit meeting in Vienna on October 8-9, 1993.
I. Main Aspects of the Reform
A. The prior part-time monitoring institutions, namely the European
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights,
ceased to exist. A new European Court of Human Rights, operating full-time,
was set up in Strasbourg, France.
B. The system has been streamlined and, above all, all applicants now
have direct access to the new court.
Any cases that are clearly unfounded will be sifted out of the system at
an early stage by a unanimous decision of the court sitting as a three-judge
* Head of the Secretary General's Monitoring Unit, Council of Europe, Strasbourg,
France. This Article is based on an address presented at the Washington and Lee School of Law
onMarch26-27,1998 in connection with TheFuture ofInternationalHumanRightssyrnposium.
1. All of the 16 new member states from central and eastern Europe have now ratified
the ECHR (including Protocol No. 11). The last one to do so, the Russian Federation, deposited
instruments of ratification on May 5, 1998. See infra Appendix II (containing detailed list).
697
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 697 (1998)
committee (the cases will therefore be declared inadmissible). In the large
majority of cases, the court will sit as a seven-judge chamber. Only in excep-
tional cases will the court, sitting as a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges,
decide on the most important issues. The President of the court and the
presidents of chambers will always be able to sit in the Grand Chamber so as
to ensure consistency and uniformity of the main caselaw. Ajudge elected in
respect of the state party involved in a case will also sit in the Grand Chamber
in order to ensure a proper understanding of the legal system under consider-
ation.
C. All allegations of violations of individuals' rights will be referred to
the court. The Committee of Ministers (the Council of Europe's executive
organ) will no longer have jurisdiction to decide on the merits of these cases.
It will, however, retain its important role of monitoring the enforcement of the
court's judgments.
D. The right of individual application will be mandatory, and the court
will have jurisdiction with respectto all inter-state cases.
I. Operation of the New Procedure as of November 1, 1998
As under the past system, individual applications and inter-state applica-
tions will exist side by side. As the secretariat of the Commission did in the
past, the registry of the court will establish all necessary contacts with the
applicants and, if necessary, request further information.
Then, a chamber of the court will register the application, and the appli-
cation will be assigned to ajudge-rapporteur. Thejudge-rapporteur may refer
the application to a three-judge committee, which may include the judge-
rapporteur. The committee may, by a unanimous decision, declare the appli-
cation inadmissible; this decision will then be final.
When the judge-rapporteur considers that the application raises a ques-
tion of principle and is not inadmissible or when the committee is not unani-
mous in rejecting the complaint, a chamber will examine the application.
(This procedure matches the prior system that was in force before the Com-
mission.)
A chamber, composed of seven judges, will decide on the merits of an
application and, if necessary, its competence to adjudicate the case. The
judge-rapporteur will prepare the casefile and establish contact with the
parties. The parties will then submit their observations in writing. A hearing
may take place before the chamber. The chamber will also place itself at the
parties' disposal with a view towards a friendly settlement. If no friendly
settlement can be reached, the chamber will deliver its judgment.
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The chamber may decide proprio motu to refer a case to the Grand
Chamber when it intends not to follow the court's previous caselaw or when
a question of principle is involved. This procedure may be adopted on the
condition that none of the parties object to it.2
Once the judgment has been delivered, the parties will have three months
to request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. However, this
procedure will be restricted to exceptional instances, that is, when a case
raises a serious question concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention and its protocols or a matter of general interest. A panel of five
judges of the Grand Chamber will determine whether the request for a rehear-
ing is admissible
The chamber's judgment will become final when there is no further
possibility of a referral to the Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber's judg-
ment will be final and, as previously, binding in international law. As under
the former system, the Committee of Ministers will supervise the execution
of the court's judgment.
Although the new system is less complicated than the one it has replaced,
one cannot honestly say that it is simple to understand by an "outsider."4 For
a comparative schema of both control mechanisms, consult Appendix I.
1V Transitional Arrangements
The Protocol, in Articles 4 and 5, regulates the transition from the prior
system to the new system. As Protocol No. 11 is an amending protocol, all
parties to the Convention have had to express their consent for the text to
become mandatory.
A. Article 4 of Protocol No. 11
Article 4 specifies that the Protocol enters into force on the first day of
the month one year after the last state party to the Convention has ratified
Protocol No. 1 . In other words, it entered into force on November 1, 1998.
Protocol No. 11 provides that prior to the date of entry into force, the
"election of new judges may take place, and any further necessary steps may
2. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, May 11, 1994,
art. 30, Europ. T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol No. 11].
3. Id. art. 43.
4. See infra Appendix I (providing comparative schema of both control mechanisms).
5. Protocol No. 11, supra note 2, art. 4.
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be taken to establish the new Court."6 Hire, top priority has been given to the
election ofjudges (which took place in January and April of 1998), who have
already had their first meeting between April 28 and May 2, 1998, and a
second meeting on July 23-25, 1998. The competent bodies of the Council of
Europe have also undertaken a number of other preparatory measures to which
later reference will be made.7
B. Article 5 of Protocol No. 11
Article 5 provides the necessary transitional provisions for applications
that have been lodged in Strasbourg and that will need to be processed, both
pending and subsequent to the Protocol's entry into force. The provision was
quite difficult to draft because no appropriate solution could initially be found
that satisfied all parties in the negotiations; discussions on this subject were
lengthy and continued well into 1994.
The terms of office of the members of the prior court and Commission,
as well as the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar of the court, terminated with
the entry into force of this Protocol on November 1, 1998. This prevented two
courts from operating at the -same time. However, the Commission will
continue to exist for the additional period of one year so as to settle any
pending applications!
Paragraphs 2 through 4 of Article 5 explain what will happen with
applications pending before the Commission.' If, at the time of the Protocol's
entry into force, the Commission had not declared them admissible, the new
court will automatically deal with these applications.'0 On the other hand,
applications already declared admissible will be finalized by the Commission
under the prior system." Because the drafters of the text considered it inap-
propriate for the Commission to continue its work many years after this
Protocol's entry into force, paragraph 3 of Article 5 provides for a time limit
of one year within which the Commission will, hopefully, be able to complete
work on most applications that it has declared admissible. Applications not
finalized during this time limit (by November 1, 1999) will go before the new
court for determination under the new system. Obviously, as the Commission
will already have declared these applications admissible, no need will exist for
a committee of the new court to examine them.
6. Id.
7. See Wolfgang Strasser, Quelques riflexions sur les dispositions transitoires, in LE
PROTOCOLEN0 I 1 ALA CONVENTIONEUROPEENNEDESDROITSDEL'HOMME97, 106,113 (1995).
8. Protocol No. 11, supra note 2, art. 5, para. 3.
9. Id. art. 5, paras. 2-4.
10. Id.
11. Id. art. 5, para. 3.
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It should be noted that the first sentence of paragraph 3 stipulates that
members of the Commission may continue their work for one year after the
entry into force of this Protocol, even if their term in office expired before that
date." This will allow them to complete work on cases declared admissible
during that additional one year period. But, because the office of members of
the Commission expired at the entry into force ofthe Protocol, those Commis-
sioners elected as judges to the new court will be able to continue, at the same
time, their Commission functions as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 5. (Any
vacancy that may occur in the Commission during this additional one year
period may be filled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the formerly
applicable text of the Convention so that no contracting party need be without
a Commissioner during the said period.) Here, it can be assumed that the
workload of persons that may find themselves both on the new court and
completing work as Commissioners will be substantial. The President of the
new court probably will need to make special arrangements for them, so as to
ensure an equitable distribution of work among the newly appointed judges.
Paragraph 4 of Article 5 relates to cases in which the Commission has
adopted an Article 31 Report - a legal opinion as to whether the ECHR has
been breached - within the period of twelve months following the entry into
force of Protocol No. 11.3 In such instances, the procedure for bringing cases
before the court in the former Article 48 of the Convention (and Protocol No.
9, where applicable) will apply. In other words, the Commission or a state
party, as well as the applicant if Protocol No. 9 is applicable, will have the
right to refer the case to the new court.
However, in order to avoid cases that have already been examined from
being dealt with at three levels, the panel of five judges of the new court will
be given the power to decide whether the Grand Chamber or a chamber should
decide the case. Cases not referred to the new court under this Article will be
decided by the Committee of Ministers in accordance with the present Article
32 of the Convention.'
4
The prior court ceased to function on November 1, 1998, and all cases
pending before it were transmitted to the Grand Chamber of the new court.
Again, for the Grand Chamber not to be inundated with "less important"
cases, the prior court had to resort to some fine-tuning in the months leading
up to the Protocol's entry into force. It is understood that, although this matter
was on the prior court's agenda, the Grand Chamber of the new court in effect
has many more cases to deal with in this context than had originally been
anticipated.
12. Id.
13. Id. art. 5, para. 4.
14. Id. art. 32.
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Lastly, paragraph 6 of Article 5 specifies that the Committee of Ministers
will be able to continue to deal with cases nottransmitted to the court underthe
present Article 48 of the Convention, even after Protocol No. 11 entered into
effect, until such time as these cases are completed."5 Although this will, in all
probability, prolong consideration of cases before the Committee of Ministers
for (potentially) several years after the Protocol's entry into force, the drafters
considered it inappropriate, by means of such an instrument, to try to tie the
hands of an organ whose existence predates the ECHR and, as the Council of
Europe's executive, works independently of the Convention mechanism.
V Election of Judges to the New Permanent Court
In a circular letter addressed to all Foreign Ministers of contracting states
parties back in October 1997, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
reminded them all of the procedure agreed upon, indicating to them the
importance of a list of candidates reaching him by mid-November 1997, at the
very latest. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the initially agreed upon
timetable could not be maintained with respect to all states.1
6
The Parliamentary Assembly's interviews with most candidates took
place within a special subcommittee of the Assembly's Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights at the Council of Europe's offices in Paris during
two periods from December 17-19, 1997 and from January 17-19, 1998. A
second set of interviews, with respect to an additional eight states, took place
on April 6, 1998.
The basic criteria laid down for the election procedure were as follows:
States had to provide a list of three candidates accompanied by a detailed
biographical note on each of them in English or French, structured in accor-
dance with a model curriculum vitae established by the Parliamentary Assem-
bly, as provided in Appendix IV.'7 Unfortunately, in a number of instances,
this proposal was not always scrupulously followed.
15. See id. art. 5, para. 6 (stating that cases shall be completed by Committee of Minis-
ters).
16. See infra Appendix III (providing indicative timetable concerning election procedure).
17. See generally EUR. PAn. Ass. RES. 1082, 9th sitting (April 22, 1996) <http://stars.
coe.fr/ta/ta96/ereslO82.htm> (providing procedure for examining candidatures for election of
judges to European Court of Human Rights); Report ofthe Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, Eur. Parl. Ass., Doe. No. 7439 (1996) <http:llstars.coe.fr/doc/doc96/edoc7439.htm>;
Hans Christian KrUger, Selecting Judges for the New European Court of Human Rights, 17
HUM. RTS. L.J. 401 (1996).
It is interesting to note, in this connection, the fact that certain states openly invited
applications from candidates possessing the necessary qualifications and experience for this
position. See Judge of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, TIMES (London),
Sept. 16, 1997; Selection of Judges for the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg,
RZECZPOSPOLITA (Warsaw), Oct. 6, 1997; CourEuropienne desDroits de l'Homme, MONITEUR
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Of interest to note, in this connection, was the rather unusual decision
taken by the Committee of Ministers on May 28, 1997 to establish an informal
procedure for the examination of prospective candidacies for election as
judges." In accordance with this decision, the Committee of Ministers'
Deputies undertook an examination of such candidacies before formally sub-
mitting the list of candidates to the Parliamentary Assembly.
The main elements of the new election procedure may be summarized as
follows: "The judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with
respect to each High Contracting Party by a majority of votes cast from a list
of three candidates nominated by the High Contracting Party." 19
The former requirement that no two judges may have the same national-
ity no longer applies under Protocol No. 11.
"[T]he judges shall be of high moral character and must either possess
the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be
jurisconsults ofrecognised competence."" They "shall sit on the court in their
individual capacity. During their term of office [they] shall not engage in any
activity which is incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with
the demands of a full-time office....",2"
"The judges shall be elected for a period of six years. They may be re-
elected. However, the terms of office of one-half of the judges elected at the
first election shall expire at the end of three years. '
"The judges whose terms of office are to expire at the end of the initial
period of three years [were] chosen by lot by the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe immediately after their election" on April 29, 1998.'
Twenty of the judges were given a sixyear mandate, and nineteen were given
a three year mandate; the fortieth judge, when elected, will automatically be
put into the latter category. The terms of office of judges shall expire when
they reach the age of seventy. Further details regarding the status and condi-
tions of service of the judges have been enumerated in a resolution adopted
by the Committee of Ministers on September 10, 1997.
BELGE (Brussels), Oct. 10, 1997; see also Human Rights Bill No. 38, House of Lords, Oct.
1997, cl. 18 (stipulating that holder ofjudicial office to which clause applies may become judge
of European Court of Human Rights without being required to relinquish his office and that he
is not required to perform duties of his judicial office while he is judge of Strasbourg Court).
The purpose of this Bill is to incorporate the ECHR into U.K. law.
18. See infra Appendix V (providing copy of text adopted).
19. ProtocolNo. 11, supra note 2, art. 22, para. 1.
20. Id. art. 21, para. 2.
21. Id art. 21, para. 3.
22. Id. art. 23, para. 1.
23. Id. art. 23, para. 2.
24. See infra Appendix VI (showing copy of resolution).
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Finally, mention should also be made of the fact that in his letter in
October 1997, the Secretary General made specific reference to the Ministers'
Deputies invitation for states to try to achieve a more balanced representation
of men and women on the new court.'
V. Work Carried Out by an Informal Working Party Between
February 1995 and May 199726
At the Vienna Summit of October 1993, the Heads of State and Govern-
ment of the Council of Europe made the solemn commitment that they "will
ensure that this Protocol is submitted for ratification at the earliest possible
date." With this in mind, and in particular the obvious need to facilitate the
entry into force of Protocol No.11, Mr. Peter Leuprecht, the then Deputy
Secretary General of the Organization, had a discussion on this subject with
the court's President, the late Mr. R. Ryssdal, in the autumn of 1994. During
this discussion they agreed that it would be useful to set up an informal
working party to discuss preparatory measures that will need to be taken prior
to and upon the (possible rapid) entry into force of Protocol No. 11.
The informal working party came into being in February 1995. In
addition to its Chairman, Mr. Peter Leuprecht, Mr. R. Ryssdal, President of
the court, and Mr. Carl Aage Norgaard, former President of the Commission
(with the agreement of Mr. S. Trechsel, the present President of the Commis-
sion), members of the informal working party included Mr. Pierre-Henri
Imbert, Director of Human Rights, Mr. Hans Christian KrUger, Secretary to
the Commission (who has recently been elected as Deputy Secretary General),
and Mr. H. Petzold, Registrar of the court. I provided secretariat backup to
the working party.
This informal working party had a total of ten meetings. During these
meetings it discussed a variety of issues such as the provision of adequate
working conditions forjudges when the new court is established, the "merger"
of the Commission's and the court's secretariats, and the need to refurbish the
Commission's "hearing room," which at present only has facilities for in
25. See infra Appendix VII (providing copy of text adopted in May 1997). The origins
of this proposal can probably be traced to an initiative taken by Ms. Err. See EUR. PARL. Ass.,
Order No. 519 (1996) <http:/stars.coe.fr/ta/ta96/edir5l9.htm> (providing procedure for
examining candidacies for election ofjudges to European Court of Human Rights); see also
Eur. Parl. Ass., Doc. No. 7530 (motioning for order by Ms. Err). Here again, it would appear
that "the result product" is less than satisfactory; 8 out of the 39 new judges are women.
26. This part of the text is partly based on my lecture course given at the Academy of
European Law (Florence, Italy) in July 1995. See generally Andrew Drzemczewski, A Major
Overhaul of the European Human Rights Convention Control Mechanism: Protocol No. 11, in
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 121 (Academy of European Law
ed., 1995).
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camera meetings. From among the numerous matters discussed, often of a
technical, administrative, and managerial nature, the following seven subjects
can be mentioned.
A. Privileges and Immunities of Judges
The privileges and immunities ofjudges was a matter to which members
of the working party attached considerable importance, stressing the urgency
of drafting a new text on this subject. Now that Protocol No. 6 to the General
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, as well as the European Agreement
on persons participating before the new court, has been opened for signature
and ratification, the onus is firmly on member states of the Council of Europe
to ensure that this instrument is ratified by all contracting states parties as
soon as possible.27 Here, it should be appreciated that although this Protocol
on Privileges and Immunities entered into force at the same time as Protocol
No. 11 to the ECHR, that is, November 1, 1998, it is important for it to be
ratified in particular by France, the Organization's host state. Were this not
to occur, a number of ad hoc arrangements may even at this late stage need to
be made to ensure that matters dealt with therein are appropriately handled in
the meantime.28
Entry into force of the 6th Protocol was contingent on (i) ratification by
three parties to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the
Council of Europe (General Agreement) that have expressed their consent to
be bound by the Protocol, and (ii) entry into force of Protocol No. 11, ECHR.
Presently, only ten parties (Albania, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, and Sweden) to the General
Agreement have ratified the 6th Protocol; it has been signed by thirteen other
states (including France), all of which are parties to the General Agreement.
This matter is more important than initially meets the eye, as nonrati-
fication by France, among others, might cause a number of practical difficul-
ties. Although the Statute ofthe Council of Europe and the General Agreement
remainpossible legal bases to ensure appropriate privileges and immunities for
the new judges, legal problems could exist. Here, reference can be made to
Article 18 of the General Agreement, which grants certain privileges and
immunities to "[o]fficials of the Council of Europe." However, when the 6th
27. European Agreement relating to persons participating in proceedings of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the Sixth Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges
and Immunities of the Council of Europe, 17 HuM. RTS. L.J. 472, 472 n.* (1996) [hereinafter
European Agreement].
28. See Andrew Drzemczewski, Protocole n° 11 l Ia CEDH: priparation i l'entrde en
vigueur, 8 EUR. 1. INT'L L. 59, 68-72 (1997). See generally European Agreement, supra note
27, at 472-76 (publishing texts of these legal instruments including their explanatory reports).
It is understood that France intends to ratify the 6th Protocol.
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Protocol to the General Agreement was being drafted, it was considered
inappropriate to qualifyjudges as "officials" of the Council of Europe. Article
51 oftheECHR, as amended by ProtocolNo. 11 (Article 59 of the Convention
currently in force) refers to "privileges and immunities provided for in Article
40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and in the agreements made thereun-
der."29 However, as concerns Article 40 of the Statute, this provision cannot
apply directly to judges because it refers to "representatives of members" and
to the "Secretariat." Also, not all states parties to the ECIR are parties to
either or both the 4th and the 5th Protocols to the General Agreement.
Consequently, one may have to anticipate a situation in which the 6th
Protocol to the General Agreement may not be considered as applicable to all
states parties to the ECHR despite its simultaneous entry into force with
Protocol No. 11. In this circumstance, the Committee of Ministers may well
need to consider or anticipate the adoption of a specific resolution on this
subject. Such a resolution could solemnly confirm that the new judges enjoy
all the privileges and immunities necessary for the fulfilment of their func-
tions and specify what this actually means.
Additionally, the position of France as the host country of the new court
may need clarification, especially with regard to the new judges' fiscal situa-
tion. It should be recalled, in this connection, that in so far as the prior mem-
bers of the court and Commission elected in respect of France are concerned,
France has not signed or ratified the 5th Protocol to the General Agreement.
Here, it is difficult to know to what extent, if at all, the French delegation's
statement attached to Appendix I of Resolution (97)9 clarifies matters in this
respect.3" The French signature ofProtocolNo. 6 to the General Agreement on
March 31, 1998 is certainly helpful in this respect, bearing in mind the signifi-
cance of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 31 which
stipulates that a state that has signed a treaty should refrain from acting in a
way that would be contrary to its "object and purpose."3"
B. Library and Research Facilities
The Council of Europe's Human Rights Library, which is part of the
Directorate of Human Rights Information Centre, is at present a public
reference library that also services the human rights sector of the Organiza-
tion, including the control organs and staffofthe European Social Charter and
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. This library is in need
of expansion or restructuring, or both, bearing in mind its size and limited
29. Protocol No. 11, supra note 2, art. 51.
30. See infra Appendix VI (providing copy of statement).
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
32. Id. art. 18.
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facilities available for readers. Currently, this library, situated in the new
Palais des Droits de I'Homme, is not in a position to provide the various
human rights bodies or their staff with modem efficient services. Hence,
appropriate facilities to users, for example, extended operating hours, provi-
sions of legal search and photocopying services, and separate research facili-
ties for judges of the new court, must be envisaged.
A decision will also need to be made on an important matter: the extent
to which, if at all, the Human Rights Library should be maintained as a public
reference library. The way in which the libraries of the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg, the International Court of Justice in the Hague, and
those of the highest judicial organs in member states are run are presently
being considered on the hypothesis that the library should, if at all possible,
continue to be accessible to bona fide postgraduate students, academics, and
researchers rather than being limited for internal Council of Europe use only.
C. Legal Secretaries
The desirability of providing the new court with a number of highly
qualified legal secretaries 33 had been discussed. The informal working party
was of the view that legal secretaries should be chosen from a pool of lawyers
from within the new registry of the court. In other words, they should be
chosen principally from the Council of Europe staffimembers already working
in the Commission's secretariat and in the court's registry. This view was
based not only on financial considerations (important though they be), but
rather for more self-evident reasons: Present staff members of the two
supervisory organs possess the required legal and linguistic qualifications as
well as the "institutional memory" and practical experience in the processing
of cases. They would be immediately operational and would be able to carry
out duties assigned to them by judges. (It should not be forgotten, in this
connection, that not all the judges on the new court will have had prior
experience with the Strasbourg system and the multifaceted nature of the
work that this entails.) This being said, it is not at all certain as to how this
matter will be dealt with by the new court.
D. Composition of Chambers
The composition of chambers was discussed in considerable detail by the
informal working party. A proposal, put forward by Carl AageNorgaard, was
33. See Drzemczewski, supra note 26, at 169-70, 172 (discussing views of European
Commission of Human Rights on this matter). Of interest, in this connection, is the way in
which certain U.S. Supreme Court Justices participate in "pooling" arrangements with respect
to their clerks. See Trenton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship Selection Process: AnApplicant's
Perspective on BadApples, Sour Grapes, andFru iul Reform, 81 CAL. L. Rav. 765, 771 (1993).
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noted with interest. The accepted hypothesis was that chambers should be
composed in such a way as to ensure that different legal families are repre-
sented in each chamber and are regionally balanced, that the workload of each
chamber should (to the extent possible) be equal, and that the presence of the
"national judge" be possible when "his or her state" is being considered with-
out too many practical difficulties. Similarly, note was taken of Rule 21 of the
court's rules, as adopted on April 27, 1995.34 Bearing the above considerations
in mind, Norgaard proposed that chambers could be composed in such a way
as to reflect, respectively, the actual number of cases registered against differ-
ent states at a given time together with an equitable rearrangement of the
subdivision adopted by the prior court in its Rule 21. (In situations in which
no cases have been registered, for example, with respect to some new contract-
ing states parties, these states would be placed according to the size of their
population.) After having established the above order, thejudge from the state
with the highest number of registered cases could be placed in the first cham-
ber, thejudge with the second highest number of registered cases in the second
chamber, and so forth. At the same time, cross reference would need to be
made to the subdivision of states effectuated in Rule 21 to ensure that an
appropriate "mix" is effectuated. With a few adjustments (as explained by
Norgaard) the resultant product would be an equal distribution of work among
chambers, with due regard taken to "regional balance." This proposal, al-
though slightly complicated, appeared to be a well-balanced, equitable, and
practical solution worthy to be reflected upon by the new court.
34. Rule 21 states:
Composition of the Court when constituted in a Chamber
1. When a case is brought before the Court...
2. For the purposes of the drawing of lots provided for in Article 43 of the
Convention and Rule 51 of these Rules, the members of the Court shall be divided
into three groups.
(a) The first group shall contain the judges elected in respect of Belgium,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
(b) The second group shall contain thejudges elected in respect ofAustria,
the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Ukraine.
(c) The third group shall contain the judges elected in respect of Albania,
Andorra, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, San
Marino, Spain, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey....
4. There shall sit as ex officio members of the Chamber:
(a) in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, every judge who has
the nationality of a Party;
(b) on an alternate basis, the President or the Vice-President of the Court,
provided that they do not sit by virtue of the preceding sub-paragraph.
European Court of Human Rights (Rules of Court A) (as amended April 27, 1995).
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In a "model" set of rules of procedure of the new court (prepared by the
working party and discussed under subsection E), the working party was
unable to find an appropriate solution with respect to the way in which
chambers of the court were to be composed. It considered that this matter
needs further study in the light of the above proposal put forward by Nor-
gaard, with the President of the new court probably needing to decide in each
case which seven judges are to constitute a chamber and which judge (or
judges) is (are) to sit as (a) substitute judge(s) so as to ensure an appropriate
"rotation" of judges in each chamber.
Finally, all members of the informal working party were also of the view
that chambers should be constituted for three year periods and should always
be composed of at least eight judges. Jochen A. Frowein's idea of creating
"specialist chambers"35 was considered inappropriate by the working party.
E. Draft Rules of Court
The informal working party carefully looked into drafting new rules and
has prepared a draft set of "model" rules for the new court.36 Although it will
obviously be for the new court to adopt its own rules, it is probably desirable
to ensure that it is able, to the extent it so desires, to take into account the
experience of both the prior court and Commission, as well as the views of
those familiar with the work of the Strasbourg organs, in particular govern-
ment agents and practicing lawyers. What is important in this respect, in my
view, is to tap the combined experience of Messrs. Norgaard, the late Ryssdal,
and Trechsel, coupled with that of Messrs. Krfiger and Petzold (who have
many years of precious in-house experience within the Convention control
bodies' secretariats), as well as others whose practical experience in the
operation of the prior control mechanism could be put into good use by the
new court. This type of preparatory work (including the "brainstorming"
organized on this subject by the DH-PR in September 1997 with lawyers who
have had practical experience of pleading cases in Strasbourg, as well as
certain or outside academic and research institutions, as was the case in
Potsdam on September 19-20, 1997) will almost certainly be of the utmost
utility if one takes into account that members of the new court had less than
seven months to draft the new rules of court and to take all other necessary
steps as required under new Article 26 of the Convention prior to the entry
into force of Protocol No. 11 on November 1, 1998.11
35. See Jochen A. Frowein, Implementation ofthe Reform ofthe ECHR Control Machin-
ery, 1995 Y.B. EUR. CoNV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.I.) 159-61.
36. The text of these "model" rules, issued in May 1997, will soon be published in the
Human Rights Law Journal
37. See Protocol No. 11, supra note 2, art. 4. As can be seen from the timetable in
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The drafting of the new rules of court has undoubtedly been one of the
priority tasks of the judges elect. Two working parties were created in May
1998, one to prepare the rules of court and the other to deal with administra-
tive questions. In this connection, I should perhaps add that in so far as
intergovernmental "work" on this subject is concerned, the Committee of
Experts for the Improvement of Procedures for the Protection of Human
Rights, known as the DH-PR Committee (a subordinate committee of the
Steering Committee for Human Rights, CDDH), made a number of useful
comments pertaining to the informal working party's "model" rules during its
meetings in 1997 and early 1998. Subsequently, the CDDH, at its meetings
in October 1997 and June 1998, requested the Secretary General ofthe Organ-
ization to have these comments transmitted to the judges of the new court (as
well as, for information, to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary
Assembly).
In addition to the need of establishing a viable internal working mecha-
nism (which will, presumably, initially at least, be an amalgam of the practice
of the Commission and the prior court so as to integrate such concepts as
"judge rapporteur" and "friendly settlement proceedings"), issues of funda-
mental importance will need to be confronted. The way in which chambers
are to be constituted is one such subject; the use of languages is another. As
concerns the latter, financial considerations will need to be borne in mind:
Whereas the prior court worked on the premise that all documents submitted
for its consideration must be provided in both Council of Europe official
languages, in the Commission such a procedure would be impracticable.
Members of the Commission receive documents either in English or in
French; a passive knowledge of the second official language is required.
Indeed, in this connection, the working party has probably rightly underlined
the need for the Council of Europe to provide new judges with language
training (and, if need be, training in the use of electronic office equipment).
F. Staffing Issues
Much progress was made on staffing issues within the informal working
party. This was due principally to the close co-operation (at that time) of the
heads of the two secretariats of the Convention control organs, supplemented
by a handful of their respective staff members possessing an acquired man-
agement experience.
Appendix III, the choice of candidates by contracting states parties, the subsequent transmission
of a list to the Parliamentary Assembly, hearings organized by the Assembly, formal voting by
the Assembly, and convocation to a first meeting in Strasbourg of the newly elected judges all
together took about seven months. The first meeting of the new court took place from April 28
to May 2, 1998.
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The structure to be proposed must involve a viable registry capable of
serving the new court properly as from the first day of its existence and must,
at the same time, be sufficiently flexible to enable smooth changes that will
subsequently follow from decisions taken by the court itself once it has
become operational. Although it is impossible to foresee how the new court
will ultimately choose to organize its activities, certain hypotheses can reason-
ably be made in light of the text of Protocol No. 11 and of the experience of
the Convention organs.
It is therefore obvious that a "merger" of the secretariat of the Commis-
sion and the registry of the court needed to be well-prepared ahead of time.
Appendix VIII reproduces the "organizational chart" of the new court's
registry as was suggested by the informal working party. The working party's
basic premise (an idea that was, in effect, subsequently accepted by the
Committee of Ministers) was that all the staff members of the prior court's
registry and Commission's secretariat should be "transferred" into the new
court's registry from the very first day of the entry into force of Protocol No.
11; staff working for the "old" Commission for up to one year after Protocol
No. lI's entry into force would be "lent" from the new court's registry. This
transfer of posts necessitated a formal decision by the Committee of Minis-
ters, which took place on February 18, 1998.11 Also, and this was stressed by
the informal working party, it was essential that staff posts (probably in the
region of at least twenty in the first year) be created for the new court and that
such appointments be made ahead of time so that the new court (including, for
example, judges' secretaries and the chambers' structure) could function as
of the very first day of Protocol No. 1 l's entry into force, namely November
1, 1998.
G. Transitional Provisions
There are many complex issues that were in need of substantial advance
planning in order to ensure, to the extent possible, that the permutation, in
organizational terms, from a well-established and efficiently functioning
system into a completely new regime occurred as smoothly as possible. 9 As
of April 1998, a number of matters were under active consideration. In
addition to structural changes within the Convention control mechanisms as
provided in Articles 4 and 5 of Protocol No. 11, practical, down-to-earth
matters such as appropriate provisions for working facilities, office space
within the new Palais des Droits de 1'Homme, and the installation of modern
computer workstations for judges were being actively studied. Some of the
38. See infra Appendix IX.
39. Other related matters, such as staffing issues, budgetary appropriations, and the need
for specialized translators and interpreters, need to be considered carefully.
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above-mentioned required forward planning; indeed, adequate budgetary
appropriations needed to be set aside in anticipation of these changes.
Following is, for illustrative purposes, a nonexhaustive list of matters
that need to be settled at the very outset by the newly elected court:4"
1. drafting and adoption of the new court's rules,
2. election of President and Vice-President(s) of the court,
3. election of Registrar and Deputy Registrar(s),
4. election of Presidents, and setting up, of chambers (and commit-
tees thereunder),
5. putting into place a new administrative/secretariat structure (new
Article 25),
6. setting up of the Grand Chamber and its panel of five judges, and
7. allocation, to the extent possible, of tasks with other sectors
of the Organization (for example, privileges and immunities of
other staff of the registry, relations with the media, publication
of documents, library and computer facilities, and personnel and
budgetary matters).
The preparation and putting into effect of Protocol No. I l's Article 5
"transitional arrangements" within the new court's registry structure
also needs to be ensured, especially as concerns procedures under paragraphs
3 and 4.
Also, every effort had been made by the "outgoing" court to ensure, to
the extent possible, that recourse not be made to the procedure envisaged in
paragraph 5 of Protocol No. 11, namely the transmission of cases pending
before the prior court at the date of entry into force of this Protocol to the new
court's Grand Chamber.
Obviously, appropriate arrangements also had to be made (budgetary and
logistic) for the Commission members who continue work for up to one extra
year after the entry into force of Protocol No. 11.41
VII. We Are Going into Uncharted Waters...
The implementation of the machinery laid out in Protocol No. 11 inevita-
bly involves some uncertainties, and a difficult period can be envisaged in the
40. Who should chair meetings prior to the election of the new court's President?
Probably the "doyen" of the new court, that is, the oldest, in age, of the newly elected judges.
The court might, as an alternative, envisage the election of an Acting President, and Acting
Registrar, for the "transitional" period or until the formal adoption of the new court's Rules of
Procedure. The judges-elect agreed that Benedetto Conforti, age 68, the "doyen" of the new
court, should be the Acting President of the new court, pending the election of the court's
President.
41. See Protocol No. 11, supra note 2, art. 5, para. 3; Explanatory report to Protocol No.
11 to the European Convention on Human Rights, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 91, 100 para. 119 (1994).
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run up, and in particular, in the transitional period leading to the entry into
force of Protocol No. 11 and for a few years thereafter. States have to face
additional costs during the transitional period; the setting-up of the new
system also calls for supplementary budgetary resources.
Also, tied to implementing the new system is the need to readjust and
"accommodate" the prior substantial caseload. As of November 1, 1998, the
new court was faced with the following caseload: some 35,000 provisional
files from the Commission and about 6800 registered applications. There
were about 400 admissible cases pending before the Commission as of No-
vember 1, 1998, with some 1300 cases pending before the Committee of
Ministers for just satisfaction issues. By the end of April 1998, there were
102 cases pending before the court, and it had been estimated that some 50 to
60 of these cases would not have been dealt with by the prior court by October
31, 1998. In addition, it had been calculated that as of November 1, 1998, the
remaining Commission members would have some 450 admissible cases to
deal with, with some 1300 cases pending before the Committee of Ministers.
Be that as it may, a more fundamental issue will need to be broached so
as to ensure the success of the new system. As the late Marc-Andr6 Eissen,
former Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, had rightly pointed
out, the real problem for the credibility of the reformed system is likely to
reside in identifying the best ways to deal with the six to eight percent of
complaints declared admissible.42 With this in mind, three interrelated factors
can be emphasized when speculating as to how the new system will work in
the future.
The first, decisive factor, is the political context. As P. Van Dijk and
G.J.H. Van Hoof have rightly observed in their book Theory andPractice of
the European Convention on Human Rights:
The success or failure of international instruments, including those like the
European Convention, in the end depends on the political will of the States
involved. Legal arguments, however cogent they may be, in the final
analysis seldom override political considerations when States feel that their
vital interests are at stake.43
The second element is, of course, the difficult issue of the so-called
"political compromise" that must somehow be made to work appropriately,
not to mention other important changes made to the prior control mechanism.
42. Marc-Andre Eissen, L 'aspect institutionnel du Protocole n0 11 b la Convention, in
LE PROTOCOLE No 11 A LA CONVENTION EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, supra note 7,
at 31.
43. P.vANDIJK&G.LH.VANHOOF, THEORYANDPRACTICEOFTHEEuROPEANCONVEN-
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 618 (2d ed. 1990); see Menno T. Kamminga, Is the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights Sufficiently Equipped to Cope with Gross and Systematic Violations?,
12 NETH. Q. HUM. RTs. 153 (1994); Editorial, 14 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 3, 3-4 (1996).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 697 (1998)
Here again, it is perhaps worth citing yet another passage, this time from a
remarkable, though highly critical, analysis of Protocol No. 11 by Freddric
Sudre. His conclusion is rather surprising. Sudre writes:
49. -Le Protocole 11, malgrd les rdserves que le caract~re biscomu
de ceriaines de ces dispositions appelle, nous semble - pour paradoxal que
cela soit - atteindre un rdsultat positif. Le protocole contient indis-
cutablement de bonnes choses - comp6tence obligatoire de la cour, droit
de saisine individuelle, suppression du Comit6 des ministres comme organe
de d6cision -, bien que celles-ci ne soient pas vraiment nouvelles, puisque
djkrdalisdes en pratique ou en droit (le Protocole 9), ou ne font qu'achever
un processus largement engagd. I1 n'en reste pas moins que le Protocole
11, en <<constitutionnalisant>> les progr~s antdrieurs, fait accomplir au
mdcanisme europden de garantie des droits de l'homme un saut qualitatif,
qu'il faut saluer : la protection des droits de l'homme en Europe s'inscrit
ddsormais dans une proc6dure judiciaire, publique et contradictoire, sous
l'autoritd d'un organe ind6pendant et impartial. Comme l'a relevd tr~s
justement le Doyen Cohen-Jonathan, le Protocole 11 lie l'ordre public
europ6en des droits de lhomme A unjuge europ6en ayant une comp6tence
obligatoire. Ce faisant, la Convention europdenne des droits de l'homme
offre le module de protection des droits individuels le plus perfectionnd
dans l'ordre international. I1 fautn6anmoins souhaiter que lanouvelle cour
sache prdserver le remarquable acquisjurisprudentiel de l'actuelle cour et
de la Commission europ6enne des droits de l'homme, qui, par une
interpr6tation 6volutive et dynamique du texte conventionnel, ont
largement contribu6 non seulement A la sauvegarde des droits de l'homme
mais aussi A leur d6veloppement.
50. - Plus discutables sont les innovations - la Grande chambre et
ses comp6tences -, qui viennent alt6rer lajuridiction unique, gdn6rant des
distorsions proc6durales et une incoh6rence globale (mais il est vrai que le
syst~me actuel ne brille pas non plus par son homogdn6itd et peut
dgalement 8tre qualifid d'hybride).
Ce n'est pas dire, pour autant, que le compromis qui fonde le Protocole
11 (enbref, ler6examenpar la Grande chambre) estmauvais: il al'immense
m6rite non seulement, en existant, de permettre la r6forme, mais aussi de
ne pas figer le syst~me. Les Etats ont voulu un mdcanisme de contrOle
batard, A la fois juridiction unique et double degr6 dejuridiction, mais cela
pourrait bien 6tre un march6 de dupes. En effet, la nouvelle architecture
repose enti~rement sur le collge de cinqjuges, qui, <<tenant>> la proc6-
dure de r6examen, donnera vie A la Grande chambre ou la maintiendra (ce
que l'on esp~re) en 6tat de 16thargie. C'est donc l'institutionjudiciaire elle-
meme, etnon les Etats, qui maitrisera l'dvolution du nouveau m6canisme de
garantie."
44. Frddic Sudre, La riforme du mdcanisme de contr6le de la Convention europienne
des droits de l'homme: le Protocole 11 additionnel tla convention, 69 LA SEMAINEJURIDIQUE
231, 240 (1995). He then concludes:
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Is Sudre not right? Is it not, in the final analysis, better to leave the system's
potential evolution in the hands of judges rather than in those of the states
themselves?
Directly linked, at least in part, with the above observations of Sudre (as
well as those of Gdrard Cohen-Jonathan cited therein) is another matter worth
stressing, namely the fact that the Convention has become a constitutional
instrument of European public order ("instrument constitutionnel de l'ordre
public europien"). This has recently been reiterated in no uncertain terms by
both the Commission and the court.4' This statement, important as it certainly
is, needs to be kept in perspective. The prior role of the Strasbourg control
organs was, and that of the new single court will continue to be, subsidiary;
it is principally for the domestic courts and internal state organs to adequately
protect human rights at the national level. This point must always continue
to be emphasized.46
Lapratique prdtorienne antdrieure amontr6 combien la cour (mais aussi la commis-
sion) savait exploiter toutes les ressources que lui offrait la procddure europdenne
pourmieux garantir les droits individuels (on songe, particulirement, Aa place fait
A l'individu dans la procddure) et asseoir son autorit6. I1 nous semble que l'on peut
alors 8tre confiant : les vices du Protocole 11 sont tels qu'ils devraient avoir une
fonction dissuasive. L'intdrt meme de la nouvelle cour, afin de pr6server la
crddibilit6 de sajurisprudence, d'assurer l'efficacit6 de son contr6le (rapidit6 de la
procddure) et de rendre <<lisible>> la procedure europ~enne, est de ne faire
intervenir Ia Grande chambre qu'A titre tout A fait exceptionnel pour des affaires
hors du commun, qui revatiront un aspect exemplaire. Gageons alors que la
procedure de droit commun sera simple et efficace : l'individu saisit la cour qui,
en chambre, rend une d6cision d6finitive par laquelle elle statue sur la violation ou
la non-violation de la convention. La pratique d6voilerait alors le vrai visage du
Protocole 11, lajuridiction unique pure et simple.
En bref, Ia r6forme r6alis6e par le Protocole 11 sera d'autant mieux appliqu6e
qu'elle sera appliqude... A demi.
Id.
45. See Chrysostomos v. Turkey, 68 Eur. Comm'nH.RI Dec. & Rep. 216 (1991); see also
id. at 242 (showing Commission Article 31 Report in same case). See generally G6rard Cohen-
Jonathan, Conclusions Gdnerales, in QUELLEEUROPEPOURLES DROrrs DEL'HOMME? 477 (Paul
Tavernier ed., 1996); Patrick Courbe, Le Droit International Privi etlesDifficultdsD 'insertion
de la Convention Dans le systame Frangais, in QUELLEEUROPEPOURLESDROITSDEL'HOMME?,
supra, at 249; Fr6dric Sudre, Fxiste t-il un ordre public europien?, in QUELLEEUROPEPOUR
LES DRorrS DE L'HOMME?, supra, at 39; Paul Tavernier, La Cour Europienne des Droits de
L 'Homme Applique - T-Elle Le Droit International ou un Droit de Type Interne?, in QUELLE
EUROPE POUR LES DROrTS DE L'HOMME?, supra, at 17.
46. See Articles 13, 26, and 60 bfthe present text ofthe Convention, which will resurface
as Articles 13, 35, and 53 in the revised text of the ECHR when Protocol No. 11 comes into
force. See Emmanuel Decaux, Article 60, in LA CONVENTION EUROPtENNE DES DROITs DE
L'HOMME 897 (Emmanuel Decaux & Pierre-Henry Imbert eds., 1995) (analyzing Article 60);
Andrew Drzemczewski & Christos Giakoumopoulos, Article 13, in LA CONVENTION
EUROPtENNE DES DROrrS DE L'HOMME supra, at 455 (analyzing Article 13); Etienne Picard,
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In short, the revision of the Convention was necessitated by the increase
in the number of applications, their growing complexity, and the widening of
the Council of Europe's membership. The Convention was designed for ten
or twelve member states, and it is quite simply impossible for the prior moni-
toring arrangements to work effectively with the expected forty or more states
parties. Revision of the Convention control mechanism was therefore essen-
tial to strengthen its efficiency. The new system should, in particular, make
the machinery more accessible to individuals, speed up the procedure, and
make for greater efficiency. The credibility of the ECHR is at stake here.
Article 26, in LACONVENTIONEUROPtENNEDESDROITSDEL'HOMME, supra, at 591 (analyzing
Article 26).
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Appendix I
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
Detailed overview
New control mechanism Former control mechanism
Full-time Court Two distinct procedural stages before part-time Commission
and then before par-tme Court or Committee of Ministers
Inter-state Individual applications Individual applications: Inter-state
applications: Article 34 Artile 25 applications:
Article 33 1 1 11 Article 24
supervises execution
oflJudgment: Article 46 (2
L " J
-o CompuLsOy Jurisdiction
.........- -> Optional jurisdiction
->- Option procedure under Protocol No. 9
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Appendix II
The Council of Europe and Central and Eastern Europe
(as of May 6, 1998)
I. Membership of Organization: 40 countries (all of which have ratified the
ECHR)
16 new member States from Central and Eastern Europe:47
Hungary (Nov. 6, 1990)
Poland (Nov. 26, 1991)
Bulgaria (May 7, 1992)
Estonia (May 14, 1993)
Lithuania (May 14, 1993)
Slovenia (May 14, 1993)
CzechRep. (June 30,1993)
Slovakia (June 30, 1993)
Romania (Oct. 7, 1993)
6 applications for membership:
Armenia (Mar. 7, 1996)
Azerbaijan (July 13, 1996)
Belarus (Mar. 12, 1993;
but see III below)
Latvia (Feb. 10, 1995)
Albania (July 13, 1995)
Moldova (July 13, 1995)
Ukraine (Nov. 9, 1995)
"the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia" (Nov. 9, 1995)
Russian Federation (Feb. 28, 1996)
Croatia (Nov. 6, 1996)
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Apr. 10, 1995)
Georgia (July 14, 1996)
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Mar. 18, 1998)
II. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
16 ratifications:
Bulgaria (Sept. 7, 1992)
Hungary (Nov. 5, 1992)
Czech Rep. (Jan. 1, 1993) '
Slovakia (Jan. 1, 1993)"8
Poland (Jan. 19, 1993)
Romania (June 20, 1994)
Slovenia (June 28, 1994)
Lithuania (June 20, 1995)
Estonia (Apr. 16, 1996)
Albania (Oct. 2, 1996)
"the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia" (Apr. 10, 1997)
Latvia (June 27, 1997)
Ukraine (Sept. 11, 1997)
Moldova (Sept. 12, 1997)
Croatia (Nov. 5, 1997)
Russian Federation (May 5, 1998)
47. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a member from February 21, 1991 to
December 31, 1992.
48. TheCzech and SlovakFederalRepublicwasaContractingPartyfromMarch 18, 1992
to December 31, 1992. Following declarations made by the Czech Republic and by Slovakia of
their intention to succeed the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and to consider themselves
bound by the ECHR as of January 1, 1993, the Committee of Ministers decided on June 30, 1993
that these states are to be regarded as Parties to the Convention effective January 1, 1993.
Similarly, these states are bound as ofJanuary 1, 1993 by the declarations made by the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic (Mar. 18, 1992) with respect to Articles 25 and 46 of the Convention.
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All of the above countries accepted the right of individual petition (Arti-
cle 25) and compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
(Article 46), pending entry into force of Protocol No. 11, ECHR on Novem-
ber 1, 1998.
III. Special Guest Status with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe
Armenia (Jan. 26, 1996); Azerbaijan (June 28, 1996); Bosnia-Herzego-
vina (Jan. 28, 1994); and Georgia (May 28, 1996) have Special Guest Status.
Special Guest Status, given to Belarus on September 16, 1992, was suspended
on January 13, 1997.
Special Guest Status was introduced by the Parliamentary Assembly in
1989 to forge closer links with the Parliaments of Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Guest Status Parliaments send delegations reflecting different
currents of opinion to plenary sessions in Strasbourg and to committee meet-
ings.
IV. Co-operation programs:4 9
The Council of Europe's co-operation programs were set up with two
aims: reinforcing, consolidating and expediting the democratic reform pro-
cess in the beneficiary countries and facilitating the gradual and harmonious
integration of these countries into the structures of European co-operation,
primarily the Council of Europe. In the human rights field, co-operation
focuses on promoting conformity and implementation of the major human
rights treaties, especially the ECHR. This co-operation includes expert con-
sultations, training workshops, study visits, and providing documentation. It
is conducted with both governmental and nongovernmental partners.
All countries that are either member states of the Council of Europe or
have applied for membership may take part in co-operation activities (see
Section I, above), although some, having reached a certain level of develop-
ment, are gradually withdrawing from the program. (A limited number of co-
operation activities have also been implemented with Kyrgyzstan in 1996-
1997.)
The programs are all funded from a specific article in the Council of
Europe budget (Vote IX), totaling some eighty million French francs in 1998.
This is supplemented by voluntary contributions from a number of member
49. For a general overview, see generally COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Doc. SG/Inf (98)1;
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Doc. H (95)9; Andrew Drzemczewski, The Council of Europe's Co-
operation and Assistance Programmes with Central and Eastern European Countries in the
Human Rights Field, 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 229 (1993). Concerning the ECHR, see generally
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Doc. H (96)12; Andrew Drzemczewski, Ensuring Compatibility of
Domestic Law with the European Convention on Human Rights Prior to Ratification: The
Hungarian Model, 16 HuM. RTS. L.J. 241 (1996).
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states, which make it possible to implement certain additional or expanded
activities. Moreover, a number of Joint Programs with the European Commis-
sion (Brussels) have been initiated in favor of Albania, the Baltic States
(currently covering Estonia and Latvia), the Russian Federation, and Ukraine
as well as in the field of minorities and the fight against organized crime and
corruption.
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Appendix I1
Timetable for the Election of Judges and Entry into Force
of Protocol No. 11, ECHR
I. November 1997




III. April 6, 1998
April 20-24, 1998
IV. May-October 1998
V. November 1, 1998
Submission of the list of candidates by
States Parties to the Committee of Minis-
ters and transmission of candidate lists to
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe
First set of personal interviews of candi-
dates by an Ad Hoc Sub-Committee to the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly
Election of thirty-one judges by the Par-
liamentary Assembly
Second set of personal interviews of can-
didates by an Ad Hoc Sub-Committee to
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Hu-
man Rights of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly
Election of remaining (eight) judges by
the Parliamentary Assembly
New court elected President and Vice-
President(s); started work on Rules of
court, setting up of chambers, settling
staffing arrangements, etc.
Protocol No. 11 entered into force; inau-
guration ceremony on November 3, 1998
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Appendix IV
Model Curriculum Vitae for Candidates Seeking Election to the




Date and place of birth
Nationality/ies
II. Education and academic and other qualifications
III. Professional activities
a. Details of judicial activities
b. Details of non-judicial legal activities
c. Details of all non-legal professional activities






VII. Publications and other works
(Indicate the total number of books and articles published but select
only the most important ones (maximum twelve))
VIII. Languages






IX. Other relevant information
50. See generally EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. 1082, supra note 17.
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Appendix V
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Informal procedure for the examination of candidature
for the election of judges
[Decision adopted by the Committee of Ministers on May 28, 1997]
The [Ministers'] Deputies agreed on the following informal procedure for the
examination of prospective candidatures for the election of Judges of the
European Court of Human Rights:
i. States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights are
invited to provide informally copies of the curriculum vitae of prospec-
tive candidates for election as members of the European Court of Human
Rights to the Deputies;
ii. An Ad Hoc group of the Deputies established for this purpose
will hold, in camera, an informal exchange of views on such candidates
before the lists are formally submitted to the Committee of Ministers for
transmission to the Parliamentary Assembly;
iii. It is understood that the results of this exchange of views would
neither bind governments, who would retain the right to present candi-
dates of their choosing, nor interfere with the Parliamentary Assembly's
function of electing judges from the lists provided.
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Appendix VI
RESOLUTION (97)951
ON THE STATUS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF
JUDGES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE
SET UP UNDER PROTOCOL No. 11 TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on September 10, 1997
at the 600th meeting of the Ministers'Deputies)
The Committee of Ministers, acting pursuant to Article 16 of the Statute
of the Council of Europe,
Having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on November 4, 1950 ("the Conven-
tion");
Having regard to Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, restructuring the
control machinery established thereby, signed at Strasbourg on May 11, 1994
("ProtocolNo. 11"), which establishes apermanentEuropean Court of Human
Rights ("the Court") to replace the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights;
Having regard to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities
of the Council of Europe, signed at Paris on September 2, 1949,
Resolves as follows:
Article 1
Elected members of the Court to be set up under Protocol No. 11 shall
enjoy the special status of "judges of the European Court of Human Rights"
("judges").
Article 2
In accordance with Article 51 of the Convention as amended by Protocol
No. 11, judges and adhocjudges appointed pursuant to Article 27 § 2 of the
Convention shall be entitled, during the exercise of their functions, to the
privileges and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute of the
Council of Europe and in the agreements made thereunder.
51. <http:llwww.coe.fr./cm/dec/1997/600/97x9.htm>.
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Article 3
The conditions of service ofjudges and adhocjudges shall be governed
by the provisional Regulations set out in appendices I and II respectively to
this Resolution. These provisional Regulations shall be reviewed by the
Committee of Ministers within the twelve months following the entry into
force of Protocol No. 11, on the proposal of the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe and in consultation with the President of the Court.
The provisional Regulations shall be implemented by the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe, who, for this purpose, shall act in consulta-
tion with the President of the Court and may have regard to the rules applied
concerning staff members of the Council of Europe.
Article 4
This Resolution shall enter into force on the same day as Protocol No. 11.
APPENDIX I TO RESOLUTION (97)9
PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF JUDGES
Article 1 -Annual salary
1. The all-inclusive annual salary ofjudges, as holders of a full-time office,
shall be 1,100,000 French francs, payable in equal monthly instalments in
advance.
2. Additional remuneration at the following annual rates shall be paid, on
apro rata temporis basis, to the following office-holders:
- the President of the Court: 75,000 French francs;
- the Vice-President of the Court and the Presidents of Chambers:
37,500 French francs.
3. The Committee of Ministers shall consider each year whether the forego-
ing amounts should be adjusted having regard to the evolution of the cost-of-
living in France.
4. The above salaries and remuneration shall be free of all taxation.52
52. At the 600th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies (September 10, 1997), the French
delegation stated that the exemption of Judges' salaries and remuneration from taxation had
been agreed to by all ministerial departments concerned by this question.
The French delegation also recalled that the requirements laid down in Article 53 of the
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Article 2- Place of residence
Judges shall reside at or near the seat of the Court.
Article 3 -Leave
i. Holiday leave
Judges shall be entitled to annual holiday leave of two-and-a-half work-
ing days per month of service.
For the purpose of calculating annual leave entitlement, periods of sick
leave during which judges are paid their salary, in full or in part, by the
Council of Europe in accordance with the general provisions contained in
paragraph ii of this Article, shall be considered as service. In the case of sick
leave occasioned by occupational injury, absences for health reasons lasting
a continuous period of up to one year shall be considered as service.
ii. Sick leave
The Administration of the Council of Europe shall be notified immedi-
ately, through the Registry of the Court, whenever judges are absent and
unable to perform their duties for health reasons and be supplied with appro-
priate medical certificates.
Judges who are absent on account of illness shall receive from the
Council of Europe:
- for the first three days: their full salary;
- thereafter and for a period of eighty-seven days: 90% of their salary;
- thereafter and for a period of ninety days: one-half of their salary.
At the end of the said period of ninety days, judges shall no longer be
remunerated by the Council of Europe.
Article 4 - Payment of expenses by the Council of Europe
1. The Council of Europe shall pay:
a. the travel and subsistence expenses of ajudge on an officialjourney;
b. travel, subsistence and removal expenses incurred byjudges and their
household (spouse and children) when taking up or on termination of
their duties.
French Constitution implied that the ratification and entry into force, with respect to France, of
the 6th Protocol to the General Agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Council of
Europe, which enshrines the principle of this exemption, can only take place once a law
authorizing such ratification has been passed.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1998)
2. On the death of a judge during his or her term of office, the Council of
Europe shall defray:
a. the cost of transporting the body of the judge from the place of death
to the place of funeral;
b. the cost of transporting the deceased judge's personal belongings;
c. the travel costs of the survivors who were dependent on the judge and
were part of the judge's household.
3. The rules issued by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
applicable to payment of expenses to staff members of the Council of Europe
shall apply to judges, save that the amounts payable in respect of travel and
subsistence expenses shall be governed by the rules issued by the Secretary
General applicable to the reimbursement of the expenses of members of the
Parliamentary Assembly and Ministers' Deputies when travelling at the
charge of the Council of Europe.
Article 5 - Social protection
1. Judges are required to ensure that they have arranged, at their own
expense, for adequate insurance cover of the following risks, for the full
period of their terms of office:
- temporary incapacity to work due to illness or accident - the cover
must be such as to replace the loss of salary indicated under Article 3,
paragraph ii above;
- costs ofhealth care, including maternity expenses, for themselves and
their dependants;
- permanent incapacity to work due to an illness or an accident;
- death.
Judges are also required to provide, at their own expense, for their
retirement or pension benefits as regards the period of their-terms of office.
2. Judges shall provide the Council of Europe at the beginning of each year
with proof that they have adequate coverage of the risks listed above. The
Council of Europe will make available proposals for an insurance policy
which covers the risks, the full premium to be paid by judges.
APPENDIX II TO RESOLUTION (97)9
PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF AD HOC JUDGES
1. For each day on which they exercise their functions ad hoc judges shall
receive an allowance of an amount equal to 1/365th of the annual salary
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payable to judges of the Court by virtue of Article 1 § 1 of Appendix I above.
The allowance shall be free of all taxation.53
2. The Council shall also reimburse to adhocjudges travel and subsistence
expenses incurred by them in connection with the performance of their func-
tions. The rules issued by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
applicable to the reimbursement of the expenses ofmembers of the Parliamen-
tary Assembly and Ministers' Deputies when travelling at the charge of the
Council of Europe shall apply.
53. At the 600th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies (September 10, 1997), the French
delegation stated that the exemption of Judges' salaries and remuneration from taxation had
been agreed to by all ministerial departments concerned by this question.
The French delegation also recalled that the requirements laid down in Article 53 of the
French Constitution implied that the ratification and entry into force, with respect to France, of
the 6th Protocol to the General Agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Council of
Europe, which enshrines the principle of this exemption, can only take place once a law
authorizing such ratification has been passed.
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Appendix VII
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Balanced representation of women and men in the
new European Court of Human Rights 4
The Deputies, in order to achieve a more balanced representation of women
and men in the new European Court of Human Rights, invited the govern-
ments of States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights:
i. to foster a more balanced representation of women and men when
drawing up the national lists of candidates to be put forward for election to the
Court;
ii. to ensure that the qualifications and experience of all the candidates
put forward, whether men or women, allow their candidatures to be taken into
consideration on an equal footing.
54. Declaration adopted by the Ministers' Deputies at their 593rd meeting on May 28,
1997. See EUR. PARt. Ass., Order No. 519, supra note 25; see also text accompanying note 25.
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Appendix VIII
Single Court Organizational Chart
Document Production,
Publications, Library
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Appendix I
RESOLUTION (98)35-
ON THE REGISTRY OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TO BE SET UP UNDER THE TERMS OF PROTOCOL No. 11 TO
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on Februaiy 18, 1998
at the 621st meeting of the Ministers'Deputies)
Having regard to Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on Human
Rights;
At the proposal of the Secretary General;
Having consulted the President of the European Court of Human Rights
and the President of the European Commission of Human Rights;
Having consulted the Staff Committee in accordance with Article 6,
paragraph 1, of the Regulations on Staff participation (Appendix I to the Staff
Regulations),
The Deputies:
1. decide that upon the date of entry into force of Protocol No. 11, the
Registry of the European Court of Human Rights will be established in
accordance with Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights as
amended by the said Protocol, in place of the Secretariat of the European
Commission of Human Rights and the Registry of the present European Court
of Human Rights;
2. approve in principle the transfer, as of the same date, of the staff allo-
cated at that date to the Secretariat of the European Commission of Human
Rights and the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, with their
posts, to the Registry of the new Court, it being understood that the Secretary
General is satisfied that the persons concerned are qualified for their new
tasks;
3. decide that, as from the date of entry into force of Protocol No. 11 and
for the period specified in Article 5, paragraph 3 thereof, the Secretariat of the
European Commission of Human Rights will be provided by the Registry of
the new Court.
55. <http://www.coe.fr./cm/ta/res/1998/98x3.htrn>.
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Appendix X
List of Judges Elected onto the New European Court of Human Rights
The following judges were elected by the Parliamentary Assembly in





























Mr. Kristaq TRAJA (3 years)
Mr. Josep CASADEVALL MEDRANO (3 years)
Dr. Willi FUHRMANN (3 years)
Frangoise TULKENS (6 years)
Mrs. Damianova BOUTOUCHAROVA-DOITCHEVA
(3 years)
Mrs. Nina VAJIC (6 years)
Mr. Loukis LOUCAIDES (3 years)
Mr. Karel JUNGWIERT (6 years)
Mr. Peer LORENZEN (3 years)
Mr. Rait MARUSTE (6 years)
Mr. Matti PELLONPAA (6 years)
Mr. Jean-Paul COSTA (6 years)
Mr. Georg RESS (6 years)
Mr. Christos L. ROZAKIS (6 years)
Mr. Andris BAKA (3 years)
Mr. Gaukur JORUNDSSON (6 years)
Mr. John I-EDIGAN (6 years)
Mr. Benedetto CONFORTI (3 years)
Mr. Egils LEVITS (3 years)
Mr. Lucius Conrad CAFLISCH (6 years)
Mr. Pranas KURIS (6 years)
Mr. Marc FISCHBACH (3 years)
Mr. Giovanni BONELLO (6 years)
Mr. Tudor PANTIRU (3 years)
Mrs. Wilhelmina THOMASSEN (6 years)
Mrs. Hanne Sophie GREVE (6 years)
Mr. Jerzy MAKARCZYK (6 years)
Mr. Ireneu CABRAL BARRETO (6 years)
56. Of the 39 judges elected, 20 have been given a six-year mandate and 19 have been
given a three-year mandate (as indicated in parentheses next to the name).
For a commentary concerning the new judges see Michel Aj, Juge europden, un metier
de pro, L'ALSACE, Feb. 24, 1998, at 1-2. See also, for a more thorough study, J.F. Flauss,
Radioscopie de l'dlection de la nouvelle Cour europienne des droits de l'homme, in REVUE
TRIvIESTRIELLE DES DRo1TS DE L'HOMME 435 (1998).














Mr. Corneliu BIRSAN (3 years)
Mr. Luigi FERRARIBRAVO (3 years)
Mrs. Viera STRAZNICKA (6 years)
Mr. Bostjan ZUPANCIC (3 years)
Mr. Antonio PASTOR RIDRUEJO (3 years)
Mrs. Elisabeth PALM (6 years)
Mr. Luzius WILDHABER (3 years)
Mrs. Margarita CACA-NIKOLOVSKA (3 years)
Mr. Riza TURMEN (3 years)
Mr. Volodymyr BUTKEVYCH (3 years)
Mr. Nicholas BRATZA (6 years)
The judge in respect of Russia has not yet been elected.
A NEW COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRASBOURG
Appendix X
Composition of the Grand Chamber
GRAND CHAMBER 1 GRAND CHAMBER 2
Mr. L. Wildhaber, President Mr. L. Wildhaber, President
Mrs. E. Palm, Vice-President, Mrs. E. Palm, Vice-President,
President of Chamber, Section 1 President of Chamber, Section 1
Mr. C. Rozakis, Vice-President, Mr. C. Rozakis, Vice-President,
President of Chamber, Section II President of Chamber, Section II
Mr. N. Bratza Mr. N. Bratza
President of Chamber, Section III President of Chamber, Section III
Mr. M. PellonpU Mr. M. PellonpMA
President of Chamber, Section IV President of Chamber, Section IV
Mr. B. Conforti Mr. L. Ferrari Bravo
Mr. A. Pastor Ridruejo Mr. G. J6rundsson
Mr. G. Bonello Mr. G. Ress
Vice-President of Chamber, Section IV
Mr. J. Makarczyk Mr. L. Caflisch
Mr. P. Kiris Mr. L. Loucaides
Mr. R. Ttlrmen Mr. I. Cabral Barreto
Mrs. F. Tulkens Mr. J.-P. Costa
Vice-President of Chamber, Section III
Mrs. V. Stranick Mr. W. Fuhrmann
Mr. C. Birsan Mr. K. Jungwiert
Mr. P. Lorenzen Mr. B. Zupan~i6
Mr. M. Fischbach Mrs. N. Vajid
Vice-President of Chamber, Section I
Mr. V. Butkevych Mr. J. Hedigan
Mr. J. Casadevall Mrs. W. Thomassen
Vice-President of Chamber, Section I
Mrs. H.S. Greve Mrs. M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska
Mr. A. Baka Mr. T. Pantiru
Mr. R. Maruste Mr. E. Levits
Mrs. S. Botoucharova Mr. K. Traja
(Russian judge)
Elected staff members of the Registry (see Articles 25 and 26 of the Convention and
Rules of Court, Rules 15-18; see <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr>):Registrar: Mr. M. de Salvia
Deputy Registrars: Mr. P. Mahoney (Grand Chamber Registrar)
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Human Rights in the United States Courts:
The Role of Lawyers
Steven M. Schneebaum*
The efforts of lawyers who represent clients in courts of the United States
have transformed the role of the international law of human rights. General
statements of policy have become the kind of law dispensed by American
judges in American courtrooms.
On one level, because the Bill of Rights codifies a very large and progres-
sive view of human rights and because the Bill of Rights is part of the Consti-
tution, which is the highest law of the land, it could be argued that in any case
invoking the Bill of Rights, the law of human rights has always been treated
as the rule of decision in U.S. courts. This Article does not address that kind
of case. Rather, this Article considers cases that, for one reason or another,
are not adequately resolved by appeals to the U.S. Constitution: cases in
which the international law of human rights is expressly cited as providing the
rule of decision. If there were no such cases, then it would be reasonable to
ask whether human rights law is anything more than aspirational and horta-
tory, a statement of hope for an improved future for everyone. But situations
in which international human rights law is actually the rule of decision that
determines whether the plaintiff wins or the defendant wins place us on the
road toward raising international human rights to the level of domestic law,
which determines the actual legal rights of actual living people.
Until 1979, the question whether the treaties of the United States that
have human rights elements are self-executing always framed the direct
application of human rights law before U.S. courts. In the 1950s, the Supreme
Court of California in Sei Fujii v. State' found that the human rights provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter are not self-executing: They cannot be
relied upon as generating the law of decision of a case without domestic
* B.A., Yale University, 1969; M.A., Oberlin College, 1970; B.A., Oxford University,
1976; M.C.L. (A.P.) The George Washington University, 1978. Partner, Patton Boggs LLP,
Washington, D.C.; Professorial Lecturer, The George Washington University Law School, and
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
1. 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 737 (1998)
legislative implementation.2 The Sei Fujii court concluded that the legislature
neVer enacted such measures?
Human rights law will seldom be useful law in U.S. courts if its use is
dependent upon the vehicle of a self-executing treaty to importtreaty language
into the courtroom. It will generally not be law in U.S. courts because the
treaties to which the United States is a party that contain human rights ele-
ments either expressly or by implication are not self-executing. Moreover, the
Congress of the United States has been slow at bringing international human
rights norms, beyond those that are already parts of U.S. law by virtue of the
Constitution, into American law.
In 1979, the case ofFilartiga v. Pena-Irala4 presented the following fact
pattern: A young Paraguayan woman, whose brother had been tortured to
death by the police of Asunci6n, saw the man who had allegedly committed
the murder on the streets of New York City.' She went to see a lawyer and
asked whether there might be any recourse against him in the U.S. courts for
the murder of her brother."
Because it has never been seriously contested, one can assume that the
murder was politically motivated. Specifically, it was an attempt by the police
of Asunci6n to strike out at the father of the boy who was killed: Joel
Filartiga, a physician and artist who was also a leading opposition figure in
Paraguay in the days of the Stroessner regime, which did not countenance
very much opposition.
Dolly Filartiga found the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York
City, whose lawyers had long dreamed of the case that would test the contours
of a statute enacted in 1789. That statute, passed immediately after the
adoption of the Constitution, was Section nine of the First Judiciary Act, 7 the
very same statute that led to Marbury v. Madison,8 in which the Supreme
Court of the United States first asserted its right to find legislative enactments
unconstitutional.' Section nine, now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides
2. See Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952) (stating that future legislation
clearly was needed).
3. Id. at 622.
4. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980). Although she did not
know it at the time, Pena-Irala was in the United States illegally.
6. See id. at 879 (stating that civil complaint was served on Pena-Irala).
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994)).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (finding that courts
resolve conflicts between Constitution and legislative acts).
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that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."' 0
Certainly the drafters of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)" did not
envisage lawsuits over torture of Paraguayans by Paraguayans in Paraguay.
Between 1789 and 1979, the statute was invoked successfully only twice:
first, in the 1790s, in a case that involved the slave trade, 2 and second, in
1960, in a child custody case from Maryland. 3 In the latter case, a parent had
kidnaped the child to whom the other parent had custody rights through the
use of a false passport. 4 The court held that it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter because this offense was the violation of international law that
the ATCA required.
In Filartiga, at first instance, Judge Eugene Nickerson felt that he had to
defer to the Second Circuit's decision in IITv. Vencap Ltd.,5 which required
that the plaintiff and the defendant had to be of different nationalities for inter-
national law to be implicated. 6 The IT court described § 1350 as a "legal
Lohengrin" because no one knows its true origins, and it held that the statute
did not confer federaljurisdiction absentan internationally recognized delict. 7
The terms of the ATCA are simple and straightforward. A tort suit is a
suit for a civil wrong, for an injury. An alien is a noncitizen. And so in the
case of Joel and Dolly Filartiga against Amerigo Pena-Irala, the police chief
from Asunci6n, the first two elements of jurisdiction under the ATCA were
met: The plaintiffs were aliens, and they were suing for the wrongful death
of their son and brother, a tort suit alleging a violation of personal rights. But
the third element required by the ATCA - that the tort must have been com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United States" -
was the element other plaintiffs had found problematic, and it was the chal-
lenge for the Filartiga plaintiffs and their counsel.
No treaty even arguably applied in Filartiga9 Therefore, the question
for the court was this: If, as the complaint alleged, the defendant actually did
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (originally enacted as Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
77 (1789)).
12. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
13. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clif, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D. Md. 1961).
14. Id. at 861.
15. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
17. IT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
19. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
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torture to death a seventeen-year-old boy because of the political views of his
father, then notwithstanding the fact that both victim and perpetrator were
Paraguayan and that the place where the injury occurred was Paraguay, was
international law violated?"
The plaintiffs argued that international human rights law now contains
a legally-enshrined prohibition against certain kinds of abuse, including
torture, regardless of nationality.2 ' According to them, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, and various other instruments, which are of legal significance even if
they are not treaties within the meaning of Article VI of the United States
Constitution, articulated this position.' They contended that virtually every
legal system in the world today contains a prohibition against torture.'
Furthermore, the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that
general principles recognized as law by civilized nations are a source of
international law.2'
Political developments in the late 1970s aided the Filartigas' arguments.
The President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, had recently proclaimed
before the General Assembly of the United Nations that the day was past
when nations could lawfully treat their own citizens in inhuman ways without
international consequences. Torture, President Carter suggested, violates
international law irrespective of the nationalities of those involved.
The three elements of ATCA jurisdiction, therefore, appeared to be
present, and it would have seemed to follow easily from that premise that the
court had the authority to try the case. However, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, in Brooklyn, where Pena-Irala
was detained in an Immigration and Naturalization Service holding facility,
dismissed it nonetheless. The court reluctantly concluded that, according to
such binding precedent as 1IT, a violation of international law may be found
only when the actor and victim are of different nationalities.' Judge Nicker-
son held that his hands were tied: As a matter of law, no international law
implications arise from actions by one citizen of a nation against another
citizen of the same nation.26
The Filartigas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in New York City. In a landmark opinion, Judge Kaufman
20. Id. at 884-85.
21. Id. at 879.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 880 (stating that virtually all nations denounce torture).
24. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(l)(c).
25. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. Id.
THE ROLE OFLA WYERS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 741
held that the legal premise underlying the trial court's resolution of the case,
if it had ever been correct, was no longer applicable." International law in the
closing decades of the twentieth century, he wrote, does include a prohibition
against certain kinds of actions even when performed by nations against their
own citizens.28
Judge Kaufman's resolution of Filartiga determined not only that interna-
tional law forbids torture by states of their own citizens, but also that these
legal provisions are part of the law of the United States.29 This latter aspect of
the decision is frequently overlooked, but it is vital to practicing lawyers: It
provided the roadmap for the invocation of human rights norms in domestic
cases.
The sources of international law at which the Filartiga court looked
included conventions that at the time had been signed but not ratified by the
United States. The court cited these conventions as evidence of customary
international law, as well as of general principles recognized by civilized
nations. Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties," however, the
fact that the United States had signed the conventions has an additional
significance: A signatory is forbidden to act in a manner inconsistent with a
treaty's object and purpose, even if it is not bound to its incidents.3 The court
therefore was correct to look at covenants of which the country was not a
party, as well as international instruments and General Assembly resolutions,
including the Universal Declaration, both because they are relevant to the
general international obligations of the United States and because they may
constitute elements of customary international law.
The Second Circuit placed particular emphasis on general principles,
citing constitutions and basic laws that condemn torture.32 It located custom-
ary law just as the International Court of Justice would, by identifying state
practice and opiniojuris.33 Filartiga, therefore, does not shed modem light
on the old question of whether any of the international human rights instru-
ments are self-executing. Scholars continue to debate this issue, but judges
have largely left it alone.
According to the normal method of textual analysis, however, it would
appear that at least key provisions of the human rights treaties are self-execut-
27. See id. at 884 (stating that distinction between aliens and citizens is clearly incon-
sistent with current international law).
28. Id. at 884-85.
29. Id. at 885-87.
30. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
31. Id. art. 18.
32. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. Id. at 883-84; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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ing. Frequently, in giving its advice and consent to the President in the process
of treaty ratification, the Senate expresses the view that a particular treaty, or
a particular provision of a treaty, is not self-executing. However, there is no
reason to assign to that expression of opinion any particular legislative force.
The courts can disregard it without fear, because the views of one house of the
legislature do not make laws under the Constitution, and it is treaties, not
resolutions of the Senate, that are "the Supreme Law of the Land."34
The process of determining when treaties are self-executing is similar to
deciding when statutes provide a private right of action. The analysis con-
cerns the precision of the instrument's language, its identification of a target
"zone of protected interests," the extent to which implementing legislation is
necessary to make sense of the textual provisions, and so on." Even without
arguing that SeiFujii was wrongly decided, and it may not have been, because
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter call expressly for legislative or other mea-
sures to give them content,36 one could defend the proposition that such
treaties as the Torture Convention are self-executing.
Finally, in Filartiga, it was not necessary as a matter of strict logic to
find treaties to be self-executing because the plaintiffs were not seeking to
invoke private rights allegedly created by treaties. The point was not that
Paraguay violated a treaty in the torture of Joelito Filartiga; it was that his
torture and murder by Amerigo Pena-Irala were nevertheless violations of the
law of nations. That is all that § 1350 requires, and it is all that Judge
Kaufnan ultimately held.
The federal courts of the United States are courts of special jurisdiction:
A jurisdictional basis under the Constitution must be present for any case to
be brought in federal court. The Constitution lists the kinds of cases that the
federal judiciary may hear;37 the state courts are competent otherwise. Gen-
erally, simple torts, contract breaches, divorces, and will contests do not
present federal cases. No jurisdictional hook allows these matters to be
brought in federal court.
The bases for bringing cases in federal, as opposed to state, court are very
few. Federal jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens
of different states, or if one of them is an American and the other a foreigner,
and the amount in controversy exceeds a statutory ceiling, currently $75,000.
31
The other primary basis for bringing cases into federal court is that the com-
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
36. See'U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (stating that United Nations will promote general human
rights and freedom); U.N. CHARTER art. 56 (stating that members pledge to take actions to
achieve goals of general human rights and freedom).
37. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994).
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plaint raises a question of interpretation or application of federal law.39 If a
case does not come within one of those categories, it is extremely unlikely that
a federal court can hear it.
40
In Filartiga, the plaintiff and defendant were both foreigners,41 so diver-
sity jurisdiction was not present. Nor could it be said that the case "arose
under" the ATCA, which does not create causes of action, but merely channels
cases arising in tort into the federal courts.42 Therefore, Judge Kaufman
reasoned, even if the three prerequisites for § 1350 jurisdiction were present
in Filartiga, the court could still be powerless to hear it.43 For that reason, he
demonstrated in his famous decision that the case did present a federal ques-
tion, because it arose under international law, which is part of the law of the
United States."4
Through that logic, Judge Kaufrman not only established the basis for
federal jurisdiction in Filartiga, but also laid the groundwork for subsequent
developments in § 1350 jurisprudence. Judge Kaufman started from the
premise that international law, whether conventional or customary, has long
been recognized as part of U.S. law.45 Mr. Justice Gray, as long ago as 1900,
specifically so held in The Paquete Habana:46 International law is part of the
law of the United States, to be invoked whenever needed to decide a case, just
like any other provision of law.47
Filartiga was such a case: A case in which interpretation and application
of international law, and an understanding of what international law is, are
vital to the determination of whether the plaintiff wins or the defendant wins,
and even to the threshold question of whether the door of the courthouse is
open or closed. Judge Kaufman's conclusion that customary international law
is federal common law meant that deciding Filartiga did not create constitu-
tional problems because, although there was no diversity of citizenship, the
case did arise under federal law, and specifically, the international law of
human rights.48
39. Id. § 1331.
40. Other exceptional categories of federal jurisdiction under the Constitution include
cases involving admiralty, diplomatically protected persons, actions brought by or against the
United States, and cases between states.
41. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (granting jurisdiction to federal courts).
43. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (finding that Alien Tort Claims Act does not grant new
rights, but presents opportunity for adjudication).
44. Id. at 887-88.
45. Id at 887.
46. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
47. ThePaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
48. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1980).
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On remand in Filartiga, another development followed, which was as
dramatic as the Second Circuit's decision and was really quite inspiring.
While Judge Kaufman had held that there was federal jurisdiction to hear this
case, he did not decide the merits, as there had not yet been a trial.4 9 The case
was remanded to the Eastern District of New York for that purpose.5
By that time, Pena-Irala, who had ceased to contest his deportation, was
out of the country." According to reports, he went back to Paraguay and
immediately fled from there to Brazil: Paraguay did not want him either. No
defendant appeared in court, and a default judgment was taken. 2 The Magis-
trate Judge to whom that procedure was assigned required the plaintiffs to
present evidence in support of their claims. 3 They presented witnesses who
testified about what had happened and about the terrible impact of the boy's
murder on them. At the end of the trial, the Magistrate Judge issued an
opinion finding that there had been a wrongful death and that damages were
to be awarded, but he declined to award punitive damages, as international
law, he said, does not recognize that concept." He also reduced the plaintiffs'
claims for pain and suffering and other "moral damages" because he con-
cluded that the law of Paraguay, where the incident occurred, does not recog-
nize such awards.5 He reduced the $10 million judgment sought to approxi-
mately $500,000.
When a case is assigned to a Magistrate Judge for a preliminary decision,
either party is free to take an appeal to the District Judge. Accordingly, the
Filartigas appealed to Judge Nickerson. Judge Nickerson's decision on
remand56 is inspiring, both as prose and as legal scholarship. He determined
that the Magistrate Judge had erred in applying the law of Paraguay; the
proper law in this type of case is international law because the acts com-
plained of were wrongs under international law, and the rules of international
law must therefore be the rules of decision.57 To do otherwise, Judge
Nickerson wrote, would be to hold that international law is "a mere set of
benevolent yearnings never to be given effect."5" International law is law, he
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 880 (stating that Pena-Irala returned to Paraguay).
52. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
53. See id. (stating that question of damages was referred to magistrate judge).
54. Id. at 864.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 860.
57. Id. at 863.
58. Id.
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held, and as such it is to be applied to real cases. Judge Nickerson awarded
millions of dollars in damages, which obviously were never paid.59
The concept of a federal common law that is unwritten, which exists
alongside the enactments of Congress, even if it is limited in scope, is not
unfamiliar. One of its primary components is customary international law,
which is binding both on and in the United States. Therefore, even if a case
presented a human rights issue, but did not have an alien plaintiff or did not
sound in tort and therefore would not satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites
of § 1350, federal jurisdiction could nevertheless be found under constitu-
tional principles that permit the federal courts to hear cases "arising under the
laws of the United States."
Since 1979, a number of other key decisions have begun to fill in the
outline and the contours of human rights law as law of decision. In the years
immediately following Filartiga, a large number of Cuban refugees reached
the shores of Florida. Following an off-hand remark by the United States
President to the effect that Cubans were always welcome here, Fidel Castro
expelled over 100,000 of his country's citizens. This gave Castro an opportu-
nity to discard those he considered to be the detritus of his civilization, mainly
inmates of mental hospitals or jails, and those whose political views were
troublesome to his regime.
When the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
processed these individuals after they came on shore, INS officials asked the
refugees a series of questions, one of which was whether they had ever
committed a crime. Most of the "Mariel boatlift" refugees - who were, after
all, in large part prisoners - knew that the proper answer to that question was
"no." Because Castro did not send prison records along with the "Marielitos,"
the INS could not verify the answers. But occasionally one would tell the
truth. A man by the name ofFernando Rodriguez-Femandez was one of them.
He confessed that he had committed two crimes in Cuba: He stole a suitcase
in a bus station, and he attempted a prison break after his conviction for the
theft.60
The INS considered these to be crimes of moral turpitude and on that
basis determined that Rodriguez-Fernandez was to be excluded from the
United States.6' Although he was detained, as irony would have it, in Fort
Leavenworth in Kansas, very near the geographical center of the country, as
an excluded alien, he was notionally not on United States soil at all.62
59. See id. at 867 (awarding total judgment of $10,385,364).
60. Rodriguez-Femandezv. Wilkinson, 654F.2d 1382, 1384(10th Cir. 1981), aff'g 505
F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
61. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505F. Supp. at 789.
62. Id.
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After he was in Fort Leavenworth for a considerable while, with no
apparent prospect for his release, lawyersacting on his behalf petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his confinement. 3 They argued that he
had not been convicted of a crime, that he had not been afforded due process
(in fact, he had had no process at all except that which went into the determi-
nation of excludability), and that he had not received a trial in the United
States." The question presented to the court was whether the United States
was violating his human rights by detaining him, potentially indefinitely, in
a federal penitentiary."
All precedent, including decisions of the Supreme Court in Cold War
cases, said that an excluded alien had no rights whatsoever.6 The U.S. gov-
ernment, therefore, found itself defending the proposition that excluded aliens
were essentially not people: They had no legal rights and therefore no legal
remedies. The government was unable to respond to an absurd proposition
that seemed to follow from its argument: that it could do medical experimen-
tation on excluded aliens, or that it could torture them. The United States
contended that the precedents that restricted the rights of excluded aliens were
binding on the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, before
whom the Rodriguez-Fernandez case came. 7 On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Denver, sitting in the very same
court building in which the Timothy McVeigh trial was to take place years
later, the government reiterated the argument that the court's hands were tied
under the system of stare decisis that rules in this country." Courts, it said,
have to obey the law as laid down by higher courts, meaning that the Tenth
Circuit was bound to conclude that this man, an excluded alien, was without
rights that could be enforced against the government.
A very wise judge in Kansas, who had probably never encountered an
international law case before in his career, said that the government's position
was clearly inconsistent with the character of the United States.69 It was
impossible to conclude, he held, that a human being, physically present within
the borders of the United States, is literally without legal rights.7 ° He said that
any logic that leads to such an impossible conclusion must have a flawed
63. Id. at 788.
64. Id. at 790.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (finding that excluded
alien is entitled only to process that Congress affords).
67. Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 794 (D. Kan. 1980).
68. See Rodriguez-Fernandezv. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382,1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating
that linchpin of government case was Supreme Court opinion).
69. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795, 799.
70. Id. at 799.
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premise, and therefore, that the premises should be reexamined.7" Every
human being has a core of human rights just by virtue of being human.72
There could be no derogation from thejus cogens norms that protect those
rights.
To the extent that a right by definition entails a remedy and that they are
the obverse and the reverse of the same definitional coin, the Rodriguez-
Fernandez holding meant that even excluded aliens may come before a United
States federal court to complain that they have certain rights and that the
United States government is violating those rights. The Reagan Administra-
tion's Department of Justice did not want such a blunt decision to go in the
books, under which a federal court would actually order the freeing of a
detained alien under these circumstances. The Tenth Circuit issued a very
well-written, powerful decision, but the courts stopped short of actually
ordering that Rodriguez-Femandez be released. Ninety days later, the Justice
Department "voluntarily" released him.7'
The days following the case that came to be reported under the name
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson were very heady days for human rights
lawyers. It looked as if a whole revolution had occurred between Filartiga
andRodriguez-Fernandez. Within two years, United Statesjudges had woken
up, the scales had fallen from their eyes, and suddenly they were aware of a
new source of law and a new source of protection for individuals in the
international law of human rights.
Legal systems, however, do not change like that: They evolve much
more glacially, and this area was to be no exception. Throughout the 1980s,
some of the more optimistic claims for human rights law underwent a gradual
erosion. Events in Central America, and especially the activities of the
United States in Nicaragua, caused human rights activists to assume extreme
positions in attempting to concoct international human rights theories that
would, they thought, enable judges to overturn aspects of U.S. foreign policy
as unconstitutional or illegal. In one case, plaintiffs' counsel told a federal
judge that U.S. policy in Nicaragua was inconsistent with binding norms of
international law that forbid war.74 Advocates in the human rights movement
actually appeared to believe that an American judge, wearing a black robe, in
a courtroom at 3rd Street and Constitution Avenue in Washington, or in the
federal building in Hammond, Indiana, or Cedar Rapids, Iowa, would pick up
his or her gavel and pronounce the words, "Because the United Nations
71. Id. at 798.
72. Id. at 799.
73. Free at Last, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 10, 1981, at 1.
74. Sanchez-Espinozav. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Charter forbids war, the plaintiff has adequately demonstrated to my satisfac-
tion that U.S. foreign policy of supporting the contras in Nicaragua is illegal,
and I hereby enjoin it. Call the next case!"
Such a result was and is inconceivable: It was never going to happen,
partly because human rights activists did not properly focus our youthful
exuberance and partly because the cases were just not powerful cases. One
case in particular stands out as marking a real problem for the emergence of
human rights law as the law of decision in domestic litigation: Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic.75
The Tel-Oren plaintiffs were the surviving victims and the representa-
tives of those killed in the bombing of a bus in the north of Israel, allegedly
by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).76 They brought their action
under the ATCA, alleging that terrorism is a violation of the law of nations.'
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the following four defendants: the PLO, the government of
Libya, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine Infor-
mation Office.78 The last two defendants are American lobbying organiza-
tions that have headquarters in Washington. They send out leaflets and go to
cocktail parties on the Hill and argue for their point of view on legislative and
executive policy. The government of Libya is, of course, a sovereign entity,
which, whether one likes it or not, has certain rights in the courts, including
the right of sovereign immunity. The PLO is without legal personality, at
least under the laws of the United States.
Tel-Oren was, therefore, a difficult case from the beginning, and it should
have been dismissed summarily simply because the only two defendants who
could actually be forced to appear before the court were, at best, remotely
connected with the substance of the case. Furthermore, the two defendants
who may have been responsible for what happened, the PLO and Libya, were
not before the court. The case could and should have been resolved on that
basis. But it was not.
Tel-Oren was dismissed in the district court on the grounds that the
norms of international law on which the plaintiffs relied are not "self-execut-
ing."79 Specifically, according to Judge Joyce Hens Green, unless the norm
of international law that forbids terrorism, assuming such a norm can be
demonstrated, also includes the agreement of nations that it can be enforced
75. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
76. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam),
affg 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
77. Id.
78. Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 544.
79. Id.at549,551.
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through private actions in municipal courts, then the plaintiff has no legal
right to assert.8"
Judge Green's decision was plainly inconsistent with the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in Filartiga. The principle that the international law of human
rights may not be used as the law of decision in a case unless the relevant
international norm itself provides for a private right of action - an explicit
provision that a norm can be enforced in the courts - entails logically that
international human rights law is not law at all. Not even the prohibition
against torture in Filartiga was found to contain a license for private rights of
action. Because it derives from custom and not text, there is nothing in the
norm condemning torture that has, after a hypothetical Article X, paragraph 1,
"Nations are forbidden to torture anyone including their own citizens," a
paragraph 2 that says, "This provision shall be enforceable in any domestic
court with personal jurisdiction over a torturer." Customary international law
simply does not develop or operate in that manner.
The decision of the United States Court of Appealslfor the D.C. Circuit
was per curiam, and three separate, passionate, and highly divergent opinions
of Judges Edwards, Bork, and Robb followed the decision." The divisions
among thejudges, as well as the complexities in the Tel-Oren facts, weakened
the case's authoritativeness. But Tel-Oren did demonstrate that human rights
activists could nottake a sound understanding of international law among U.S.
judges for granted. Promoting the international law of human rights as the
law of decision in U.S. courtrooms was going to require no small amount of
effort, including that ofeducatingthejudiciary. Some human rights advocates
attempted to take that stricture seriously. They have been somewhat success-
ful on two fronts: the judicial, and the legislative.
In the mid-1980s, at the strong urging of various non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), Congress passed the Torture Victims Protection Act
of 1991 (TVPA),8 - which locks the result in Filartiga into statutory law. The
TVPA provides that victims of torture in foreign countries may bring tort
cases against their abusers over whom the courts of the United States have
personal jurisdiction.83 It provides a statute of limitations, lays down proce-
dures for service of process, and resolves other technical issues that might
otherwise bar a potential torture victim plaintiff's cause of action." But it is
limited to state-sponsored or state-endorsed torture: It does not assist victims
80. Id. at 549.
81. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
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of apartheid, disappearance, or female genital mutilation,85 whose human
rights abuse cases might someday come before the courts.
Some human rights lawyers, including this author, thought that the legis-
lative initiative to enact the TVPA was counterproductive and had absolutely
no chance of success. They thought that having Jesse Helms and others
denouncing it on the floor of the Senate not only would kill the bill, but would
be the death knell for the Filartiga holding itself. They imagined that the
speeches that Helms and others would give, condemning the interference of
foreigners in our American judiciary, would be cited in every domestic case
involving the international law of human rights forever. But they were wrong:
The bill passed. The President signed it. Progress was therefore made on the
legislative front.
At the same time, one of the lessons of Filartiga actually came to be
internalized by the judiciary. During the oral argument one of the judges
asked counsel representing the Filartigas the following question: Because the
defendant apparently does not have much money, what was the point of this
high-profile case, other than getting your name in the newspapers? Peter
Weiss answered that the point was to send a message that the United States
is not a haven for people like Pena-Irala. People who torture are not welcome
here, and if they come here, they will be pursued by their victims, who will
use the full arsenal of the United States judicial process to defend and to
vindicate their rights.86
Weiss's prediction turned out to be accurate. Ferdinand Marcos came to
the United States and was sued. 7 He and his estate had to go through a
full-blown trial in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii,
in which witness after witness took the stand and testified about torture and
mistreatment at the hands of Ferdinand Marcos. A judgment was entered
against the Marcos estate and, this time, there is a real prospect not only that
they will have some kind of psychological closure, but that human rights
abuse victims-will be compensated by their tormentors with real dollars.88
The recent decision of the Second Circuit involving Radovan Karadzic89
also constitutes an important part of the good news. The plaintiffs were
85. Id.
86. At oral argument, a similarly troublesome question was asked of the defendant's
counsel: Why make such an issue out ofjurisdiction in the federal courthouse when no question
existed that jurisdiction over the defendant would have been proper in the state supreme court,
just across Foley Square in lower Manhattan? The court pointed out that, to assert jurisdiction
in state court, all the Filartigas needed was a live defendant who was properly served and a
proper allegation that the defendant had done something wrong.
87. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 503 (affirming judgment).
89. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
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people generally who claimed to have been subjected to ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia, and women who claimed to have been the victims specifically of
systematic rape and other sexual violence. 0 Both groups sued Karadzic
personally for the campaign of human rights violations of which he was the
architect.9 He was served with process in the lobby of the Hotel Inter-Conti-
nental on East 48th Street in New York City.'
The plaintiffs brought suit against Karadzic in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan under the ATCA
and also the TVPA 3 The plaintiffs made the same arguments that the plain-
tiffs made in Filartiga: They were aliens, their case was one in tort, and the
actions that injured them constituted violations of international law.94
At the threshold, it was necessary to determine whether or not Karadzic
was properly served.95 Apparently, the process server attempted to hand
Karadzic the papers, but they fell at his feet after his security guards inter-
vened.96 He claimed not only that the service was ineffective, but also that he
was entitled to diplomatic immunity, not least because he was in New York
in connection with official business at the United Nations.97 In any event, it
was resolved that the service was effective.98
Karadzic did not attempt to argue that the horrible events alleged in the
complaint had not happened. Presented by Ramsey Clark, a former Attorney
General of the United States and the son of a Supreme Court justice, Karad-
zic's argument was much cleverer than that. Karadzic contended that he is not
bound by international law." International law, he argued, is not simply a set
of abstract normative propositions. In order to understand what international
law is, one has to know to whom it is addressed. Torture, after all, is an
internationally cognizable wrong only by virtue of who is doing it. Purely
private acts do not fall within the scope of international law."° So, if one
should have the misfortune to be gunned down on the streets of Washington,
or to be blown up in a federal office building in Oklahoma City, however
90. Id. at 23 6-3 7.
91. Id. at237.
92. Id. at 246.
93. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
94. Id. at 739.
95. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996).
96. Id. at 246.
97. Id. at 247.
98. Id.
99. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
100. See id. (stating that only state actors come within purview of § 1350).
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dreadful that might be, no violation of international law has occurred. Torture
is different from mere thuggery, which may be criminal by all means, but it
is criminal only under municipal law.
Karadzic's argument was an interesting position for an individual who
considered himself to be the head of state of the so-called Republika Srpska,
the Bosnian Serb entity. An obvious inconsistency exists between Karadzic's
contention that service on him was improper because he was a diplomati-
cally-protected person attending a meeting of the United Nations in his
official capacity and the argument that he is not a subject of international law,
but rather a private actor.
Nevertheless, Judge Peter Leisure of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York agreed with Karadzic's position, and he
held that to be bound by international law, one must have international legal
personality.101 For an individual, international legal personality depends upon
the actual or at least apparent authority to act on behalf of, in connection with,
or under the umbrella of a state. Concluding that Karadzic's Republika
Srpska is not a state, inter alia, because it is not widely recognized, Judge
Leisure held that the acts were simply those of a gang of outlaws, just like a
gang on the streets of Washington or Los Angeles or in the hills of Burma. 2
What happened to these plaintiffs may have been terrible and appalling, said
Judge Leisure, and the acts themselves may have violated every norm of
civilized conduct known, but there are no logically compelled international
legal implications of even outrageous misconduct unless it was committed by
or on behalf of an international legal person. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a cause of action against
Radovan Karadzic.'O The Second Circuit held that there is no presumption
that international law imposes obligations only on states and not on individu-
als, much less on groups organized under arms for the purpose of taking
political power.'05 Situations in which international law bound individuals
have always existed - piracy, abduction of ambassadors, and the trade in
101. See id. at 741 (finding that § 1350 does not redress acts of torture engaged in by
private individuals).
102. See id. (finding that Karadzic's faction did not act under color of any state law).
103. Id. at 740-41.
104. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 247 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996). The case in New York is civil in nature, and therefore it has no preclusive effect con-
cerning the possibility of a subsequent criminal prosecution of Karadzic before the Tribunal in
The Hague.
105. See id. at 239 (holding that certain conduct violates international law whether under-
taken by state or private actors).
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slaves- are all international offenses that only individuals can commit.'0 6 The
addition to this list of new internationally-cognizable offenses that can be
committed only by individuals in the late twentieth century is merely building
on what has always been the law. Human rights abuses ofat least certain types,
when committed by individuals in circumstances that otherwise give rise to
international implications - not on the streets of Detroit, for example, but on
the streets of Sarajevo, where there are foreign armies and where international
politics is being waged - are sufficient to create violations of international
dimension out of what would otherwise be acts of simple criminality.
The Supreme Court of the United States declined to review the decision,
and it therefore stands as law, albeit only of the Second Circuit (New York,
Vermont, and Connecticut)."°7 The Second Circuit, however, is avery author-
itative one, and it is the Second Circuit, after all, that began this trend toward
the use of human rights norms as the law of decision in U.S. courtrooms in
Filartiga. There is reason to hope, therefore, that Doe v. Karadzic is the wave
of the future.
Positive developments have emerged even since the Karadzic decision.
International human rights scholars have begun to turn their attention to a
potentially fruitful area, both to remedy and to deter violations: attempting to
hold private American corporations thatjoint-venture with repressive regimes
liable for the foreseeable human consequences of their activities. In a current
case in California, for example, a group of Burmese victims of human rights
abuses has filed suit under the ATCA and the TVPA against UNOCAL, which
apparently has a joint venture with the governing junta in Burma, almost
universally condemned for its illegality and brutality, to construct a natural
gas pipeline.'0° The plaintiffs claim to represent various classes of people
who they allege were abused in connection with carrying out the joint ven-
ture's objectives: people who were forced into slavery or porterage, who were
uprooted from their homes, whose villages were destroyed, and who were
raped and killed.0 9
Sovereign immunity almost certainly prevents a suit against the govern-
ment of Burma in such a case. A government has not been the defendant in
any of the successful human rights cases. Under current law, sovereign
immunity means that governments are simply not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the courts unless certain enumerated exceptions apply."0 The degree to
106. Id.
107. See Karadzic v. Kadic, 518 U.S. 1005, 1005 (1996) (denying certiorari).
108. Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883-84 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
109. Id. at 883.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994); Argentine Republic v. Amerada-Hess Shipping, 488 U.S.
428,439 (1989) (findingthatimmunity appliesunless case comeswithin enumerated exception).
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which conduct was reprehensible, however, is not sufficient to create an
exception.
There may be nojudicial remedy against the Burmese governing junta for
whatever might have happened on that pipeline, however, a remedy against
the junta's American business partner could be possible. The common law
decrees that if one participant in a joint pursuit commits a tort in the course
of pursuing the shared objective, both are liable because they were engaged
in a common venture. The argument in UNOCAL is that an immune defendant
and a nonimmune defendant conspired together, and the nonimmune defen-
dant can be sued and is liable. The federal trial court in California denied
UNOCAL's motion to dismiss,' and this case is proceeding.
UNOCAL's lawyers will have some serious problems. Even if they are
confident that they can file powerful motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment, they are still going to have to take depositions, to produce docu-
mentary evidence, and to show all of their books and records in connection
with the building of the pipeline. Moreover, a resolution to the effect that a
private actor can be held jointly responsible with a government that abuses
human rights is, in any event, a major development of human rights law.
Yet, for all the good news about the use of human rights law in American
courtrooms, there is still no progress in bringing the techniques and the
content of international law to bear on the most egregious human rights viola-
tions committed by the United States itself on a systematic basis. Challenges
founded in the emerging respect for the international law of human rights have
not been successful.
In the least defensible systematic abuse of human rights in the United
States -the use of the death penalty - absolutely no inroads from international
human rights law have permitted. Several years ago, the Supreme Court, in
one of the last times it removed an entire class of people from death row, held
that it was unconstitutional to execute someone who was under the age of
sixteen at the time of commission of the crime. The Court struck down an
Oklahoma law that permitted the execution of juveniles,' but in so doing
went out of its way to ignore all the friends of the Court who had argued that
international law provides an independent but compelling basis to forbid that
kind of state action. The Supreme Court held that the execution of juveniles
was inconsistent only with U.S. domestic constitutional law making not even
a passing reference to the international authorities. The Supreme Court
111. UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 897.
112. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (finding that imposition of
death penalty for acts committed by person under age 16 violates Eighth Amendment of
Constitution). But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding that imposition
of death penalty on persons age 16 or above did not violate Constitution).
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foreclosed any hope that the Court would ever expand the prohibition beyond
that sixteen-year-old age limit."'
Another area in which international human rights law was dramatically
held not to have any relevance to evaluation of conduct of the United States
involved the kidnaping (the government prefers the locution "irregular rendi-
tion") of a fugitive from Mexico: UnitedStates v. Alvarez-Machain.,4 In that
case, representatives of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) entered the territory of Mexico, a country with which we have an
extradition treaty, captured someone suspected of killing a DEA agent and
abducted him into the United States, where he was brought before the United
States District Court for the Central District of California to stand trial. 1 5 He
challenged the ability of the court to try him on the grounds that his appear-
ance was obtained illegally, but he failed." 6 The court held that it did not
matter why or how he came to be there, and it rejected the claim that his
presence was procured only by way of a violation of international law and that
therefore the trial could not lawfully proceed.' 7
In the Supreme Court of the United States, six out of ninejustices agreed
with the district court. They found that although the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty (the Treaty) provides procedures for extraditing suspected criminals,
nothing in the Treaty says that those procedures are exclusive."' The United
States, reasoned the Court, retains the power to do whatever is not expressly
forbidden, and the victim of this international abduction has absolutely no
right to insist that the Treaty's provisions be honored." 9 The irony in this
case is that when Alvarez-Machain was finally tried, he was acquitted. The
precedent, however, endures as another example of a double standard in the
use of human rights law in the courts, with the United States not held account-
able under the same rules applicable to other nations.
Considerable improvement over the last twenty years in the use of
international human rights law in the courts of the United States has occurred.
Judges increasingly take notice of international law arguments in broader
113. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States
and the governor of Virginia both denied the relevance of international law to death penalty
decisions, even those involving foreigners. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (per
curiam); International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M. 810 (Interim Protection Order of Apr. 9, 1998).
114. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).




119. Id. at 668-69.
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contexts, for example, in evaluating prison conditions: They have been
invoked in cases alleging that conditions of detention constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. The courts will look to conventions that the United
States has signed, whether or not they are self-executing, at least to assist in
the definition of acceptable standards. However, in the final analysis, courts
appear particularly reluctant to order changes to U.S. government policy, or
even to criticize it very aggressively, based on developments in international
law.
This is understandable when considered in its domestic, political context.
Senator Dole ran for President two years ago, campaigning against the GATT
as an erosion of U.S. sovereignty. It is hardly surprising that U.S. courts
would say that they "do not want our laws made by foreigners." A cynical,
negative conclusion would suggest that this is a familiar pattern: The United
States is the great champion of international law in the world, so long as it is
winning, but the moment it stands to have its conduct condemned, it changes
the rules. 20 As the world's only superpower, the United States is probably
uniquely situated to do that.
All in all, this cynicism is not merited. It is surely true that the United
States, and its judiciary in particular, can be a beacon of hope for those whose
rights are abused abroad, when the abusers seek to enjoy the benefits thattheir
presence, or their business, in this country can bring. But certainly one has to
temper one's optimism about the future of international human rights law in
the courts, of the United States until judges and political leaders accept the
notion that, in the international legal order, the United States is subject to the
laws and cannot make, repeal, or ignore elements of that body of law on its
own initiative or for its own domestic or political reasons.
To become a worthy subject of international law was an important
objective of the founders of this country. To remain so, and not to claim to
be above the law, is a goal to which the American public, their heirs, might
usefully dedicate themselves.
120. An obvious illustration of this point is the purported withdrawal of the United States
from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in a futile effort to avoid
losing the judgment in the Nicaragua case.
New Challenges for the American Lawyer
in International Human Rights
Susan L. Karamanian*
I Introduction
Every licensed lawyer in the United States takes an oath to support or
uphold the Constitution of the United States and to support or uphold the laws
of the respective state in which he or she is licensed. Every lawyer licensed
to practice in a federal court in the United States similarly swears to uphold
the laws of the United States Constitution. No explicit reference is made to
the obligation of a lawyer to support or uphold international law, let alone the
law of international human rights.
For many practitioners and courts alike, international norms on human
rights are irrelevant, for "it is American conceptions of decency that are dis-
positive."' Domestic lawyers, however, more often are invoking the law of
international human rights in an effort to expand the protection afforded their
clients' civil, criminal, social, political, and economic rights. At times, they
succeed. Indeed, courts have entered substantial monetary judgments based
on violations of the law of nations2 or based on violations of federal statutes
* Shareholder, LockePumell Rain Harrell (AProfessional Corporation), Dallas, Texas.
This Article expresses the author's views. It is not intended to reflect the views of the firm.
1. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369 n.1 (1989). In concluding that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit the State from executing a person who was ajuvenile at the time
of the offense, Justice Scalia rejected as irrelevant to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that
three treaties, one of which the United States had ratified, explicitly prohibit the death penalty
forjuveniles. See id at 389-90 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 668-70 (1993) (concluding that forcible abduction did not
violate United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty even though abduction may violate general
international law principles); Jack H. Backman, A USException on UNRights, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 8, 1997, at A15 ("No case involving enforcement of the Universal Declaration [of Human
Rights] has gone before the U.S. Supreme Court and general legal opinion is that unless it is
enacted into U.S. law, it is not enforceable in U.S. courts.").
2. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate ofMarcos, 103 F.3d 789,791 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that
district court entered $750 million judgment in favor of plaintiff class in case brought under
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (originally enacted as Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77)); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 197-202 (D. Mass. 1995)
(entering multi-million dollar default judgment against Guatemalan Minister of Defense for,
among other things, violating the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994))). For
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that implicate international human rights principles
Despite the apparent interest ofsomejudges4 and the deliberate efforts of
international human rights lawyers, acceptance of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in The Paquete Habana5 that "[i]nternational law is part of our
law"6 still is not widespread. Further, even though certain domestic courts'
application of international law and comparative constitutional law norms "is
a step forward," little assurance can be hadthatthese courts' decisions comport
with the decisions of other tribunals, particularly those that focus on human
rights, such as United Nations treaty bodies or regional human rights treaty
bodies, and vice versa.7 The likelihood of inconsistency is magnified given
that, at any moment numerous United States courts may be reviewing cases
that involve what even legal scholars admit is an evolving concept
insight into how certain United States courts determine what conduct violates international
human rights law, see generally Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 th Cir. 1996); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos (In re Estate ofFerdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th
Cir. 1994); and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998) (entering
default judgment of more than $250 million against Iran and various Iranian officials for state-
sponsored terrorism for violations of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West
Supp. 1998))).
4. The 1996 Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit devoted a full session to international human rights. The speakers included two of the
field's most preeminent scholars, Professor Louis Henkin and Professor Harold Koh, leading
activists from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch/Asia, and
a prosecutor from the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. The proceedings are at Judicial
Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 170 F.R.D. 201, 274-318 (1996)
[hereinafter Judicial Conference].
5. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
6. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Supreme Court found that the
capture of two Cuban fishing vessels by the United States was unlawful and without probable
cause. Id.
7. See Richard B. Lillich, HarmonizingHuman Rights Law Nationally and Internation-
ally: The Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 699, 701 & n.11
(1996) (describing concern about "normative consistency" expressed by Judge Rosalyn Higgins
of International Court of Justice and by Professor Philip Alston, independent expert for United
Nations, that inconsistency and confusion likely will grow as standards proliferate and new
treaty bodies are created).
8. See, e.g., ROSALYNHIGGINS, PROBLEMS &PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How
WE USE IT 104 (1994) ("IT]he articulation of claims as human rights is part of the process of
according priority to decision-making processes."); Louis Henkin, Evolving Concepts of
International Human Rights Law and the Current Consensus, in 170 F.R.D. 275, 276 (1997).
As an example of inconsistency within United States courts, compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that federal court has jurisdiction over alien's claim
for violations of law of nations), with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("[I]t is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause
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Within this fragile environment works a unique group of professionals,
the lawyers. As the gatekeepers of justice,9 lawyers play an essential role.
Lawyers, with specialized training and skills, have a license that enables them
to appear in court to protect and promote rights. The rights at issue here are
those that each individual has against the state because of his or her status as
a human being. They are human rights. These rights have become of para-
mount importance during this century, in large part due to the deliberate
efforts of lawyers, namely, international law professors, attorneys for various
international human rights groups, and interested private practitioners. One
international lawyer poignantly summarized the role of these lawyers: "It is
somewhat paradoxical that the once-impregnable walls of the sovereign State,
so carefully constructed by thejurists of the nineteenth century, are now being
dismantled by the innovative and ingenious techniques of the jurists of the
twentieth century."'"
This paper discusses the future role of the lawyer in international human
rights. Its framework is based on Professor Anthony Kronman's observation
in The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession that the lawyer
must be more than a professional who has the "legal know-how."" The lawyer
in international human rights plays a highly public function. First and fore-
most, the lawyer must be devoted to the public good as defined by existing or
emerging universally-accepted international norms.'2 To paraphrase Professor
Henkin, we lawyers must accept international human rights for ourselves.'3
This devotion means that the international human rights lawyer must
continue to invoke universal norms in assuming the traditional and indispens-
able role as an advocate on behalf of a specific client in a specific dispute. He
of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a
federal tribunal.").
9. For example, paragraph 1 of"Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities" to the Texas
Disciplinary Rules ofProfessional Conduct states: "[A lawyer is a] public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality ofjustice. Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of
their relationship with and function in our legal system." TEx. GoV'TCODEANN. tit. 2, subpart
G, app. A; art. 10, § 9 (West Supp. 1998). Similarly, the American Bar Association has
recommended that each local bar association adopt "A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism" that
recognizes that a lawyer has "a devotion to the public good."
10. Symposium, The Legal Profession and Human Rights: International Human Rights
and Sovereignty of States: Role and Responsibility ofLawyers, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 541,
546-47 (1997) (remarks of Fali Nariman, President, Bar Association of India; Chairman,
International Commission of Jurists).
11. ANmTHoNYT.KRoNMAN, THELOSTLAWYER: FAILING IDEALS oFTHELEGALPROFES-
SION 15 (1993).
12. See id. at 14 (stating that "the outstanding lawyer... is, to begin with, a devoted
citizen").
13. SeeLouisHenkinRights: American andHuman, 79 COLUM.L.REv. 405,421(1979).
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or she should, however, do more or at least encourage other lawyers to do
more. The lawyer must link international human rights law with the public
good and exalt the cause of the public good. The lawyer should educate other
lawyers, judges, and lay persons about internationally-accepted norms and
urge them to use these norms in guiding these persons in their conduct and
decisions. Citizens, clients, and government and nongovernment agencies
should look to the international human rights lawyer for guidance and advice
on the subject. In addition, the lawyer should work with other lawyers from
around the world in documenting human rights abuses and monitoring en-
forcement in domestic and regional tribunals and in insisting that his own
federal government submit to international scrutiny.
In sum, the lawyer should be "a public-spirited reformer who monitors
[the] framework [of public norms] itself and leads others in campaigning for
those repairs that are required to keep it responsive and fair." 4 Absent a
broad-based, activist approach, domestic efforts to enforce universally-recog-
nized rights will continue to suffer from an apparent "crisis of legitimacy.'
5
I. The American Lawyer in International Human Rights:
A Brief Overview
Lawyers who promote or defend international human rights already serve
a public good, one that is defined on behalf of individuals and in terms of
internationally-accepted norms. While the public good aspect may be self-
evident, a brief review should reaffirm and provide a theoretical basis for this
conclusion.
A. International Law and the Public Good
As Professor Henkin remarks, "international non-conventional human
rights law isjus cogens, or is likejus cogens.'"'6 Jus cogens, in turn, reflects
"common consensus from which few dare dissent." 7 Some federal courts
14. KRONMAN, supra note 11, at 19. In Dean Kronman's view, these qualities are
elements of a "statesman," and those lawyers who possess them and certain other qualities,
particularly a proper sense ofjudgment, fit within the nineteenth century ideal of the "lawyer-
statesman." Id. at 11-17. For various reasons, I prefer not to equate the "lawyer-statesman"
model with the ideal international human rights lawyer, although I agree, as set forth in this
paper, that certain attributes of that ideal are essential for the lawyer who seeks to promote or
defend international human rights.
15. See Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An
Internationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 15, 24 (1996).
16. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
31, 38 & n.28 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]).
17. Id. at 38. In a similar vein, the International Court of Justice has written that these
norms, which include "principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,"
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have recognized in human rights cases thatjus cogens means, as the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties said, "a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted." 8
Jus cogens norms reflect the international community's fundamental
values; they are not based on the consent of states. 9 They are so fundamental
that they prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules
of international law that conflict with them.2" They can be modified or dero-
gated only by a subsequentjus cogens norm.2' Norms ofjus cogens by defini-
tion reflect the public good.
Customary international law that does not rise to the esteem level ofjus
cogens, nevertheless, also is founded on principles of the public good. Cus-
tomary international law arises from "a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."' It is "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."' In ascertaining
and administering customary international law, courts resort "to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators."24 International law is to be interpreted as it has
evolved and as it exists among the nations of the world today.'
are the concern of all states; "they are obligations erga omnes." Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5).
18. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332,
8 I.L.M. 679), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993); Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); National Coalition Gov't of Burma v.
UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 n.18 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (same).
19. David F. Klein, A Theoryfor the Application of the Customary International Law of
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 351 (1988).
20. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TiE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. k (1987).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 102(2).
23. Statute of International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans
1179, 1187 (1945).
24. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1990)). Furthermore,
jurists and commentators... by years of labor, research and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is.
Id. at 880-81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
25. Id at 881.
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Prime evidence of the customs and usages of civilized nations are human
rights treaties and resolutions.26 Foremost among these are the UnitedNations
Charter 7 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.28 The
Charter, which "heralded also the birth of international human rights,"29 and
which in large part was written by lawyers, provides in article 1, paragraph 3
that the United Nations is "[t]o achieve international cooperation ... in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all."30 Article 55(c) provides for "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."31 The Uni-
versal Declaration is "the first comprehensive statement enumerating the basic
rights of the individual to be promulgated by a universal international organi-
zation."32 It proclaims, among other things, that all human beings (1) "are
born free and equal in dignity and rights;"33 (2) have civil and political rights,
including the right to life, liberty, and security of person, the prohibition
against slavery, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the right
to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the right to privacy,
freedom of speech, religion, and assembly;3" and (3) have economic, social,
and cultural rights, including the right to work and to an education.3
Federal courts frequently cite both the U.N. Charter and the Universal
Declaration in defining the law of nations.36 They also have cited the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights,37 the International Covenant on Civil and
26. See Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution andInternational Human Rights, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 851, 857 (1989).
27. U.N. CHARTER, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 10.1
(Richard B. Lillich ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter INSTRUMENTS].
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
29. Henkin, supra note 16, at 34.
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3), reprinted in INSTRUMENTS, supra note 27, at 10.2.
31. Id. art. 55(c), reprinted in INSTRUMENTS, supra note 27, at 10.5. Article 56 provides
that Member States "pledge themselves.to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56, reprinted
in INSTRUMENTS, supra note 27, at 10.5.
32. Thomas Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights Law andInstitutions: Accomplish-
ments andProspects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988). Professor Buergenthal also notes that the
Universal Declaration "ranks with the Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man, and the American Declaration of Independence as a milestone in mankind's struggle for
freedom and human dignity." Id.; see Henkin, supra note 16, at 40 n.31 (stating that Universal
Declaration "is perhaps the most important document, excepting only the U.N. Charter").
33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, art. 1.
34. Id. arts. 3-5, 9, 12, 18-20.
35. Id. arts. 23, 26.
36. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
37. American Convention on Human Rights, openedfor signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
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Political Rights,38 the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,39 and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishmenta0 for the conclusion
that the prohibition against official torture is a norm of customary interna-
tional law.4 Federal courts have adopted a similar analysis of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 2 for the proposi-
tion that "the proscription of genocide has applied equally to state and non-
state actors."43 Indeed, "through their repeated reference to the Charter and
the Universal Declaration" and other conventions, courts in the United States
and abroad have contributed "to the incremental formation of a practice that
has now ripened into customary law of international human rights."'
B. Lawyers Promoting the Public Good
Lawyers who represent clients before tribunals seeking relief for viola-
tions of customary international law, or who otherwise participate in support
of amidi curiae or as expert witnesses, are promoting the public good. The
same holds true for lawyers who prudently urge the tribunal to follow interna-
tional human rights law in construing the Constitution or statutes of the
United States. Lawyers seek to enforce established norms that reflect funda-
mental values of the international community in each of these instances.
Without enforcement of these universally-recognized rights, the law of human
rights merely would be a set of principles without much consequence.45
U.N.T.S. 144 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
38. International CovenantonCivil andPoliticalRights, Dec. 19,1966,999U.N.T.S. 171.
39. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
40. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027.
41. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,716-17 (9th Cir. 1992).
42. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, openedfor
signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the United States
Feb. 23, 1989).
43. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996).
44. Francesco Francioni, An International Bill ofRights: Why It Matters, How It Can Be
Used, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 471,474 & n.21 (1997) (citing Louis B. Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12
(1982)).
45. Jerome J. Shestack, Immediate Past President of the American Bar Association and
former Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, has noted, "In a
democratic system wherejudicial independence prevails, enforcement of legal rules through the
courts is the principal safeguard of human rights in the international arena." Jerome J. Shestack,
The Legal Profession and Human Rights: Globalization ofiHuman Rights Law, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 558, 564 (1997).
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The seminal case in the United States federal courts, Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,46 exemplifies this point. In Filartiga, the plaintiffs, two citizens of
Paraguay, sued a Paraguayan official for torturing their son/brother.47 They
alleged jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act,48 which provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."49 The plaintiffs claimed that torture violated the "law
of nations," or established norms of the international law of human rights.5"
The district court dismissed the case because the "law of nations" did not
concern acts of a Paraguayan official against another Paraguayan citizen.5 In
reversing the district court's dismissal, the Second Circuit analyzed various
sources of customary international law52 and concluded that "official torture
is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambig-
uous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens."53
Judge Kaufman, writing for the panel, also noted that "international law
confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments.
While Judge Kaufman's detailed examination of the sources of interna-
tional law and the conclusions he reached based on his examination have
proven to be of lasting importance, his concluding paragraph of the opinion
is equally compelling. In particular, Judge Kaufman noted that after World
War II, civilized nations "banded together to prescribe acceptable norms of
international behavior ... to recognize that respect for fundamental human
rights is in their individual and collective interest."55 The torturer, like the
pirate and slave trader before him, had become "hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind.,
56
46. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. Id. at 879.
49. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
50. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
51. Id. at 880.
52. Id. at 881-84 (discussing United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration, Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975), American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 (entered into force July 18, 1978),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
Council of Europe, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (semble)).
53. Id. at 884.
54. Id. at 885.
55. Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
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Filartiga opened the doors of the United States courthouses to other alien
tort claims based on violations of the "law of nations." After Filartiga,
federal courts have concluded that torture, murder, genocide, and slavery
violate jus cogens norms of the international community." Those who
commit these intolerable, inhumane acts are now recognized as the "enemy of
all mankind."
Lawyers are indispensable tojudicial enforcement of international human
rights. In claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act, for example, American
lawyers have served as counsel to various foreign plaintiffs. Many of the
plaintiffs' attorneys are affiliated with groups such as the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights and International Human Rights Clinic, which are committed to
promoting international human rights. Lawyers also have served as counsel
for amici curiae, including leading nongovernmental human rights organiza-
tions such as Amnesty International, the International League for Human
Rights, the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Groups, and Human Rights Watch. These groups
have been at the forefront of the legal effort to implement human rights
standards and "in marshaling public opinion against human rights abuses."58
Not to be forgotten are the lawyers for the United States government. In
Filartiga, then-Assistant Attorney General Drew Days submitted an amicus
curiae brief on behalf of the United States that confirmed "the universal
abhorrence with which torture is viewed."59 Kadic v. Karadzic" involved
claims of torture, summary execution, acts of genocide, and war crimes under
the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
against Radovan Karadzic, the self-proclaimed president of an unrecognized
Bosnian-Serb entity.61 The Legal Adviser to the United States Department of
State and the United States Solicitor General submitted a "Statement of
Interest" that "expressly disclaimed any concern that the political question
doctrine should be invoked to prevent the litigation of these lawsuits.""2
Lawyers are also involved as expert witnesses in defining the law of
nations. 3 In Filartiga for example, four distinguished international legal
scholars submitted affidavits that "the law of nations prohibits absolutely the
57. See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).
58. See, e.g., Shestack, supra note45, at 561 (discussing specifically role of International
League for Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists, and Amnesty International).
59. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing and quoting from
Memorandum of United States as Amicus Curiae).
60. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
61. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996).
62. Id. at 250.
63. See supra note 24 (citing Filartiga).
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use of torture."' Law professors also play an important role to the extent that,
in determining international law, courts refer to their learned treatises and
books. We also should be mindful that some lawyers are judges. Federal
judges are enforcing universally-accepted human rights in cases in which a
federal statute, such as the Alien Tort Claims Act, prescribes application of
the "law of nations." Certain judges look more frequently to international
human rights law in analyzing what may appear to be routine domestic dis-
putes. In other words, they are incorporating international human rights law
into United States constitutional and statutory standards.
In Alabama v. Engler65 for example, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it
was required under the Constitution to extradite an inmate from Michigan to
Alabama, even though Alabama uses the chain gang and one of its state
senators recently had declared that slavery was "good for blacks."66 Judge
Jones commented that "I only wish, however, that penal institutions will soon
shed rather than irrationally embrace socially vindictive policies and proce-
dures soundly condemned as violations of international human rights
norms." '67 Another example may be found in Lipscomb v. Simmons" in which
the court struck down as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Oregon's
practice of declaring that foster children who lived with relatives were ineligi-
ble to receive state funds because it denied the children the right to choose to
live with family members.69 The court stated that the right to associate with
family members is fundamental, citing the Universal Declaration, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on
Human Rights.7" In a habeas case, Caballero v. Caplinger,7' a federal district
court held that a federal statute allowing indefinite detention of an alien
without the opportunity to have a bond hearing violated the Eighth Amend-
64. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879 & n.4 (referring to affidavits of Richard Falk, Albert G.
Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University and former Vice
President of American Society of International Law; Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Interna-
tional Law at New York University, Director of New York University Center for International
Studies, and current President of American Society of International Law; Richard Lillich,
Howard W. Smith Professor of Law at University of Virginia School of Law; and Myres
MacDougal, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School and past President of American
Society of International Law).
65. 85 F.3d 1205 (6th Cir. 1996).
66. Alabama v. Engler, 85 F.3d 1205, 1210 (6th Cir. 1996) (Jones, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Jones, J., concurring).
68. 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989).
69. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1248-50 (9th Cir. 1989).
70. Id. at 1244 n.1.
71. 914 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. La. 1996).
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ment.7 In support, Judge Berrigan cited the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and various conventions as represent-
ing "the collective consciousness of the international community, creating a
hope if not an expectation of adherence."'7
1II. Toward a Broader, More Activist Approach for the American Lawyer
in Recognizing and Enforcing International Human Rights
All lawyers are acting in the public good in promoting and defending
international human rights. As a result of their work, certain United States
courts have risen above the shield of sovereignty and have applied interna-
tional law in recognizing specific universal human rights and in imposing
remedies for violations of these human rights. 4 But few United States courts
have done so. Furthermore, the "well-established, universally recognized
norms of international law" that have received judicial acknowledgment are
few in number.
Lawyers need to continue to do what they do best in promoting the rule
of law; in other words, they should be advocates. They must, however,
expand and intensify their efforts on all fronts, and this means going beyond
judicial tribunals. Furthermore, they need to become more organized, method-
ical, and efficient in the process.
A. Organizing and Educating Lawyers
In a recent law review article, two economists argue very persuasively
that changes in the law occur, in part, not because of judges' preferences or
even because of the preference of the litigants, but because of the preferences
of lawyers.75 The law will "come to favor organized interest groups."76 When
72. Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (E.D. La. 1996).
73. Id. at 1379. ProfessorLillich has observedthat"[t]his'indirect incorporation' of both
conventional and customary international human rights law is an exceptionally promising
approach warranting even great attention and increased use in the future." Lillich, supra note
26, at 859-60. He also noted that this approach is not new; 40 years ago, Professor Schacter
stated that "[i]t would be unrealistic to ignore the influence ... of the Charter as a factor in
resolving constitutional issues which hitherto have been in doubt." Id. at 860 n.48 (quoting
Oscar Schacter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American
Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 658 (1951)).
74. See supra notes 36-73 and accompanying text (describing Filartiga and other cases
citing international law sources). Butsee Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,805
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, L, concurring) (stating that it would violate separation of powers for
plaintiff to have standing to sue for violation of international law).
75. See generally Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role ofLawyers in Changing
the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994).
76. Id. at 825.
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no other organized parties with strong interests rise to the front in a specific
matter, the law should tend to favor the interests of the lawyers.7 7
Organized bar associations and other collections of lawyers, whether they
be international, national, or regional in scope, either are, or have the potential
to be, powerful interest groups. Indeed, it was nongovernmental human rights
organizations, such as the International Commission of Jurists, a group of
lawyers and judges "with a mission to develop the rule of law in the human
rights area" that led the charge against human rights abuses.78 During the mid-
and late- 1970s, the International Bar Association, the American Bar Associa-
tion, and the Union of Advocates "started to endorse human rights treaties and
monitor human rights abuses and send observers to trials of human rights
advocates."79 The Lawyers Committee "report[ed] on and help[ed] redress
human rights abuses."8 These organizations have "become a significant non-
governmental force" because they have access to lawyers, as a whole, and to
government leaders.81
But as one observer properly notes, "[t]he struggle to secure fundamental
human rights is ultimately a local struggle." 2 All of the work of international
and national bar associations could be for naught if lawyers at the local level
are not involved. State bar associations, and possibly county bar associations,
should have sections that at least address international human rights issues.
Law schools also should hold classes and conduct seminars on the subject and
offer practitioners continuing legal education on international human rights.
Finding interested lawyers at the local level should not be too difficult.
In particular, criminal defense attorneys would be a good starting point. For
example, a federal statute enacted within the last fifteen years permits pretrial
seizure of an accused's assets when those assets are proven to be the product
of criminal activity. 3 The federal government has applied this statute to seize
defense attorney's fees. 4 An argument could be made, however, that the fee
seizure statute violates international human rights law because it effectively
deprives the defendant of the benefits of the presumption of innocence.85
77. Id.
78. Shestack, supra note 45, at 561.
79. Id. at 562.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 562-63.
82. Thomas, supra note 15, at 16.
83. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1994).
84. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989).
85. See Richard J. Wilson, Using International Human Rights Law and Machinery in
Defending Borderless Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606, 1610-14 (1997) (citing
Universal Declaration and various other international conventions and declarations, including
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by Eighth United Nations Congress on the
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Similarly, for those criminal defense attorneys who work in one of the thirty-
eight states in the United States that imposes capital punishment, an under-
standing of the role of various international conventions and declarations and
of the opportunity to file claims before regional tribunals, such as the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, is becoming more important now
that state and federal habeas review processes are being streamlined. 6
The evolving law of international human rights also is relevant to the
work of many private civil attorneys. For example, in National Coalition
Government of Burma v. Unocal,8" the plaintiffs alleged that Unocal was
liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act for alleged human rights abuses
occurring at a gas pipeline project in Burma.88 Unocal moved to dismiss on
the grounds that it was not a state actor as required for liability under the
Alien Tort Claims Act.89 The court held that plaintiffs' pleading of a joint
venture relationship between Burma and Unocal was sufficientto state a claim
because "Unocal may have been 'a willful participant in joint action with the
State or its agents."'90 IfUnocal ultimately is held liable under ajoint-venture
theory, no doubt more plaintiffs' attorneys will be looking for creative ways
to sue solvent multinational corporations for international human rights
abuses.9
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (United Nations, Report of the Eighth
UnitedNations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana,
Cuba, 27 August-September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28 (Oct. 5,1990)), which provides
in article 16 that "Governments shall ensure that lawyers... shall not suffer, or be threatened
with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken in
accordance with recognized professional duties, standards and ethics.").
86. See id. at 1614-20. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, ABOLITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1997).
87. 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
88. National Coalition Gov't of Burma v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329, 334-35 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
89. Id. at 335.
90. Id at 348 (quoting Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989)).
91. But see Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D. La. 1997)
(dismissing plaintiffs claims for cultural genocide, human rights violations, and international
environmental torts). In Beanal, an Indonesian citizen filed a class action lawsuit against
Freeport-McMoRan and a related entity under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim
Protection Act. Id at 366. Plaintiff alleged that Freeport violated the law of nations, namely
that it engaged in environmental torts, human rights abuses, and cultural genocide. Id. The
claims arose from Freeport's operation of an open pit copper, gold, and silver mine in Irian
Jaya, Indonesia. Id. Plaintiff alleged that Freeport's security guards "in conjunction with third
parties" engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, surveillance, and destruction of
property that caused severe physical pain and suffering. Id. at 369. Plaintiff also alleged that
Freeport engaged in "cultural genocide" through the "deliberate, contrived and planned cultural
demise of the Amungme culture," of which plaintiff is a member. Id. The district court
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Federal judges also should receive training in the law of international
human rights. The session at the 1996 Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit devoted to international human rights' was enlightening as evidenced
by the follow-up questions and comments.93 A similar session for judges in
all of the other ten federal circuits could perhaps make the federal judiciary
"familiar with the law of nations," so that they may feel more "comfortable
navigating by it."'94
B. Educating the Public
Lawyers should educate the general public about universal human rights
norms as part of their civic obligations. They should express concern when
human rights are violated and not be deterred if their statements possibly
could be construed to interfere improperly with the affairs of the State.95 They
should advise the public about the need for the United States to subject itself
dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id.
at 384. It first concluded that, under Kadic, certain of the alleged acts violated the law of
nations, regardless of whether they were committed by a state or private actor (for example,
genocide), whereas other conduct violated the law of nations only if committed by a state actor
(for example, murder and torture). Id. at 371. The district court found that plaintiff had not
pleaded genocide because it did not plead that Freeport committed acts with the intentto destroy
the Amungme group, as opposed to its culture. Id. at 372-73. The court also dismissed the
claims requiring state conduct on the grounds that plaintiff had not pleaded that Freeport acted
under color of state law. 1d. at 374, 380. Moreover, it dismissed plaintiff's claim under the
Torture Victim Protection Act on the grounds that that statute does not apply to a corporation.
Id. at 381-82. Finally, the court ruled that plaintiff's international environmental torts claims
"do not constitute international torts for which there is universal consensus in the international
community as to their binding status and their content." ld. at384. After the original dismissal,
plaintiff filed two other amended complaints, both of which were dismissed and the latter of
which was dismissed with prejudice. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., Civ. No. 96-1474
(E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998). The case is on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
92. See supra note 4 (describing conference).
93. Judicial Conference, supra note 4, 170 F.R.D. at312-14. For example, Judge Jacobs
asked whether if Canada enacted a law comparable to the Alien Tort Claims Act, ajudgment
could be entered and enforced against the Governor of Texas for violating international norms,
including torture, for holding prisoners on Texas's death row. Id. at 312. Judge Laval asked
if state actors who participate in the death process could be held accountable if an international
criminal tribunal is ever established that would have jurisdiction over all crimes against
humanity. Id. at 314.
94. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39,
49 (1994) (observing that Supreme Court "enforces some principles of international law and
some of its obligations some of the time" and reasoning that it appears this is so because of
Court's concern about separation ofpowers andjudicial competence and because modernjurists
lack diplomatic experience of early Justices).
95. See Hans Corell, The United Nations and the Legal Community in Promotion of
Human Rights, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 519, 524 (1997).
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to monitoring so that it could "be said to truly follow the ideas of the protec-
tion of human rights and can also speak with much more legitimacy when [it]
address[es] human rights concerns or violations in other States."9 As one
United Nations official remarks:
Irrespective ofwvherewe serve inthe legal community, however, we all have
a special responsibility to advance human rights. We are privileged be-
cause we have had the opportunity of studying the role of human rights in
society under the rule of law. We have an obligation to share this knowl-
edge with others. For a genuine observation of human rights, it is impor-
tant that this knowledge also be spread to the grass roots.97
C. Litigation
When appropriate, lawyers should continue to assert claims based on
international human rights norms. As the Filartiga court recognized, stan-
dards of international law are "evolving," and the courts should apply the
international law in effect when the issue is raised.98 Thus, the lawyer needs
to keep abreast of all of the new developments from whatever possible
sources, including new conventions, declarations, and cases.
Lawyers should act deliberately in identifying those norms that are
sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory to meet the test of Filartiga.
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Hilao v. Estate ofMarcos9 held that while
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" is a universally-recognized norm
under international law, it is not sufficiently specific to allow a claim for its
violation under the Alien Tort Claims Act."° But the district court inXuncax
v. Gramajo'0' found that torture, ransacking of homes, and bombings qualify
as specific examples of "cruel, inhuman or degrading" activity in violation of
international law.' Clearly, over the next few years, parties will litigate the
scope of "cruel, inhuman or degrading."' 3
96. Id. at 525.
97. Id. at 528-29.
98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (citing Filartiga).
99. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
100. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 795 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
102. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995).
103. Another example of the area in which more litigation is likely is "international
environmental torts." See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362,383 (E.D. La.
1997) (discussing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 CIV. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668,670 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); I PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS
AND IMPLEMENTATION 183-86 (Philipe Sands ed., 1995)).
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Further, lawyers should be mindful of the Torture Victim Protection Act,
which now provides a federal cause of action for official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing.'4 But they should also realize that the Torture Victim Protection
Act requires a showing that the individuals who have committed torture or
extrajudicial killing must have acted "under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation."' 5
It is likely that Congress will enact new laws that require courts to exam-
ine international human rights principles. For example, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 199606 may prompt important decisions on
issues such as exemption from the sovereign immunity doctrine and state-
sponsored terrorism.
At all times, though, the lawyer should examine each case from the per-
spective of relevant international human rights principles and, when appro-
priate, attempt to incorporate those principles into the analysis. As the late
Professor Lillich wrote, using the "' indirect incorporation' approach seems to
be a sensible strategy for human rights lawyers and a wise policy for U.S.
courts concerned with developing the promising relationship between the U.S.
Constitution and international human rights law.'
10 7
IV. Conclusion
Professor Kronman reminds us that lawyers should aspire to serve the
public good, to be devoted citizens committed to the spirit of the law. As such,
we must be advocates for international human rights. And we must do more.
Onthe day JusticeBlackmun announced his retirementfrom the Supreme
Court, hejust happened to be giving the keynote address at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law. That day also coincided with
Professor Henkin's retirement as President of the Society. Justice Blackmun's
concluding statement was a simple reminder to everyone of the work that
remains: "I look forward to the day when the majority of the Supreme Court
will inform almost all of its decisions almost all of the time with a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind."'0 8 For that day to ever come, we as
lawyers must assume our solemn responsibilities on behalf of all of mankind.
104. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing claims in Kadic).
105. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act of 1991 § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(1994))), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
106. See supra note 3 (discussing case finding violation of Act).
107. Lillich, supra note 26, at 860 (footnote omitted).
108. Blackmun, supra note 94, at 49.




One can address the right of self-determination from a number of differ-
ent perspectives. For example, the exercise of this right in the past decade has
had a dramatic effect on theories of international organizations, the role of
force, and conflict resolution. Claims of self-determination led in part to the
destruction of the former Yugoslavia, and the specter of secessionist move-
ments has magnified the attention given to the rights of minorities and indige-
nous peoples.
In the following discussion, I will link self-determination to human rights
in two different ways. First, I explore self-determination as a human right,
addressing issues of content and definition. Second, I discuss the impact of
self-determination claims on other human rights.
I. Self-Determination as a Human Right
Self-determination is a human right. Although there are many hortatory
references to self-determination in General Assembly resolutions and else-
where, the only legally binding documents in which the right of self-determi-
nation is proclaimed are the two international covenants.' The first paragraph
of common article 1 states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."2
Although the quoted language fails to answer several questions, at least
some aspects of the right have become clear through subsequent reflection and
* Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,1966,
art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note I, art. 1; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 1.
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interpretation. The first clarification is that self-determination is a right that
belongs to collectivities known as "peoples," not to individuals. Thus, the
Human Rights Committee has consistently made clear that claims that the
right of self-determination has been violated cannot be raised under the First
Optional Protocol, which applies only to individuals.3 I think that the Com-
mittee is probably wrong to exclude self-determination claims automatically
from the scope of individual complaints, but its jurisprudence has been con-
sistent on this point.
It also is clear that self-determination is a right that belongs to peoples,
but not to minorities.4 This truism may only shift the debate to definitions and
semantics, but the distinction between minorities and peoples remains an
article of faith for states and international bodies concerned with monitoring
human rights.
There are numerous problems in defining both "peoples" and what they
are entitled to "determine." Without reviewing the entire history of self-
determination, let me just outline how the concept has passed through at least
two distinct phases and is now entering athird one.' Initially, meaning perhaps
the middle of the nineteenth century when the phrase "self-determination"
came into common usage, self-determination was not a right but was a princi-
ple. It was a principle that first allowed disparate people who spoke the same
language, such as Germans and Italians, to group themselves together and
form a new state. This "grouping," of course, did not occur without coercion
and, in some cases, a good deal of violence. A bit later, at the end of World
War n, the principle ofself-determination provided aguidingprinciple orration-
ale for dismembering the defeated Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.
As a political principle, but not a right under international law, self-
determination in this period was subject to many limitations. The most
obvious limitation, consistentwith realpolitik concerns, was that the success-
ful exercise of self-determination required the support of the victorious
powers if there had been a war or the support of major powers even absent a
war. Philosophically, "external" self-determination or independence would
be rejected if the resulting state would not be economically and politically
viable. Self-serving political restrictions made the principle ofself-determina-
tion applicable to Europe, for instance, but not to colonial empires; thus to
Poland, but not to Ireland.
3. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee's General Comment 23 on art. 27 (50th Sess.
1994), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/1/Rev. 3 (1997), 3.1, at 39.
4. See id.
5. For further discussion of the phases, see generally Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-
Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993).
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Following a somewhat confused period between the two world wars, the
adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 marked the beginning of the
second phase. This second phase began, as did the first phase, by identifying
self-determination as a principle rather than as a right.6 Self-determination
was proclaimed in a manner that did not necessarily require the dismember-
ment of colonial empires; if it had included such an understanding, Britain,
France, and Belgium simply would not have adhered to the Charter. Yet, at
the same time, use of the word "peoples" must have implied that self-determi-
nation meant more than simply a reaffirmation of the sovereign equality of
states.
This situation gradually changed, and I think that one of the great contri-
butions of the United Nations to international law was in promoting the shift
from proclaiming a principle of self-determination in the Charter to recogniz-
ing a right of self-determination some twenty years later. The problem is that,
during this transition, the United Nations continued to refer rhetorically to the
right of all peoples to self-determination, when what it really meant was the
right of colonial territories to independence.' And those are two very different
concepts.
Self-determination from 1960 on, at least as articulated by the United
Nations, had nothing to do with ethnicity, language, or culture. Although
there were some exceptions - the division of British India, Rwanda-Urundi,
and a few others - the accepted mantra was that colonial territories would
become independent. It did not matter how many "peoples" were found
within them, although obviously each contained many different peoples,
nations, and ethnic groups. Thus, in general, territories, not peoples, enjoyed
the right to independence.
It was also clear during this period that, although there were other theo-
retical options - for example, Hawaii and Alaska exercised their right to self-
determination by becoming part of the United States - the international
preference was for independence. This result could, and often was, achieved
with only minimal preparation or even consultation with the colony con-
cerned, although any option other than independence, such as free association
or full integration, required the full and informed consent of the people
involved.'
6. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 55 (discussing "respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples").
7. See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960) (discussing independence of colonial countries and peoples).
8. See Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an
Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called For Under Article 73e of the Charter,
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Thus, in the second half of the twentieth century, a territorial right to
independence for former colonies replaced the nineteenth century principle of
allowing ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups to form various kinds of
political units that might or might not become independent states. In the post-
colonial period,9 what I would identify as the third phase of self-determina-
tion, some are attempting to join those two principles in order to create a new
right in international law: the right of every people - defined ethnically,
culturally, or religiously - to have its own independent state.
Although this new position has its adherents, it is clear that international
law has not yet recognized such a new paradigm. One reason for this is that,
because practically all of the world's surface is now divided among sovereign
states, self-determination defined as the right to create a new state would nec-
essarily imply a right to secession. However, no state, no foreign ministry, and
very few disinterested writers or scholars suggest that every people has the
right to a state, and they implicitly or explicitly reject a right to secession."
This is the current state of international law, whether one is talking about
popular groups like Tibetans or unpopular groups like Tamils in Sri Lanka.
There simply is no right of secession under international law, nor has there
been even preliminary agreement on the criteria that might be used in the
future to determine when secession should be supported. Of course, there is
no prohibition in international law against secession, either. If a country
disintegrates as the result of a civil war, international law poses no barrier to
recognition of the two or more succeeding states. That is, however, a quite
different position than recognizing the right of a group to secede from an
existing state.
Cementing the world's frontiers forever is an overly conservative posi-
tion, however, and I would like to suggest at least two exceptions to the no-
right-to-secession rule that I articulate. The first exception would recognize
a right of secession when there have been massive and discriminatory human
rights violations that approach genocide. The violations need not constitute
genocide under the technical definition of that term, but I do believe that they
must be both massive and discriminatory. So-called "cultural genocide," for
example, in which a culture may be radically affected by modernization or by
a surrounding dominant culture but not otherwise subjected to human rights
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm., 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29-30, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960).
9. There are today only 17 non-self-governing territories recognized by the United
Nations, most of which are small islands controlled by the United Kingdom or the United
States.
10. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Specter ofSecession: Responding to Claimsfor Ethnic
Self-Determination, 77 FOREIGNAFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 13, 16.
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violations, would notjustify secession. Rather, this category seeks to provide
a remedy in those rare situations in which there is an explicit attempt to
destroy a culture or people. One could argue, although one would have to
look at the facts very closely, that the repression ofKurds in Iraq and conceiv-
ably Tibetans might be among the situations that would fall into this excep-
tion.
The other and more difficult exception might arise when a group, com-
munity, or region has been systematically excluded from political and eco-
nomic power or when a minimum level of minority rights or a reasonable
demand for self-government has been consistently denied. I want to empha-
size that this exception would not apply when a central government refuses to
agree to whatever the minority or the region wants. Rather, it would apply
only when the central government has been so intransigent that, for example,
it refuses to allow the minority to speak its own language, it excludes minority
members from participation in the parliament, or it refuses to accede to
demands for minimal local or regional power-sharing.
Leaving aside these two possible exceptions to the rule, I now return to
the basic proposition that self-determination today does not mean either
independence or secession. If that is correct, is there any reason that we still
talk about self-determination as a human right? Is there anything left of it?
I would suggest that there is. What is left - the contemporary content of self-
determination - reflects the right's position in the two covenants and offers
an opportunity to ensure that it continues to have meaning and validity into the
next century.
Here, too, I am suggesting what the law should be, rather than describing
what I think it is at present. First, we should keep in mind that self-determina-
tion, except in the narrow context of decolonization, is not absolute. This
point should not be surprising, because there are very few absolute rights.
Recognizing that one has a right to self-determination does not imply that one
can always exercise the right to its maximum extent any more than exercising
the right to free expression means that one is absolutely free to say whatever
one wants under all conceivable circumstances.
I suggest that we can find meaningful content to self-determination by
looking at two other human rights, or at least aspects of two human rights, on
which there is a much greater degree of consensus than is the case if one
focuses on self-determination per se. These related rights are as follows:
(1) the protection of the cultural, religious, linguistic, and ethnic identity of
individuals and groups; and (2) the right of individuals and groups to partici-
pate effectively in the economic and the political life of the country.
Protecting the identity of groups is not very popular in the United States
or in some other countries, such as Sweden. It is clear, however, that, particu-
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larly during the past decade, greater attention is being given to the issues of
minority and indigenous rights, reflecting what I believe is a consensus on the
importance of preserving one's identity both as an individual and as a member
of a group. Related to this is a growing consensus that diversity and pluralism
are, in themselves, worthwhile goals to pursue. Thus, there is room to include
protection of identity in a contemporary understanding of self-determination.
The second aspect, participation, is derived to some extent from eco-
nomic development discussions, in which the right of popular participation in
decision-making was identified as a way of ensuring that assistance received
by states would better serve the purpose for which it was intended. This
concept was extraordinarily subversive, because, once one effectively partici-
pates in economic decision-making, a need to participate effectively in all
sorts of other decision-making processes almost inevitably follows.
More recently, the belief that a new democratic era has arrived has
reinforced this notion of participation." Participation, however, goes beyond
democracy. 2 Determining what is and what is not effective participation is,
of course, difficult. Ensuring participation opens up a whole range of possi-
bilities, ranging from representation in the central government to different
forms of federalism, consociationalism, and autonomy. As a principle, how-
ever, it is not inherently less manageable than due process or fair trial, even
if the answer to whether the people in a particular region or group participate
effectively in governing themselves, both through the central government and
locally, is not always immediately apparent. The idea of effective participa-
tion identifies another component of self-determination that should not be
overly threatening to the states that are expected to implement it.
A final suggestion in defining self-determination for the twenty-first
century is to impose a limit or a price on its exercise by requiring that any
ethnic group that succeeds in establishing a new state based on principles of
ethnicity, religion, language, or culture should be willing to grant to other
groups within the new state the same right of self-determination and secession
that it has just exercised. Pursuant to this principle, Serbs would have had a
right to secede from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Crees would be
able to leave an independent Quebec. Such a principle might cause potential
11. Compare, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992), and Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Demo-
cratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992), with Robert D. Kaplan, Was Democracy Just a
Moment?, ATLANTICMONTHLY, Dec. 1997, at 55, 55, andFareed Zakaria, The Rise ofIlliberal
Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 22.
12. 1 remain disturbed by the fact that the Clinton Administration decided to rename the
Bureau of Human Rights the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. This suggests
that neither democracy nor labor is included in human rights or that democracy and labor are
somehow more important than human rights. Both are dangerous positions to maintain.
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secessionists to think more carefully about the consequences of their actions
and would give newly trapped minorities a way out without resorting to
violence.
Even with, or perhaps because of, the exceptions and the nuances I
outline, self-determination as a human right remains relatively vague. Unfor-
tunately, it is unlikely that any existing human rights mechanism or even a
new mechanism will be of much assistance in defining the right in the foresee-
able future, because few states are willing to allow an international forum to
judge a situation that might, if a claim to self-determination and secession is
upheld, result in the destruction of the state itself. Some things are too impor-
tant to be left to lawyers, and I think that self-determination might be one of
those issues.
III Impact of Self-Determination Claims on Other Human Rights
The situation in Kosovo and recent statements by the U.S. House of
Representatives and Secretary of State Madeline Albright demanding that
Serbia recognize the "legitimate rights" of the people of Kosovo raise several
questions: What are those rights? Do they have anything to do with human
rights? Does the United States support the political goal of an independent
Kosovo or a Kosovo united with Albania? Do Kosovo Albanians have a right
to autonomy? Do they have a right to return to the status they enjoyed in
Yugoslavia in 1989, even though we certainly are not returning anything else
to its 1989 position? The obvious danger is that, whenever self-determination
is involved, a destructive confusion of political goals, basic human rights
norms, and humanitarian issues may make it more difficult to deal with any
of these aspects successfully. 3
The other potential impact of self-determination claims is to encourage
violent conflict. Although it is a truism, it needs to be reiterated that more
human rights are violated during wars than at any other time. Ifpolicymakers
do not arrive at a better understanding of how to respond to claims for self-
determination, such claims are likely to increase. It is very likely that the
number of violent conflicts will increase as well, and increased conflict will
have a direct impact on the entire gamut of international human rights.
At the same time, I think that if we reverse the lens and look at "ordinary"
human rights first, and if we can imagine that all the human rights that we
want to have protected are protected, violence is much less likely to ensue.
Disputes over self-determination will not disappear, but they will be resolved
13. For further discussion of these issues, see Hurst Hannum, Whose Rights in Kosovo,
and Just What Rights? It is Unclear What is Being Demanded ofSerbia, BOsTON GLOBE, Apr.
5, 1998, at D2.
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by countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, as opposed
to being decided by countries such as Russia or Yugoslavia. If one creates a
genuinely democratic rights-respecting regime, it is less likely that people will
want to leave it. If, however, they do leave it, it is also more likely that any
separation will occur peacefully.
This approach suggests that, even when self-determination is purportedly
the issue, it is better to try to address denials of human rights before trying to
address the denial of so-called self-determination. As a practical matter, a
nongovernmental organization or human rights activist is more likely to be
able to influence a government by focusing on respect for human rights than
by entering the quagmire of self-determination and secession. I think that one
is also more likely to protect what we would all agree are human rights - for
example, physical integrity, use of language, and protection of culture -
without confusing those rights with political goals. Even if we may share
some of the latter goals, it is essential to keep them distinct from the univer-
sally recognized and legally articulated provisions of international human
rights law.
IV. Conclusion
For better or for worse, self-determination will not disappear as an issue
that has the potential to create serious conflict in the future. Self-determina-
tion is not a new issue, however. Self-determination claims did not start at the
end of the Cold War, as numerous conflicts in Africa and Asia remind us. But
we do need to guard against the usurpation of the slogan and the symbol of
self-determination and its use as a purely partisan political tool by both
governments and disaffected groups. Because self-determination is such an
emotional concept, appeals by "ethnic entrepreneurs" are always likely to
create an atmosphere in which violence and greater violations of human rights
are more, rather than less, likely. This position may be relatively conserva-
tive, but I believe that it is a solid human rights position.
As the immortal Mick Jagger said, "You can't always get what you
want/You can't always get what you want/But if you try sometimes/You just
might find/You get what you need.
14
14. ROLLING STONES, You Can't Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED (Decca
Records 1969).
The Mid-Life Crisis of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Hilary Charlesworth*
I. Introduction
A half century in a human life is regarded as a particularly significant
anniversary because it is viewed as mid-life -fifty years is at least the halfway
point in a person's earthly existence. We anticipate that, by the age of fifty, a
person is at the apogee of their development. We expect them to have fulfilled
any promi.e they showed as a young person and to have tied up loose ends.
We are impatient with any signs of unexploited talent and missed opportuni-
ties. At the same time, the age of fifty is sometimes associated with mid-life
crises that propel middle aged individuals into dramatic change in personal
relationships or in work. Mid-life crises take a variety of forms. Sometimes
a mid-life crisis is an attempt to live a more authentic existence, an existence
that is truer to the real desires of the person than the imposed traditional
lifestyle they previously have followed. Other mid-life crises may be attempts
to slough off responsibilities and to cling to a youth that has passed.
These somewhat contradictory currents are implicated in the fiftieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declara-
tion).' Some reactions to the fiftieth anniversary will be purely celebratory-
it is, after all, a great feat that this set of human rights standards adopted in the
tense post-war world has achieved widespread acceptance, at least in the sense
that no state has denounced it, and more positively in the sense that it has been
widely implemented in national legal systems. Other responses to the fiftieth
anniversary will be tempered by the sustained resistance to many of the Uni-
versal Declaration's provisions. Some states are reluctant to be bound fully to
the treaty translations of the Universal Declaration's provisions. Some states
claim that the Universal Declaration and the United Nations (U.N.) system of
human rights protection is a reflection of Western values and therefore is a
vehicle of cultural imperialism. Some activists and scholars claim that in our
* Director, Centre for International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian
National University, Canberra. The author thanks Jyoti Larke who provided able research
assistance and Anne Orford who made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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globalized world, the provisions of the Universal Declaration are completely
inadequate to respond to the real threats facing humanity.
In this paper, I focus on one element of mid-life benchmarks: What
relevance is the Universal Declaration - and the body of human rights law it
has generated -to women's lives around the world? My argument is that the
Universal Declaration can be likened to a certain type of fifty-year-old man.
It was born in an era when the rights of men to control and dominate the public
spheres of the economy, politics, law, and culture were unquestioned. It may
have been shaken a little by the increasing claims of women to participate in
life beyond the private sphere, but it nonetheless has settled into a rather self-
satisfied middle age in which society accommodates women by changing
slogans or vocabulary. The Universal Declaration needs a mid-life crisis of
identity to force it to reexamine its existence in a radical way and to launch it
into an energetic middle age that is not set in traditional male patterns. This
is, of course, an unpredictable journey that may antagonize those who have
relied on the Universal Declaration as a stable symbol of international values.
First, I will set forth the limited attention that the text of the Universal
Declaration gives to women's lives. Then, I will describe some of the recent
feminist critiques of the U.N. human rights system and the U.N.'s responses
to these critiques. Finally, I will present some possible outcomes of a produc-
tive mid-life crisis of the Universal Declaration.
11 Text of the Universal Declaration
Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the Commission on Human Rights's (CHR)
drafting committee that was responsible for the Universal Declaration. All of
the other committee members were men. The language of the Universal
Declaration reflects this uneven representation of the sexes. The new Com-
mission on the Status of Women (CSW), however, kept a watching brief on the
creation of the instrument. John Humphrey's account of the drafting of the
Universal Declaration notes that the CSW successfully objected to Rene
Cassin's draft of article 1 that stated: "All men are brothers. Being endowed
[with] reason, members of one family, they are free and possess equal dignity
and rights."2 The final version of article 1 refers to human "beings" as born
free and equal in dignity and rights, but article 1 nevertheless retains a refer-
ence to "the spirit of brotherhood."3 Throughout the Universal Declaration,
"man" is used as a general category (although the terms "human beings" and
"person" are also used) and the male pronoun is used consistently.4 We now
2. John P. Humphrey, The UniversalDeclaration ofHuman Rights: Its History, Impact
and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARA-
TION 21, 25 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 1.
4. Id.
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know that such word use is significant in reinforcing hierarchies based on
gender, even if the drafters intended the language to be generic. The origins
of the use of the masculine as generic were to give prominence and deference
to men.5 It is still often unclear whether a writer's intention in using mascu-
line terms is to signify a generic category. As Helen Bequaert Holmes writes
regarding the use of "generic" masculine terms, "[a] man is sure that he is
included; a woman is uncertain."'
The Universal Declaration does, however, implicitly or explicitly ac-
knowledge women in a number of articles. Article 2 promises entitlement to
the rights set out in the Universal Declaration "without distinction of any
kind," including sex.7 A more general guarantee of nondiscrimination in
article 7 does not refer to any categories of discrimination.' Article 16 sets
forth the right for "[m]en and women of full age" to marry and to have a
family.9 The right to an adequate standard of living in article 25 refers specifi-
cally to the need for security in the event of widowhood.'0 It also states that
"[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.""'
The Universal Declaration's acknowledgment of women's lives clearly
is quite limited. Women enter the picture only insofar as they are connected
to men. The Universal Declaration depicts women as wives and mothers and,
in the latter capacity, as particularly vulnerable individuals. The constant
references to the family in the Universal Declaration reinforce the restricted
image of women. In fact, the Universal Declaration presents the family as "the
natural and fundamental group unit of society" and as a unit that is "entitled to
protection by society and the State."'2 The langtage of the Universal Declara-
tion suggests that a family comprises only a heterosexual married couple and
their offspring. Indeed, the Universal Declaration assumes that the primary
purpose of marriage is to have children. In a marriage, a woman will be
economically dependent on her husband such that, if she is widowed, she will
have a special claim to social security." One could interpret the Universal
Declaration as indicating that the right to leave a marriage is very limited,
although the Universal Declaration does provide equal rights to men and
5. DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE 147-48 (1980).
6. Helen Bequaertl-olmes, A FeministAnalysis ofthe Universal Deelaration ofiHuman
Rights, in BEYOND DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 250, 259
(Carol C. Gould ed., 1983).
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 2.
8. See id. art. 7 (implying that women and men enjoy same protections under law).
9. Id. art. 16.
10. See id. art. 25 (stating that everyone has right to adequate standard of living).
11. Id.
12. Id. arL 16.
13. Id. art. 25.
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women on dissolution of marriage. 4 The Universal Declaration's emphasis
on the family as the foundation of society also may suggest that human rights
are not applicable within the family context. The sacrosanct image of the
family in the Universal Declaration discourages proper scrutiny of whether the
rights to life, liberty, freedom from slavery, and security of the person are
realized within particular family contexts.'5
Fifty years after its drafting, we can see that the Universal Declaration has
limits. For example, the Universal Declaration contains no reference to self-
determination nor to the rights of minorities. Can we now single out its
provisions and silences with respect to women? One might argue that this
would be an unfair use of current standards to assess a fifty-year-old document.
However, international concern with the position of women in particular
contexts was well-established at the time of the drafting of the Universal
Declaration. For example, prior to the Universal Declaration, there were
conventions on trafficking in women and on women in the work place. 6 This
suggests that human rights relevant to women's lives were seen as a discrete
and separate category to the "general" human rights guarantees that were
designed with men in mind. Moreover, the Universal Declaration's image of
women is reflected in all of the subsequent "general" international human
rights treaties. These documents similarly rely on a generalized male experi-
ence and attend to a very limited notion of women's lives. Women's submis-
sion to male authority appears as a "natural" consequence of their reproductive
role.'7 In other words, as Spike Peterson writes, "a woman's capacity for
biological reproduction becomes essentialized as her nature; the 'givenness'
of this capacity is then extended to the entire process of social reproduction,
thereby consigning women to a restricted 'family' domain."'"
The Universal Declaration, then, began its life with a limited acknowledg-
ment of women's lives and of the different human rights issues that women
face. Much of the extensive literature on the Universal Declaration reinforces
this lack of relevance that the Universal Declaration has to women's lives. For
example, a volume of essays published to commemorate the thirtieth anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration did not contain any reference to women's
human rights. 9 It identified the major unfinished business as implemen-
14. Id. art. 16.
15. See Holmes, supra note 6, at 253.
16. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children, 9 L.N.T.S. 415 (1921); Underground Work (Women) Convention, 1935, International
Labour Organisation <http:llwww.ilo.orgpublicenglish/90travailcis/ilostandards/c045.htm>.
17. See V. Spike Peterson, Whose Rights? A Critique of the "Givens" in Human Rights
Discourse, XV ALTERNATIVES 303, 314-15 (1990).
18. Id.
19. See generally HUMANPGHTS: THIRTYYEARS AFTER THEUNIVERSAL DECLARATION,
supra note 2.
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tation.2° According to these essays, the first standard-setting phase of the
human rights system was largely complete. The only question that the authors
raised regarding the nature of the standards was a concern about the differing
concepts of human rights that were held by Western, Socialist, and Third
World states.21 The contributors to the book cautioned against abandoning the
notion of universality of rights and argued that "certain common values...
transcend differences of race, faith, political structure, culture and economic
development.., which are based on the equality, freedom and solidarity of all
men."2
III Feminist Critiques of the UN. Human Rights System
Although treaties devoted to particular rights of women were adopted by
the U.N. system in the 1950s,' recognition that the U.N. human rights system
did not adequately respond to women's situations did not begin until after the
1975 Mexico World Conference on the International Women's Year that
launched the U.N. Decade for Women (1976-85).24 The adoption of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women in 1979 elaborated on the norm of nondiscrimination on the basis of
sex.' It took another decade for women to begin interrogating the generally
applicable human rights instruments and to show that, in fact, they gave
particular prominence and protection to men's lives.
There is now significant literature critiquing the international system for
the protection of human rights from a feminist perspective.26 Following are the
main themes of this work:
20. See, e.g., Kamleshwar Das, Some Reflections on Implementing Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNVEPRSAL DECLARATION, supra note 2, at 131,
133-34.
21. H. Gros Espiell, The Evolving Concept of Human Rights: Western, Socialist and
Third WorldApproaches, in HUMANRIGHTS: THIRTYYEARSAFTERTHEUNwERSALDECLARA-
TION, supra note 2, at 41, 41-42.
22. Nicolas Valticos, The Role of the ILO: Present Action and Future Perspectives, in
HuMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 2, at 211,
213.
23. See, e.g., Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S.
135.
24. Report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year, July 2, 1975,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 66/34.
25. Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms offDiscrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, art. 3, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
26. See generally HuMANRIGHTs OF WOMEN: NATIONALAND INTERNATIONALPERSPEC-
TivEs (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (evaluating international human rights from feminist
perspective); WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS: AREFERENcE GUIDE (Kelly Askin & Dorean Koenig
eds., forthcoming 1998); WOMEN's RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PER-
SPECTIVES (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
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1. Feminist activists and scholars point out that there exists an absence
of women in the processes of defining and implementing human rights stan-
dards. For example, none of the human rights treaty-monitoring bodies (apart
from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women)
have an equal number of women and men members.27 Many see this non-
participation by women as a human rights issue in itself. Many scholars also
conclude that the lack of participation by women is connected to the lopsided
concerns of the traditional human rights canon.2"
2. The monitoring and enforcement of the specialized women's treaties
is weaker than that of their "general" counterparts. For example, the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is
monitored only through a reporting system.29 The International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination," the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,3' and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,32 on the
other hand, offer reporting as well as individual33 and state complaine4 mecha-
nisms. Moreover, the institutions designed to promote and monitor the obser-
vance of women's human rights have less resources than the comparable
institutions of "general" human rights.3
3. The traditional human rights canon does not cover issues that have a
particular significance for women. For example, the issues of illiteracy,
development, and sexual violence are dealt with in "soft" law instruments but
are not addressed in legally binding norms. Moreover, international law
focuses on states as the primary violators of human rights. More significant
arethe activities ofnonstate actors, such as international monetary institutions,
which have the power to impose social and economic conditions that can
27. See Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men 's Club: Feminist Futuresfor
the United Nations, 4 TRANsNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 421, 423-24 (1994).
28. Id.at438-39.
29. Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, supra
note 25, art. 18.
30. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
32. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027.
33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 31, arts. 14, 22.
34. Id. art. 41.
35. See Andrew C. Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 56-58
(1989) (discussing lack of resources available to committees working to protect human rights
of women); Laura Reanda, The Commission on the Status of Women, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HuMAN RIGHTS 265, 300-01 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
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adversely affect women's lives through their loans.3 6
4. The ideas ofequality and nondiscrimination that animate the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the
flagship of women's human rights, are very limited in the sense that they
promise equality on male-defined terms only. The terms of the Convention
require that women be treated in the same way as a similarly situated man.
The Convention does not recognize the effects of structural discrimination
against women.37
5. Feminists have argued that the focus on activities that occur in the
public sphere introduces a significant bias against women into human rights
law. For example, the accepted international definition of "torture" requires
the involvement of a "public official."38 Also, the guarantee of a right to work
applies to the paid, public workforce only.3 9 Although many women do suffer
from this public type of human rights violation, the violations of rights that
take place in the "private" sphere are much more significant in women's lives
globally."
6. More generally, the model of human nature that underlies the human
rights tradition is gendered and cannot claim to have an "objective" core. The
Western, liberal, and individualistic underpinnings of human rights law all
contribute to its male bias.4 Feminists from the South have particularly criti-
cized the Western framework of human rights law and indeed of much feminist
criticism.42
36. Anne Orford, Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of
Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. (forthcoming 1998).
37. See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, FeministApproaches
to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 631-32 (1991) (discussing "equality" as proposed
by Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
38. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 32, art. 1.
39. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
40. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Worlds Apart: Public/Private Distinctions inlnterna-
tionalLaw, in PUBLICANDPRIvATE: FEMNSTLEGALDEBATES 243,248-51 (MargaretThornton
ed., 1995) (discussing neglect of women's private rights in international laws); CelinaRomany,
State Responsibility Goes Private: 4 Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in
International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 85, 85-87 (discussing neglect of women's human rights
in private sphere of familial relationships). Not all feminist critics of international human rights
law share this view. Karen Engle, for example, argues that it may be in women's best interests
to resist legal incursions into the "private" sphere. Using the analogy of international trade law,
she speculatesthattheprovince ofthe mostpowerful may be outside ofthe scope ofinternational
legal regulation. Karen Engle,.After the Collapse ofthePublic/PrivateDistinction: Strategizing
Women's Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALrrY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 149-50
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
41. See Peterson, supra note 17, at 308-32.
42. See, e.g., J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "The Personal Is Political," or Why
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7. Even when women can be shown to have suffered violations of human
rights in the traditional, male-defined sense, these violations are given much
less attention and publicity than is accorded to violations of men's rights. For
example, the reports by the special rapporteurs of the Commission on Human
Rights have typically ignored human rights violations against women.43 The
methods of investigating and documenting human rights abuses can often
obscure or even conceal abuses against women. As a result, the U.N.'s "fact
finding" in Rwanda in 1994 did not detect systematic sexual violence against
women until nine months after the attack and genocide, when women began
to give birth in unprecedented numbers.'
8. Society justifies many violations of women's rights on the grounds
that the violations are an aspect of particular religious or cultural practices.45
States, religious communities, and individuals invoke the rights to religious
freedom or cultural integrity as "trumping" women's rights.46 The pattern of
reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimina-
tion Against Women provides a good example of this phenomenon. 7
IV.. UN. Responses
How has the U.N. system responded to the wave of feminist critiques of
its protection of human rights? On one level, the response has been surpris-
ingly rapid and impressive. For example, atthe United Nations World Confer-
ence on Human Rights in 1993, the international community formally recog-
nized that the human rights system did not adequately respond to women's
lives.48 The community committed itself to the furtherance of the belief that
the human rights of women were "an inalienable, integral and indivisible part
of universal human rights."49 It also accepted that gender-specific violations
Women's Rights.Are IndeedHuman Rights: AnAfrican Perspective on International Feminism,
17 HuM. RTS. Q. 691, 697-705 (1995).
43. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, REPORTNO. 1, ToKEN GEsTUREs:
WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN REPORTING 5-6 (1993).
44. Anne Gallagher, Ending the Marginalization: Strategies for Incorporating Women
into the United Nations Human Rights System, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 283, 292 n.31 (1997).
45. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Dis-
course, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMANRIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINISTPERSPECTIvES, supra
note 26, at 167, 167.
46. Id. at 167-69.
47. Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 297-98 (1991); Rebecca J. Cook,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 673-78 (1990).
48. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Oct. 13, 1993, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/24 18, at 33, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661.
49. Id.
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of human rights were part of the human rights agenda." Another significant
development was the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in December 1993."' The
Declaration contains a broad definition of the notion of gender-based
violence. 2 It acknowledges gender-based violence as an international issue
and more specifically, as an issue of sex discrimination. 3 The Beijing Decla-
ration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on
Women in September 1995, identifies the human rights of women as a critical
area of concern. 54
While these developments have generally been hailed by feminist scholars
and activists, they are worth a closer look. How far do they respond to the
criticisms of the international human rights system outlined above? It is
striking that the assertion that "[w]omen's rights are human rights," while
contained in the Beijing Declaration,55 is not reiterated in the more action-
oriented Platform for Action because of an apparent anxiety of states about
recognizing "new" human rights.56 Thus, the Platform distinguishes between
human rights of women (meaning the application of the traditional human
rights canon to women), which are universal and women's rights (meaning
rights that are of especial relevance to women only), which are not universal.
Moreover, the model of women's existence presupposed by the Beijing Plat-
form is quite restricted. Although the Platform for Action gives a nod in the
direction of the diversity of women's experiences,57 it nevertheless presents
50. Id. art. 2.
51. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg. at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
52. Id. art. 2.
53. Id. art. 5.
54. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995),
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 401, 405.
55. Id.9 14.
56. Dianne Otto, A Post-Beiing Reflection on the Limitations and Potential ofHuman
Rights Discourse for Women, in WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE GUIDE (Kelly Askin &
Dorean Koenig eds., forthcoming 1998).
57. Paragraph 46 of Chapter IV of the Beijing Platform for Action states:
The Platform for Action recognizes that women face barriers to full equality and
advancement because of such factors as their race, age, language, ethnicity, culture,
religion or disability, because they are indigenous women or because of other status.
Many women encounter specific obstacles related to their family status, particularly
as single parents; and to their socio-economic status, including their living condi-
tions in rural, isolated or impoverished areas. Additional barriers also exist for
refugee women, other displaced women, including internally displaced women as
well for immigrantwomen andmigrantwomen, includingwomen migrantworkers.
Many women are also particularly affected by environmental disasters, serious and
infectious diseases and various forms of violence against women.
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 54, 46.
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women in a very limited and encumbered way. The major role for women
remains that which is described in the Universal Declaration - wife and
mother. As Dianne Otto points out in her analysis of the Beijing negotiations,
the only acknowledged development in the role of women is that women are
expected to participate in decision-making structures and to play a part in the
free market economy. 8 Attempts to raise the diversity of women's identities,
most particularly with respect to sexual orientation, were unsuccessful at
Beijing. 9
The new international concern with women's rights also is limited in the
way it understands the notion of equality. Although there have been signifi-
cant moves to recognize some gendered harms, particularly violence against
women, the major remedy for the global subordination of women has been to
increase women's roles in decision-making. 0 This simply allows women
access to a world that is already constituted by men. Dianne Otto argues that
"[i]n the absence of-a recognition that the decision-making structures must
themselves change, it is not clearwhat difference women's equal participation
could make. Ultimately, it may merely equally implicate women in the perpet-
uation of the masculinist liberal forms ofminimalist representative democracy
and capitalist economics."61 The new international discourse on women's
rights also gives prominence to civil and political rights of women at the
expense of economic and social rights. Health and reproductive rights are
much more likely to be controversial in international fora than civil rights.62
Although the feminization of poverty clearly is acknowledged in the Beijing
Platform,63 it was not placed squarely in a rights context.' It has been noted
that the Platform "assumes... that capitalism has the ability to deliver eco-
nomic equality to the poor women of the world and... that the obligation of
states to guarantee certain economic and social rights is made redundant by the
more 'efficient' processes of free market forces."6" The practices of interna-
tional monetary institutions such as the World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund also have serious implications for economic and social rights. The
narrow notion of development that animates these institutions elevates private
58. Dianne Otto, Holding Up Half the Sky, Butfor Whose Benefit?: A Critical Analysis
of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 6AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 7,25-27 (1996).
59. Id. at 25.
60. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 54, 142(a), 253(a).
61. Otto, supra note 56.
62. See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 54, 162-164 (express-
ing Holy See's reservation on Beijing Platform's section on women and health).
63. Id. 47-57.
64. Id. But see id. at 27 (referring, in Strategic Objective A.2, to women's equal rights
to economic resources but refraining from elaborating on that idea).
65. Otto, supra note 56.
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sector interests over public funding for food, health, education, and social
security.6
In the last few years, the various levels of the U.N. human rights machin-
ery have shown an interest in women's rights. In March 1994, the CHR
appointed RadhikaCoomaraswamy as Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women. Coomaraswamy is the first Special Rapporteur with a gender-specific
mandate. 7 Some of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies have an-
nounced changes to their procedures in order to better respond to women's
concerns. In 1995, for example, the Centre for Human Rights in collaboration
with the United Nations Development Fund for Women organized a meeting
of experts to create guidelines for "mainstreaming" gender perspectives into
the human rights system. 8 Also, the CSW currently is considering a draft
Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention that would allow individual and
group complaints of noncompliance with the Convention. 9
Thus, the international community seems to have accepted the rhetoric of
women's rights. What effect has this had in practice? I will focus on the
commitmentto "gendermainstreaming" inthe U.N. human rights treaty bodies.
The treaty monitoring bodies' responses to calls for "gender mainstreaming"
have been varied. The reactions differ depending on the presence of at least
one or two committee members who have a true commitment to the issue. At
one end of the spectrum, there have been significant advances. For example,
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which monitors the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has taken the
task of gender mainstreaming seriously, referring to the position of women in
its concluding observations on states parties' reports and in general com-
ments.70 Its reporting guidelines, however, are uneven with respect to gender
issues. Gender is not referred to with respect to some important articles, such
as the right to free primary education set out in article 14 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.7' In contrast, the Commit-
66. See Orford, supra note 36.
67. See Report on the Fiftieth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th
Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 140-41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132 (1994) (renewing Coomaraswamy's
gender-specific mandate).
68. Follow-Up to the Fourth World Conference on Women: Review of Mainstreaming
in Organizations of the United Nations System, U.N. ESCOR Commission on the Status of
Women, 40th Sess., 20, U.N. Doc. EICN.6/199619 (1996).
69. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Including the Elaboration of a Draft Optional Protocol, to the Convention, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on the Status of Women, 42d Sess., art. 2, U.N. Doc. EICN.6/19981WGIL.2
(1998).
70. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 39, arts.
3,7.
71. See Gallagher, supra note 44, at 301.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 781 (1998)
tee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which monitors the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
does not include gender considerations at all in its concluding observations or
in its general comments, although the intersection of race and sex discrimina-
tion is an important and controversial area. 2 The Chairman of CERD stated
in 1996 that directives to integrate gender into states parties' reports were
"fundamentally misconceived."' Similarly, the Committee Against Torture
has not displayed any concern with the gendered aspects of torture.74
The Human Rights Committee, the committee that monitors the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is regarded as one of the most
progressive of the treaty monitoring bodies with respect to women, due at least
recently in large part to its distinguished women members such as Elizabeth
Evatt and Cecilia Medina. It has adopted a number of useful general com-
ments on articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
that show a sensitivity to gender issues. Also, in 1995, the Committee
amended its reporting guidelines to request states parties to provide informa-
tion on the position of women.
As Jane Connors observes, however, the Committee is not consistent in
its concern with gender.75 Most of the Committee's general comments do not
address the position of women. A 1994 general comment on torture did not
examine the gendered dimensions of the right to be free from torture, although
it did refer to the need for states parties to address the infliction of torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by private actors.76 On the other hand,
the Committee has used its concluding observations in a number of cases in a
progressive way. For example, in 1996, the Committee's concluding com-
ments on Peru's periodic report under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights express concern "about criminalization of abortion even in
cases of rape," which results in "backyard" abortions as the major cause of
maternal mortality.77 The Committee stated that "these provisions not only
mean that women are subjectto inhumane treatment but are possibly incompat-
ible with articles 3, 6 and 7 of the Covenant."7
72. See id. at 304.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Jane Connors, General Human Rights Instruments and Their Relevance to Women,
in ADVANCING THEHUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: USING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN DOMES-
TIC LITIGATION 27, 33 (Andrew C. Byrnes et al. eds., 1997).
76. Compilations of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by the
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General cmt. 20(44), U.N. Doc. HRI/GENI1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994).
77. Christine Ainetter Brautigam, Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in the Work of
the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 389, 392-93 (John Lawrence
Hargrove ed., 1997).
78. Id. at 393.
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The Committee has given a mixed reception to complaints under the
Optional Protocol involving gender issues. The Committee has found that
cases of direct discrimination on the basis of sex - for example, a Mauritian
law that gave greater status to foreign wives of Mauritian men than to foreign
husbands of Mauritian women79 - breach the article 26 guarantee of nondis-
crimination. However, in other cases of direct discrimination on the basis of
sex, the Committee has permitted a considerable margin of appreciation to
states. For example, in Vos v. The Netherlands,0 the Committee found that a
Dutch law that allowed disabled men to retain a disability allowance on the
death of their wives but that did not allow disabled women to retain disability
on the death of their husbands was not aviolation of article 26.8 The Commit-
tee also has had much more difficulty with cases that involve laws or practices
that are facially gender neutral but that, in effect, discriminate against women.
Overall, gender mainstreaming has had a mixed fate. It has been rela-
tively easy to obtain a revision of reporting guidelines but much more difficult
to obtain practical follow-through on these revisions, such as through the
systematic questioning of states.8 2
V Future Development of Women's Rights in International Law
The sheaf of resolutions that the various U.N. bodies adopted in com-
memoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration acknowl-
edge in various ways that there are significant problems with the international
protection of rights. These resolutions outline the major concerns with the
Universal Declaration's protection of rights as nondissemination and non-
implementation of the pertinent Universal Declaration provisions.83 In other
words, the problems are external to the Universal Declaration and to the U.N.
human rights system itself. The U.N. bodies see the Universal Declaration as
having a continuing and universal relevance. To these U.N. bodies, then, the
cure for the mid-life crisis is better coordination, better promotion, better
evaluation, better information, and better implementation. I argue, in contrast,
that for women, the Universal Declaration and its progeny themselves may be
the problem.
79. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, Communication No. 35/1978, in 1 SELECTED
DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 67, 71 (1985).
80. Communication No. 218/1986, U.N. Doc. A/44/40, Annex XI.G, at 232.
81. Vos v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 218/1986, U.N. Doc. A/44/40, Annex
XI.G, at 232.
82. See Brautigam, supra note 77, at 394.
83. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 51/88, U.N. GAOR, 51stSess., 82d plen. mtg. at 231, U.N. Doc.
A/51/49 (1996) (stating that it recognizes "the Declaration as the source of inspiration and the
basis of subsequent progress in the field of human rights" and that it is "[c]oncemed that inter-
national human rights standards are not fully and universally respected, that human rights con-
tinue to be violated in all parts of the world").
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The U.N. human rights system and the Universal Declaration have grown
into middle age. Like many fifty-year-old men today, the Universal Declara-
tion is rather smug in its attitude towards women. The U.N.'s reactions to
criticism of the Universal Declaration include simply ignoring the issue and
hoping that, in time, it will go away. Another argument sometimes made is
that taking the specificity of women's lives into account will undermine the
objectivity and universality of the system. Yet another reaction is that of the
double message -the public use of"politically correct" language acknowledg-
ing the problem and the announcement of special programs to alleviate it, but
failure to tailor the programs to the specific problem or to give enough weight
or resources to the programs to ensure their success. The human rights system
appears to have learned that the art of politically correct rhetoric is an effective
tool in silencing potential critics. It finds it very hard, however, to institute
significant change. The human rights system's responses to the criticisms of
feminist activists and scholars have been very mixed. Generally, the human
rights system has only recognized claims of women that involve rights viola-
tions akin to those that men might sustain.84 Recognition of rights violations
in the "private" sphere are still the exception. For example, the negotiations
on the text of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
in which some states resisted the definition of violence against women as a
human rights issue on the grounds that this would water down the concept of
human rights, 5 indicate the problems of enlarging the androcentric focus of
human rights law. The overarching slogan of the U.N. human rights system
with respect to women seems to be just "add women and stir."86 A mid-life
crisis is necessary for the system to change course in a more radical way to
ensure that there is substantive change.
There has been much debate among feminists about whether human rights
discourse is a useful strategy. Many have argued, for example, that civil and
political rights are manipulable, individualistic, and unlikely to respond to the
more general structural disadvantages that women face. 7 In my view, how-
ever, the significance of human rights discourse outweighs its disadvantages.
Human rights provide an alternative language and framework to the existing
welfare and protection approach to the global situation of women as victims
or dependents. 8 Human rights allow women to claim specific entitlements
from a specified obligation-holder. Moreover, there are international, regional,
and national systems in place that can be invoked to protect human rights.
84. Connors, supra note 75, at 37.
85. See Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Violence Against Women: A Global
Issue, in WOMEN, MALE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 13, 24-25 (J. Stubbs ed., 1994).
86. See Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions Into International Law, 19 ADEL. L.
REV. 13, 18 (1997).
87. CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 138-57 (1989).
88. See Brautigam, supra note 77, at 390.
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Human rights discourse is the dominant progressive moral philosophy operat-
ing at the global level.89 It is important for women to engage in such discourse
and contest its parameters.
What might the Universal Declaration's mid-life crisis produce? One
outcome could be attention to the gendered model of human nature embedded
in the human rights system. Just as some men at fifty suddenly regret the
limitations of traditional male roles, the human rights system should develop
rights responding to the life experiences of women, rather than forcing women
to articulate their concerns in terms of rights based on male lives. Radhika
Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
proposes the creation of a "fourth generation" of women's rights." This
"fourth generation" of rights includes "new" rights such as the right to sexual
autonomy as well as a reinterpretation of the earlier generations of rights in
order to respond to women's concerns.91
The use of an equality paradigm in women's human rights law needs to
be reassessed. While it can offer some progress for women, it also can ration-
alize the deeper inequities in social structures around the world. As Nicola
Lacey writes, the idea of equality as sameness cuts little ice when men and
women are simply running different races.92 Dianne Otto proposes thatwomen
reclaim the language of equity from states that have used it to signal a lesser
standard than equality to achieve substantive redistributive outcomes.93 She
also emphasizes the need to respond to the diversity of women's experiences
in a meaningful way. 4 One way to do this is to focus on economic and social
rights that would draw attention to "the operation of systems of privilege
among women" and the inequitable structures of global capital.95
A mid-life crisis of the Universal Declaration may cause the U.N. to
rethink the significance of arguments of cultural relativism with respect to
women's rights. RadhikaCoomaraswamy argues that, in Asia, the next decade
especially will be marked by the collision of national cultural movements and
the development of women's rights." The debate about cultural difference in
the human rights arena tends to accept male-defined versions of culture as
89. RADHIKACOOMARASWAMY, REvEwoGINTERNATIONALLAW: WOMEN'sRIGHTS
AS HUMAN RIGHTs 4 (1997); Peterson, supra note 17, at 303-04. See generally Anne Orford,
Locating the International: Military andMonetary Interventions after the Cold War, 38 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 443 (1997) (investigating way in which moral philosophies have been generated in
international sphere).
90. CooMARAswAMY, supra note 89, at 25.
91. Id.
92. Nicola Lacey, Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist
Perspective, 14 J.L. & SOC'Y 411,420 (1987).
93. Otto, supra note 56.
94. IM
95. Id.; see Orford, supra note 36.
96. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 89, at 27.
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authoritative. New feminist understandings of culture need to be developed.
Arati Rao proposes that we pay close attention to the politics of arguments
based on culture in human rights discourse.97 For Rao, a critical assessment
of claims based on culture requires investigating the status of the speaker, in
whose name the argument from culture is advanced, and the degree of partici-
pation in culture formation of the social groups primarily affected by the
cultural practices in question.98
Another outcome of a mid-life crisis would be thoroughgoing gender
mainstreaming in the U.N. human rights system, both in the way that the rights
protected by human rights treaties are understood and in the way that the U.N.
human rights machinery deals with them. The development of an optional
complaints procedure to the Women's Convention through the CSW may have
radical potential, especially if such a development allows consideration of
structural gender inequality.
VI. Conclusion
One might say that a basic flaw in my analogy of the Universal Declara-
tion to a man's life is that the Universal Declaration was created to be both
universal and eternal. As Sean MacBride said at the time of the thirtieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration, "the precepts of the [U]niversal
Declaration are immutable and will remain valid forever: the right to life,
freedom from torture, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention
and other such rights know no bounds of time."99 Emphasis on its middle age
may imply that the Universal Declaration will naturally fade away sometime
before its centenary. Butthe language of rights cannot be fixed. It will always
be contested and its meaning constantly renegotiated. A popular guide to
coping with middle age quotes Carl Jung's statement that: "We cannot live the
afternoon of life according to the programme of life's morning; for what was
great in the morning will be little at evening, and what in the morning was true
will at evening have become a lie."1" In this spirit, I argue that the Universal
Declaration is not based on immutable truth. It is a product of a situated and
partial understanding of the human condition generated by men. If we under-
stand the implicit commitments of the Universal Declaration, we open up
transformative terrain.
97. Rao, supra note 45, at 168.
98. Id.
99. Sean MacBride, Message, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION, supra note 2, at ix.
100. HERANT A. KATCHADOURiAN, FIFTY: MIDLIFEINPERsPECTIVE 13 (1987) (quoting
CARL JUNG, THE PORTABLE JUNG (Joseph Campbell ed., 1971)).




The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),
adopted December 10, 1948, proclaimed that "[e]veryone has the right to life"
and "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."' The same approach was taken in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 4, 1948.2 At the
time, the vast majority of United Nations Member States still employed
capital punishment. Moreover, the death penalty was also recognized as an
appropriate penalty for major war criminals and was imposed by the postwar
tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo.' When the Universal Declaration's pro-
visions were transformed into treaty law in universal and regional instruments,
the death penalty was specifically mentioned as a form of exception to the
right to life.4
Fifty years later, as we commemorate the anniversary of the adoption of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the compatibility of the death
* M.A. (Toronto), LL.D. (Montreal), Professor of Law and Chair, Ddpartement des
sciences juridiques, Universitd du Quebec A Montrdal.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.
art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 1, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
ser.L./V./I.4 (1948).
3. See Agreementforthe Prosecution and Punishment oftheMajor War Criminals ofthe
EuropeanAxis, Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 27, 82 U.N.T.S.
279,300; SpecialProclamation bythe Supreme CommanderfortheAllied Powers atTokyo, Jan.
19, 1946, art. 16, 4 Bevans 20, 26, amendedby International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
Apr.26, 1946, art. 16, 4Bevans 27,31 ("Charter ofthe Tokyo Tribunal"); Control CouncilLaw
No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, in NUREMBERG TRIALS FINAL REPORT, Appendix D, art. II(3)(a).
4. See American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica," Nov.
22, 1969, art. 4, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 145 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (allowing death
penalty); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 174-75 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (same); Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 2(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221,224
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (same).
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penalty with international human rights norms seems less and less certain.
The second generation of international criminal tribunals - the ad hoc tribu-
nals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the nascent international
criminal court - rule out the possibility of the death penalty, even for the most
heinous crimes.' The basic international human rights treaties have been
completed with additional protocols that prohibit capital punishment.' Fifty-
one states are now bound by these international legal norms abolishing the
death penalty,7 and the number should continue to grow rapidly.'
The importance of international standard-setting was evidenced by
parallel developments in domestic legal systems. The list has grown steadily
from a handful of abolitionist states in 1945 to considerably more than half the
countries in the world having abolished the death penalty de facto or dejure.
According to the United Nations Secretary General in his January 16, 1998
5. The Security Council has excluded use of the death penalty by the two international
ad hoc tribunals created to deal with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See
UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Annex, art. 24, § 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); UNITED NATIONS,
SECURITY COUNCIL, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, Annex, art. 23,
§ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); UNITED NATIONS, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, 17 JULY 1998, art. 77, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) <http://www.un.org/
icc>.
6. See, e.g., Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil andPoliti-
cal Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force July 7, 1991);
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 114
(entered into force Mar. 30, 1985); Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, art. 1, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73 (entered into force Oct. 6,
1993). The American Convention on Human Rights is also an abolitionist instrument because
it prevents countries that have already abolished the death penalty from reintroducing it. See
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 4, at 145 (dealing with death pen-
alty). Thus, a state that has abolished the death penalty at the time of ratification of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights is abolitionist from the standpoint of international law.
7. See Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 18
HUM. RTs.L.J. 79,84-86 (1997) (noting that Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania,
San Marino, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay,
and Venezuela have ratified abolitionist treaties). These states are abolitionist either dejure or
defacto and have either signed or ratified one or more of the abolitionist treaties. Id.
8. Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, and
Ukraine have indicated their intention to be bound by international norms prohibiting the death
penalty, either by signing an abolitionist instrument or by publicly declaring their intention to
ratify.
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report to the Commission on Human Rights, 102 states have abolished the
death penalty and 90 retain it.9 Those that retain it find themselves increas-
ingly subject to international pressure in favor of abolition. Sometimes, this
pressure is quite direct, as evidenced by the refusal of certain countries to
grant extradition when a fugitive will be exposed to a capital sentence. Aboli-
tion of the death penalty is generally considered to be an important element
in democratic development for states breaking with a past characterized by
terror, injustice, and repression. In some countries, abolition is effected by
explicit reference in constitutional instruments to the international treaties
prohibiting the death penalty. In others, it has been the contribution of the
judiciary that has brought about abolition of the death penalty. Judges have
applied constitutions that make no specific mention of the death penalty but
enshrine the right to life and prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
or punishment.'0
Thus, the question of abolition of the death penalty stands as one of the
sharpest examples of both the evolution of human rights norms and the
ongoing relevance of the broadly-worded texts in the Universal Declaration.
In 1948, Ren6 Cassin and Eleanor Roosevelt rejected suggestions that the Uni-
versal Declaration contain a reference to capital punishment as an exception
to the right to life. They did so not because international law had reached the
stage of abolition, but because they saw such a trend emerging and wanted the
Universal Declaration to retain its relevance for decades and perhaps centuries
to come.1 Half a century later, we must acknowledge their clairvoyance.
While it is still premature to declare the death penalty prohibited by customary
international law, it is clear that we are somewhere in the midst of such a
process, indeed considerably close to the goal. The many signs of this devel-
opment are the subject of this paper.'
2
9. See Question of the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General submitted
pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/12, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 54th Sess., 82d
mtg. 18, at 10, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1998/82 (1998).
10. See The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391, 144, 151 (CC);
ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 17 (1996) (discussing
Ruling 23/1990 (X.31) AB, Constitutional Court of Hungary, Judgment of Oct. 24, 1990,
Magyar Kozldny (Official Gazette), Oct. 31, 1991); Tibor Horvath, L'abolition de lapeine de
mort en Hongrie, 2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE ET DE POLICE TECHNIQUE 167
(1992) (same).
11. See WiLLIAMA. SCHABAS, THEABOLrONOFTHEDEATHPENALTYININTERNATIONAL
LAW 30-35 (2d ed. 1997).
12. Several recent works provide detailed overviews of international legal issues relating
to abolition of the death penalty. See generally CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GLOBAL ISSUES AND
PROSPECTS (Peter Hodgkinson & Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996) (discussing death penalty
throughout world); HOOD, supra note 10 (same); SCHABAS, supra note 11 (describing movement
away from capital punishment in international community). For a discussion of the death
penalty in the United States, see generally THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, CURRENT CON-
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I1 International Legal Norms Concerning the Death Penalty
The issue of the death penalty is associated with two fundamental human
rights norms: the right to life and the protection against cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishments. Both norms can trace their roots to the great instru-
ments of Anglo-American constitutional law. The guarantee against "cruel
and unusual punishments" was set out in the English Bill of Rights of 1689."3
It was aimed at some of the more barbaric accompaniments of execution that
characterized Stuart England, such as drawing and quartering, disemboweling
while alive, and amputation. The "right to life" was immortalized by the
words of Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence of 1776."4 The
American revolutionaries sought to protect the right not to be deprived of life
"without due process of law," a not-so-tacit recognition of the legitimacy of
capital punishment. 5 From a historical standpoint, then, neither of these
norms could be considered to challenge capital punishment. Yet in their more
modem formulation, both of these rights have served to restrict and in some
cases to prohibit the death penalty.
A. The Right to Life
The drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6 of 1948
looked to domestic constitutions 7 for inspiration in preparing a document that
they termed "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations."' 8 Most of these constitutions were inspired to a greater or lesser
extent by the principles of the English Bill of Rights, 9 the American Declara-
tion of Independence"0 and Bill of Rights,2' and the French Declaration des
TROVERSIES (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
13. See 1 W. & M. ch. 2 (1688) (Eng.); see also Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 839 (1969)
(noting that English Bill of Rights of 1689 prohibits cruel and unusual punishments).
14. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
15. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting
that Constitution allows capital punishment provided there is due process of law); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (same).
16. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1; see also SCHABAS,supra
note 11, at23-45 (providing academic comment on article 3 of Universal Declaration); ALBERT
VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 99-100 (1964) (same); Lilly E. Landerer, Capital Punishment as a Human Rights
Issue Before the United Nations, 4 HuM. RTS. J. 511, 511-34 (1971) (same).
17. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 29 n.12.
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, preamble.
19. See 1 W. & M. ch. 2 (1688) (Eng.).
20. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
21. See U.S. CONST. amends. I - X.
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droits de l'homme et du citoyen.' High on the list of this new international
catalogue of human rights was the "right to life."' However, the scope of this
right had become considerably different, and broader, than it had been when
it was first announced in the eighteenth century, as many participants in the
drafting process took pains to point out.
As such, the Universal Declaration makes no mention of the death pen-
alty. But distinct from the domestic constitutions from which it is derived, the
Universal Declaration also does not explicitly refer to the death penalty as an
exception to the right to life. Indeed, unlike the case of the American Bill of
Rights, it cannot be said that the drafters of the Universal Declaration sought
to preserve the death penalty as an implicit limitation on the right to life. The
debates in the General Assembly's Third Committee during the autumn of
1948 make this quite clear.24
The original draft of the Universal Declaration, prepared by John P.
Humphrey in early 1947, recognized a right to life that "can be denied only to
persons who have been convicted under general law of some crime to which
the death penalty is attached."' But Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the
Drafting Committee, cited movement underway in some states to abolish the
death penalty and suggested that it might be better not to make any explicit
mention of the matter.26 Her views found support from the Soviet delegate,
Koretsky, who argued that the United Nations should in no way signify
approval of the death penalty.27 Ren6 Cassin cautioned that even countries
that had no death penalty must take into account the fact that some are in the
process of abolishing it.28 Cassin reworked Humphrey's draft and removed
any reference to the death penalty.29 His proposal found its way, virtually
unchanged, into the final version of the Universal Declaration, despite some
unsuccessful attempts to return to the original proposal." It is clear from the
travauxpriparatoires that the death penalty was considered to be fundamen-
22. See DECLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN (France 1789).
23. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
24. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 35-40.
25. UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNcIL, COMMrrrTONHUMAN RIGHTS,
IST SEss., REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMiTEE TO THE COMMIssION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
Annex A, art 3, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/21 (1947).
26. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 30 (citation omitted).
27. Id. (citation omitted). His views were supported by Santa Cruz of Chile, and Wilson
of the United Kingdom. See PHILIPPE DE LA CHAPELLE, LA D-CLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME ET LE CATHOLICISME 94 (1967).
28. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 30.
29. See id. at 31 (citations omitted).
30. See id.
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tally incompatible with the protection of the right to life, and that its abolition,
although not immediately realizable, should be the "common standard of
achievement" of the Member States of the United Nations. 1 Subsequent
interpretation by General Assembly and Economic and Social Council resolu-
tions supports this conclusion.3 2
The Universal Declaration was not intended to establish binding treaty
obligations. However, it provided the normative framework for the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the three major regional
human rights treaties. A chronological perspective on the adoption of these
treaty provisions shows that although the death penalty was retained as an
exception or limitation on the right to life, it has been progressively restricted
in scope.
The European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention),
adopted less than two years after the Universal Declaration, recognizes the
right to life, "save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law."33 It reflects
the postwar context in Europe, when war crimes trials (and the resulting
executions) were still fresh in the collective memory. The provision was
almost immediately anachronistic. There have been only a handful of execu-
31. A Soviet amendment calling for addition of a paragraph providing for the abolition
of the death penalty in time of peace (Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics: Amendment toArticle
3, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., Annex, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/265 (1948)) was deemed
premature and was rejected by twenty-one votes to nine, with eighteen abstentions. See U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 107th mtg. at 185, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.107 (1948). The vote,
however, can in no way be interpreted as a gesture favorable to the death penalty.
32. G.A. Res. 2393, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1969); G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1972); G.A. Res. 61, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No.45, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978);
G.A. Res. 128, supra note 6, at 207; E.S.C. Res. 1745, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 1,
at4, U.N. Doc. E/5367 (1973); E.S.C. Res. 1930, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35,
U.N. Doc. E/5664 (1975); see UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIiCAND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY GENERAL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 13, § 11, at 4, U.N.
Doc. E/5242 (1973).
33. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 4, art. 2(1), at 224; see also SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 222-38 (discussing death
penalty and European Convention on Human Rights); JACQUES VELU & RUSEN ERGEC, LA
CONVENTIONEUROPtENNEDESDROITSDEL'HOMME37-39, 169-71 (1990) (same); Gilbert Guil-
laume, Article 2, in LA CONVENTION EUROPENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME: COMMENTAIRE
ARTICLEPARARTICLE 143-54 (L.E. Pettiti etal. eds., 1995) (same); B.G. Ramcharan, TheDraft-
ing History ofArticle 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-61 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985) (same); Alphonse Spielmann, La
Convention europdenne des droits de l'homme et la peine de mort, in PRSENCE DU DROIT
PUBLIC El DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, MLANGES OFFERTS A JACQUES VELU 1503-27 (1992)
(same).
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tions within Member States of the Council of Europe since 1950. By the early
1970s, the Council of Europe had begun work on a protocol to the Conven-
tion, which was adopted in 1983,"4 that modifies article 2 by abolishing the
death penalty in peacetime.35 In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights
observed that capital punishment has been abolished de facto in the Contract-
ing States of the European Convention.36
Negotiation of a human rights treaty took considerably more time in the
United Nations than in the Council of Europe. Although drafting work was
already underway as early as 1947, it was not until 1966 that the treaty in-
tended to accompany the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (International Covenant), was adopted.37 It took
yet another ten years before the instrument had obtained the necessary thirty-
five ratifications for it to enter into force. The "right to life" provision, article
6, was drafted during the 1957 session of the Third Committee of the General
Assembly." Although only seven years younger than the corresponding text
34. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 2-4
(abolishing death penalty).
35. See id art. 2, at 2 (permitting death penalty in time of war); see also SCHABAS, supra
note 11, at 238-56; A. Adinolfi, Premier instrument international sur l'abolition de lapeine
de mort, 58 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr Pi-NAL 321-24 (1987); Gilbert Guillaume,
Protocole no 6 glla Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertisfonda-
mentales concernant l'abolition de la peine de mort, in LA CONVENTION EUROPENNE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 1067-72; Erik
Harremoes, The Council of Europe and Its Efforts to Promote the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, 12-13 CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIM. JUST. NEwSL. 62 (1986); Peter Leuprecht, The
First International Instrument for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 2 FORUM 2 (1983).
36. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1989) (noting that
defacto death penalty no longer exists); see also (Qinarv. Turkey, 79-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 5, 9 (1994) (citing Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40) (noting that death penalty
no longer exists); H. v. Sweden, 79-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85, 94 (1994) (mention-
ing death penalty). Nevertheless, in recent years it has been pronounced (although not imposed)
in Turkey, Poland, and Belgium.
37. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, at 171.
38. See id. at 174-75 (discussing right to life). Article 6 states:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgement rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood
that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant
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in the European Convention, it already shows the remarkable and rapid
evolution of international law regarding the death penalty. 9 Article 6 of the
International Covenant also includes the death penalty as an exception to the
right to life, but it lists detailed safeguards and restrictions on its implementa-
tion.4" The death penalty may only be imposed for the "most serious crimes,"
it cannot be pronounced unless rigorous procedural rules are respected, and
it may not be applied to pregnant women or to individuals for crimes commit-
ted while under the age of eighteen.4" Furthermore, article 6 of the Inter-
national Covenant clearly points to abolition of the death penalty as a human
rights objective and implies that states that have already abolished the death
penalty may not reintroduce it.42 It too has been amended by an additional
protocol, which was adopted in 1989 and which proclaimed the death penalty
abolished in time of peace and war.43
The second major regional human rights treaty is the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights (American Convention), adopted in 1969 but in force
only since 1978." Here too, the progress is evident. Taking article 6 of the
to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commuta-
tion of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death
may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition




41. See id. For further discussion of article 6 of the International Covenant, see SCHABAS,
supra note 11, at 47-146 (discussing International Covenant); Marc J. Bossuyt, The Death
Penalty in the "travaux prdparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in ESSAIS SUR LE CONCEPT DE "DROIT DE VIVRE": EN MEMOIRE DE YOUGINDRA
KHUSHALANI 251-65 (Daniel Pr~mont ed., 1988) (discussing article 6 of International Cove-
nant); Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114-138 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981) (same); and see also Report of the Human Rights Committee: General Com-
ments under Article 40, paragraph 4 of the Covenant, General Comment 6(16), U.N. GAOR,
37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 93-94, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (discussing right to life).
42. See Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, Kindlerv. Canada (No. 470/1991), U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/48ID/470/1991 (1993) (Wennergren,
dissenting) ("What article 6, paragraph 2, does not, in my view, is to permit States parties that
have abolished the death penalty to reintroduce it at a later stage.").
43. See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 1, at 207.
44. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, at 123; SCHABAS, supra
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International Covenant as a model, the American Convention tightens the
restrictions on the use of the death penalty and affirms explicitly that states
may not reintroduce capital punishment once they have abolished it.4" This
renders the American Convention an abolitionist instrument, to the extent that
ratifying states that have already abolished the death penalty are now bound
as a matter of international law not to use the death penalty. In 1990, an
abolitionist protocol patterned generally on the Second Optional Protocol was
adopted within the inter-American system."
The third major regional treaty is the African Charter of Human and
Peoples' Rights (African Charter),47 adopted in 1981 and in force since 1986.
It too enshrines the right to life, but unlike the European, American and
universal instruments, it makes no mention of capital punishment as an
exception or limitation to this right.4' There is little interpretative material to
assist in construing the African Charter's right to life provision. Some schol-
ars point to African practice, in which a majority of states still employs the
death penalty, and conclude that the African Charter in no way forbids capital
punishment.49 Nevertheless, the African Charter is to be interpreted in light
note 11, at 273-90; ChristinaM. Cema, Universality ofHuman Rights: The Case of the Death
Penalty, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 465,472 (1997); J. Colon-Collazo, A Legislative History
of the Right to Life in the Inter-American Legal System, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 33-41 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985).
45. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has issued two advisory opinions that
interpret this provision. See Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3
(1983), Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) of the American Convention on
Human Rights); Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14 (1994),
InternationalResponsibilityfor the Promulgation andEnforcement ofLaws in Violation of the
Convention (Arts. I and2 ofthe American Convention on Human Rights). The Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights has also issued several reports dealing with the death penalty and
the right to life provision of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See
Celestine v. United States, Resolution No. 23/89, Case 10,031, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62, OEA/
ser.L./V./II.77, doe. 7 rev. 1 (1990); Roach and Pinkerton v. United States, Case No. 9647,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L.IV./II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987); see also Christina M. Cema,
US Death Penalty Tested Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 10 NETH.
Q. HuM. RTs. 155, 155-65 (1992).
46. See Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, supra note 6, at 9-11 (abolishing death penalty).
47. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art 4, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). For a comment on the right to life provision in the
Affican Charter, see JOHANNES G.C. VANAGGELEN, LEROLEDES ORGANISATIONSINTERNATION-
ALES DANS LA PROTECTIONDUDROrr LA vIE 40-41 (1986).
48. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47.
49. See Etienne-Richard Mbaya, A la recherche du noyau intangible dans la Charte
africaine, in LE NOYAU INTANGIBLE DES DROITS DEL'HOMME 207-26 (Patrice Meyer-Bisch ed.,
1991); see also KEBA MBAYE, LES DRorrs DE L'HOMME EN AFRIQuE 197 (1992).
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of other international human rights instruments, including "the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [and] other instruments adopted by the United
Nations. 5o At the very least, then, the restrictions and limitations on the death
penalty found in the International Covenant must apply. Several African
states have already abolished the death penalty,51 the most recent being South
Africa,52 and this will surely influence future interpretation of the African
Charter.53
The recent Arab Charter of Human Rights, adopted September 15, 1994,
but not yet ratified by any members of the League of Arab States, proclaims
the right to life." Three distinct provisions, articles 10, 11, and 12, recognize
the legitimacy of the death penalty in the case of"serious violations of general
law," but prohibit the death penalty for political crimes" and exclude capital
punishment for crimes committed under the age of eighteen and for both
pregnant women and nursing mothers for a period of up to two years follow-
ing childbirth. 6 In international fora such as the United Nations, Arab, and
more generally, Islamic, nations have been among the most aggressive advo-
50. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47, art. 60.
51. See John Hatchard, Capital Punishment in Southern Africa: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 43 INT'L & Corw. L.Q. 923, 923 (1994) (noting that several states have now abolished
death sentence); William A. Schabas, African Perspectives on Abolition of the Death Penalty,
in THEINTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOKONCAPITALPUNISHMENT30-33 (William A. Schabas ed.,
1997) (same).
52. See The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); see also William
A. Schabas, South Africa's New Constitutional Court Abolishes the Death Penalty, 16 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 133, 133 (1995) (noting that South Africa's Constitutional Court abolished death
penalty). For a literary account of the South African Constitutional Court hearing, see NADINE
GORDImR, THE HOUSE GUN 131-39 (1998).
53. Recently, the Supreme Court of Nigeria heard an application contesting the legality
of the death penalty based inter alia on article 5 of the African Charter. See Nemi v. The State,
[1994] 1 L.R.C. 376,388-89,400 (S.C.N.). The court held that the application was inadmissi-
ble on procedural grounds, but noted that the matter was sure to return to the court in the near
future. 1d. According to Chief Justice Bello, the application has "alerted the court to appreciate
the gravity and constitutional importance of the question. It is anticipated that the occasion for
its determination is likely to be presented soon." Id.
54. See Charte arabe des droits de l'homme, REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DRoITS DE
L'HOMME 212 (1995).
55. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on
Iran, has observed that "there are groups of Islamic legal scholars and practitioners who
recommend the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes on the ground that it is
contrary to Islamic law." See Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of
Iran by the Special Representative of the Comm 'n on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo
Pohl, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1988/69, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 45th
Sess., 26th mtg. § 36, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/26 (1989).
56. See Charte arabe des droits de l'homme, supra note 54, at 212-14.
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cates of retention of the death penalty, defending its use in the name of
obedience to Islamic law and the strictures of the chari'a.57
Observers sometimes cite the right to life provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and those of the regional treaties,
which allow the death penalty as a limitation or exception to the right, in
defense of the affirmation that abolition of the death penalty is not an interna-
tional norm. 8 This is incorrect. Abolition can be deemed an international
norm since at least as early as 1948, if a dynamic interpretation of articles 3
and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is adopted. 9 By the time
article 6 of the draft International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
adopted in 1957, there could be no doubt that abolition of the death penalty
had found its way into positive international human rights law. What would
be an exaggeration at this stage in the development of international human
rights law would be the affirmation that abolition is a universal norm or a
customary norm.
The notion that fundamental rights are subject to limitations is well
accepted inhuman rights law. Generally, such limits exist as a counterbalance
to individual rights and express the collective rights concerns of the commu-
nity as a whole. Thus, for example, prohibitions on hate propaganda consti-
tute limits on freedom of expression that are not only authorized but required
by international law.6' As we have seen, in several instruments, the death
penalty is expressed as a limitation to the right to life. But it is a unique
57. For example, during debate at the 1994 session of the General Assembly, the Suda-
nese delegate noted that "capital punishment was a divine right according to some religions, in
particular Islam.... [C]apital punishment was enshrined in the Koran and millions of inhabit-
ants of the Muslim world believed that it was a teaching of God." U.N. GAOR General Comm.,
49th Sess., 5th mtg. § 13, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/BUR/49ISR.5 (1994); see FRDtRIC SUDRE, DROrr
INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPLEN DES DROITS DE L'HOMMffE 85-87 (1989) (discussing capital
punishment in Islamic law); N. Hosni, Lapeine de mort en droit dgyptien et en droit islamique,
58 REvuEINTERNATIONALEDEDRoITP NAL 407-20 (1987) (same); Tunis Conference Declara-
tion on the Death Penalty in the Legislation of Arab States, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 51, at 233-36 (same); A. Wazir, Quelques
aspects de la peine de mort en droit pdnal islamique, 58 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
P NAL 421-29 (1987) (same).
58. See, e.g., The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391, 36 (CC)
(Chaskalson, President). According to President Chaskalson, "[c]apital punishment is not
prohibited by public international law, and this is a factor that has to be taken into account in
deciding whether it is cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of section
11(2) [of the interim constitution of South Africa]." Id
59. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 3, 5.
60. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 20, § 2,
at 178 (noting prohibition on hate propaganda); International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4(a), 660 U.N.T.S. 195,220 (entered
into force Jan. 4, 1969) (same).
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limitation, born of political compromise rather than respect for collective
rights, and couched in terms that express the desirability of its abolition.
B. The Prohibition of Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Punishment
The same international legal instruments that protect the right to life also
affirm the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
or punishment.6 The travauxpriparatoires of these instruments indicate that
their drafters considered that the issue of the death penalty fell within the
context of the right to life, rather than within the issues that are considered
under the rubric of the prohibition of torture or cruel punishment. Yet a literal
reading of the norm leads to the inescapable observation that capital punish-
ment, in that it may be considered "cruel, inhuman or degrading," is a breach
of international norms. While the two norms co-exist in human rights law,
and to the extent that the formulation of the right to life appears to authorize
the death penalty, there is an essential and inevitable tension with a norm that,
at least potentially, may prohibit it. "Cruel" punishment is obviously not a
static notion, as it reflects the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."62 International tribunals recognize that
human rights norms must be interpreted in an evolutive or dynamic manner.63
Therefore, even if the death penalty was not deemed "cruel" in 1948, 1957, or
1969, it may well be today or at some future date.
In 1989, a majority of the European Court of Human Rights stopped short
of concluding that the death penalty constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment prohibited by article 3 of the European Convention in Soering v.
United Kingdom.' Amnesty International, which intervened in the Soering
case as an amicus curiae, argued that although article 2 § 1 of the European
Convention authorized capital punishment as an exception to the right to life,
the provision had become inoperative because of the progressively evolving
content of article 3, which prohibits inhuman and degrading punishment.65
The court looked to subsequent state practice for elements that would assist
61. See African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47, art. 5; American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 5, § 2, at 146; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 7, at 175; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 4, art. 3, at 224; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 1, art. 5.
62. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
63. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 71-72, at 26-27 (1995) (Prelim-
inary objections).
64. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
65. Seeid. 8atlO.
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in interpretation.66 As the court noted, during the 1980s, the members of the
Council of Europe had chosen to address the issue of abolition of the death
penalty in the form of an optional or additional protocol to the European
Convention, and not a mandatory or amending protocol. 7 Therefore, the
European Court of Human Rights concluded, it was going too far to suggest
that the European Convention now prohibits the death penalty, despite the
terms of article 2.68 The Strasbourg bench reasoned that, had the Member
States of the Council of Europe sought for the European Convention to evolve
in such a way as to outlaw capital punishment as a form of inhuman and
degrading punishment, contrary to article 3, they would not have proceeded
by an optional protocol.69 Judge Jan de Meyer was alone in adopting a more
radical and dynamic view of the European Convention:
The second sentence of Article 2 § 1 of the Convention [which permits the
death penalty as an exception to the right to life] was adopted, nearly forty
years ago, in particular historical circumstances, shortly after the Second
World War. In so far as it still may seem to permit, under certain condi-
tions, capital punishment in time ofpeace, it does not reflect the contempo-
rary situation, and is now overridden by the development of legal con-
science and practice.
70
Still, the court found a way to apply the prohibition of inhuman and
degrading punishment to the death penalty. The Soering case involved the
threat of extradition to the United States from the United Kingdom of an
individual charged with murder and therefore subject to execution by lethal
injection in the Commonwealth of Virginia.7 It was not the death penalty
itself that the European Court of Human Rights found offensive to the Euro-
pean Convention, but rather the "death row phenomenon," or the years-long
wait for the scaffold under gruesome conditions, both physical and psycholog-
ical.72
66. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 3 l(3)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (recognizing role of practice in interpretation).
67. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 40-41.
68. See id.
69. See icl at 41.
70. Id. at 51 (de Meyer, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 11-12.
72. Id. at 44-45. See generally John Andrews & Ann Sherlock, Extradition, Death Row
andthe Convention, 15 EUR.L.REv. 87 (1990) (discussing Soering); Henri Labayle, Droits de
l 'homme, traitement inhumain etpeine capitale: Reflexions sur i 'ddification d'un ordre public
europden en matire d'extradition par la Cour europienne des droits de l 'homme, 64 SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 3452-57 (1990) (same); Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM.J. INT'LL. 128
(1991) (same); Michael O'Boyle, Extradition and Expulsion under the European Convention
on Human Rights, Reflections on the Soering Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
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The "death row phenomenon" has been one of the most vexing issues to
confront international human rights adjudicative bodies,73 and some of them,
such as the European Court, have been quick to condemn it, while others, such
as the Human Rights Committee, have taken the contrary view.74 The Human
Rights Committee has held that delay in and of itself in implementation of the
death penalty following sentence cannot be termed cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment or punishment.75 This view appears to be altering, perhaps
LAW, ESSAYS IN HoNOuR OF BRIAN WALSH 93-107 (James O'Reilly ed., 1992) (same); John
Quigley & S. Adele Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is it Illegal to
Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1989) (same); Christine van den Wyngaert,
Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's
Box?, 39 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 757 (1990) (same); Colin Warbrick, Coherence andthe European
Court of Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background to the Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1073 (1990) (same); Susan Marks, Comment, Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the
European Convention on Human Rights, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194 (1990) (same).
73. The issue of the "death row phenomenon" has also been litigated before many domes-
tic courts. For case law on the subject, see Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-47 (1995);
Chambers v. Bowersox, No. 97-3067WM, 1998 WL 647289, at *9 (8th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998);
Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1960); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp.
408, 431 (D. Utah 1984), affd, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 919
(1988); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894-95 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972); Arsenault v. Commonwealth, 233 N.E.2d 730, 735 (Mass. 1968), rev'd, 393 U.S. 5
(1968); Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465; RajendraPrasad v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 916; Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. I
(P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jamaica); Riley v. Attorney-General of Jamaica, [1983] App.
Cas. 719 (P.C. 1983) (appeal taken from Jamaica); Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in
Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, 1993 (4) SA 239 (Z.S.C.); Dhlamini v. Carter N.O., 1968 (2)
SA 445(A); Abbott v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342 (P.C.
1979) (appeal taken from Trinidad and Tobago). Several works discuss the "death row phenom-
enon" in general. See generally STEPHENM. GETrINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE: THE PEOPLE, THE
CRIMES, AND THE CONTROVERSY (1979); BRuCE JACKSON & DIANE CHRISTIAN, DEATH Row
(1980); ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE, LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981);
HELEN PREIEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEwITNESS ACCOUNT OF THEDEATH PENALTY IN
THEUNITED STATES (1993); WILLIAMA. SCHABAS, THEDEATH PENALTYAS CRUEL TREATMENT
AND TORTURE 96-156 (1996); Francis Alexis & Margaret De Merieux, Inordinately Delayed
Hanging: Whether an Inhuman Punishment, 29 J. INDIANL. INST. 356,356-79 (1987); Johnnie
L. Gallemore, Jr. & James H. Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement,
129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167-72 (1972); Lloyd Vogelman, The Living Dead: Living on
Death Row, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 183, 183-95 (1989); Nancy Holland, Comment, Death Row
Conditions: Progression Toward Constitutional Protections, 19AKRONL. REV. 293,293-310
(1985).
74. See generally Markus G. Schmidt, The Complementarity of the Covenant and the
European Convention on Human Rights - Recent Developments, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED KINGDOM LAW 629-59 (David Harris
& Sarah Joseph eds., 1995).
75. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica (nos.
210/1986, 225/1987), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 280, U.N.
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because of the result of a growing weight of authority from domestic tribunals
that have examined the same question,' as well as a consequence of the chang-
ing composition of the Committee.77 As for the death penalty itself, the Com-
mittee shares the view of the European Court that the death penalty cannot be
deemed "cruel" and therefore contrary to article 7 of the International Cove-
nant, precisely because it is authorized as an exception to the right to life in
article 6.78
Methods of execution may themselves be cruel, inhuman, and degrading.
The Human Rights Committee has affirmed that the use of the gas chamber
in the State of California involves excessive and gratuitous suffering and that
it is therefore contrary to article 7 of the International Covenant.79 But this
puts human rights bodies in the uncomfortable and inappropriate position of
ruling on what is a more humane way to kill an individual.8 The Committee
has since concluded that execution by lethal injection is not cruel, inhuman,
and degrading despite uncontested evidence tendered before it showing that
Doc. A/44140 (1989); Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, Reid v. Jamaica (no. 250/1987),
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. 2, at 92, U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990); Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, Barrett andSutcliffe v. Jamaica (nos. 270/1988
and 271/1988), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 250, U.N. Doc.
A/47/40 (1994); Howard Martin v. Jamaica Communication No. 317/1988 (U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/47/D/317/1988), 1 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 128, § 12.1, at 131 (1994); Report of the Human
Rights Committee, Kindlerv. Canada (No. 470/1991), supra note 42, § 15.2; UN Human Rights
Committee (UN-HRCee), GenevalNew York, Extradition to the United States to Face the
Possible Imposition of the Death Penally Not Considered to Violate the CCPR/Cox v. Canada,
15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 410 (1994) [hereinafter Cox v. Canada].
76. Prattv. Attorney General forJamaica, [199412App. Cas. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken
from Jamaica); Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, 1993
(4) SA 239 (Z.S.C.). But see Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
77. See Cox v. Canada, supra note 75, § 17.2, at 417. See also the individual views of
Committee members Hemdl, Sadi, Tamar Ban and Wennergren. Id. at 417-21. In Peart and
Pearl v. Jamaica, the Committee considered assaults of death row inmates to constitute a breach
of article 7. See Peart and Pearl v. Jamaica, Communications Nos. 464/1991 and 482/1991
(U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/464/1991 and CCPR/C/5 4/D/482/1991), 3 INT'L HUM. RTs. REP. 15,
15-22 (1996). But despite obvious division in its ranks, it has stopped short of endorsing the
European Court's position on the death row phenomenon. See Francis v. Jamaica, Communi-
cation No. 606/1994 (UN. Doc. CCPRIC/54/D/606/1994), 3 INT'L HUM. RTs. REP. 43 (1996).
78. See General Comment 20(44), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., 1138th
mtg. at 1-4, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.I/Add.3 (1992).
79. See Gomez v. U.S.- Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654-59 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing view of United States courts on this question); Report of
the Human Rights Committee, Ngv. Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Vol. 2, at 205, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) (noting that gas chamber is cruel and
inhuman).
80. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Ng v. Canada, supra note 79, at 220
(noting Christine Chanet's dissenting opinion).
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this more modem and fashionable method of execution also may involve
terrible suffering."
Serious issues of cultural relativism arise in the interpretation of the norm
prohibiting "cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment." The scope of the
three adjectives obviously depends upon value judgments, and these will vary
depending on social and cultural conditions. When Commission on Human
Rights rapporteur Gaspar Biro suggested in February 1994 that the death
penalty as imposed in the Sudan was contrary to articles 6 and 7 of the Inter-
national Covenant,8" his "blasphemy" in attacking "Islamic punishments" was
condemned.83 In fact, however, enthusiasm for the death penalty appears to
cut across cultural lines, as its most aggressive defenders on the international
plane are the United States, China, Singapore, and the Sudan!
C. Customary Norms
Customary international law exists when there is evidence of state
practice accompanied by unequivocal manifestations of policy or opinio
juris.,4 With somewhat less than half of the world's states still employing the
death penalty, it would be too ambitious to assert that abolition is a customary
norm of international law. However, a strong argument can be made that
some or all of the limitations on the use of the death penalty enumerated in
article 6 of the International Covenant have attained the status of customary
law.
The requirement that strict procedural safeguards accompany any capital
trial undoubtedly has become customary international law. The universal
condemnation of summary executions within the human rights bodies of the
United Nations shows that there is unanimity on this point. Moreover, com-
mon article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, often cited as the lowest common
denominator of humane behavior, proscribes "the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
81. Coxv. Canada, supra note 75, § 17.3, at 417.
82. U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/48 (1994).
83. See SCHABAS, supra note 73, at 160 (discussing statement by H.E. Mr. Abdelaziz
Shiddo, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the Republic of the Sudan and Leader of
Sudan Delegation to the 50th Session ofthe Commission on Human Rights, commenting on the
report of Dr. Gaspar Biro, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights situation in the Sudan under
agenda item 12, Geneva, Feb. 25, 1994); see also U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th
Sess., Agenda Item 12, §§ 58-64, at 18-19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/122 (1994).
84. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 1989 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 61,
77 (discussing which law ICJ may apply).
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recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 5 The International Court
of Justice has held that common article 3 codifies a customary rule.86
Another customary principle is the prohibition on executions for crimes
committed by young persons. This rule respects an undisputed principle of
criminal law, namely that children have diminished criminal liability due to
their immaturity. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
stated that there is a customary norm prohibiting executions for juvenile
offenses, although it has stopped short of fixing the minimum age at eight-
een.8" The Commission was only prepared to conclude that a norm setting the
minimum age at eighteen was "emerging."88 More recently, the Human Rights
Committee has suggested a corresponding hesitation in its recent General
Comment on reservations, which affirmed thatthe execution of"children" and
pregnant women was contrary to customary norms, but did not specify the
precise minimum age. 9 Both the International Covenant' and the American
Convention on Human Rights,9 ' as well as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,92 the fourth Geneva Convention, and its two additional protocols,
however, specify eighteen as the minimum age.93
85. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 (entered into force Oct 21, 1950).
86. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14, 129-30, 148 (June 27) (discussing article 3 and violations thereof); see
also Prosecutor v. Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, Appeals Chamber Decision, § 98 (Oct. 2, 1995).
87. See Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647 (United States) (1987), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
172, OEA/ser.L.N./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
88. See id.
89. See General CommentNo. 24 (52), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d
mtg. § 3, at 2, U.N. Doe. CCPRIC/21/Rev.I/Add.6 (1994).
90. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 6(5), at
175.
91. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 4(5), at 146.
92. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, art. 37, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (noting age limit). But see African
Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
However, article 46 states that the African Charter is to be interpreted with an eye to the
universal Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Convention on the Rights of the Child,
supra, art. 46.
93. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
ofAugust 12, 1949, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68,75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)
(noting minimum age of eighteen); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), June 8, 1977, art. 77, § 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (same);
Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, art. 6,
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When the United States of America ratified the International Covenant
in 1992, it included a reservation to article 6 § 5, which is the provision
concerning juvenile executions.9 Several European states objected that the
reservation was incompatible with the object and purpose of the International
Covenant and therefore invalid.95 The Human Rights Committee, in its
consideration of the initial report by the United States pursuant to article 40
of the International Covenant in March and April 1995, has also concluded
that the reservation is inadmissible. 96 This is a strong argument for the
position that there is a customary norm prohibiting executions for crimes
committed while under eighteen.
D. The Death Penalty in Wartime
Most domestic legislation establishes distinct rules concerning the death
penalty in time of war, when it is employed more frequently and with less
concern for procedural safeguards. This distinction has been carried over into
the abolitionist protocols. In the case of Protocol No. 6 to the European
§ 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (same); see also William A.
Schabas, The Death Penalty for Crimes Committed by Persons Under Eighteen Years ofAge,
in MONITORING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 603-19 (Eugeen Verhellen ed., 1996).
94. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, at 132, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11 (1993).
95. Id. Several works discuss the debate concerning the United States's reservation. See
M.S. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka"Strategy: US Evasion ofthe Spirit ofthe International
Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, 10 S. AFR. J.HUM. RTS. 357,357-71 (1994) (discussing
United States's reservations); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 341-50 (1995) (same); Ved. P. Nanda,
The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An
Appraisal under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAuL L. REv.
131, 131-391 (1993) (same); John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of
the United States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 59-86 (1993) (same); William A. Schabas, InvalidReservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 277-325 (1995) (same); William A. Schabas, Les riserves des Etats-
Unis d'Amirique aux articles 6 et 7 du Pacte international relatifaux droits civils etpolitiques,
6 REVUEUNIVERSELLEDES DROITSDEL'HOMME 137, 137-50 (1994) (same); David P. Stewart,
US. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77, 77-83 (1993) (same);
Edward F. Sherman, Jr., Comment, The US. Death Penalty Reservation to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible System Gov-
erning Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 69, 69-93 (1994) (same).
96. See UNITEDNATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HUMANRIGHTS COMMITTEE, CONSIDER-
ATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT,
COMMENTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, § 14, at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50
(1995).
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Convention of Human Rights, execution in wartime is simply excluded from
its scope. The Protocol prohibits the death penalty only in time of peace,
allowing that "[a] State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in
respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war."' This
compromise in the drafting process of the first abolitionist treaty reflected the
fact that many European states had abolished capital punishment only in time
of peace.9" Increasingly, however, European states have abolished the death
penalty altogether. The Steering Committee for Human Rights ofthe Council
of Europe is studying the possibility of a draft protocol to the European
Convention that would abolish the death penalty in war as well as in peace.9
The protocol to the International Covenant takes a different approach, outlaw-
ing capital punishment in all circumstances, but allowing states to make a
reservation if they seek to preserve the possibility of imposing the death
penalty in wartime for serious crimes of a military nature.' °° Only one state
party to the Protocol, Spain, has formulated such a reservation.'
The humanitarian law treaties provide specific rules concerning the death
penalty in wartime. Two groups of individuals are contemplated by the legal
rules concerning the death penalty in time of war- combatants taken prisoner
and noncombatant civilians in the hands of a belligerent. The protection of
prisoners of war is governed principally by the third Geneva Convention of
1949 (third Convention). 02 According to the third Convention, prisoners of
war are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in effect in the armed
forces of the detaining power." If the death penalty is applicable in the laws
of the detaining power, then a prisoner of war may be exposed to the threat of
capital punishment. The third Convention specifically envisions this possibil-
ity in two articles whose aim is to mitigate the rigors of the death penalty and
97. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 2, at 2.
98. See Gilbert Guillaume, supra note 35, at 1067-72.
99. See EuR. PARL. Ass. REC. 1246, 25th Sitting (Oct. 4, 1994) <http:llstars.coe.fr/ta/
ta94/erecl246.html>.
100. See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 2, at 207. The Protocol
to the American Convention adopts the same approach. See Protocol to the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 2, at 9.
101. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HUMAN RIGHTS CoMMITrEE, RESERvA-
TIONS, DECLARATIONS, NOTIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONs RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIvIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS THERETO, at 101,
U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/2/Rev.3 (1992).
102. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, supra note 85, at 135.
103. Id. art. 82, at 200.
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encourage commutation or even exchange of prisoners." These provisions
are a more extensive version of an article in the 1929 Geneva Convention that
protected prisoners of war facing the death penalty."05 Civilians in the hands
of a belligerent were slower to receive comprehensive protection in the
international humanitarian conventions,0 6 but the grave abuses of capital
punishment, mainly by the Nazi occupying forces during World War II,
compelled the elaboration of specific norms in the fourth Geneva Convention
(fourth Convention). 7 The fourth Convention limits the nature of capital
crimes ratione materiae, prohibits the execution of persons for crimes com-
mitted while under the age of eighteen, and establishes a six month morato-
rium on execution after sentencing. 8 It also provides that an occupying
power may never impose the death penalty if it has been abolished under the
laws of the occupied state prior to the hostilities.0 9 The norms in the fourth
Convention have been expanded somewhat by Protocol Additional I, which
prohibits the death penalty for offenses related to armed conflict in the case
of pregnant women or mothers having dependent infants and for offenders
under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime."0 The death penalty
provisions in Protocol Additional II,"' which deals with noninternational
armed conflicts, largely repeat the norms found in article 6 of the International
Covenant and reflect the human rights scope of that instrument. Serious
violations of Protocol Additional II may be prosecuted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda."' Arguably, the pronouncement of the death
penalty on persons under the age of eighteen years at the time of the crime
constitutes such an infraction. How ironic it is, then, that the Rwanda Statute
was adopted with the support of the United States, which continues to allow
104. Id. arts. 100, 101, at210-12.
105. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 66,
118 L.N.T.S. 343, 383 (entered into force June 19, 1931).
106. Some norms protecting civilians appear in the Hague Regulations, although none
address the death penalty. See Convention Regulating the Laws and Customs ofLand Warfare,
Oct. 18, 1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90, arts. 23, 25, 27, 28, 42-56, at 107-17 (Supp. 1908).
107. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of August 12, 1949, supra note 93, arts. 68, 75, at 330, 334-36 (dealing with death penalty).
108. See id.
109. See id. art. 68.
110. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 93, arts.
76, 77, at 38-39 (discussing protection for women and children).
111. See Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims ofNon-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra
note 93, art. 6, § 4, at 614 (discussing death penalty).
112. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 5, art. 4.
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sentencing and execution ofjuvenile offenders.
E. International Law and Domestic Courts
The classic weakness of international human rights law is in its means of
implementation. Increasingly, however, international human rights law is
being applied by domestic courts, and this contributes immensely to its
effectiveness. In some countries, it is given primacy over incompatible
domestic legislation. In others, it has been used by courts to assist in inter-
preting the scope of constitutional norms that have usually been inspired by
the international instruments. Death penalty jurisprudence provides one of the
most dramatic examples of this synergy between international and domestic
human rights law.
Courts of several states, including South Africa,"
's Zimbabwe, 1 4
Canada," 5 Tanzania," 6 and the United Kingdom,"7 have found international
law to be particularly helpful in the interpretation of such notions as the right
to life and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. In
a recent judgment of the South African Constitutional Court, which found
capital punishment to be incompatible with the right to life and the protection
against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, President Arthur Chaskal-
son wrote: "The international and foreign authorities are of value because
they analyze arguments for and against the death sentence and show how
courts of otherjurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue. For that reason
alone they require our attention.""' In writing the decision, he provided a
detailed analysis of the international instruments as well as the case law of
such bodies as the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of
Human Rights.
IM1 International Organizations
As an important human rights issue, the death penalty has been the object
of initiatives within several international organizations, including the United
Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe, and the European Union. Although this activity has not
113. See The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
114. See Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, 1993
(4) SA 239 (Z.S.C.).
115. See Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 779-82.
116. See Republic v. Mbushuu, [1994] 2 L.R.C. 335 (High Court of Tanzania).
117. See Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal
taken from Jamaica).
118. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391, § 34.
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always resulted in the creation of positive legal norms, it is a source of "soft
law" and an important reference in the evolution of international custom.
A. The United Nations
In parallel with the drafting of international legal norms found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, different bodies of the United Nations have been
involved in a variety of initiatives aimed at limiting and eventually abolishing
the death penalty. As a general rule, these have originated in the Commission
on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission and, when there was sufficient
unanimity, resulted in resolutions in the Economic and Social Council and the
General Assembly."9
An early resolution, presented at the 1968 session of the Commission on
Human Rights, observed that "the major trend among experts and practitioners
in the field is towards the abolition of capital punishment."' 20 It cited a series
of safeguards respecting appeal, pardon, and reprieve and mandated delay of
execution until the exhaustion of such procedures. It invited governments to
provide for a six month moratorium before implementing the death penalty.'
In the General Assembly, many retentionist states even supported the draft
resolution, noting that it confined itself to the "humanitarian" aspect of the
question, 22 although more militant abolitionist states criticized its timidity,
saying it would not "induce Governments to abolish the death penalty.""m The
119. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1396, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 23, U.N. Doc.
A/4354 (1960); G.A. Res. 2392, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at4l, U.N. Doc. A17218
(1968); G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1972); G.A. Res. 3011, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1973); G.A. Res. 61, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No.45, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978);
G.A. Res. 59, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1981); G.A. Res. 192, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at209-10, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1982); G.A. Res. 137, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 226, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984); E.S.C. Res. 934, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Doc.
E/3753 (1963); E.S.C. Res. 1574, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 7, U.N. Doc.
E/5044 (1971); E.S.C. Res. 1656, U.N. ESCOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/5183
(1972); E.S.C. Res. 1745, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/5367
(1973); E.S.C. Res. 1930, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5683
(1975).
120. Cf U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/972 (1968).
121. See id. at 134-36, 162-64.
122. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1557th mtg. § 17, at 3, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/
SR.1557 (1968) (China); U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1558th mtg. § 10, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1558 (1968) (France).
123. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1558th mtg. § 2, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1558
(1968) (Austria).
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Commission's resolution, with some minor amendments, was then adopted by
the General Assembly.'24 A few years later, an Assembly resolution declared
that "the main objective to be pursued is that of progressively restricting the
number of offences for which capital punishment may be imposed, with a
view to the desirability of abolishing the punishment in all countries."'"
The United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Control, held
every five years, has also provided a forum for debate on the death penalty.
In 1975, the Congress successfully resisted attempts by nongovernmental
organizations 26 to raise the issue of capital punishment at its Geneva session
because the issue was not on the agenda. 27 At the Sixth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in
1980 in Caracas, more time was devoted to the issue of capital punishment
than to any other question.' A draft resolution called for restriction and
eventual abolition of the death penalty and added that abolition would be "a
significant contribution to the strengthening of human rights, in particular the
right to life."'29 A controversial provision urged states that had not abolished
capital punishment to "consider establishing a moratorium in its application,
or creating other conditions under which capital punishment is not imposed
or is not executed, so as to permit those states to study the effects of abolition
on a provisional basis."'3 ° But faced with some stiff opposition and inade-
quate time to complete the discussions, the sponsors withdrew the revised
draft resolution.'' At the 1990 Congress held in Havana, a resolution on
124. See G.A. Res. 2393, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 41-42, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968); U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1727thplen. mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1727 (1968)
(adopted by ninety-four votes to zero, with three abstentions); U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d
Sess., 1559th mtg. § 34, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1559 (1968) (adoption in Third Commit-
tee).
125. G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1972).
126. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: THE DEATH
PENALTY 33 n.7 (1979).
127. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIFTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON
THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, PROVISIONAL AGENDA AND
ORGANIZATION OF WORK, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.56/l/Rev.1 (1975).
128. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., 73d mtg. § 40, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/SR.74
(1980) (recording comments of Chief, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch).
129. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SIXTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON
THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, DRAFT RESOLUTION SuBMIT-
TED BYAUSTRIA, ECUADOR, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND SWEDEN, at 58-60, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1 (1980).
130. See id. at 59.
13 1. See id. at 51-52; see also Roger S. Clark, Human Rights and the U.N. Committee on
Crime Prevention and Control, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 68,75 (1989) (noting
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capital punishment was proposed that returned to the idea of a moratorium on
the death penalty, "at least on a three year basis."' The resolution was
adopted in Committee by forty votes to twenty-one, with sixteen abstentions,
but was rejected in plenary session because it failed to obtain a two-thirds
majority.
33
The Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the
Death Penalty were drafted by the Committee on Crime Prevention and
Control (the Commission) 34 at its March 1984 session. 35 The safeguards
expand upon the restrictions on use of the death penalty found in article 6 of
the International Covenant. They specify that use of capital punishment must
be confined to "intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave
consequences." 136 With respect to categories of persons excluded from the
death penalty, they add "new mothers" and "persons who have become in-
sane" to juvenile offenders and pregnant women, who were already expressly
protected by article 6 § 5 of the International Covenant.137 The death penalty
can only be imposed "when the guilt of the person charged is based upon clear
and convincing evidence leaving no room for an alternative explanation of the
facts."'' The safeguards were later endorsed in resolutions by the Economic
and Social Council, 139 the General Assembly, 14' and the Seventh United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
held in Milan in 1985.Y In 1988, the safeguards were themselves strength-
lack of consensus). -
132. See Roger S. Clark, The Eighth UnitedNations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27-September 7, 1990, 1 CRIM. L.F.
513, 518 (1990) (citation omitted).
133. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE EIGHT UNITEDNATIONS
CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, §§ 350, 358,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990); see also Clark, supra note 132, at 513-48.
134. ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JusTICE
PROGRAM, FORMULATION OF STANDARDS AND EFFORTS AT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 58-62
(1994) (discussing the Commission).
135. See Draft resolution VII: Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection ofthe Rights of those
Facing the Death Penalty, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 19-21, U.N. Doc. E1i 984/16
(1984) (outlining safeguards).
136. Id. at 21.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMICAND SocIAL COUNCIL, SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE DEATH PENALTY, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50
(1984). This resolution was adopted without a vote.
140. See G.A. Res. 118, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, § 79, at 211,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (endorsing safeguards).
141. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SEVENTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS
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ened by a new resolution of the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control,
which addressed additional matters, such as the prohibition of execution of the
mentally handicapped. 42
In 1994, at the forty-ninth session, a General Assembly draft resolution
called for a moratorium on the death penalty.1 43 The resolution originated
from a newly-formed nongovernmental organization, "Hands Off Cain - the
International League for Abolition of the Death Penalty Before the Year
2000," which had obtained the support of the Italian Parliament for the draft
resolution. A series of preambular paragraphs referred to earlier General
Assembly resolutions on the death penalty, the 1984 safeguards, relevant
provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the statutes of the ad hoe criminal tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda, and the draft statute of the proposed International Criminal
Court.'" The first of three dispositive paragraphs invited states that still
maintain the death penalty to comply with their obligations under the Interna-
tional Covenant and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, in particu-
lar, to exclude pregnant women and juveniles from execution. 4 The second
paragraph invited states that had not abolished the death penalty to consider
the progressive restriction of the number of offences for which the death
penalty may be imposed and to exclude the insane from capital punishment.'46
The final paragraph
encourage[d] all States that have not yet abolished the death penalty to
considerthe opportunity ofinstituting amoratorium on pending executions
with a view to ensuring that the principle that no State should dispose of
the life of any human being be affmned in every part of the world by the
year 2000."4
ONTHEPREVENTIONOF CRIMEAND THETREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, MILAN, ITALY, 26 AUGUST-
6 SEPTEMBER1985, REPORTBYTHE SECRETARIAT, at 83-84, 131-32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/
22/Rev.1 (1986); see also UNITED NATIONS, EcONOmc AND SociAL COUNCIL, IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING PROTEcTON OF THE RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE
DEATHPENALTY,E.S.C. Res. 1989/64 (1989) (providing follow-up on the "Safeguards"). This
resolution was adopted without a vote. Id.
142. See E.S.C. Res. 1989/64, supra note 141.
143. See U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/49/234 (1994), A/49/234/Add.1,
A/49/234/Add.2, amendedbyU.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 49th Sess., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/
L.32/Rev.1 (1994).
144. See id. at l-2.
145. See id. at 2.
146. See id
147. See id.
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Italy eventually obtained forty-nine cosponsors for the resolution. '48 How-
ever, Singapore was able to obtain the support of several retentionist states
and, with a procedural gambit, succeeded in blocking adoption of the resolu-
tion. 49
Capital punishment returned to the United Nations agenda at the 1996
session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which
considered a draft resolution entitled "Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of
the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty." 5' The 1996 resolution calls
upon Member States in which the death penalty has not been abolished to
apply effectively the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those
facing the death penalty, to ensure that each defendant facing a possible death
penalty is given all guarantees to ensure a fair trial, to ensure that defendants
who do not sufficiently understand the language used in court are fully in-
formed by way of interpretation or translation of all the charges against them
and the content of the relevant evidence deliberated in court, to allow ade-
quate time for the preparation of appeals and for the completion of appeals
proceedings as well as for petitions for clemency, to ensure that officials
involved in decisions to carry out an execution are fully informed of the status
of appeals and petitions for clemency of the prisoner in question, and to
effectively apply the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Pris-
oners"' in order to keep the suffering of prisoners under sentence of death to
a minimum and to avoid any exacerbation of such suffering.'52 The resolution
was subsequently endorsed by the Economic and Social Council.'
Italy recovered from the frustration of the 1994 General Assembly and
presented a resolution to the 1997 session of the Commission on Human Rights
148. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 187 n.314 (listing Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, CostaRica, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tomd and Principe, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands,
Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela as co-sponsors for resolution).
149. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 49th Sess., 61st mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.61
(1994).
150. Cf UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE DEATH PENALTY, E.S.C. Res. 1996/15 (1996).
151. E.S.C. Res. 663(C), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048
(1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, U.N. ESCOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc.
E/5988 (1977); see CLARK, supra note 134, at 145-79 (discussing Standard Minimum Rules).
152. Cf. SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 150.
153. See id.
INTERNATIONAL LAW & ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALYY 823
calling for, inter alia, a moratorium on the death penalty."' The preamble
refers to the right to life provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as relevant resolutions of the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council."'5 It notes deep
concern that several countries impose the death penalty in disregard of the
limitations provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as the safe-
guards promoted to guarantee the protection of the rights of those facing the
death penalty. 6 The resolution states the Commission's conviction "that
abolition of the death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dig-
nity and to the progressive development of human rights.'0
5 7
In its operative paragraphs, it calls for accession or ratification of the
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.' States that still main-
tain the death penalty are urged to comply fully with their obligations under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, notably, not to impose the death penalty for any but
the most serious crimes, not to impose it for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age, to exclude pregnant women from capital punish-
ment, and to ensure the right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence. 9
It requests states to consider suspending executions and imposing a morato-
rium on the death penalty. 6 The resolution was passed by a roll-call vote,
twenty-seven in favor and eleven opposed, with fourteen abstaining.'6 The
154. See U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Agenda Item 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/L.20 (1997).
155. Id. at 1.





161. See UNITED NATIONs, COMMIsSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS APPROVES MEASUREs ON
ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY, PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, MINORITIES, at 3, U.N.
Doc. HR/CN/789 (1997). The resolution is recorded as 1997/12. The following countries were
in favor of the resolution: Angola, Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape
Verde, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal,.Netherlands, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa,
Ukraine, and Uruguay. Id. at 4. The following countries were against the resolution: Algeria,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
and United States of America. Id. The following countries abstained from the vote on the
resolution: Benin, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, India, Madagascar, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Kingdom, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. Id.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 797 (1998)
terms of the 1997 resolution require that the matter return to the Commission
agenda in 1998.
Although the Commission on Human Rights has not designated a special
rapporteur with specific responsibility for capital punishment, its special rap-
porteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, Senegalese lawyer
Bacre WalyNdiaye, has taken a considerable interest in the subject and clearly
views it as part of his mandate. In his 1997 annual report to the Commission
on Human Rights, Ndiaye set forth his views on the desirability of abolishing
the death penalty. He stated that "given that the loss of life is irreparable...
the abolition of capital punishment is most desirable in order fully to respect
the right to life."'62 He added that when "there is a fundamental right to life,
there is no right to capital punishment."'63
In his report, Ndiaye noted such positive developments as the abolition
of the death penalty by Belgium in July 1996.16' He expressed concern about
the expansion of the scope of the death penalty in Estonia and Libya and
regretted the fact that some states resumed executions after a lull of many
years, notably Bahrain, Comoros, Guatemala, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.'65
The special rapporteur referred to the importance of maintaining the highest
procedural standards in capital trials, including public hearings. 6 6 Ndiaye
was disturbed by reports that the death penalty was imposed in secrecy in
some countries, such as Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Ndiaye
noted that:
As in previous years, the Special Rapporteur received numerous reports
indicating that in some cases the practice of capital punishment in the
United States does not conform to a number of safeguards and guarantees
contained in international instruments relating to the rights of those facing
the death penalty. The imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded
persons, the lack of adequate defence, the absence of obligatory appeals
162. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Agenda Item 10, § 79, at 22, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/60 (1996).
163. See id. § 73, at 20; see also UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 52ND SEss., ITEM 10 OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA, QUESTION OF
THE VIOLATION OF HUMANRiGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS INANY PART OF THE WORLD,
WITH PARTICULARREFERENCETO COLONIAL AND OTHERDEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITO-
RIES, EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMmARY ORARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, REPORTBYTHE SPECIAL RAPPOR-
TEUR, MR. BACRE WALY NDIAYE, SUBMITrED PURSUANT TO COMMIssION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOLUTION 1995/73, §§ 507-17, 540-57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4 (1996) <http:/www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrrep/496.htm>.
164. See Extrajudicial, Summary orArbitrary Executions: Report ofthe Special Rappor-
teur, supra note 162, at 22.
165. See id. at 21.
166. See id. at 22.
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and racial bias continue to be the main concerns.167
In his report, he also stated that:
[le] remains deeply concerned that death sentences continue to be handed
down after trials which allegedly fall short of the international guarantees
for a fair trial, including lack of adequate defence during the trials and
appeals procedures. An issue of special concern to the Special Rapporteur
remains the imposition and application of the death penalty on persons
reported to be mentally retarded or mentally ill. Moreover, the Special
Rapporteur continues to be concerned about those cases which were
allegedly tainted by racial bias on the part of the judges or prosecution and
about the non-mandatory nature of the appeals procedure after conviction
in capital cases in some states. 6
Throughout 1996, the special rapporteur sent urgent appeals to the United
States of America concerning death sentences imposed on the mentally
retarded in cases following trial in which the right to an adequate defense had
allegedly not been fully ensured, in which individuals had been sentenced to
death without resorting to their right to lodge any legal or clemency appeal,
and in which they had been sentenced to death despite strong indications
casting doubt on their guilt.169 Ndiaye sent a special appeal to the United
States in the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell who, according to his report to the
Commission on Human Rights, "ha[d] reportedly extraordinary proof of inno-
cence which could not be considered because the law of the State of Virginia
does not allow new evidence into court 21 days after conviction.1 71 *Despite
an international campaign, O'Dell was executed in July 1997. Ndiaye also
noted that, in response to his urgent appeals, the United States government
provided nothing more than a reply in the form of a description of the legal
safeguards provided to defendants in the United States in criminal cases. 7'
Ndiaye had inquired on several occasions as to whether the United States
would "consider extending him an invitation to carry out an on-site visit."
172
As a result of repeated initiatives, on October 17, 1996, he received a written
invitation from the government to visit the United States and conduct his
investigation.173 In October 1997, Special RapporteurNdiaye conducted atwo
167. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 10, § 543, at 127, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/1997/601Add.1 (1996).
168. Id. § 551, at 130.
169. Id. § 544, at 127-28.
170. Id.
171. Id. § 546, at 129.
172. Id. §§ 547, 548, at 129.
173. Id. §549, at130.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 797 (1998)
week mission to the United States, where he attempted to visit death row
prisoners in Florida, Texas, and California. At California's San Quentin
Penitentiary, he was refused permission by authorities to meet with designated
prisoners. Ndiaye's visit provoked the ire of Senator Jesse Helms, chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who in a letter to William Richardson,
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, described the
mission as an "an absurd U.N. charade."174 Senator Helms asked, "Bill, is this
man confusing the United States with some other country or is this an inten-
tional insult to the United States and to our nation's legal system?"'75 Ndiaye
replied: "I am very surprised that a country that is usually so open and has been
helpful to me on other missions, such as my attempts to investigate human
rights abuses in the Congo, should consider my visit an insult."'76
B. Council of Europe
The Council of Europe, now composed of forty Member States covering
virtually all of the European continent as well as much of northern Asia, was
the first regional system to incorporate a fully abolitionist international norm
when, in 1983, it adopted Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty. 77 In 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe adopted a resolution calling upon Member States that had not yet done
so to ratify Protocol No. 6.178 The resolution praised Greece, which in 1993
had abolished the death penalty for crimes committed in wartime as well as
in peacetime. It stated:
In view of the irrefutable arguments against the imposition of capital pun-
ishment, it calls on the parliaments of all member states of the Council of
Europe, and of all states whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest
status at the Assembly, which retain capital punishment for crimes com-
mitted in peacetime and/or in wartime, to strike it from their statute books
completely.1
79
It urged all heads of state and all parliaments in whose countries death sen-
174. John M. Goshko, Helms Calls Death Row Probe "Absurd U.N. Charade"; Senate
Foreign Affairs ChiefDemands Explanation ofRights Investigation From U.S. Envoy, WASH.
POST, Oct. 8, 1997, at A07.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection offHuman Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6.
178. See EuR. PARL. Ass. Ras. 1044,25th Sitting (Oct. 4,1994) <http'//stars.coe.fr/ta/ta94/
eres1044.html>; see also Report of the Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, EUR. PARL.
Ass., 25th Sitting, Doc. No. 7154 (1994).
179. See EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. 1044, supra note 178, § 3.
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tences are passed to grant clemency to those convicted and subject to the
death penalty.' It also affirmed that willingness to ratify Protocol No. 6 be
made a prerequisite for membership of the Council of Europe."' Signifi-
cantly, in the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed at Paris on December 14,
1995, the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held to the highest stan-
dard ofcompliance with contemporary human rights norms, including ratifica-
tion of Protocol No. 6 and the incorporation of its terms as the fundamental
law of the new republic.' 2
The Parliamentary Assembly also adopted a "recommendation" that
deplored the fact that the death penalty was still provided by law in eleven
Council of Europe Member States and seven states whose legislative assem-
blies have special status with respect to the organization. 3 An indication that
the death penalty is far from a theoretical issue in Europe, it expressed shock
that 59 people were legally put to death in those states in 1993 and that at least
575 prisoners were known currently to be awaiting their execution. The
Assembly said that application of the death penalty "may well be compared
with torture and be seen as inhuman and degrading punishment within the
meaning of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights."' 84 It
recommended that the Committee of Ministers draft an additional protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights, abolishing the death penalty both
in peace and wartime, and obliging the parties not to reintroduce it under any
circumstances.' The recommendation also proposed establishing a control
mechanism that would oblige states in which the death penalty is still pro-
vided by law to set up commissions with a view to abolishing capital punish-
ment. 6 A moratorium would be declared on all executions while the com-
missions fulfill their tasks.' The commissions would be required to notify
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of any death sentences passed
and any executions scheduled without delay. 8 Any country that had sched-
180. See id. § 8.
181. See id. § 5.
182. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4:
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. II, § 2 <http:llwww.state.gov/www/regions/eur/
bosnialdayann4.html>; General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights, art. 1 <http:llwww.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/
dayann6.html>.
183. See EuR. PARL. Ass. REC. 1246, supra note 99, § 1.
184. Id.§3.
185. Id. § 6(i).
186. Id. § 6(i).
187. Id. § 6(ii)(c).
188. Id. § 6(ii)(d).
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uled an execution would be required to halt it for a period of six months from
the time of notification of the Secretary General.'89 During this time the
Secretary General would be empowered to send a delegation to conduct an
investigation and make a recommendation to the country concerned."'° Finally,
all states would be bound not to allow the extradition of any person to a
country in which the person risked being sentenced to death and subjected to
the extreme conditions on "death row." 191
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in a January 1996
interim reply, indicated that the proposals of the Parliamentary Assembly were
being examined. The Parliamentary Assembly adopted a new recommenda-
tion on June 28, 1996 calling for the Committee of Ministers to follow up on
the 1994 proposals without delay.192 On June 28, 1996, the Parliamentary
Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming its opposition to the death pen-
alty. 93 The Assembly declared that all states joining the Council of Europe
must impose a moratorium on executions, without delay, and indicate their
willingness to ratify Protocol No. 6.9' The resolution added that
the Assembly reminds applicant states to the Council of Europe that the
willingness to sign and ratify Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and to introduce a moratorium upon accession has
become a prerequisite for membership of the Council of Europe on the part
of the Assembly. 195
Resolution 1097 was also an answer to reports that the Russian Federation and
Ukraine, which had recently joined the Council of Europe, were not honoring
their commitments. The Resolution condemned Ukraine "for apparently vio-
lating its commitments to introduce a moratorium on executions of the death
penalty upon its accession to the Council of Europe."'96 As for Russia, the
Parliamentary Assembly demanded that it respect the Assembly's undertak-
ings to stop all executions. 97 The resolution stated that further executions
could imperil the continued membership of the two states in the Council of
Europe. 98 The Assembly extended its warning to Latvia, where apparently
189. Id. § 6(ii)(e).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See EuR. PARL. Ass. REc. 1302, § 3,24th Sitting (June 28, 1996) <http://stars.coe.fr/
ta/ta96/erecl302.html>.
193. See EuR. PARL. Ass. RaS. 1097, 24th Sitting (June 28, 1996) <http://stars.coe.fr/taf
ta96/eres1097.html>.
194. See id. § 6.
195. Id.
196. Id. § 2.
197. Id.§3.
198. Id. § 4.
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two executions had been carried out since it joined the Council. 9 Amnesty
International has reportedthat in 1996 Ukraine carried out 167 executions and
Russia carried out 140 executions, putting the two states at the top of the list
for executions world-wide, with the exception of China, whose title to first
place in the standings has been undisputed for many years.200 In order to
advance the debate within Ukraine, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe held a seminar on the abolition of the death penalty in Kiev on
November 28-29, 1996 at which international experts debated the issues with
members of the Ukrainian judicial community.2"'
Since then, Russia and Ukraine signed Protocol No. 6, on April 17, 1997
and May 5, 1997, respectively. These states must still ratify the instrument,
although pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty . .202
It appears that the Russian Federation has, in effect, respected the moratorium
and that executions have stopped.20 3 The evidence from Ukraine is more
ambiguous.
On October 11, 1997, at the Second Summit of the Council of Europe,
the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe adopted a series
of declarations, including one dealing with capital punishment.2 "' In their
declarations to the Summit, several ofthe leaders insistedupon the importance
of abolition of the death penalty as one of the central human rights goals of
the Council. These included Romano Prodi of Italy,2"5 Jean-Claude Juncker
199. Id.§2.
200. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, The Death Penalty World-Wide: Developments in
1996, Al Index: ACT/50/05197, June 1997.
201. Seminar on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, The Cruelty of the Death Penalty:
Capital Punishment and Human Rights, EUR. PARL. ASS., Doc. No. AS/Jur 72 (1996).
202. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18(a), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 336 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
203. The Committee Against Torture recently urged Ukraine to make its moratorium on
the death penalty permanent. See UN=rED NATIONS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE CON-
CLUDES EIGHTEENTH SESSION IN GENEVA, 28 APRIL-9 MAY, at 2, U.N. Doc. HR/4326 (1997).
204. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
inStrasbourg: FinalDeclaration<http://www.coe.fr/summittedeclplan.htm> [hereinafiterFinal
Declaration].
205. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Slrasbourg: Statement by Mr. Romano Prodi, President of the Council ofMinisters ofItaly
<http://www.coe.fr/summit/discours/eprodi.htm>.
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of Luxembourg," 6 Alfred Sant of Malta, 7 and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen of
Denmark.2" 8 Russian president Boris Yeltsin announced: "Russia has intro-
duced a moratorium on capital punishment and we are strictly complying with
this undertaking. I know that the European public opinion was shocked by
public executions in Chechnya. Russia's leadership is taking all necessary
measures to contain such manifestations of medieval barbarity. "20 9 The Presi-
dent of Latvia, Guntis Ulmanis, explained that a year earlier, he had imposed
a moratorium on executions, and that it is still in force.210 In the Final Decla-
ration of the Summit, the heads of state and government "call[ed] for the
universal abolition of the death penalty and insist[ed] on the maintenance, in
the meantime, of existing moratoria on executions in Europe."2"'
C. European Union
Death penalty issues have frequently been raised within the European
Parliament, which has adopted a number of resolutions on the subject over the
years. As early as 1981, a resolution called for abolition of the death penalty
in the European Community. 2 Following the coming into force of Protocol
No. 6, the European Parliament urged Member States to ratify that abolitionist
instrument. 3 In 1989, the European Parliament adopted the "Declaration of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms," which proclaims the abolition of the
death penalty." 4 In 1990, the president of the European Parliament an-
206. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister ofLuxembourg <http:ll
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/elux.htm>.
207. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Alfred Sant, Prime Minister of Malta <http://www.coe.frl
summit/discours/emalta.htm>.
208. See Council ofEurope, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Prime Minister ofDenmark <http://
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/edk.htm>.
209. See Council of Europe, Second Summit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation <http://
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/erussia.htm>.
210. See Council ofEurope, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Guntis Ulmanis, President of the Republic ofLatvia <http:/l
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/elatvia.htm>.
211. See Final Declaration, supra note 204.
212. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 258 (discussing abolition of death penalty in Euro-
pean Union) (footnote omitted).
213. See E.C. Doc. A2-167/85; 1986 O.J. (C36) 214-15.
214. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 259 (discussing abolition of death penalty in Euro-
pean Union) (footnote omitted).
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nounced that he had forwarded a motion for a resolution on abolition of the
death penalty in the United States."a Subsequently, the Political Affairs
Committee decided to prepare a report on the death penalty and appointed
Maria Adelaide Aglietta as rapporteur. In 1992, a motion for a resolution was
prepared that named those European Union states, namely Greece, Belgium,
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, whose legislation still provided for the
death penalty in the case of exceptional crimes, to abolish it altogether.2" 6 It
also urged all member states that had not yet done so to ratify Protocol No. 6
as well as the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.2" 7 The resolution also called upon member states to
refuse extradition to states where capital punishment still exists, unless suffi-
cient guarantees that it will not be imposed were obtained.2" The resolution
stated that:
[The European Parliament h]opes that those countries which are members
of the Council of Europe, and have not done so, will undertake to abolish
the death penalty (in the case of exceptional crimes, this applies to Cyprus,
Malta and Switzerland, and in the case of both ordinary and exceptional
crimes, to Turkey and Poland), together with those countries which are
members of the CSCE, in which the death penalty still exists (Bulgaria,
United States of America, Commonwealth of Independent States, Yugosla-
via, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Albania).2"9
It urged the United Nations to adopt a "binding decision imposing a general




Death penalty practice has also been a factor in assessing human rights
within states whose recognition is being considered by the European Union.
In its opinion on the recognition of Slovenia, the Arbitration Commission
presided by French judge Robert Badinter took note of the abolition of the
death penalty in the Constitution of Slovenia."2
In October 1997, the European Union adopted the Treaty of Amster-
dam,' which amends the various conventions concerning the body and its
215. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union) (footnote omitted).
216. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
217. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
218. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
219. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
220. See id (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
221. See Opinion No. 7, On International Recognition of the Republic ofSlovenia by the
European Community and Its Member States, 31 I.L.M. 1512, 1516, § 3(a)(i) (1992) (noting
prohibition on death penalty in Slovenian Constitution).
222. See Treaty ofAmsterdam, in THETREATYOFAMsTERDAM: TExT AND CoMMENTARY
209-322 (Andrew Duff ed., 1997).
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components. The instrument was completed with a series of declarations, the
first of which concerns the death penalty. It states:
With reference to Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Con-
ference recalls that Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome
on 4 November 1950, and which has been signed and ratified by a large
majority of Member States, provides for the abolition of the death penalty.
In this context, the Conference notes the fact that since the signature of
the abovementioned Protocol on 28 April 1983, the death penalty has been
abolished in most of the Member States of the Union and has not been
applied in any of them.'
IV International Criminal Law
The first truly international trials were held in the aftermath of World
War II and led, in many cases, to capital executions.224 The Charter of the
International Military Tribunal authorized the Nuremberg court to impose
upon a convicted war criminal "death or such other punishment as shall be
determined by itto be just."2" Many oftheNazi defendants were condemned
to death, although a few received lengthy prison terms and some were acquit-
ted. The Sovietjudge expressed, as an individual opinion, the minority view
that all of those convicted should also have been sentenced to death. Those
condemned to death were subsequently executed within a few weeks, with the
exception of G6ring, who committed suicide hours before the time fixed for
sentence. 6 A series of successor trials were held in Nuremberg pursuant to
Control Council Law No. 10." Again, large numbers of defendants were
sentenced to death or to various lesser punishments, including life imprison-
ment or lengthy terms of detention. At the Tokyo Trial, seven defendants
were sentenced to death and fifteen defendants were sentenced to life impris-
223. See Declaration on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, in THE TREATY OF AMSTER-
DAM: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 222, at 309.
224. See William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and the Death
Penalty, 60 ALB. L. REV. 733, 733 (1997) (noting that "the first international war crimes
tribunals, created in the aftermath of the Second World War, made widespread use of the death
penalty").
225. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3, art. 27, at 300.
226. See In re Goering and Others, 13 I.L.R. 203-22 (Int'l Mil. Trib. 1946); see also LES
PROCE.S DE NUREMBERG ET DE TOKYO (Annette Wieviorka ed., 1996); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992).
227. Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, supra note 3.
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onment. The president of the Tokyo Tribunal penned a separate opinion
that seemed to favor sentences other than death:
Itmay well be that the punishment of imprisonment for life under sustained
conditions of hardship in an isolated place or places outside Japan - the
usual conditions in such cases - would be a greater deterrent to men like
the accused than the speedy termination of existence on the scaffold or
before a firing squad.229
In answer to arguments that these sentences breached the rule nulla
poena sine lege, it was said that "[i]nternational law lays down that a war
criminal may be punished with death whatever crimes he may have commit-
ted."'' O The 1940 United States Army Manual Rules of Land Warfare de-
clared that "[a]ll war crimes are subject to the death penalty, although a lesser
penalty may be imposed."'" A postwar Norwegian court answered a defen-
dant's plea that the death penalty did not apply to the offense as charged by
finding that violations of the laws and customs of war had always been pun-
ishable by death at international law."2 Early efforts to establish an interna-
tional criminal justice system considered the appropriateness of the death
penalty. A preliminary draft of the Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide suggested that the maximum penalty for
genocide be capital punishment. 3 A group of three experts involved in
drafting the Genocide Convention, Donnadieu de Vabres, Pella, and Lemkin,
revived provisions from a 1937 treaty that had never come into force that
228. United States v. Araki, in 20 THETOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 49,854 to 49,858 (R.
John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981).
229. The Separate Opinion of the President of the Tribunal, Sir William Flood Webb, in
21 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 228, at 17; see B.V.A. ROLING & ANTONIO
CASSESE, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND (1993).
230. 15 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 200 (1949).
231. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAR OFFICE, FM 27-10: BASIC FIELD MANUAL, RULES
OF LAND WARFARE, 357, at 89 (1940).
232. See Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, 13 1.L.R. 262,263-64 (Nor. Sup. Ct. 1946) (discuss-
ing war crimes and international law).
233. See UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 5TH SESS., DRAFT CONVEN-
TION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE, ANNEX I, ESTABLISHMENT OF A
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF AcTs OF GENOCIDE,
art 38, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947) [hereinafter ESTABLISHMENTOFAPERMANENTINTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF ACTs OF GENOCIDE]; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 5TH SEss., DRAFT CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF GENOCIDE, ANNEXII, ESTABLISHMENT OF ANAD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTFOR
THE PUNISHMENT OF ACTS OF GENOCIDE, art. 32, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947) [hereinafter ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF AN AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF ACTS OF
GENOCIDE].
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provided for capital punishment for serious international crimes. 34 But only
a few years later, a draft provision proposed by the International Law Com-
mission for its Draft Code of Offences Against The Peace and Security of
Mankind avoided any categorical reference to capital punishment: "The pen-
alty for any offence defined in this Code shall be determined by the tribunal
exercising jurisdiction over the individual accused, taking into account the
gravity of the offence." 5
A General Assembly committee subsequently recommended that the
statute of the proposed international criminal court contain only the most
general of provisions dealing with sentencing and suggested the phrase "the
court shall impose such penalties as it may determine.""2  Moreover, the
General Assembly committee even stated that the statute might exclude
certain forms of punishment, such as the death penalty."
The Cold War intervened to arrest further developments in international
justice, and only in 1989 did the General Assembly revive the proposal to
establish an international court. In the interim, as we have already discussed,
international human rights law progressed from a somewhat benign tolerance
of capital punishment to direct and outright opposition. When the issue of
sentencing came before the International Law Commission in 1991, special
rapporteur Doudou Thiam formally prescribed that capital punishment be
excluded from the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
and that a maximum sentence of life imprisonment be provided.3 Although
a few members of the Commission argued that capital punishment should not
be abandoned,' 9 the vast majority disagreed, given the international trend in
234. See ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE
PUNISHMENT OF AcTs OF GENOCIDE, supra note 233, art. 38; ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD Hoc
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTFORTHEPUNISHMENTOFACTS OF GENOCIDE,supra note 233,
art. 32.
235. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 5, [1951] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 133, 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1.
236. See Report ofthe Committee on International CriminalJurisdiction, U.N. GAOR,.7th
Sess., Supp. No. 11, §§ 110-11, at 113, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952). "The Court shall impose
upon an accused, upon conviction, such penalty as the Court may determine, subject to any
limitations prescribed in the instrument conferring jurisdiction upon the Court." Id. Annex I,
art. 32, at 23.
237. Id.§111.
238. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security, [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n, pt. 1, § 29,37,40, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/435 and Add.1 (1991). For a discussion ofthis
proposal by the International Law Commission, see Summary Records of the 2207th-2214th
Meetings, [1991] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 4-52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991 (1991);
Document A/46/10: Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Third Session (29 April-19 July 1991), [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, pt. 2, §§ 70-105, 80-
85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/19911Add.1 (1991) [hereinafter Document A/46/101.
239. See Summary Records of the 2211th Meeting, [1991] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n § 15,
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favor of abolition of the death penalty.24 Several members also expressed
their reservations about sentences of life imprisonment, which they said were
also a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.24 The draft statute
for an international criminal court, adopted by the Commission in 1994, stated
that a person convicted under the statute would be subject to imprisonment,
up to and including life imprisonment, but capital punishment was not envi-
sioned.242 During subsequent debates on the statute in the Preparatory Com-
mittee and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, there have been
occasional, isolated attempts to revive capital punishment, butthese now seem
clearly condemned to rejection.243
28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A1991 (1991); Summary Records of the 2212th Meeting, [1991]
I Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n §§ 19, 28, 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1991 (1991); Summary
Records of the 2213th Meeting, [1991] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n § 55, 40, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1991 (1991). Special rapporteur Thiam promised that the Commission's report would
state that "two or three of its members had expressed reservations" about exclusion of the death
penalty. Id. § 59,40, U.N. Doc. ACN.4/SER.A/1991 (1991). The report eventually stated that
"many members of the Commission supported" excluding the death penalty and "[s]ome other
members opposed" excluding the death penalty. Id.; see Document A/46/10, supra note 238,
§§ 84-85.
240. See Summary Records of the 2207th Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 23-24; Summary
Records of the 2208th Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 2,21, 30; Summary Records ofthe 2209th
Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 5, 29; Summary Records of the 2210th Meeting, supra note 238,
§§ 25,33, 46; Summary Records ofthe 2212thMeeting, supra note 239, § 4; SummaryRecords
of the 2213th Meeting, supra note 239, §§ 12, 23, 33.
241. Summary Records of the 2208th Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 10 (Graefrath), 21
(Calero Rodriguez); Summary Records ofthe 2209th Meeting, supra note 238, § 19 (Barboza);
Summary Records of the 2210th Meeting, supra note 238, § 47 (Njenga); Summary Records of
the 2212th Meeting, supra note 239, § 4 (Solari Tudela); see Document A/46/10, supra note
238, § 88. The German Constitutional Court has suggested that life imprisonment without
possibility of parole constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. See DONALD P.
KOMMERs, THECONSTmONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THEFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY314-
20 (1989) (discussing Life Imprisonment Case (1977) 45 BVerGE 187).
242. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth
Session, 3 May-23 July 1994, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 123-25, U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994); see also Report ofthe InternationalLaw Commission on the Work ofIts Forty-
seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 63-64, U.N. Doc. A/50/10 (1995).
243. See UNITED NATIONS, DISCUSSION TURNS TO RANGE AND DEFINITION OF PENALTIES
IN DRAFT STATUTE IN PREPARATORY COMMTTEE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N.
Doc. L/2805 (1996); UNITED NATIONS, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT DISCUSSES DEFINITION OF CRIMES; POTENTIAL USE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
U.N. Doc. L/2806 (1996); UNITED NATIONS, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT CONCLUDES SECOND SESSION, U.N. Doc. L/2813 (1996); UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT BODY, AND NOT SUBSIDIARY OF
SECURITYCOUNCIL, SPEAKERSTELLLEGAL COMMITTEE, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3044 (1997); UNITED
NATIONS, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TELLS LEGAL COMMITrEE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT SHOULDNOTBE DIRECT PART OF UNITEDNATIONS, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3046 (1997);
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While the debate had been underway in the International Law Com-
mission and the Preparatory Committee, the Security Council had also ad-
dressed the issue of sentencing when it set up the ad hoe tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The statutes of the two ad hoe tribunals
contain brief provisions dealing with sentencing, proposing essentially that
sentences be limited to imprisonment (thereby tacitly excluding the death
penalty, as well as corporal punishment, imprisonment with hard labor, and
fines) and that they be established while taking into account the "general
practice" of the criminal courts in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda.' The
exclusion of the death penalty by the International Tribunal is a particularly
sore point with Rwanda. In the Security Council, Rwanda claimed there
would be a fundamental injustice in exposing criminals tried by its domestic
courts to execution if those tried by the international tribunal- presumably the
masterminds of the genocide - would only be subject to life imprisonment.245
Rwanda's representative stated that "[s]ince it is foreseeable that the Tribunal
will be dealing with suspects who devised, planned and organized the geno-
cide, these may escape capital punishment whereas those who simply carried
out their plans would be subjected to the harshness of this sentence." '246 He
also stated, "[t]hat situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in
UNITED NATIONS, DELEGATES DIFFER ON WHETHER STATUTE OF PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT SHOULD COVER CRIME OF "AGGRESSION," U.N. Doc. GA/L/3047 (1997);
UNITED NATIONS, SPEAKERS IN LEGAL COMMIrEE CALL FOR REVIEW OF STATUTES OF UN
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3048 (1997).
244. See STATUTEOFTHEINTERNATIONALTRIBUNALFORTHEFORMERYUGOSLAVIA, supra
note 5, art. 24; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 5, art. 23.
Several works discuss the ad hoc tribunals generally. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI &
PETER MANKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (1996); DAI TRIBUNALI PENALI INTERNAZIONALI AD HOC A UNA CORTE PER-
MANENTE (Flavia Lattanzi & Elena Sciso eds., 1996); KARINE LESCURE, LE TRIBUNAL PENAL
INTERNATIONAL POURL'EX-YOUGOSLAVIE(1994); VIRGIN,1AMORRIS &MICHAEL P. SCHARFAN
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(1995); Morten Bergsmo, The Establishment of the International Tribunal on War Crimes, 14
HUM. RTS. L.J. 371, 371-73 (1993); Eric David, Le tribunal international pdnal pour l'ex-
Yougoslavie, 25 REV. BELGE DROIT INT'L 565, 565-98 (1992); Jules Deschenes, Toward
International Criminal Justice, 5 CRIM. L.F. 249,249-77 (1994); David Forsythe, Politics and
the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 401,401-22 (1994); Melissa
Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J.
INT'L COMP. L. 217, 217-42 (1995); Christopher Greenwood, The International Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia, 69 INT'L AFF. 641, 641-55 (1993); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in
Yugoslavia and the Development ofInternational Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 78-87 (1994);
Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugosla-
via, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360, 360-80 (1994).
245. See UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, THE SITUATION CONCERNING RWANDA,
at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1984).
246. Id.
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Rwanda."247 But to counter this argument, the representative of New Zealand
reminded Rwanda that "[f]or over three decades the United Nations has been
trying progressively to eliminate the death penalty. It would be entirely
unacceptable- and a dreadful step backwards- to introduce it here."248 Since
domestic trials began in Rwanda in December 1996, more than one hundred
persons have been sentenced to death, although these sentences have not yet
been carried out.249 In fact, Rwanda has not imposed capital punishment since
1982, and in 1992, President Habyarimana systematically commuted all
outstanding death sentences." ° According to the United Nations Secretary-
General, Rwanda is now considered a de facto abolitionist state because it has
not conducted executions for more than ten years."s Even the program of the
Rwandese Patriotic Front calls for abolition of the death penalty. Further-
more, in the 1993 Arusha peace accords, which have constitutional force in
Rwanda, the government undertook to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at Abolition
of the Death Penalty, although it has not yet formally taken this step? 2
Recent legislation adopted by Rwanda in order to expedite trials of genocide
suspects abolishes the death penalty for the vast majority of offenders, who




Extradition has become an important indirect way in which international
law promotes the abolition of the death penalty. Since the late nineteenth
century, extradition treaties have contained clauses by which states parties
may refuse extradition for capital offenses in the requesting state unless a satis-
factory assurance will be given that the death penalty not be imposed. Such
247. Id
248. Id. at 5.
249. See William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide
Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 8 CRIM. L.F. 523, 560 (1997).
250. Arrgt& prisidentiel No. 103/105, Mesure de grdce du 13 Mars 1992, in 1 CODE FT
Lois DUE RWANDA 432 (Filip Reyntens & Jan Gorus eds., 2d ed. 1995).
251. See UNITED NATIONs, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING THEPROTECTIONOF THERIGHTS OF THOSE
FACINGTHEDEATHPENALTY: REPORTOFTHE SECRETARY-GENERAL, § 36, U.N. Doe. E/1995/78
(1995); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, The Death Penalty: List ofAbolitionistandReten-
tionist Countries (Sept., 1985), AI Index: ACT 50/06/95, Sept. 1985.
252. Protocole sur les Questions Diverses et Dispositions Finales, art. 15, in 1 CODE ET
Lois DUE RwANDA, supra note 250, at 18, 20.
253. See WLLIAMA.SCHABAS&MARTNIMBLEAU,INTRODUCTIONTORWANDANLAW44,
59-60 (1997) (discussing death penalty).
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provisions can be found as early as 1889, in the South American Convention,
in the 1892 extradition treaty between the United Kingdom and Portugal, in
the 1908 extradition treaty between the United States and Portugal, and in the
1912 treaty prepared by the International Commission of Jurists. 54 These
clauses have now become a form of "boilerplate" international law and are
contained in model extradition treaties adopted within international organiza-
tions including the United Nations." Several important cases have been
heard by courts in Europe and Canada concerning extradition to the United
States. As a result of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights,
extradition to the United States from Europe is now virtually contingent on
such assurances, while in Canada, the position is not nearly as clear.
The European Commission of Human Rights first addressed the question
of extradition to the death rows on the other side of the Atlantic in Kirkwood
v. United Kingdom," a case originating in California. Kirkwood's applica-
tion was declared inadmissible, not because the argument itself was flawed,
but because he had failed to demonstrate that detention on "death row" was
inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 3." The issue
returned to the Strasbourg organs several years later in the case of Jens
Soering, who had been arrested in the United Kingdom under an extradition
warrant issued at the request of the United States.258 In ajudgment issued on
July 7, 1989,259 the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that circum-
254. See GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITIONLAW 99-100 (1991); American lnsti-
tute of International Law, Project No. 17,20 AM. J. INT'L L. 331,331-35 (Supp. 1926); Draft
Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'LL. 15,228 (Supp. 1935); P. Leboucq, Influence en
mati~re d'extradition de lapeine applicable dans lepaysrequirant, 38 J.DUDROIT INT'L 437
(1911); J.S. Reeves, Extradition Treaties and the Death Penalty, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 298,298-
300 (1924); Sharon A. Williams, Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty, 1990
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 117, 117-68; Sharon A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards andInterna-
tional Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3 CRIM. L.F. 191, 191-224 (1992);
Sharon A. Williams, Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence as
Bases for Refusing Extradition, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 259, 259-80 (1991).
255. See UNITED NATIONS, EIGHTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTON OF
CRIMES AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, MODEL TREATY ON EXTRADITION, art. 4, at 75,
U.N. Doc. AICONF.144/28 (1990); Inter-American Convention on Extradition, art. 9,20 I.L.M.
723, 724 (1981); European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11,359 U.N.T.S.
273,282. The Italian Constitutional Courthas ruled that article 11 ofthe European Convention
on Extradition does not codify a customary rule of international law. See Re Cuillier, Ciambor-
rani and Vallon, 78 I.L.R. 93, 94 (1988) (Italy, Constitutional Court).
256. 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158.
257. See Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 184
(1984).
258. See 2 VINcENTBERGER, CASELAWOFTHEEUROPEANCOURTOFHUMANRIGHTS 118-
23 (1992) (discussing Soering); Warbrick, supra note 72, at 1085-95 (same).
259. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1989).
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stances relating to a death sentence could give rise to issues respecting the
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and concluded
that if the United Kingdom were to extradite Soering to Virginia, this would
constitute a breach of the European Convention.
Although the court has not revisited the question since Soering, the
European Commission on Human Rights has been called upon to interpret the
Soeringjudgment. In January 1994, it ruled an application from an individual
subjectto extradition to the United States for a capital offense to be inadmissi-
ble.26 The Commission considered the guarantees that had been provided by
the Dallas County prosecutor to the French government, stating that if extradi-
tion were granted, "the State of Texas [would] not seek the death penalty," to
be sufficient.26" ' Texas law stated that the death penalty could only be pro-
nounced if requested by the prosecution. The fugitive had claimed that the
undertaking was "vague and imprecise."262 Furthermore, she argued that it
had been furnished by the federal authorities through diplomatic channels and
did not bind the executive or judicial authorities of the State of Texas.263 The
Commission compared the facts with those in Soering, in which the prosecu-
tor had made a clear intention to seek the death penalty.2' The Commission
found the Texas prosecutor's attitude to be fundamentally different265 and
concurred with an earlier decision of the French Conseil d'Etat holding the
undertaking to be satisfactory.2"
Still more recently, the Commission considered the case of Lei Ch'an
Wa, threatened with extradition from Macao to China for a capital crime,
trafficking in narcotics.267 The representative of the Chinese news agency
Xinhua, which unofficially represented China's interests in Macao, had stated
that the death penalty would not be imposed in the event of extradition, which
was allowed by the Portuguese extradition legislation in force in Macao.268
260. See Aylor-Davis v. France, 76-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 164, 173 (1994).
261. Id. at 167.
262. Id. at 171.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 172.
266. See Dame Joy Davis-Aylor, Conseil d'Etat, Oct. 15, 1993, D. 1993 inf. rap. 238;
Christian Vigeuroux, Les engagements d'un Etat itranger en matiare d'extradition, in REVUE
FRANCAISEDEDROITADMNISTRATIF 1166 (1993).
267. Lei Ch'an Wav. Portugal, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94 (Nov. 27, 1995)
(unreported decision on file with Washington& Lee Law Review); Yuk Leung v. Portugal, Eur.
Comm'n H.R. App. 24464/94 (Nov. 27, 1995) (unreported decision on file with Washington
& Lee Law Review).
268. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
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However, Portugal's constitution says that extradition is forbidden for crimes
for which the death penalty is provided in the receiving state's legislation.269
In other words, extradition was forbidden by the constitution, despite the
existence of an assurance from the representative of China. The Constitu-
tional Court held that under the circumstances, extradition was prohibited.270
In the meantime, Lei had registered an application with the European Com-
mission, which issued provisional measures pursuant to article 36 of its
Regulations.27' However, once the Constitutional Court had settled the matter,
the problem was resolved, and the Commission decided that it was unneces-
sary to examine further the application.272 In another case, involving extra-
dition from Austria to the Russian Federation to stand trial for murder, the
Commission noted a maximum sentence often years in the Penal Code of the
Russian Federation, observed that the two accomplices had been sentenced to
nine years, and concluded that "there are no substantial grounds for believing
that the applicant faces a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty in
the Russian Federation.,
273
Protocol No. 6 has also been cited in domestic law in cases concerning
extradition of fugitives to states imposing the death penalty. On two occa-
sions, the French Conseil d'Etat has refused to extradite, expressing the view
that Protocol No. 6 establishes a European ordrepublic that prohibits extradi-
tion in capital cases.274 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands took a similar
view, invoking the Protocol in refusing to return a United States service-
man,275 although required to do so by the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment 276 The court considered that the European Convention and its Protocol
269. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
270. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
271. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
272. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94; Meng v. Portugal, 83-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 88, 90 (1995).
273. Raidl v. Austria, 82-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 134, 144-45 (1995).
274. See Fidan, Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 27, 1987, D. 1987, II, 305, concl. M. Bonichot;
Gacem, Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 14, 1987, I Semainejuridique IV-86. Fidan was cited by Judge
De Meyer in his concurring opinion in Soering v. United Kingdom. See Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 52 n.2 (1989).
275. See Short v. Netherlands, 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990); see also Steven J. Lepper, Short v.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands: Is It Time to Renegotiate the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 867, 874 (1991); Major John E. Parkerson, Jr. &
Major Steven J. Lepper, Commentary on Short v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 698, 698-702 (1991).
276. Agreement Between the Parties to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
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No. 6 took precedence over the other treaty.
In June 1996, Italy's Constitutional Court took judicial opposition to
extradition for capital crimes one step further when it refused to send Pietro
Venezia to the United States despite assurances from American prosecutors
that the death penalty would not be sought or imposed.2" Venezia's extradi-
tion to Dade County, Florida had been requested by the United States, pursu-
ant to the Treaty of Extradition dated October 13, 1983.278 Article IX of the
treaty entitles Italy to request that extradition be conditional upon an undertak-
ing by the United States that the death penalty not be imposed.279 The United
States government gave assurances in the form of a note verbale on July 28,
1994, August 24, 1995, and January 12, 1996.280 But this was not enough for
the Italian Constitutional Court.
According to the judgment of the court, the prohibition of capital punish-
ment is of special importance, like all sentences that violate humanitarian
principles, in the first part of the Constitution.28" ' The right to life is the first
of the inviolable human rights, enshrined in article 2.2"2 The judgment also
stated that the absolute character of this constitutional guarantee is of signifi-
cance to the exercise of powers attributed to all public authorities under the
republican system, and specifically with respect to international judicial co-
operation for the purposes of mutual judicial assistance.283 The court noted
that it had already stated that the participation of Italy in punishments that
cannot be imposed within Italy in peacetime constitutes a breach of the
Constitution.284
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
Note that on 19 June 1995, the States parties to the NATO treaty finalized the
Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other
States Participating in the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of Their
Forces together with an Additional Protocol. Article 1 of the Additional Protocol
states: "Insofar as it has jurisdiction according to the provisions of the agreement,
each State party to the present additional protocol shall not carry out a death
sentence with regard to any member of a force and its civilian component, and their
dependants from any other state party to the present additional protocol."
SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 254 n.174.
277. See Andrea Bianchi, Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Guistizia, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
727, 727 (1997) (discussing Venezia).
278. See Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Italy, Oct. 1983, U.S.-Italy, 35 U.S.T. 3026.
279. See id. art. IX.
280. See Bianchi, supra note 276, at 728.
281. See id. at 727.
282. See id. at 728.
283. See id.
284. See id.
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Referring to the mechanism by which the Italian authorities consider the
sufficiency of the undertaking by the United States authorities not to impose
capital punishment, the Italian Constitutional Court held that:
The extradition of a fugitive indicted for a crime for which capital punish-
ment is provided by the law of the requesting state would violate Articles
2 and 27 of the Italian Constitution, regardless of the sufficiency of the
assurances provided by the requesting state that the death penalty would
not be imposed or, if imposed, would not be executed.8 5
As a result, the court declared provisions of the code of penal procedure
designed to give effect to the extradition treaty between Italy and the United
States to be contrary to the Constitution.286 It also declared that the portion of
Law 225 of March 26, 1984, implementing article IX of the extradition treaty,
was unconstitutional.2 7 Venezia had also filed an application with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights. The Commission decided to strike the
case from its docket as a result of the judgment of the Italian Constitutional
Court.
28
Canadian courts have been reluctant to follow the European prece-
dents,8 9 although a recent judgment suggests that they will be increasingly
severe in granting extradition in capital cases. In United States ofAmerica v.
Burns and Rafay,29 issued on June 30, 1997, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal overruled the decision of the Canadian Minister of Justice to allow
extradition in a capital offense without seeking an assurance that the death
penalty would be imposed.291 Article VI of the Extradition Treaty between
Canada and the United States declares:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State
do not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused
unless the requesting State provides such assurances as the requested State
considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if




288. See Venezia v. Italy, 87-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 140, 150 (1996) (striking
case from docket).
289. See, e.g., Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
290. [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524 (B.C.C.A.).
291. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 542-43
(B.C.C.A.).
292. Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Canada, Dec. 3,
1971, U.S.-Can., art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 989.
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Bums and Rafay were both eighteen at the time of the crime, a brutal murder
of Rafay's parents.293 They were charged by the State of Washington with
aggravated first degree murder, punishable by sentence of death.294 Canada
abolished the death penalty for common law crimes in 1976.295 Although the
death penalty still exists under military law, it has not been imposed for more
than fifty years, and a pending revision of the National Defense Act plans to
eliminate capital punishment from the Canadian statute books altogether.
Justice Donald, writing for the majority of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, admitted that he could not refuse extradition on the basis of section
12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms, which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment, 296 or section 7 of the Charter, which enshrines the right
to life,297 given the 1991 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kindler
v. Canada.298 However, he concluded that because Bums and Rafay were
Canadian citizens, their extradition would violate § 6(1) of the Charter, which
declares that "[e]very citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and
leave Canada. ' 299 As dissenting Justice McEachern noted, § 6(1) is subject
to the limitation clause of § 1, which instructs the courts to subject Charter
rights to the test of "reasonable limits in a free and democratic society."300
Following an analytical approach developed by the European Court of Human
Rights in the application of similar provisions,3"' Canadian courts consider
whether the legal rule that violates the Charter right has a legitimate purpose
293. Burns and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 530.
294. Id. at 530-31.
295. Id. at 531.
296. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. II, No. 44, § 12 (1985) (Can.).
297. Id. § 7.
298. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 536
(B.C.C.A.); see Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. For further discussion of the Kindler
decision, see Donald K. Piragoff& Marcia V.J. Kran, The Impact ofHuman Rights Principles
on Extradition from Canada and the United States: The Role of National Courts, 3 CRIM. L.
F. 225, 225-70 (1992); William A. Schabas, Extradition etpeine de mort: le Canada renvoie
deuxfugitifs au couloir de la mort, 4 REvuBUNIVERSELLEDES DROrrs DEL'HOMME 65, 65-70
(1992); William A. Schabas, Kindler andNg: Our Supreme Magistrates Take a Frightening
Step into the Court of Public Opinion, 51 REVUE BARREAU 673, 673-91 (1991); William A.
Schabas, Kindler v. Canada, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 128-33 (1993); Sharon A. Williams,
Extradition and the Death Penalty Exception in Canada: Resolving the Ng and Kindler Cases,
13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 799, 799-839 (1991).
299. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 533, 536
(B.C.C.A.); Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. II, No. 44, § 6(1) (1985) (Can.).
300. See Burns and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 543 (McEachern, J., dissenting)
(quoting Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. II, No. 44, § 6(1) (1985) (Can.)).
301. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE
CANADIAN CHARTER (2d ed. 1996).
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and whether it constitutes a minimal infringement upon the right in question.
The Supreme Court of Canada had already determined that extradition consti-
tutes an acceptable limit on the right of Canadians to remain in Canada." 2 But
according to Justice Donald, execution of Burns and Rafay would violate their
right to return to Canada upon completion of their sentence, something that
extradition for noncapital offenses would not.3"3 Given alternatives, specifi-
cally a sentence of life imprisonment, it was clear that extradition without an
assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed failed the minimal
impairment test. He wrote:
The simple point taken by the applicants in the present case, with which I
am in full agreement, is that their return to Canada is impossible if they are
put to death.... By handing over the applicants to the American authori-
ties without an assurance, the Minister will maximally, not minimally,
impair the applicants' rights of citizenship.3 4
Although bound by precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada that
allows the extradition of noncitizens for capital offenses - case law that,
incidentally, has been criticized by other courts in other countries 30 5 - Justice
Donald's reasons suggest that he is opposed to extradition for capital offenses
in general. He wrote:
With respect, the Minister appears to have given only lip service to a
fundamentally important aspect of Canadian policy, namely, that we have
decided through our elected representatives that we will not put our killers
to death [on the reflected] will of the majority and their concern for the
sanctity of life and the dignity of the person.3"
He cited the reasons of Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory, who dissented in
Kindler, referring to the fact that Canada's Parliament rejected the death
penalty in two separate free votes. °7 Criticizing the executive decision to
extradite Burns and Rafay without the assurance that capital punishment
would not be imposed, he stated:
The Minister confesses his support for abolition but then fails to act on his
conviction. Apart from trying to have it both ways, the problem with the
302. United States of America v. Cotroni, United States of America v. El Zein, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1469, 1470.
303. Burns and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 534-35.
304. Id. at 534.
305. See Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal
taken from Jamaica).
306. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 541-42
(B.C.C.A.).
307. Id.
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Minister's thinking is that he treats the policy question about the death
penalty in Canada as undecided and at large. This approach led him to give
effect to the minority view on the death penalty as far as these applicants
are concerned."'
Burns and Rafay is being appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. That
court, in a four to three decision, authorized the extradition of Joseph Kindler
in 1991. Yet even the Kindler decision suggests the court's discomfort with
the death penalty, as six of the seven justices indicated that capital punish-
ment, were it to be imposed in Canada, would violate the right to life and the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
VI. Conclusion
In his 1995 report to the Economic and Social Council," 9 English crimi-
nologist Roger Hood concluded that "there has been a considerable shift
towards the abolition of the death penalty both dejure and in practice" in the
years 1989 through 1993.31 After consulting other sources, Professor Hood
observed that "it appears that since 1989 24 countries have abolished capital
punishment, 22 of them for all crimes in peacetime or in wartime. 311 Over
the same period, the death penalty was reintroduced in four states.3 12 Profes-
sor Hood stated that "the picture that emerges is that an unprecedented num-
ber of countries have abolished or suspended the use of the death penalty.
3 13
Amnesty International issued revised figures in July 1997 that declared that
ninety-nine states have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice,
whereas ninety-four retain the death penalty. Amnesty International adds that
"the number of countries which actually execute prisoners in any one year is
much smaller."3 4
Capital punishment remains in force in many countries, and while the
situation continues to evolve, quite convincingly, in favor ofabolition, it is too
early to speak of customary or universal norms. There is nothing unusual
308. Id. at 542.
309. Pursuant to E.S.C. Res. 206, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1,at 65, U.N. Doc. E/1994/94
(1994).
310. CAPITAL PUNISHMENTAND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING THE
PROTECTION OFTHE RIGHTS OF THOSEFACING THE DEATHPENALTY: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, supra note 251, § 32.
311. Id.§34.
312. Id. § 38.
313. Id.§ 87.
314. AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, AI Index: ACT
50/08/97, July 1997. For an even more optimistic assessment, see generally THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 51.
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here. One need only think of the emergence of other fundamental rights, such
as the prohibition of slavery and torture, sometimes qualified, with little
debate, as peremptory orjus cogens norms. Yet not so long ago - barely a
century, in the case of slavery- it was impossible to speak of any international
consensus on these matters. With that comparison in mind, can it be unrealis-
tic to lobk to the universal abolition of the death penalty, the consequence of
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Introduction
Consider the following appropriations of intellectual property thatmight
be committed by public employees: (1) During the course of her development
of a new technique for cheaply producing large amounts of the anti-cancer
drug taxol, a professor at a public university makes unauthorized uses of a
patented cloning process; (2) In the course of training new accountants in a
state tax office, a supervisor makes and distributes photocopies of a substan-
tial portion of a popular accounting text; (3) In order to calm parents who are
worried about the quality of the food in a public elementary school cafeteria,
the principal misleads them into believing that the food is made by a popular
local catering service; (4) In the course of her regulatory duties, an employee
of a state environmental agency releases confidential business information to
the public without the owner's consent; (5) In order to commemorate famous
residents of its state, the head of the state's tourism office strikes and sells
medals of several popular entertainers. Given the likely inadequacy of a suit
for infringement against an individual who has committed a wrongful act,
owners of patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and publicity rights
have begun to bring suits against the governments that benefit from misappro-
priations by their officials.
The answer to the simple but important question of whether a state or
local government can be held liable for the unauthorized appropriation of
private intellectual property turns out to be frustratingly complex. The result
of a lawsuit brought by an aggrieved rights-holder will turn on numerous
variables: Is the named defendant in the suit the state government, a state
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employee acting in his official capacity, a municipality, a municipal employee
acting in his official capacity, or an individual? Is the requested relief mone-
tary or injunctive? Is the intellectual property at issue a patent, copyright,
trademark, trade secret, publicity right, or the right to be free from false
advertising? Is the suit brought in state or federal court? Is the cause of
action based on state law or federal law? Is the appropriation an exercise of
a state's right of eminent domain or an inverse condemnation of property
under the Takings Clause?
The recent enactment of federal legislation purporting to abrogate state
immunity from suit in cases involving patents,' copyrights,2 trademarks,3 and
false advertising4 promised briefly to simplify the question of state liability.
The Supreme Court's subsequent landmark decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,5 however, has reinvigorated state claims to sovereign
immunity and thereby increased uncertainty over the potential liability of a
state or a state actor for the unauthorized use of intellectual property. Given
the increasingly important role played by intellectual property in the economy,
particularly in the areas of computer software and biotechnology, and given
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994).
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person,
including any governmental or non-governmental entity, for infringement of a
patent... or for any other violation under this title.
Id.
2. See 17U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994).
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal [c]ourt by any person...
for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner provided by...
this title.
Id.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994).
Any State, any instrumentality of a State or any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person...
for any violation under this chapter.
Id.
4. See id.
5. See 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (concluding that Congress cannot abrogate states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I powers).
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the pervasive use of intellectual property by state agencies and universities,6
the need for clarity is particularly acute. State and municipal governments
desperately need guidance on the precise parameters of their potential liabil-
ity, especially because courts and commentators have begun to conclude, too
hastily in our view, that Seminole Tribe nullifies the abrogating statutes.7
6. In 1995, state and municipal governments spent over $890 million on business soft-
ware. See Jacqueline D. Ewenstein, Note, Seminole Tribe: Are States Free to Pirate Copyrights
with Impunity?, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 91, 92-93 (1997) (citing amicus brief in Chavez
v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1996), vacatedsub nom. University of Houston v.
Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996) (mem.)).
In addition, numerous recent cases involve patent and copyright suits brought against
states and state universities. See generally College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 148,F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that patent claims against state
agency are not barred by Eleventh Amendment),petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 1998) (No. 98-531); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623
(5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1998) (concluding that copyright and false advertising claims brought against
state university press are barred by Eleventh Amendment); Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding that patent suit against state university is not barred
by Eleventh Amendment); Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that patent suit against state agency is barred by Eleventh Amend-
ment); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that patent suit against
state is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Lane v. FirstNat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989)
(concluding that copyright suit against state is barred by Eleventh Amendment); BV Eng'g v.
UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that copyright suit against state is barred by
Eleventh Amendment); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that copyright suit against state university is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Better
Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 904 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (holding that federal
unfair competition suit against state agency is not barred by Eleventh Amendment), affd sub
nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 689 (1998); Unix Sys.
Lab., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.J. 1993) (concluding that
copyright and trademark causes of action against state university are not barred by Eleventh
Amendment, but trade secret claim is barred).
Professor Kwall has surveyed uses of intellectual property by federal agencies. See
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Pre-
rogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1989) [hereinafter Kwall, The Sovereigns Prerogative]
(describing uses of copyrighted property by large numbers of government agencies).
7. See Chavezv. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623, at* 1 (5th Cir. Oct.
1, 1998) (concluding that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity in copyright
suit); John T. Cross, Intellectual Property and the Eleventh Amendment After Seminole Tribe,
47 DEPAuLL. REv. 519,562 (1998) (concluding that Seminole Tribe nullifies statutes abrogat-
ing Eleventh Amendment in federal intellectual property cases). Compare Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 77 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority's decision poses grave threat to
enforcement of copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws against states), Gen-Probe, Inc. v.
Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948,954 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (asserting thatSeminole Tribe "would
probably compel the conclusion that the patent code cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity"), andAndrew S. Williamson, Note, Policing the States After Seminole,
85 GEO. L.J. 1739, 1751 (1997) (asserting that Congress cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity in patent and copyright cases), with College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
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In order to construct a liability roadmap for the states, specialists in the
substantive law of intellectual property and experts in the field of federal
jurisdiction must combine forces. Although the contours of intellectual
property protection are continually shifting and the law of federal jurisdiction
is notoriously slippery, a convincing picture of much of the law governing the
misappropriation of intellectual property by governments and governmental
actors can be outlined, and unresolved issues can be identified with some
precision.
Part I of this Article addresses relief available to intellectual property
owners under the Takings Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment. Before Congress's
express abrogation of state sovereign immunity in 1992, federal, state, and
local governments were nonetheless potentially liable for misappropriations
of intellectual property that constituted takings without just compensation.8
This examination of the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is
also key to answering the critical question of whether federal patent, copy-
right, and trademark laws establish rights in "property" for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for only under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment may Congress abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Intellectual property owners, not surprisingly, were dissatisfied with the
rather limited restitutionary nature of the states' Fifth Amendment liability.
In 1992, these owners convinced Congress to make the broader remedies
found in federal intellectual property laws applicable against the states. Part
II addresses whether the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe - that Congress
cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity9 pursuant to any of
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that
Seminole Tribe does not eliminate Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity in patent cases),petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1998) (No.
98-531), and Ewenstein, supra note 6.
8. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (stating that patentee "may also assert a 'takings' claim against the state under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments"); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that if copyright owner "exhausts State remedies and establishes that the Massachusetts
legal system affords her no just compensation for the wrongful confiscation of her property, the
Takings Clause of the federal Constitution might at that point enable her to pursue a damage
remedy in federal court"); cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984)
(holding that trade secrets are protected by Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment in suit against
federal government); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1882) (stating that when
government grants patent, it confers on patentee exclusive property that cannot be used or
appropriated by government itself without just compensation).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id. This clause has been interpreted to bar federal
court suits brought by individuals, foreign governments, orlndiantribes, regardless oftheir state
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its Article I powers - renders the 1992 abrogating legislation unconstitutional.
The question is of vital interest to owners of federal intellectual property
because unlike the remedy for a takings claim, a valid claim for patent,
copyright, trademark infringement, or false advertising carries with it the
presumption of injunctive relief and the possibility of monetary damages
beyond mere restitution."0
Moreover, litigating under these statutes affords the plaintiff the subtle
but potentially decisive advantage of access to a federal forum for his federal
claims." After analyzing the Court's recent clarifying opinion in City of
Boerne v. Flores,2 we conclude that Congress properly exercised its power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render states liable in federal
court for patent, copyright, and trademark infringement, but probably not for
false advertising claims. Even if the Court disagrees and strikes down the
abrogating statutes, we conclude that principles of sovereign immunity
probably would not prevent the successful pursuit of a remedy for the viola-
tion of a federal statute in state court.
In Part III, we discuss how the liability landscape differs when the
defendant is a state official or a local government being sued for a statutory
or constitutional violation under the federal intellectual property statutes or
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When a local government has taken property pursu-
ant to an "official policy," the plaintiff may be obliged to pursue an inverse
condemnation suit in state court in lieu of, or at least before, bringing a federal
suit under § 1983. When an officer acts outside the "official policy" of a local
government, a federal § 1983 suit is appropriate, and both damages and
prospective relief will often be available.
Because suits over government intrusions on intellectual property rights
may be brought under federal statutory and constitutional law and state
condemnation law, and in both federal and state courts, the need arises to
coordinate the work of the two judicial systems. Part IV identifies and
addresses these jurisdictional issues.
of residence against any state or "arm" of the state. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115-16 (1994) (providing remedies for trademark infringement and
false advertising); 17 U.S.C. § § 502-04 (1994) (providing remedies for copyright infringement);
35 U.S.C. § 283-84 (1994) (providing remedies for patent infringement).
11. See Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977)
(suggesting "mistaken assumption of parity" among federal and state courts in area of enforce-
ment of federal constitutional rights); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline
of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REv. 609, 610-11
(1991) (stating that "most participants in the parity debate" believe that there is only weak parity
between state and federal courts).
12. See 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997) (concluding thatReligious Freedom Restoration Act
is beyond Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment).
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I Intellectual Property and the Takings Clause
Congress did not attempt to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 3 immunity
in patent, copyright, and trademark cases until 1992. This is not to say,
however, that states and their "arms" had historically been able to misappro-
priate intellectual property with impunity. The Fifth Amendment provides
that the federal government may not take private property for public use
without offering just compensation for the deprivation.14 This clause has long
been interpreted as forbidding uncompensated takings of property by states
and municipalities as well. 5 Under the Eleventh Amendment, claims of
compensation against a state must be brought in state court. 6 The Eleventh
Amendment does not, however, divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to
hear the appeals of disappointed state court takings clause litigants. 7 There-
fore, to the extent that intellectual property constitutes "private property" for
the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, states have always been potentially
liable for some misappropriations.
The Court has defined "property" very broadly in the Fifth Amendment
context. Property is not limited to the
vulgar and untechnical sense ofthe physical thing with respect to which the
citizen exercises rights recognized by law. [Instead it] ... denote[s] the
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[INor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
15. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(concluding that private property taken by state without just compensation to owner is "want-
ing in the due process of law required by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States"). This was the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be applied to the states. See
ERWIN CHEMERNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.4.1, at 504 & n.1
(1997).
16. See John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th
Cir. 1994) (dismissing inverse condemnation claim against State of Texas on Eleventh Amend-
ment grounds); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1710 n.122 (1997) ("The Eleventh Amendment does, however, bar individuals from
maintaining takings claims against states in the lower federal courts."). If a state does not
provide adequate procedures for seeking just compensation, suit may bebrought in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (stating thatproperty owner cannot claim violation ofJust Compensa-
tion Clause ofFifth Amendment ifstate provides adequate procedure for seekingjust compensa-
tion).
17. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Bev. & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26
(1990) (rejecting idea that Eleventh Amendment precludes Supreme Court's exercise of appel-
late jurisdiction in state court suit against state for monetary relief).
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group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it .... The constitutional provision is
addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess. 8
In concluding that copyrights constitute protectable interests, or property,
Professors Dreyfuss and Kwall identify specifically the right to exclude, the
right to manage, and the right to derive an economic benefit as legal interests
marking something as property.' 9 Economists tend to focus on the right to
exclude others from unauthorized use as the key component in defining a
property right.2" The right to exclude others is, of course, the hallmark of both
federal and state intellectual property systems.
Two Supreme Court decisions suggest strongly that intellectual property
shares the constitutional protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment's
command that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation."'" In 1882, the Court in James v. Campbell' declared that
patents were protected by the Takings Clause.' A century later, in Ruckels-
haus v. Monsanto Co.,24 the Court extended the Fifth Amendment guarantee
to trade secrets protected under state law.' Ruckelshaus is particularly
important to the determination of which types of intellectual property are
protected. Iftrade secrets, one ofthe weakest forms of intellectual property,26
are protected by the Fifth Amendment, then patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks must logically be protected as well.
In the intellectual property context, two questions require careful atten-
tion. Liability is based on a "taking" of "property." Which common law or
statutory rights qualify as "property," thus triggering the protection of the
Takings Clause? What kinds of governmental interference amount to a
"taking" of that property?
18. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
19. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 2-3 (1996) (discussing legal concept
of ownership of copyrights).
20. See RICHARDA.POSNERECONOMICANALYSiSOFLAW § 3.1, at36-38 (5th ed. 1998)
(asserting that exclusivity of property is necessary because it creates value and efficient use of
resources).
21. U.S.CONST. amend. V. TheFifthAmendment is directed to the national government.
It was first applied to the states in 1897. See supra note 15.
22. 104 U.S. 356 (1882).
23. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1882).
24. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
25. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
26. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing Court's finding in Ruckels-
haus that government's revealing of trade secret is taking under Fifth Amendment).
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A. Is Intellectual Property Fifth Amendment Property?
By limiting the Fifth Amendment guarantee to "property," the framers
obliged the Supreme Court to come up with criteria for identifying those
interests that qualify as property and for excluding others that would fail the
test. The scarce case law on the subject indicates that the Fifth Amendment
applies in a fairly broad manner to legal rights in intellectual property.27 In
1882, the Court in James v. Campbell considered a claim that a United States
postmaster had infringed the patent for a letter stamping device.28 The Court
held:
That the Government of the United States when it grants letters patent for
a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an
exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated
or used by the Government itself, without just compensation, any more
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land ... 29
The Court found that the sovereign retained no right to make use of patented
devices.30 It reasoned that incentives to invent valuable devices such as
"explosive shells, rams and submarine batteries" would be curtailed were the
government to have the right to infringe a patent without paying just compen-
sation.31
Were Campbell the only precedent on point, one might legitimately
question whether weaker forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights
and trademarks, should also be considered property for the purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. Copyrights and trademarks, after all, do not confer the
same powerful set of exclusive rights as patents, nor do they generally confer
the sort of power in the market that a patent does.32 In 1984, however, in
27. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
28. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357.
29. Id. at 357-58; see Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945)
("That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and by govern-
ment, has long been settled.").
30. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882). This finding was unlike the practice
in the ancient Venetian Republic, which retained prerogative to use freely devices for which it
had issued apatent. See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
166, 177 (1948) (quoting Venetian statute from 1474).
31. Campbell, 104 U.S. at358.
32. See infra notes 61-65. Many unauthorized uses of copyrighted expression and trade-
marks are permitted. For example, independent creation and fair use are both defenses to copy-
right infringement that are unavailable in patent infringement actions. See 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994) (stating that "the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright").
Unauthorized uses of trademarks are common (such as comparative advertising) and are not
actionable in the absence of consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (1994) (stating that person who uses mark is "liable in a civil action" if it "is likely to
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Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that the weakest and least
property-like form of intellectual property, the trade secret, constituted prop-
erty for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.33
In Ruckelshaus, the Court considered a claim by Monsanto that confiden-
tial information it submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
constituted property under Missouri law that was "taken" by the agency when
it was disclosed to Monsanto's competitors.34 Because valuable information
is only legally protectable under trade secret doctrine if it is in fact secret,35
disclosure by the EPA disabled Monsanto's legal right to prevent others from
misappropriating its information.36 The Court held that the federal govern-
ment would have to compensate Monsanto for the value of trade secrets
destroyed without its express or implied consent.37 Noting that it had earlier
found other intangible rights to constitute "property,"3" the Court declared
unequivocally that trade secrets were protected by the Fifth Amendment from
uncompensated governmental takings.3 9
To understand the breadth with which Ruckelshaus defines property, one
must understand what a weak form of property atrade secret is. A trade secret
is "any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others."4 The possessor of the informa-
tion, however, is only protected from the acquisition of the information
through breach of an express or implied promise or through a trespass.4' The
cause confusion"). In addition, it is more difficult to see, especially with trademarks, how the
national interest in the creation of valuable devices usable by the government is enhanced by
the protection of copyrights and trademarks.
33. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
34. Id. at 998-99.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (defining trade
secrets as informndtion that is both valuable and secret).
36. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
37. Id. at 1002-04. The Court also noted that the vehicle for compensation is a claim
under the Tucker Act. Id. at 1016.
38. Id. at 1003; see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,44,46 (1960) (finding that
state law materialman's lien is Fifth Amendment property); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935) (finding that real estate lien is Fifth Amendment
property); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (stating that valid contracts are
Fifth Amendment property).
39. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
40. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39.
41. See id. §§ 40, 43. Section 43 states that "'[i]mproper' means of acquiring another's
trade secret under the rule stated in § 40 include theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of confidence .... "
Relevant case law reveals one extraordinarily narrow exception. See E.I. duPont deNemours
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owner has no right to prevent someone from discovering the secret through
reverse engineering or independent creation or because the owner has not
taken reasonable precautions to keep it secret.42 In other words, the owner of
a trade secret can enforce promises made to keep the information confidential,
and it can sue those who acquire the information through independently
tortious behavior, such as a physical trespass or fraud.43 Obviously, compa-
nies whose information does not qualify as a trade secret have a similar
capacity to protect it through contract" and the prosecution of trespassers and
fraudfeasors.
What does it mean, then, to qualify as the owner of a trade secret? In
essence, being able to prove possession of a trade secret means that one is
entitled to enhanced remedies for breach of contract and for trespass beyond
those that are normally available. A promise not to reveal a trade secret is
enforceable through injunctive relief" and potentially punishable by puni-
tive damages,46 neither of which is available in a suit to enforce a typical
promise.47 When the trade secret is obtained through a physical trespass, such
as through the breaking of a window and the photographing of secret equip-
ment, compensatory damages are measured by the profits that would be lost
if the secret fell into the hands of the owner's competitors or by a reasonable
royalty orby an accounting ofthe infringer's profits.48 They are not measured
& Co. v. Rolfe Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017(5th Cir. 1970) (finding that aerial photogra-
phy of manufacturing plant under construction constituted improper acquisition of trade
secrets).
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMP=rrON § 43 (1995) ("Independent
discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper means of
acquisition.").
43. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text
44. Shrinkwrap licenses are often attempts to protectnonconfidential information through
contract law. Their enforceability outside the trade secret context, however, is controversial.
Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing contract
that restricted buyer beyond limits of intellectual property law) with Vault Corp. v. Quald
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding state statute permitting enforcement
of broad shrinkwrap license void under Supremacy Clause).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPNTION § 44.
46. Id. § 45 cmt. i; see Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating
that court has power to award punitive damages in action for misappropriation of trade secret).
47. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 160 (2d ed.
1998) (noting that "usual form of relief at common law was substitutional... that the plaintiff
recover from the defendant a sum of money"); id. § 12.8, at 192-93 (stating that for breach of
contract actions, "a court will not ordinarily award damages that are described as 'punitive"' and
"[n]o matter how reprehensible the breach, damages are generally limited to those required to
compensate the injured party for lost expectations").
48. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPNETITION § 45(1) (1995) (stating that
monetary remedy should be greater of owner's actual pecuniary loss or misappropriator's gain);
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merely by the cost of replacing the window. In other words, to be the owner
of a trade secret means only that one can recover tort-like remedies for a
breach of promise and contract or unjust enrichment-like remedies for atort.49
This is not to say that trade secrets should not qualify as property for the
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. As the Court noted in Ruckelshaus, trade
secrets bear many attributes traditionally associated with tangible property:
they are assignable,"0 they can form the res of a trust 5 and a debtor's interest
in a trade secret passes to the trustee in bankruptcy.52 Patents, copyrights, and
trademarks53 share all of these attributes with trade secrets.
Trade secrets, however, are a significantly more ephemeral form of
property than patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The term of protection is
uncertain-the moment the secret becomes known through disclosure, reverse
engineering, or independent discovery, legal protection vanishes.5 Due to the
lack of a registration system and the nature of the right itself, trade secrets
often do not have clearly identifiable exclusive owners. Rights and remedies
vary from state to state.56 Licensing is difficult due to the lack of a registra-
tion system and the practical problems created by the fact that one must reveal
a secret in order to market it. 7 The central rationale of the Court in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,s which held that federal patent law did not preempt
state trade secret law, was based on the Court's finding that the level of
protection under trade secret law is significantly inferior to the level of federal
patent protection. 9 State trade secret law did not directly conflict with the
goals and objectives of federal law because the rights afforded trade secret
owners were so weak.60
see also id. § 45 cmt. d (making clear that lost profits may be recovered).
49. See Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual PropertyLaw and the Economics ofPreemption,
76 IowA L. REv. 959, 974-81 (1991) (comparing trade secret and patent protection).
50. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (citing Dr. Miles Med. Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 401-02 (1911)).
51. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. e (1959)).
52. Id. (citing In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1975)).
53. Trademarks, however, may not be assigned without the goodwill of the business or
product that bears the trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).




58. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
59. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482-93 (1974).
60. See id. at 487 (finding that "the potential rewards of patent protection are so far
superior to those accruing to holders of trade secrets").
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If trade secrets are property for the purposes of Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause analysis, then copyrights and trademarks certainly are as
well." In fact, the federal government exercises its eminent domain power
over copyrights just as it does over real property.6' Although neither copy-
right nor trademark law provides the near-absolute exclusivity that patent
protection does,63 they are both far more stable, certain, and property-like
than trade secret law. An owner of a copyright presumptively is entitled to
injunctive relief when someone makes an unauthorized reproduction of her
work.' A trademark owner presumptively is entitled to injunctive relief when
someone uses her mark in a confusing manner.65 The owner of a trade secret,
however, has no presumptive right to prevent a person from making use of
her confidential information because information, in and of itself, has no
61. See Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that when
copyright "is taken for public use, a constitutional right to just compensation attaches"); Roth
v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983) ("An interest in a copyright is a property right
protected by the due process and just compensation clauses of the Constitution."); see also
LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2, at 590-91 & n.11 (2d ed. 1988)
(endorsing broad reading of Ruckelshaus).
62. See Zapruder's JFKAssassination Film in the Public Domain, PUB. DOMAIN REP.,
Feb. 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Zapruder's Film] (reporting that federal government has recently
condemned Zapruder's famous film and paid compensation to his surviving heirs); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1994) (providing compensation for copyright owners whose works are
infringed by federal government). Numerous cases note that the rationale behind a § 1498
recovery is eminent domain. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Decca Ltd. v. United
States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082 (Ct Cl. 1976).
63. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) ("Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which - (A) is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising
or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."), and 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (stating that"[s]ubjectto sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize" reproduction of, preparation of
derivative works of, performance of, and display of copyrighted work), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(Supp. 111996) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (stating that court may grant temporary and final injunc-
tions "to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright").
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994) (stating that court may grant injunction "to prevent the
violation of any right of the registrant of a mark").
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owner.66 One can register one's ownership of a patent, copyright, or trade-
mark in Washington, D.C. There is no similar registry of trade secret owner-
ship nor could one exist. As noted above, the possessor of confidential
information must prove that the information was secret and was improperly
obtained by the user, almost always through the breach of a contract or
trespass.67
Another type of intellectual property, the publicity right, should also
qualify as property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." The right of an
individual to exploit commercially her persona is not protected under federal
law, but as with trade secrets, some states provide substantial legal
protection.69 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, discussing the
right of publicity immediately following its section on trade secrets, describes
the parameters of such protection: "One who appropriates the commercial
value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liabil-
ity...."" Although protection of the right to publicity falls exclusively under
state law, the Supreme Court has analogized the rationale behind the right of
publicity to the purposes underlying federal patent and copyright law.71
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,72 a case involving
publicity rights under Ohio law, the Court explained why federal law grants
property rights to inventors and authors: "The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and the useful Arts."'73 The patent and copyright laws were "in-
66. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,344 (1991) (stating
that "facts are not copyrightable").
67. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
68. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 35-47 (1997) [hereinafter Kwall,
Fame] (concluding that publicity rights should be treated as property after exhaustive discussion
of economics, natural law, Hegelian property theory, and analogies to other kinds of property).
69. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at 547 (stating that about half of states have
recognized right of publicity and that in at least fifteen of those states, legislation exists
regarding this right).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
71. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 (1977) (finding
that First Amendment does not privilege television station's unauthorized broadcast of human
cannonball act because protection provides economic incentive to performer); Roberta Rosen-
thal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
191, 197-98 (1983) [hereinafter Kwall, Right ofPublicity] (discussing rationale for protection
of right of publicity in Zacchini).
72. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
73. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Mazer
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tended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights.'74 In determining that
the First Amendment did not privilege a television station's unauthorized
broadcast of a human cannonball act, the Court in Zacchini found that "[t]he
Constitution does not prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in
deciding to protect the entertainer's incentive in order to encourage the
production of this type of work." 5 The Court considered publicity rights
analogous in policy terms and in function to patents and copyrights, indicating
that it also might be willing to treat them as property for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.76
A brief trip to the local mall or a few minutes of viewing a television
commercial provides ample evidence that merchants recognize the inherent
value of the celebrity persona." Not surprisingly, publicity rights may be
assigned and licensed," and in mostjurisdictions they may be inherited.79 The
protection provided to publicity rights by the law parallels that afforded to
copyright owners. For example, injunctive relief is typically available to
prevent an unauthorized use." As with copyright law, First Amendment
considerations provide the most significant limit on the exclusivity of the
owner's rights.8 ' Although no cases discuss the question, the right to exploit
commercially one's persona would seem to be the sort of property that could
be taken by a state under the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, because the abrogation provisions of the Lanham Act raise the
issue, we must enquire whether the legal shield against false advertising may
be considered a species of "property." Federal law affords protection to
merchants from materially false statements made about their products, and
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
74. Id. at 577 (quoting Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 575-77 (noting that rationale for protecting publicity rights involves per-
former's economic incentive to perform, and economic considerations also underlay patent and
copyright laws); see also Kwall, Right ofPublicity, supra note 71, at 198 (discussing Zacchini).
77. For a comprehensive discussion of the value of the celebrity persona, see Kwall,
Fame, supra note 68.
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995).
79. See id. § 46 cmt h.
80. Id. § 48.
81. See id. § 47 (stating that "the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commen-
tary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such
uses" is not protected); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (stating that fair use of copyrighted work "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright"). See generally
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994) (discussing conflict between protecting right of
publicity and First Amendment limitations on that protection).
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from materially false statements made by competitors about the competitors'
own products.82 A recent Third Circuit case found that the right to complain
about a competitor's false claim about its products "is not an intangible
property right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment,"83 but reserved the
question of whether the right to be free from false statements made about
one's own products might be properly characterized as protecting a type of
business interest.84
We believe the distinction suggested by the Third Circuit to be logical,
although not because we think business reputation or good will are outside a
plausible definition of property. Measurable damage to a company's good
will looks much like damage to a property interest. An illustration might help.
A state might falsely assert that McDonald's provides the hamburgers served
in its school lunch program. This would constitute a public use of McDon-
ald's good will for the state's benefit and under our analysis constitute a
confiscation of McDonald's property. The diminishment of that same good
will, however, by false statements made by the state attorney general about the
quality of McDonald's products would not seem to be an appropriation of its
property for public use. 5 Its claim should fail for that reason, not because
reputation can never be property.
B. When Is Infringement of Intellectual Property a Fifth
Amendment "Taking?"
Governments interfere with our property every day in innumerable
ways. Some of these intrusions are compensable "takings," but the vast
majority are not. Just because one's property is adversely affected does not
mean a compensable taking has occurred. One must not only prove that one
has affected property, but that the governmental conduct constituted a com-
pensable condemnation. In the intellectual property area, the Supreme Court
has provided two guideposts, James v. Campbell and Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., which hold respectively that the unauthorized use by the post
office of a patented device86 and the improper disclosure by the EPA of a trade
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) (affording protection from those who "in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresent[ ] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities").
83. See College Sav. Bank v. FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d
353, 360 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that "right to be free of false advertising" is not protected
property right), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149).
84. See id. at 362 (expressing "no opinion" about whether property rights protect one
from misrepresentations made about one's goods by competitor).
85. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
86. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1882).
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secret 87 can constitute takings. In order to understand these cases and their
implications for other government encroachments on intellectual property, it
will be helpful to place them in the broader context of takings law.
The Supreme Court has divided the universe of takings cases into roughly
two categories: possessory takings and regulatory takings.8 A government
confiscation of property or a physical occupation of property is a "possessory"
taking and constitutes the strongest sort of claim for compensation. The Court
has articulated a per se rule requiring governmental entities to compensate the
victims of confiscatory takings of real property, no matter how little damage
was done.89 For example, the nonconsensual occupation of just over one
cubic foot of real property constitutes a taking.9" The governmental appropri-
ation of interest accruing in an interpleader account also constitutes a taking.9
On the other hand, the law regarding regulatory takings is notoriously
tortured.92 A "regulatory" taking occurs when a law, regulation, or ordinance
"denies all economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use."93 For example, in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council94 the Court found that a zoning ordinance restrict-
ing all viable use of valuable beachfront property constituted a taking.95 The
land, which was worth almost one million dollars before the ordinance, had
been rendered worthless due to building restrictions on the site.96 Few cases,
however, present such extreme facts, and few regulations effect compensable
takings. Because virtually everything a government does affects the value of
somebody's property, the difficult question in cases of regulation has been:
When has the regulation gone too far?
87. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
88. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, §§ 8.4.2.1-8.4.2.2, at 506-19 (discussing posses-
sory takings and regulatory takings in two separate sections).
89. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(affirming rule that "a permanent physical occupation is a taking" and property owners have
expectation of compensation).
90. See id. at 438 n. 16 (noting that size of displaced property is not important to determin-
ing whether taking occurred).
91. Webb's Fabulous Pharm., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).
92. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.4.2.2, at 511 (noting that problem of when
regulation becomes taking has "confounded courts and commentators").
93. Id. § 8.4.2.2, at 513.
94. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
95. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-32 (1992) (stating
rule that when regulation prohibits all economically beneficial use of land, Takings Clause
requires compensation).
96. See id. at 1006-09 (stating that Lucas had purchased land for $975,000 and was
prohibited from developing it by South Carolina Beachfront Management Act).
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Obviously, the classification of a given encroachment as "possessory"
or "regulatory" has important implications for the outcome of a lawsuit,
both in general and in the particular context of intellectual property. In
general, courts apply the possessory rationale most consistently to situations
in which the government wishes to make use of the owner's property, such
as the temporary exploitation of an owner's business facilities,97 whereas
courts apply the regulatory rationale most frequently when a statute, rule, or
administrative action incidentally has negative effects on the owner's prop-
erty.
The distinction between the two classes of cases is critical because in the
regulatory context "the Court has not found a taking so long as the govern-
mental regulation met a rational basis test and so long as the regulation did not
prevent almost all economically viable use of the property."98 In the posses-
sory or confiscatory context, however, even a small intrusion will constitute
a taking.99 Also, the value of the property at issue need not be destroyed -
mere diminishment of value is enough. As a result, if a city confiscates a
dump truck for one day to haul rocks to a government work site, compensation
must be paid. If, instead, the city passes a reasonable air pollution ordinance
that costs the truck owner thousands in repairs, no compensation need be paid.
Similarly, in the private intellectual property context, when unauthorized
copies of registered blue prints for a new school are made and used by a city,
compensation must be paid under the confiscatory rationale."° On the other
hand, under the regulatory rationale, a city tax on photocopying that raises an
architect's cost of making copies of and distributing his work would fail to
constitute a taking)'O'
The question is identifying which principle is applicable to govern-
ment intrusions on intellectual property. Because intellectual property is
intangible, it cannot, strictly speaking, be "possessed."'0 2 At the same time,
97. See generally Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (discussing
compensation for government's taking of owner's laundry business during WWII).
98. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.4.2.2, at 519.
99. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(holding that "a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property" is taking).
In Loretto, the Court noted that although the appropriation in question displaced only one and
one-half cubic feet, the size of the appropriation was not a factor in determining whether it
constituted a taking. Id. at 438 n. 16.
100. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
102. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 734-41 (discussing notion
that governmental uses of copyrighted property can constitute physical invasions, prohibitive
regulatory measures, or regulations that interfere with property owner's ability to use his
property as he pleases).
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not all encroachments on intellectual property are adequately conceived as
"regulations." The Court's conventional categories are not altogether satisfac-
tory for classifying government intrusions on intellectual property. We think
that, rather than trying to shoehorn intellectual property as a whole into one
category or the other, a better approach is to examine the circumstances of
particular cases. Sometimes the policies of takings law will be better served
by using principles developed in the possessory context; sometimes a regula-
tory focus will be appropriate.
Analogizing to the confiscation analysis better serves the aims of takings
law in cases in which the government has appropriated the property to its own
use, such as when a state official makes unauthorized copies of computer
software rather than buying it or uses patented biotechnology without obtain-
ing permission. Other variations of government conduct may look more like
regulations. For example, governmental regulations do limit intellectual prop-
erty rights in a variety of ways, such as by imposing limits on the exclusive
use of trademarks, 3 permitting "fair use" of copyrighted works,"°4 or by
applying the antitrust laws to intellectual property. We do not dispute that
a regulatory analysis is appropriate in a case in which a party challenges such
rules, nor do we dispute that most of these regulations are valid.
Other cases raise more difficult problems. In Ruckelshaus, where the
government revealed Monsanto's trade secret, the Court clearly found a
taking."0 6 In doing so, it relied on cases typically classified as possessory
takings cases,0 7 but it applied a test derived from regulatory takings cases,
08
focusing on whether Monsanto had a "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 11995) (creating safe harbors for certain unautho-
rized uses of famous trademarks).
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (permitting unauthorized uses of material otherwise pro-
tected by copyright).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (forbidding registration oftrademark used to violate anti-
trust laws).
106. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013-14 (1984).
107. See id at 1005 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979))
(stating that public access to private navigable waterway constituted taking); PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,88 (1980) (stating that public access to private shopping
center did not constitute taking). Chemerinsky describes both as possessory takings cases. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.4.2.1, at 506-09.
108. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (identifying factors that should be taken into
account when courts decide whether taking has occurred); see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,225 (1986) (evaluating whether regulatory taking has occurred by
weighing: "(1) 'the economic impact ofthe regulation on the claimant;' (2) 'the extentto which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;' and (3) 'the
character of the governmental action"' (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
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tion[ ]" that the EPA would keep its information secret.0 9 The regulatory
focus was probably driven by the fact that the EPA made the damaging
disclosure pursuant to amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The Court seemed to view the suit as a challenge
to the regulatory interpretation of those amendments, rather than as an im-
proper act by an agency employee. It concluded that Monsanto had a property
interest in its trade secret, and that the business advantage protectable under
trade secrecy law was destroyed by the EPA's disclosure."0
One could quarrel with the regulatory analogy. Although Monsanto's
secret in Ruckelshaus was revealed, the EPA's disclosure of Monsanto's
information did not prevent Monsanto from continuing to use the information
in its business. The destruction of secrecy only rendered Monsanto unable to
claim the additional remedies that it would have been able to assert under
trade secret law. Monsanto became less able to protect its information, and
the information became significantly less valuable once it was discovered by
competitors. Of course, we have noted above that trade secret laws do not
protect information itself, but rather merely augment pre-existing contract and
tort remedies. Obviously, the disclosure did render the augmented remedies
unavailable. Monsanto, however, characterized its damages as caused by the
loss of its competitive edge. In any event, the EPA did not so much regulate
Monsanto as confiscate its property and constructively dedicate itto the public
domain.
Considerthe consequences of a regulatory analysis in the use-of-intellec-
tual-property context. Under a regulatory taking analysis, an appropriation of
intellectual property would rarely amount to a taking because the owner will
rarely lose all beneficial use of the property. Intellectual property is intangi-
ble, and therefore it is incapable of being physically possessed or taken
away." ' Although the government can condemn a piece of intellectual
property and take title to it or cast it into the public domain,"' the typical
infringement does not divest the property owner of the use of his property."'
109. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005.
110. See id. at 1012 ("The economic value of [Monsanto's] property right lies in the com-
petitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to the data,
and disclosure or use by others of the data would destroy that competitive edge.").
111. Although the federal copyright and patent laws provide for registration, registration
documents are not certificates of title. Ownership does not arise from mere possession of a
registration certificate.
112. See supra note 62 (discussing government's taking of Zapruder's film and placing it
into public domain).
113. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 735-37 (noting that govern-
ment takings can result in personal and professional harm to copyright proprietor, but often
preserve owner's overall use).
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Even if a government is infringing a patent, copyright, or trademark, the
owner may continue to exercise her rights against other infringers. In Camp-
bell, for example, the post office's use of the patented stamping device did not
prevent the patent owner from practicing the patent or suing other infring-
ers." 4 Regulatory takings doctrine provides little solace to owners of intellec-
tual property, Ruckelshaus notwithstanding.
Whatever the merit of characterizing Ruckelshaus as a regulatory taking,
it is both unwise and unnecessary to read Ruckelshaus as standing for a broad
rule that government interference with intellectual property should always be
evaluated under regulatory taking principles. The characterization made no
difference in Ruckelshaus, because a taking could have been found under
either a confiscatory or regulatory rationale. Moreover, the Court apparently
did not considerthis an important issue under the circumstances of the case.'
15
The opinion simply treats the government's actions as a regulatory taking
without explicitly considering whether the confiscatory analysis would have
been more appropriate." 6 For these reasons, Ruckelshaus provides dubious
authority for the proposition that government use of intellectual property
should generally be scrutinized under regulatory taking principles.
Moreover, Ruckelshaus does not expressly tell us how to treat cases in
which governments actually use someone's intellectual property. In this situa-
tion, the principles developed in the context of confiscatory takings seem
most relevant. In Campbell, which was decided in the era before the devel-
opment of the regulatory takings doctrine," 7 the Court analogized a case of
federal patent infringement to the physical possession of real property, the
paradigm confiscatory takings context."' It had no difficulty finding that the
post office's infringement of the owner's patented letter-stamping device
constituted a taking." 9 Because the taking was confiscatory, the fact that the
patent was still economically viable 20 did not defeat the claim, as it would
114. See generally James v. Campbell,. 104 U.S. 356 (1882).
115. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (stating factors courts
should use in determining whether there has been taking without reference to either possessory
or regulatory rationale).
116. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (describing possessory takings cases
cited in Ruckelshaus and how test developed in Ruekelshaus is same).
117. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Mahon is
generally considered the first regulatory takings case.
118. See Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357-58 (stating that government cannot appropriate new
invention without compensation "any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation
land which has been patented to a private purchaser").
119. Id
120. But see Cross, supra note 7, at 552-53 (arguing that device had no economical value
except in hands of government). Cross cites no authority for this assumption. The invention
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in the regulatory context.'
. But the argument for applying the confiscatory standard to cases of
governmental use does not rest solely, or even primarily, on the authority of
Campbell. The premise behind the restrictive rules of regulatory takings
doctrine is not applicable to most invasions of intellectual property. The
reason it is hard to win a regulatory takings case is that the government's
regulation typically has a legitimate aim independent of its impact on the
value of the property, an aim the government is ordinarily free to pursue under
the police power." These aims may be as diverse as environmental protec-
tion, preserving historic landmarks, and promoting general welfare." The
resulting vulnerability to government intrusion is a regrettable but necessary
implication ofthe exercise of government prerogatives. Courts quite properly
hesitate before requiring the state to compensate the property owner just
because achieving a valid regulatory aim has an effect on the use of his
property. It is critical, therefore, to note that in most intellectual property
cases the complained-of government action is not the exercise of the police
power by the passage of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, nor the action of
a zoning board; it is typically the appropriation of patented or copyrighted
materials by bureaucrats or university professors for the state's own use."24
Unlike the typical regulation, there is no good reason for the intrusion, other
than a desire to exploit the property cheaply. When a biochemistry professor
infringes a patent, or a secretary in a governmental agency makes an unautho-
rized copy of registered software, the government has exploited the property
for its own purposes just as if it had temporarily borrowed a private car for
public use. These actions do not look like regulatory takings, nor would
allowing them to go forward advance the legislative prerogative underlying
the narrow nature of the regulatory takings doctrine.
Finally, .the central aim of takings law is to limit the "govern-
ment's power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the general
may well have had multiple uses other than canceling letters. The Court does not rely on the
premise that only the government could use such a device.
121. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (stating
that Fifth Amendment is violated when regulation "denies an owner economically viable use
of his land" (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
122. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,488 (1987)
(noting that government was acting to protect public interest in health and environment);
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (noting that government regulation served to adjust
rights for public good); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978)
(noting that state law did not effect taking because restrictions were related to preserving
historic landmark and promotion of general welfare).
123. See supra note 122 (citing cases regarding varied aims of government takings).
124. See cases cited supra note 6.
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good."" That goal is directly and powerfully implicated in a case in which
the government, without obtaining permission, makes use of intangible
property that belongs to someone else. 26 The intellectual property owner can
be singled out by the state to bear a burden not shared by his fellow citizens.
Unlike evenhanded regulation, which is presumptively valid, an appropriation
looks more like a prohibited attempt to "forc[e] some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."'27 The fact that the target of the taking is intangible should not
prevent it from being partially confiscated within the meaning of the takings
doctrine.' In fact, Congress seems to think that infringement of copyrights
and patents constitutes a confiscation, and it has provided compensation for
owners under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Courts explaining the purpose behind § 1498
state that infringement constitutes "an eminent domain taking."'2 9
C. Remedial Aspects of the Fifth Amendment
The applicability of the Fifth Amendment means that just compensation
will always be available for government appropriations of intellectual prop-
erty that constitute takings, because that provision carves out an exception to
otherwise applicable rules of sovereign immunity. 30 Whatever may be true
125. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 9-6, at 605. For a discussion of the considerations of utility
and fairness underlying this proposition, see Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, andFairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1214-24 (1968).
126. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 694, 728 (noting that gov-
ernment has right to copy protected works, but must pay compensation). There is at least one
case to the contrary. See Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1338 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding
that copyright infringement by government not compensable taking under Tucker Act). In our
view, Porter cannot survive Ruckelshaus. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1020 (1984) (finding that government disclosure of trade secret constitutes compensable taking
under Tucker Act).
127. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
128. Note that in other contexts the intangibility of property rights does not impede their
legal protection. Thus, for example, the Uniform Commercial Code categorizes patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks as "general intangibles," a long recognized category of personal property
that can be bought and sold, and used as collateral under Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-106 cmt.
(1995) (listing property that can be used as commercial security). Moreover, the Supreme Court
has extended constitutional protection to intangible personal property. See, e.g., Armstrong,
364 U.S. at 49 (stating that Fifth Amendment protects materialman's lien); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (stating that contract rights are property protected by Fifth
Amendment).
129. See Teletronix v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Decca Ltd. v.
United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
130. See generally Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6.
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of violations of other constitutional and statutory directives, the Supreme
Court declared in First English EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County ofLos
Angeles' that "in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required
by the Constitution." '132 Notwithstanding principles of sovereign immunity,
the state and federal governments must provide remedies for takings of prop-
erty.
133
In ordinary situations, governments themselves typically institute con-
demnation proceedings. This procedure has been used for appropriations of
intellectual property as well.13 The difficult issues arise in situations in
which a government simply uses or damages someone's property, without
undertaking to condemn it first. In such circumstances, First English requires
that the government submit to an inverse condemnation suit brought by the
property owner to determine whether a taking occurred and the value of the
property taken. 135 It bears emphasizing that the sole remedy available in such
a suit is the value of the property. A property owner normally cannot obtain
injunctive relief as a matter of constitutional right.
36
Governments have the privilege of litigating these suits in their own
courts. When the federal government is the target, the case may be brought
in federal court under the Tucker Act 137 or 28 U.S.C. § 1498. State govern-
ments must allow such suits to be brought against themselves and against local
131. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
132. First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,316 (1987).
133. Id. at 316 n.9; see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ETAL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THEFEDERAL SYsTEM 849 & n. 1, 1029 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER] (describing Just Compensation Clause as dictating remedy for interference with
property rights). Courts may compel compensatory remedies for constitutional violations in
other circumstances as well. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 111 (1994) (stating that
due process requires states to provide clear and certain remedy for unconstitutionally collected
state taxes). Compare Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception,"
110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 125 & n.161 (1996) (stating that adequate relief required) with
Vzquez, supra note 16, at 1770-73 (stating that remedy not required). This debate, however,
is not directly relevant to the present inquiry. First English makes it clear that takings claims
require a remedy, regardless of how the general issue is resolved.
134. See Zapruder's Film, supra note 62, at 1 (reporting that federal government has
condemned Zapruder's famous film and paid compensation to his surviving heirs).
135. See First English, 482 U.S. at 315 (discussing right of landowner to bring inverse
condemnation suit).
136. See id. at 321 (noting that compensation consists of value of property for period
during which taking was effective).
137. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1994) (definingjurisdiction of federal district court);
see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1016-19 (1984) (holding that adequate remedy
for government taking of Monsanto's trade secret was available under Tucker Act and equitable
relief was not available); see also HART& WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1028-29 (discussing
Tucker Act).
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governments in their own courts.' Otherwise, a federal suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deprivation of property without due process of law will be avail-
able against the local government or state officers responsible for the injury.139
Such suits are also available against officers who take property without
authorization of the government for which they work. In a § 1983 suit, the
remedies may be far broader than 'just compensation.'0
40
11 Protection Beyond the Takings Clause:
Legislation Abrogating Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Seminole Tribe,
and City of Boerne
In the eyes of intellectual property owners, the Takings Clause provides
some, but hardly adequate, protection against government encroachments.
Although compensation must be paid even when the damage done is min-
138. See First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,315-16
n.9 (1987) (discussing landowners' right to bring inverse condemnation actions); cf HART &
WECHsLER, supra note 133, at 1054 (discussing argument over whether unconsenting states can
be held liable in federal courts).
Professor Kwall suggests that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) would preclude state courtjurisdiction
over takings claims that involve copyrights. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra
note 6, at 764. We respectfully disagree. Section 133 8(a) grants federal courts exclusive juris-
diction over suits "arising under" federal copyright law. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). A takings
claim does not "arise under" federal copyright law, but rather is grounded in the Fifth Amend-
ment itself.
ProfessorKwall also argues that 17 U.S.C. § 301, which preempts state laws that provide
protection "equivalent" to federal copyright law, preempts the application of state remedies for
takings of copyrighted property. See Kwall, The Sovereign's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 764-
65. Because a state is obligated by the Fourteenth Amendment to provide just compensation
to property owners, we fail to see how Congress could relieve states of that obligation by
statute. Section 301 preemption in this context appears to be unconstitutional. Congress could,
because it has the power to create and define copyright protection, declare prospectively that
copyrighted material can be used freely by the states. It has, however, done just the opposite.
See supra notes 1-3.
139. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194-97 (1985) (discussing state procedures for seeking just compensation).
140. One may obtain injunctive relief against an officer under the principle of Exparte
Young. See generally Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that federal courts can
enjoin state officials in their official capacities). See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690
(1978) (applying Exparte Young). Compensatory damages may include not only the value of
the property, but also recovery for such items as emotional distress, providing they can be
proved. See, e.g., Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986);
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978). Punitive damages may be obtained against an
officer who acts egregiously. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Successful plaintiffs
are generally entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(1994).
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imal, 4 ' or the deprivation is temporary, 142 the measure of compensation is
primarily restitutional. In the intellectual property context, no more than a
reasonable royalty is probably due the owner under the Fifth Amendment.
1 43
This result is suggested by Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States'" in which
the Court held that proper compensation for the temporary taking of a laundry
business for military purposes was its rental value during the time of the
taking, not the difference between the market value of the business before and
after the taking.141
The likely limitation of damages to a reasonable royalty helps explain
why copyright and patent owners were not satisfied with the remedies avail-
able to them under the Fifth Amendment and fought to convince Congress that
a direct action for infringement should be available against the states. In
addition, under takings law, a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to an injunc-
tion, nor can the plaintiff recover certain types of compensatory damages
146
or trebled or punitive damages.147 By contrast, under federal patent, copy-
right, trademark, and false advertising law, an injunction is presumptively
available,' as are other sorts of enhanced remedies. 49 Injunctions are also
141. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(requiringjust compensation for unobtrusive television cable installation in apartmentbuilding).
142. See First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987) (stating that compensation must be paid, even when taking is temporary).
143. See Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding
that reasonable royalty, not lost profits, is preferred measure of recovery in patent infringement
suits against United States), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1466 (1997).
144. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
145. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1949).
146. See id. (denying recovery in takings case for difference between market value of
laundry business before and after taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
379 (1945) (denying recovery for "future loss of profits, ... the loss of good-will which inheres
in the location of the land, or other like consequential losses which would ensue the sale of the
property to someone other than the sovereign").
147. At any rate, we have found no authority for such a recovery, and the logic of takings
law suggests that the property owner is entitled to compensation and nothing more. Cf City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) ("[C]onsiderations of history and
policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad-faith actions of
its officials.").
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1994) (court may grant injunctions in trademark and false
advertising cases); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (court may grant injunction in copyright case); 35
U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (court may grant injunction in patent case).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) (court may award treble damages for trademark
infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994) (court may award statutory damages from $20,000
to $100,000); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (court may award treble damages for patent infringe-
ment).
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available to plaintiffs under state trade secret and publicity rights law, 5' and
such plaintiffs can also recover punitive damages.' An owner is substan-
tially better off as the prevailing party in an infringement action than in a
takings claim.'52
Another reason why plaintiffs would prefer to file suit under the federal
intellectual property statutes is that although takings actions against state and
local governments must be brought in state courts, federal court is available
for patent, copyright, and trademark actions. For a variety of reasons, federal
judges are likely to be more sympathetic than state courts to claims based on
federal law. Federal judges enjoy life tenure and undiminishable salary, while
many state judges must stand for election and generally depend upon state
legislatures for their salaries.' Federal courts maintain a strong tradition of
vigilance in defense of federal rights.'54 Talent probably plays a larger role
in the selection of federal judges than in the selection of state judges.' For
all these reasons, the disparity between federal and state courts may make the
difference between winning and losing in close cases on the facts or the
law.'56 Given that state court remedies were already available under the
Takings Clause,'57 this "substantive" theme may well have influenced Con-
gress when it enacted the abrogating legislation. 8
150. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFUNFAIRCOMPETITION §§ 44,48 (1995) (statingthatinjunc-
tive relief may be awarded for misappropriation of trade secrets and publicity rights).
151. See Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1972) (allowing punitive
damage award for misappropriation of trade secrets); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMP~rrrON § 45 cmt. i (stating that successful plaintiff in action for appropriation of trade
secret may recover punitive damages); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1104-
06(9th Cir. 1992) (allowing punitive damage award for voice misappropriation); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. e (stating that punitive damages are available to
plaintiffs in right of publicity actions).
152. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
153. See Neubome, supra note 11, at 1127-28 (noting that federal district judges are
appointed for life and state court judges are more vulnerable to political pressure).
154. See id. at 1124-25 (discussing psychological and attitudinal characteristics of state and
federal judges).
155. See id. at 1121-24 (discussing technical competence of state and federal judges); see
also Burt Neubome, Parity Revisited: The Uses ofaJudicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1995) (discussing performance of state and federal trial judges).
156. See Michael Wells, Who'sAfraidofHenryHart?, 14CONST. COMMENT. 175,184-86
(1997) (addressing "weak parity" between federal and state courts).
157. See supra Part I (addressing relief available to intellectual property owners under
Takings Clause).
158. Cf Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 472-74 (1991) (stating that it is appropriate for Congress
to consider such factors in allocating jurisdiction between federal and state courts).
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Champions of intellectual property rights succeeded in securing enact-
ment of abrogating legislation in the early 1990s, ' and the federal intellectual
property statutes accorded them the sweeping remedies previously noted.
Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe,60 owners of intellectual
property felt confident that the abrogating legislation was constitutional
because the Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 6' had broadly authorized
Congressional abrogation of state immunity, so long as Congress clearly
stated its intent. 62 Seminole Tribe cast doubt on the legislation, for it substan-
tially restricts Congress's abrogating power. At the same time, however,
Seminole Tribe did not necessarily undercut the remedial scheme enacted in
the early 1990s. Seminole Tribe held that Congress may not abrogate state
Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting solely under its Article I powers,
such as the power to regulate commerce among the states Or the power to
grant patents and copyrights.'63 The Court, however, reaffirmed earlier cases
ruling that Congress may abrogate immunity when acting under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to enforce the consti-
tutional rights protected by that amendment." In 1997, the Supreme Court
in City of Boerne v. Flores'65 addressed the scope of congressional power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part examines the impact
of Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne on the abrogating legislation that
purported to make state governments fully responsible for their appropriations
of intellectual property. We argue that the abrogating legislation can largely,
and perhaps entirely, survive the restrictive rule of Seminole Tribe.'66
159. See supra notes 1-4.
160. For a general overview of the case and its background, see generally Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
161. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
162. Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1989) (determining that Congress
may abrogate state immunity when acting under any of its powers), overruled by Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242-43 (1985) (stating that Congress has power to abrogate state immunity, however, it must
express its intent to do so in language of statute).
163. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
164. Id. at 59-62.
165. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
166. Our emphasis is on problems raised by Congress's effort to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity. This objection to the abrogation legislation should be distinguished from
an objection based on the states' Tenth Amendment right to be free of certain types of substan-
tive regulation. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (finding that
Congress may not oblige local sheriffs to perform background checks on gun permit applicants);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (finding that Congress may not oblige
states either to create toxic waste dump sites or take title to waste).
A Tenth Amendment attack on the abrogating legislation is bound to fail because that
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A. What Is a "State?"
Before considering the impact of Seminole Tribe on intellectual property
rights, it is useful to delineate as precisely as possible the potential scope of
sovereign immunity. To say that the "states" may assert sovereign immunity
raises an important issue: What is a "state?" The Eleventh Amendment
presumptively divests a federal court of its power to hear the case not only
when a state itself is named as a defendant, but also when any "arm of the
state" is named as such. Accordingly, given the relevance of the question
whether state universities, which are frequent defendants in intellectual
property litigation, should be considered arms of the state, an appropriate
starting point for our inquiry into sovereign immunity is to define what is
meant by a "state" for the purposes of the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
A suit brought against the "State of Georgia" is, of course, a suit against
a state for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. A suit brought against
a statewide agency is also considered to be a suit against the state itself.67 A
suit against a county or city, however, is not considered to be a suit against the
state.'68 Nor is a suit against a multistate regional agency considered to be a
suit against the state, when the states involved are not responsible for the
agency's debts.169 In general, the Court has indicated that "when the action is
in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real,
substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity
from suit."'70
In its most recent decision on the issue, Regents of the University of
California v. Doe,' the Court noted that determining whether an entity is an
amendment forecloses regulation only in circumstances in which Congress has singled out the
states. The Tenth Amendment does not bar Congress from applying laws of general applicabil-
ity to the states. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985)
(stating that minimum wage and overtime laws are not "destructive of state sovereignty"). The
intellectual property laws covered by the abrogating legislation are also laws of general applica-
bility.
167. See generally, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (involving suit against
Illinois Department of Public Aid); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945) (involving suit against Indiana Department of Treasury).
168. See generally, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.-v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) (involving suit against county school board); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552
(1900) (involving suit against city).
169. See generally, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)
(involving suit against New York-New Jersey agency); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'I PlanningAgency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (involvingsuitagainstCalifornia-Nevadaagency).
170. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464.
171. 519 U.S. 425 (1997).
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arm of the state involves an examination of the "relationship between the State
and the entity in question."'72 The Court looked at "the essential nature and
effect of the proceeding" '173 and the "nature of the entity created by state
law." 74 In practice, this overall inquiry seems to focus primarily on whether
the state would be obligated to satisfy ajudgment rendered against the defen-
dant entity.175 In Regents v. Doe, the Court considered a Ninth Circuit ruling
that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, operated by the Board of
Regents of the California university system, was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court because the Department of
Energy was contractually obligated to indemnify the laboratory if it were to
lose a lawsuit. 76 Because money was unlikely to flow from the state's coffers
into the pocket of the defendant, the Ninth Circuit allowed the suit against the
lab to proceed.'77
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "it is the entity's potential
legal liability, rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to
reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the first instance, that is
relevant.' ' Declining to address the ultimate issue of whether the laboratory
was an arm of the state, the Court reversed on other grounds. 79 Given the
Ninth Circuit's prior acceptance of the position that the University of Califor-
nia system is generally an arm of the state, one would expect the cause of
action against the laboratory to be dismissed.'
172. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
173. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
174. Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Rd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977)).
175. See id. at 430 ("[lT]he question whether a money judgment against a state instrumen-
tality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any
evaluation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued.").
176. See id. at 426-28 (describing Ninth Circuit ruling and question for Supreme Court
review); see also Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 65 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997).
177. See Lawrence Livermore, 65 F.3d at 774.
178. Regents, 519 U.S. at431.
179. Id. at 431-32.
180. See BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that University
of California system is instrumentality of state). The Ninth Circuit applies a five-factor test to
determine whether an entity is an arm of the state. The five factors are as follows:
(1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, (2) whether the
entity performs central governmental functions, (3) whether the entity may sue or
be sued, (4) whether the entity has power to take property in its own name or only
the name of the state, and (5) the corporate status of the entity.
Lawrence Livermore, 65 F.3d at 774-75.
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The question of whether state universities are arms of the state for the
purpose of establishing their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court is especially important in the intellectual property context. A
substantial portion of the nation's research and development in the fields of
medicine, biotechnology, computer science, and engineering is conducted
under the auspices of large public universities."' In addition, universities
typically photocopy large amounts of copyrighted materials in the everyday
course of their business.' They are likely defendants in any number of
misappropriation suits.' Although the Court has not answered this question
definitively, the majority of lower courts that have addressed the question
have assumed state universities to be arms of the state for the purpose of
asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity.' " Putting aside until later the case
of state officials sued in their official capacities, an entity that successfully
proves it is an arm of the state presumptively is entitled to absolute immunity
from suit in federal court, irrespective of the nature of the cause of action
pleaded against it.
B. Seminole Tribe and the Revival of State Sovereign Immunity
Let us assume, then, that the defendant agency is indeed the "state." In
1992, Congress plainly and expressly abrogated state Eleventh Amendment
immunity in cases of violations of federal patent, copyright, trademark, and
false advertising law."8 Federal law is silent as to trade secrets and publicity
181. Cf Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931,935 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (detailing
university's role in biotechnology research).
182. Cf Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (detailing common practice of professorial creation and photocopying
of copyrighted materials in "coursepacks," although in this case defendant was for-profit,
commercial copy service), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
183. See supra note 6.
184. See generally, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995)
(finding that copyright and false advertising claims brought against state university press are not
barred by Eleventh Amendment), vacatedsub nom. University of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S.
1184 (1996) (mem.); Genentech, Inc., 998 F.2d 931 (finding patent suit against state university
not barred by Eleventh Amendment); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(finding patent suit against State of California barred by Eleventh Amendment); Richard
Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding copyright suit against
state university barred by Eleventh Amendment).
185. The Court will never imply abrogation. Congress must be absolutely clear when it
intends to override the Eleventh Amendment. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 243 (1985) (requiring "unmistakable language in the statute itself"). There is little doubt
that Congress has spoken clearly as to patent, copyrights, and trademarks. See supra notes 1-3
(providing statutory language). All courts that have considered the question agree. See gener-
ally College Say. Bank v. FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353 (3d
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rights claims; therefore, a plaintiff must still bring those causes of action
against a state exclusively in state court, if at all. 8'
Our inquiry will focus on the validity of Congress's abrogation of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity for patent, trademark, copyright, and false adver-
tising claims. Some courts and commentators maintain that Seminole Tribe
renders these statutes unconstitutional. 8 7 To the contrary, we contend that
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to
bring states within the jurisdiction of the federal courts in most cases involv-
ing appropriations of federally protected intellectual property.
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court severely restricted Congress's
power to abrogate state immunity from federal court suit. The issue in Semi-
nole Tribe was whether Congress had acted constitutionally in depriving the
states of immunity in certain actions brought under the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act.'88 Striking down the legislation by a five-to-four vote, the Court
overruled its previous holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. that Con-
gress could force states into federal court to comply with regulations it had
Cir. 1997) (determining that false advertising claims by state agency are not barred by Eleventh
Amendment), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149);
Chavez, 59 F.3d 539 (determining that copyright and false advertising claims brought against
state university press are not barred by Eleventh Amendment); Genentech, 998 F.2d 931
(determining that patent suit against state university not barred by Eleventh Amendment); Better
Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 904 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (holding that federal
unfair competition suit against state agency is not barred by Eleventh Amendment), affd sub
nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 689 (1998); Unix Sys. Lab., Inc.
v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1993) (concluding that copyright
and trademark causes of action against state university are not barred by Eleventh Amendment,
but trade secret claim is barred).
186. Cf Chavez, 59 F.3d at 547 (noting thatplaintiffconceded that abrogation of immunity
in copyright and trademark cases did not extend to publicity rights claim).
187. See Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that majority decision "prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad
range of actions against States, [including] those sounding in copyright and patent law");
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1998)
(holding legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity in copyright cases to be unconstitu-
tional under Seminole Tribe); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 954 n.6
(S.D. Cal. 1996) ("If the issue were whether the patent code abrogates the state's immunity, then
Seminole Tribe would apply, and would probably compel the conclusion that the patent code
cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity."); Cross, supra note 7, at 523
(concluding that abrogating legislation "cannot be justified as exercises of Congress's Four-
teenth Amendment power"); Williamson, supra note 7, at 1752 ("It's highly unlikely that
Congress could remove the Copyright and Patent Acts from Seminole's reach .... insofar as
they abrogate the sovereign immunity of states and state agencies, both Acts' sovereign
immunity provisions are unconstitutional after Seminole .... ).
188. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996); see 25 U.S.C. § 2710
(1994).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYMISAPPROPRIATION
passed under its Commerce Clause powers.189 In fact, the Court went so far
as to find that Congress lacked the power to abrogate state Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity under any of its Article I powers,'" holding in particular that
the Indian Commerce Clause191 could not be invoked by Congress. 2 At the
same time, the Court reaffirmed a twenty-year-old rule that state immunity
from suit in federal court can be overridden when Congress acts pursuant to
its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
Seminole Tribe, with its distinction between legislation enacted pursuant
to Article I powers and section 5 legislation, turns on the Court's understand-
ing of sovereign immunity. A narrow majority of the justices take the view
that the immunity pre-dates the Eleventh Amendment. Relying on Hans v.
Louisiana, 1 4 they maintain that the immunity is of constitutional dimension
and entered the Constitution when the document was ratified in 1788, at the
same time as the Article I powers. 9 The Eleventh Amendment itself is
merely a surgical correction of a 1793 case, Chisholm v. Georgia,'96 that
erroneously denied a state's immunity claim against an out-of-state plaintiff. 
97
The constitutional status of the immunity shields the states from suits in
federal court based on causes of action grounded in Article I legislation.
Section 5 cases are different because the Fourteenth Amendment was not
enacted until 1868 and represents a deliberate decision to restrict state prerog-
atives in ways that were not contemplated in 1788. In contrast to Congress's
Article I powers, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Con-
gress the power to enforce the amendment's proscriptions "by appropriate
legislation,"'98 does authorize Congress to abrogate state immunity. The
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to "fundamentally alter[ ] the balance of
189. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
190. Id. at 72-73.
191. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress has power to regulate com-
merce "with the Indian Tribes").
192. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
193. Id. at 59-60; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I (stating that state may not "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); id. § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
194. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
195. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
196. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
197. See HART& WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1047 (discussing Chisholm). In the view
reflected in Hans and Seminole Tribe, this circumstance explains the narrow wording of the
Eleventh Amendment, which by its terms only protects states against suits by "Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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state and federal power struck by the Constitution" '99 and therefore overrides
the Eleventh Amendment.
Of course, not everyone agrees with this account of sovereign immunity
and the Eleventh Amendment. Contrary views that recognize broader Con-
gressional power have won strong support with the Supreme Court and in the
academic literature. Fourjustices dissented in Seminole Tribe.200 Just seven
years earlier, the Court in Union Gas held, again by a five-to-four margin, that
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting under Article
I powers.20' The weight of scholarly opinion, for whatever it may be worth,
is on the side of the Seminole Tribe dissenters.20 2 Our project, however, is to
examine the current state of the law as it relates to intellectual property, not
to enter into the debate over the accuracy of Seminole Tribe. We take the
decision as a given while noting that it may not be the last word in the area.
In addition, as we conclude that the legislation abrogating state sovereign
immunity in patent, copyright, and trademark cases is authorized by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the somewhat shaky foundation of Seminole Tribe
does not threaten the constitutionality of that legislation. The holding of
Seminole Tribe is clear: Congress may only abrogate states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity when it properly enforces rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. It follows that the scope of Congressional power under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a key to determining whether Congress
acted constitutionally in abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent,
copyright, and trademark cases.
C. City of Boerne and the Abrogation Statutes:
The Scope of CongressionalAuthority Under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court has recently cleared up much of the confusion
surrounding the meaning of the section 5 enforcement provision of the Four-
teenth Amendment.0 3 It held in City ofBoerne v. Flores that section 5 was
199. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
200. See id. at 76, 100 (identifying dissenting justices).
201. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
202. See Meltzer, supra note 160, at 7-13 (discussing scholarly debate over Eleventh
Amendment and state sovereign immunity).
203. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996); see U.S. CoNST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (stating that state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws");
id. § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.").
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a purely remedial provision.2" In other words, Congress can combat pre-
existing constitutional violations under section 5, but may not expand the
substantive protections provided by a particular provision of the Bill of
Rights, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
In City of Boerne, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), °' legislation specifically passed
to overturn the Court's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith.206 Smith
held that the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion was not
violated by "generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct."
207
Although neutral laws passed with an antireligion motivation may still be
declared unconstitutional, 28 the decision made it impossible to challenge a
neutral, generally applicable law on the grounds that it merely burdened the
free exercise of religion. In response, Congress passed RFRA, mandating the
application of a balancing test" 9 in cases involving challenges to state laws
that burden religion. Under RFRA, governments at all levels were forbidden
from placing "substantial[ ] "burden[s]" on a person's exercise of religion,
even if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government could demonstrate both a "compelling governmental interest" in
its law and that the regulation was the "least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.,
210
A powerful attack on RFRA was mounted by the city of Boerne, Texas,
in defense of its historic preservation ordinance after the city had denied the
application of a local historic church to expand its facilities.211 When the city
refused the permit, the church sued, arguing that under RFRA it did not have
to comply with the ordinance.212 The church's claim under the RFRA balanc-
ing test was quite strong. Without the needed renovations, some forty to sixty
parishioners were being turned away from some Sunday masses.213 To justify
204. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-63 (1997).
205. Id. at 2172.
206. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
207. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
208. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523-24
(1993) (striking down municipal regulation of animal slaughtering as impermissibly directed
at burdening practice of Santeria).
209. InframingRFRA, Congresswas influencedbySherbertv. Verner, an earlier Supreme
Court case. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963) (holding that in absence of
compelling governmental interest, state may not punish individual who does not obey law that
substantially burdens his free exercise rights).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
211. City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997).
212. Id.
213. Il
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this clear burden on religion, the city could not have asserted a public health
or safety rationale, but rather would have been forced to argue that its aes-
thetic interests were compelling. Not surprisingly, it argued primarily that the
power to enact RFRA itself was beyond the powers delegated to Congress by
the Constitution." 4
The church, supported by the Solicitor General's office, sought to justify
RFRA as a proper exercise of Congress's powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."5 The Court agreed that Congress can properly
legislate against practices that violate rights protected by the First Amend-
ment.216 It reaffirmed that under Smith, however, the enforcement of a gener-
ally applicable historic preservation ordinance against a church almost cer-
tainly did not violate the First Amendment." 7 The Court reserved for itself
the ultimate right to define what constituted a violation of a constitutional
right.218 Congress could not overrule Smith by statute.
The Court grounded its holding, in part, in the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2"9 The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had
deliberately rejected an alternative formulation of the amendment, drafted by
Congressman Bingham, that would have given Congress the power to define
constitutional protections." The framers rejected it because it "would [have]
give[n] Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibil-
ity, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution."'22
Accordingly, a new draft was prepared, under which "Congress' [s] power was
no longer plenary but remedial. Congress was granted the power to make the
substantive constitutional prohibitions against the States effective."' In this
form, the amendment was ratified.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2162-63.
216. Id. at2163-64.
217. Id. at2161.
218. Id. ("Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said
to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
it is.").
219. Id. at2164-66.
220. See id. at 2164. That version stated:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2165.
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Apart from this federalism argument, the Court in City of Boerne noted
that opponents of the Bingham draft invoked another structural principle of
constitutional government: the separation of powers among the branches of
the national government. The Court recognized that "[tjhe first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmen-
tal action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those prohibi-
tions." A problem with the initial draft was that it "departed from that tradi-
tion by vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the
meaning of the new Amendment through legislation." 4 In the later, success-
ful draft, "the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the
States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. The
power to interpret the constitution in a case or controversy remains in the
judiciary. '
The distinction between the "remedial and preventive" legislation autho-
rized by section 5 and legislation that defines constitutional rights, which is
forbidden," 6 will sometimes be hard to apply. The Court in City of Boerne
devoted several pages to distinguishing RFRA from 1960s voting rights
legislation that forbids certain practices, such as literacy tests, that the Court
had earlier found constitutional. 7 "Preventive rules" like those found in the
voting rights legislation, are "appropriate remedial measures" under section
5 only when there is "a congruence between the means used and the ends to
be achieved.""8 The Court recognized that "[s]trong measures appropriate to
address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.""
In the voting rights context, the legislation addressed "widespread and persist-
ing deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country's history
of racial discrimination.""0 By contrast, "RFRA's legislative record lack[ed]
examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry.""1
Although the City of Boerne distinction between remedial and defini-




226. See id. (discussing "remedial and preventive" nature of Congress's enforcement power,
which is constitutional, and legislation "generally upon" life, liberty, and property, which is
unconstitutional).
227. Id. at2166-71.
228. Id at 2169.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2167.
231. Id. at2169.
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statutes abrogating immunity for copyright, patent, and trademark infringe-
ments is straightforward. Unlike RFRA, the abrogating statutes do not define
rights. These statutes merely provide effective remedies for violations of the
intellectual property statutes by removing a barrier that may otherwise stand
in the way of relief. Like the abrogation of state immunity from federal sex
discrimination suits upheld by the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,"2
Congress's abrogation in the intellectual property contexthas merelyprovided
remedies against the states for pre-existing wrongs of constitutional dimension.
Seminole Tribe, of course, requires that the wrong remedied by Congress
be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have provided the main
reason why the abrogating legislation is designed to remedy a Fourteenth
Amendment wrong: Virtually all state infringements of patents, copyrights,
and trademarks without payment of just compensation are violations of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 The Fifth Amendment was the
first section of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 In other words, to the extent that Congress provides a remedy
for an uncompensated taking of property by a state, it addresses a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a response that is presumptively authorized by
section 5 and City of Boerne. We have shown in Part I that the interests
delineated by the intellectual property statutes are constitutionally protected
property."5 Insofar as the question of the availability of suit under the copy-
right, patent, and trademark statutes is whether Congressional power is exer-
cised under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are confident that the
abrogating legislation passes muster.
As we discussed in Part I, acts of infringement by a state government are
best analogized to partial confiscations of property. Confiscation by the state
is a per se taking of property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The abrogating legislation is only directed at acts of infringement committed
232. 427 U.S. 445,447-48 (1976) (upholding application ofTitle VII employment discrim-
ination remedies against states).
233. See supra Part I.
234. See supra note 15.
235. See supra Part I. The congruence between violations of the intellectual property
statutes and violations of property rights may not be complete. On the facts of a given case, a
particular infringement may not rise to the level of an unconstitutional interference with
property rights. See, e.g., College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that abrogation of state immunity in some
types of false advertising suits does not remedy constitutional deprivation of property, and
therefore is not valid), petition for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-
149). Such a case would present the question of whether allowing the suit to proceed would
nevertheless serve the goal of effectively remedying constitutional violations. As City of
Boerne's distinction between RFRA and voting rights legislation indicates, the answer may turn
on the facts of particular cases.
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by states. It does not render states generally liable if they pass statutes and
regulations that may negatively affect the value of intellectual property. Such
regulations would seldom constitute a taking. In other words, the fit between
the remedy (abrogation) and the constitutional wrong (taking by infringement)
is close enough to satisfy the City of Boerne test.
Two further aspects of the section 5 issue need to be addressed. The
abrogating statutes permit injunctive relief against state governments, as well
as extra-compensatory damages. Neither of these forms of relief may be
obtained as a matter of constitutional right in a suit for a "taking" of property.
Assuming that Congress may grant federal courts jurisdiction over claims that
state governments have unlawfully intruded on interests in intellectual prop-
erty, does it follow that Congress may authorize, consistent with the limits on
its section 5 power, remedies that are not available in the state courts?
We believe the provisions for injunctions and extra-compensatory dam-
ages are well within Congress's section 5 authority. City of Boerne distin-
guishes between legislation that defines the scope of constitutional protection
and legislation that provides remedies for violations of rights recognized by
the courts. The abrogating statutes do not define constitutionally protected
"property," but only provide remedies deemed by Congress to be necessary to
the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights. In fact, the remedies
for injunctive relief available under federal intellectual property laws may not
typically go beyond the remedies available to the victims of violations of the
Takings Clause. Case law seems to provide for a grant of injunctive relief to
the victim whose property is taken by a state official in the course of her
duties who is not authorized under state law to condemn the property. 6 In
other words, when the official confiscating the property is a professor or
bureaucrat, injunctive relief is probably already available. We assume, of
course, that the proper state authority could later ratify the rogue official's
action and offer to pay just compensation for any future use of the property.
Nothing in the abrogating legislation of the intellectual property law should
be interpreted as ultimately preventing a state from properly exercising its
constitutional power to take property for public use."
236. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 698-99 & n.21
(1949). The court stated that
specific relief in connection with property held or injured by officers of the sover-
eign acting in the name of the sovereign has been granted only where there was a
claim that the taking of property or the injury to it was not the action of the sover-
eign because unconstitutional or beyond the officers statutory powers ....
Id.; cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) ("Equitable relief is not
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for public use, duly authorized by law,
when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign for the taking.") (emphasis
added).
237. We doubt, however, that a state could entirely condemn a copyright, patent, or
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The Court in City of Boerne stressed that the courts have, ever since
Marbury v. Madison, 8 had the final say in determining the content of consti-
tutional rights. 9 An equally time-honored tradition is Congress's role in
authorizing remedies for constitutional violations. Although the courts should
participate in this effort as well, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
primary responsibility for making constitutional remedies belongs to Con-
gress.240 We know of no case in which the Court has invalidated a Congres-
sional remedy for constitutional violations on the ground that Congress
accorded greater protection than the Constitution requires.
Finally, an objection might be raised that the abrogating statutes autho-
rize a suit against the state before a constitutional violation has occurred
because a violation of the Takings Clause is typically not complete until the
state refuses to pay compensation. In other words, the statute might be seen
as sanctioning primarily constitutional conduct, in violation of the principle
stated in City of Boerne, insofar as it does not require plaintiffs to exhaust
their state remedies first. In response, we note, as we did above, that the vast
majority of the infringements we describe are perpetrated by state officials
who lack statutory authority to exercise their state's power of eminent domain.
In those situations, case law indicates that the cause of action for relief arises
immediately.24' In other words, we believe the "fit" required by City of
Boerne is still quite-tight if we are right that the typical infringement resem-
bles an inverse condemnation of property by an official without eminent
domain authority, as opposed to a proper exercise of the state's constitutional
right to offer reasonable compensation for the public use of a private citizen's
property.
D. Two Post-Seminole Tribe Decisions
The only two courts to have considered the constitutionality of legislation
abrogating state sovereign immunity in cases involving federal intellectual
property have come to opposite conclusions.
trademark, take title to it, and then attempt to exclude others from using it.
238. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
239. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
240. See generally Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367 (1983). See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 877.
241. See First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 316
(1987); supra text accompanying notes 134-36. Of course, the case may not yet be ripe for
adjudication in federal court. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172; 186 (1985) (stating that due process claim based on illegal taking theory
not ripe until inverse condemnation action brought by victim against state). The abrogation
statute can be seen as bypassing any ripeness objection, something Congress can do as long as
the state remedy exhaustion requirement is not of constitutional dimension. For a discussion
of why it is not, see infra text accompanying notes 373-78.
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In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,242 the Federal Circuit found that "[i]n subjecting the states to
suit in federal court for patent infringement, Congress sought to prevent states
from depriving patent owners of their property without due process through
infringing acts."243 After discussing Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne, it
concluded that abrogation "comport [ed] with the text and judicial interpreta-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment."'2 Although its treatment of the jurisdic-
tional precedent is convincing, the court did little to prove its conclusion that
the state's action constituted a taking of property apart from citing older case
law that characterizes a patent as "property." In other words, it did not engage
in any detailed analysis of whether an infringement constitutes an unconstitu-
tional taking of that property, which, as we have seen, is the more difficult
question.
In Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,245 the Fifth Circuit took a different
approach and held in a confusing opinion that a claim for copyright infringe-
ment could not constitutionally be brought against a state after Seminole
Tribe. The opinion does not seem to deny that a copyright is "property,"
citing Ruckelshaus and finding that "[b]y analogy, copyrights constitute
intangible property that, for some purposes at least, receives constitutional
protection."246 The court did not, however, proceed to decide the question of
whether the state's conduct effects a confiscatory or regulatory taking.
Instead, it noted that in addition to allegedly infringing the plaintiff s copy-
right, the state also breached its contract with the plaintiff, suggesting errone-
ously that the existence of a breach of contract claim somehow bars the
bringing of the copyright claim.247 Because a breach of contract does not
constitute a violation of due process, according to the court, no constitutional
violation existed and the abrogating statute must be seen as expanding the
substantive rights of copyright owners rather than merely providing a remedy
for a pre-existing constitutional violation. This doomed the statute under the
"logic of City of Boerne," according to the court.248
242. 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
243. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d
1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998),petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1998)
(No. 98-531).
244. Id
245. 139 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 1998).
246. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-2881, 1998 WL 685623, at *5 (5th Cir. Oct. 1,
1998).
247. Id. This claim is especially bizarre given that the state law claim may well be
preempted by federal copyright law. See National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v Computer Assoc.
Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426,428 (8th Cir. 1993).
248. Chavez, 1998 WL 685623, at *5.
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The Chavez court's claim that the occasional existence of a breach of
contract claim against a state dooms the abrogation legislation was not persua-
sive. The existence of a parallel state remedy does not mean that the constitu-
tional violation is somehow nullified. 49 Take for example the Supreme
Court's holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, reaffirmed in Seminole Tribe, that
Congress properly abrogated state sovereign immunity in Title VII sex dis-
crimination cases brought against the states.20 In many cases of sex discrimi-
nation in employment, the state has not only violated the employee's right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the plaintiff's
private contractual rights (for example, the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing) and local antidiscrimination regulations. The existence of
potential state remedies does not render the abrogation legislation blessed in
Fitzpatrick somehow suspect. To the extent that the facts underlying many,
if not most, constitutional violations provide a basis for bringing a state law
cause of action, the Fifth Circuit's position means that Congress can seldom,
if ever, abrogate state sovereign immunity after Seminole Tribe and City of
Boerne. Although some states' rights advocates may prefer such an outcome,
it runs directly contrary to the express holding of Fitzpatrick and Seminole
Tribe itself.
One final argument raised by the Fifth Circuit merits consideration. The
court worried that upholding the plaintiff's claim would allow Congress to
make an end run around Seminole Tribe by declaring something to be "prop-
erty" under its Article I powers and then declaring it protected against state
encroachment under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It asserts that
"Congress could easily legislate 'property' interests and then attempt to sub-
ject states to suit in federal court for the violation of such interests.""1 This
argument, if persuasive, would reduce the significance of Ruckelshaus, given
that the property right protected in that case was created by a state and not by
Congress.
The most powerful response we can offer is that under City of Boerne,
Congress does not have the power to define what constitutes a violation of an
individual's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court made clear that Con-
gress does not have the power to declare something a constitutional violation
and willy-nilly provide a remedy. It is up to the courts to decide whether a
state law or an act of Congress establishes a right that may be characterized
as property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and whether that
right has been unconstitutionally burdened. The Court has frequently denied
249. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1913) (explaining
that existence of constitutional violation does not turn on whether state remedies are available).
250. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
251. Id.at5ll.
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plaintiffs' claims that a law establishes a right that is constitutionally pro-
tected. The fact that sometimes Congress has the power to create something
that looks like property (for example, a copyright or a patent) does not mean
that it has plenary power to declare all interferences with property rights to be
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Does the Subjective Intent of Congress Matter?
The Curious Case of Bankruptcy
Although College Savings Bank and Chavez are the only cases to
squarely address the question of the propriety of Congress's abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent, copyright, and trademark cases,
several federal appellate courts have examined a similar amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act. 2 Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that Con-
gress's abrogation of state Eleventh Amendment immunity in bankruptcy
cases was ineffective. 3 These cases are relevant because, as Justice Stevens
recognized in his dissent in Seminole Tribe, 4 abrogation in the intellectual
property and bankruptcy contexts probably raises similar issues.
At first glance, the bankruptcy decisions in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
may seem odd. After all, much of bankruptcy law is concerned with protect-
ing the property interests of creditors. In situations in which a state has
unconstitutionally taken property from a creditor without paying just compen-
sation or has deprived a creditor of its property without due process of law,
Congress should have the power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to enact legislation to protect the creditor. Imagine a situation in which
a creditor properly perfects a security interest in the debtor's farm equipment
in StateA, butjust before the debtor declares bankruptcy, StateA's tax bureau
seizes the farm equipment pursuant to a subsequently filed tax lien. Under
both state and federal law, the creditor has the superior interest in the prop-
erty. 5 In other words, the state's seizure of the property is wrongful and is
252. See I I U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994) ("Notwithstanding an assertion ofsovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section
with respect to the following [sections]."); id. § 106(a)(3) ("The court may issue against a
governmental unit an order, process, or judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not
including an award of punitive damages.").
253. See generally In re Estate ofFemandez, 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Creative
Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517
(1998).
254. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.2 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that majority decision "suggests that persons harmed by state violations of federal
copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws have no remedy").
255. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (stating that security interest takes priority over
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properly characterized as a deprivation of property without due process of
law. 2 6 Under City ofBoerne,.Congress would have the power under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such a creditor with an appropriate
remedy in federal court.
Neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Circuits considered the possibility that
the abrogation of immunity in § 106 of the Bankruptcy Act remedies unconsti-
tutional deprivations of property. Rather, in a bizarre analytical turn, both
courts focused on Congress's subjective intent in passing § 106. Although the
Bankruptcy Reform Act was passed in 1994, in the era before Seminole Tribe
when Congress naturally presumed it could rely on the Commerce Clause or
the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity, 7 the Fourth
Circuit in In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.," seemed
surprised that "there is no evidence to indicate that in enacting the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Congress acted under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. " 9 It found that Congress acted under its Article I powers and
rejected the plaintiff's "reliance on [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a post hoc justification for Congress's attempted abrogation in 11 U.S.C.
§ 106.16 The court refused to "presume that Congress intended to enact a
law under a general Fourteenth Amendment power to remedy an unspecified
violation of rights when a specific, substantive Article I power clearly enabled
the law."z6 1 We note here that Congress referenced section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the legislative history behind the statute abrogating state
sovereign immunity in patent and trademark cases, but not in copyright
cases.
262
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit did not consider the extent to which § 106
might remedy unconstitutional deprivations of property by the states. The
person who becomes lien creditor after interest is perfected). A state, of course, could change
this priority rule. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (stating that trustee may avoid transfers made on
account of antecedent debt owed by debtor during ninety-day period before bankruptcy is filed).
256. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,44 (1960) (finding that materialman's
lien was protected by Takings Clause); cf North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601,606-07 (1975) (finding unconstitutional state law that allowed certain sorts of process-less
seizures).
257. See Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (finding that Congress can
abrogate state sovereign immunity under Commerce Clause), overruled by Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
258. 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
259. In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1146 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Cross, supra note 7, at 544-55 & n.199.
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decision in In re Estate of Fernandez63 is driven by the conclusion that
"[t]here is no evidence that the 1994 Act was passed pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment."2" What neither court realized is that the Supreme Court
has "never require[d] a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute." '265 The validity of a statute does not rise or fall on the existence of a
House or Senate committee report that suggests congressional reliance on a
particular section of the Constitution. Every Supreme Court opinion that has
addressed the subject makes it clear that the constitutionality of a statute
does not depend on whether Congress used the magic words "Fourteenth
Amendment" in the legislative history.267 Recent appellate court cases
agree.
268
The inquiry into the constitutionality of legislation is properly focused
on one question: Does the Constitution authorize the legislation at issue?
McCulloch v. Maryland269 provides the enduring paradigm of how the Court
approached the question of whether Congress has the power to enact a particu-
lar piece of legislation. The focus is on the Constitution and whether its
ratifiers intended Congress to have the power to act. We know of no Supreme
Court case that suggests that an otherwise properly authorized act of Congress
is invalid because Congress invoked an inappropriate section of the Constitu-
tion or none at all.
263. 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997).
264. In re Estate of Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241,245 (5th Cir. 1997).
265. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); see Ramirez v.
Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The omission of any ritualistic
incantation of powers by the Congress is not determinative, for there is no requirement that the
statute incorporate buzz words such as 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'section 5."').
266. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("[T]he constitutional-
ity of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes
to exercise.").
267. In fact, the legislative history does indicate that Congress relied on the Patent Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating state Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent
and trademark cases. See S. REP.No. 102-280, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,3093-94;
see also College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 423 n.23 (D.N.L 1996), aff'd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149).
268. See Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431,436(5th Cir. 1998) ("Seminole Tribe 'requires
us to make an objective inquiry, namely whether Congress could have enacted the legislation
at issue... ." (quoting Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997))); Wheeling &
Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen
determining the sources of Congress's authority to legislate, we may look beyond the expressed
constitutional basis in a statute's preamble or legislative history.").
269. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (finding that Congress has implied Article I power to
establish Bank of the United States).
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Nonetheless, the end result reached by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on
the abrogation issue in the bankruptcy context is probably correct. Although
§ 106 provides a federal forum for some unconstitutional deprivations of
property, as in the hypothetical posed above, it casts its net far too broadly,
making states amenable to federal jurisdiction in a wide variety of contexts in
which a state's behavior is constitutional. Under City ofBoerne, Congress can
only legislate pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
remedy a preexisting violation of the rights secured by section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 7 Although the Court will tolerate a remedy that is
slightly overbroad,"' the opinion in City of Boerne requires a "congruence"
between the unconstitutional wrong targeted by Congress and the means
chosen. The Court therefore held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
was unconstitutional because most of the conduct it prohibited was constitu-
tional. 2
Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1994 is similarly defec-
tive. One can imagine numerous scenarios in which § 106 forces states that
have not committed any violations of the Fourteenth Amendment into federal
court. For example, § 106 expressly abrogates state sovereign immunity as to
11 U.S.C. § 362, which provides for an automatic stay against creditors of the
debtor at the moment the debtor files his bankruptcy petition. Case law holds
that sending a letter to the debtor demanding payment constitutes a violation
of the stay.273 Therefore, under § § 106 and 362, a state agency that sends such
a letter to the debtor could theoretically be dragged into federal court, al-
though it is clear that such letter writing is not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Consider a further illustration. In In re Creative Goldsmiths, the trustee
in bankruptcy sought to recover a payment of $43 82 in income taxes paid to
the Maryland Comptroller of Currency during the ninety-day preference
period before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.274 Again, this scenario does not
present unconstitutional behavior on the part of the State of Maryland; all
Maryland did was accept money that it was legally owed. We cannot find a
decision suggesting that a state's failure to return money rightfully owed to it
constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although § 106 may
sometimes afford a remedy for an unconstitutional deprivation of property by
270. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
271. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1997) (noting that ban on
literacy tests by Voting Rights Act prohibited some constitutional uses of tests, but evidence
showed primary use of tests was discriminatory).
272. Id. at2171-72.
273. See In re Nelson, 123 B.R. 993, 1000 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1991).
274. In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998).
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a state, most of the time a state would find itself subject to federal jurisdiction
without having committed a constitutional wrong.
In the final analysis, the fit between means and end in § 106 is unconsti-
tutionally disproportionate under City ofBoerne. We have already suggested
that the congruence between remedy and wrong in the context of the abroga-
tions of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal patent, copyright, trade-
mark law is constitutionally snug. 5 The vast majority of state infringements
of federal intellectual property constitute violations of the Takings Clause.
And that is what matters - not the existence of the proper invocation of
section 5 in the respective legislative histories.
F. Can State Immunity Be Avoided by Suing in State Court?
Suppose we are wrong in concluding that the intellectual property abro-
gating legislation is a valid exercise of section 5 power. Does it follow that
plaintiffs must resort to a state law cause of action for inverse condemnation,
as discussed in Part I, or can plaintiffs avoid the Eleventh Amendment by
bringing suits under the patent, copyright, and trademark statutes in state
court?276 The issue is worthy of attention not only because of its relevance to
the intellectual property context, but also because Congress has purported to
abrogate immunity in a range of contexts, and the section 5 argument we have
advanced may not work in some of them.277 Professor Daniel J. Meltzer
points out that Congress has recently passed numerous statutes that impose
liability for retrospective relief on the states, listing "copyright, trademark, and
patent laws; the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; the Fair Labor
Standards Act; the bankruptcy laws; the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act;
and provisions barring discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age, and
disability.
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We believe the Supreme Court will hold that a state does have an obliga-
tion to open its courts to suits brought by individuals seeking to enforce
federal laws against that state.279 To begin with, there is recent precedent
275. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
276. For the sake of exploring this issue, we put aside 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which provides
for exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent and copyright cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
If an otherwise compelling case could be made in favor of giving effect to the recent abrogating
legislation by allowing state court suits, then an equally compelling argument may be advanced
in favor of reading the abrogating legislation as carving out an implicit exception to exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
277. See College Say. Bankv. FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Educ. ExpenseBd., 131 F.3d
353, 361-62 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that Congress may not abrogate Eleventh Amendment in
false advertising cases when state makes false statement about one of its own products),petition
for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149).
278. Meltzer, supra note 160, at 47-48.
279. Others holding this position include Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justicia-
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favoring access to state courts. The clearest example is found in Hilton v.
South Carolina Public Railways Commission.28 In Hilton, an injured em-
ployee of a state-owned railroad brought suit against South Carolina under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) in federal court.28' While his
damages action was pending, the Court rendered its decision in Welch v.
Texas Department offHighways andPublic Transportation,282 which held that
the Jones Act did not properly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.283 Because the Jones Act, which provides remedies for injured
seamen, and FELA, which provides remedies for injured railway workers,
establish parallel statutory schemes, Hilton logically assumed that the Elev-
enth Amendment doomed his federal court suit, had it voluntarily dismissed,
and refiled his FELA claim in South Carolina state court.284
In its own courts, South Carolina successfully resisted Hilton's refiled
claim, arguing that FELA did not authorize an action for money damages
against an unconsenting state.28 Reversing the South Carolina courts, the
Supreme Court emphatically rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amend-
ment provided South Carolina with immunity from suit in its own courts,
noting "as we have stated on many occasions, 'the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply in state courts."'286 Although the Eleventh Amendment barred Hil-
ton's suit in federal court, Congress retained the power to provide a remedy
in state court for the violation of a federal right. The Court stated that when
"a federal statute does impose liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause
makes that statute the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court." '287
Nor does Hilton stand alone. Nevada v. Hall288 held that when a state is
sued in the courts of another state, the forum court is not constitutionally
compelled to respect the state's assertion of substantive immunity.289 In order
bility of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NoTREDAMEL. REv. 1145, 1171-77 (1984); Vicki
C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1, 38 nn.157-58, 74 n.304, 99 n.394 (1988); Meltzer, supra note 160, at 58; Louis
E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: DamagesAgainst States in Their
Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. RsV. 189, 198 (1981).
280. 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
281. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 199 (1991).
282. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
283. Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476 (1987).
284. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199-200.
285. Id. at 200-01.
286. Id. at 204-05 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1989)).
287. Id. at 207.
288. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
289. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1979).
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to uphold state immunity against a federal cause of action in the state's own
courts, the Court would need either to abandon Hall or else explain why it
should matter whether suit is brought in one state court rather than another.
An advocate of broad immunity" may argue that, by according state
immunity a constitutional pedigree, Seminole Tribe undercuts the authority of
Hilton and Hall. If state immunity is of constitutional dimension, then a mere
statute may be ineffective to annul it. But Seminole Tribe itself never men-
tions Hilton and Hall, much less overrules them. The opinion addresses only
the states' immunity from federal suit, and the Court held only that immunity
from federal suit has constitutional status. Seminole Tribe contains only a
passing reference, buried in a footnote, to state court suits. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had dissented in Hall, observed that "this
Court is empowered to review a question of federal law arising from a state-
court decision where a State has consented to suit."29' The negative implica-
tion of this truism may be that the Court would recognize a state's assertion
of immunity in its own courts from suits to enforce federal laws. On the other
hand, neither Hans v. Louisiana nor Seminole Tribe involved suits brought in
state court, and the dicta hardly squares with cases in which, for example, a
tax refund was required of a recalcitrant state.292
While Seminole Tribe's dictum may unsettle the authority of Hilton and
Hall, we doubt, for a variety of reasons, that the Court is ready to overrule the
earlier cases. In the first place, a strong pragmatic argument can be advanced
in favor of requiring state courts to hear such suits. In the absence of access
to state court for suits brought by individuals against state governments, the
enforcement mechanisms of these laws would be extremely limited. The
United States could bring an enforcement action, of course, as the states'
immunity is unavailable in such a suit.293 So far as individual plaintiffs are
concerned, the primary enforcement mechanism would be suits against
individual government officials in their personal capacities. This approach
would have numerous defects:
The responsible officials may be hard to identify, have left the jurisdiction,
or be judgment-proof. When the scope of substantive duties is uncertain,
personal liability may impair effective government decision making and
unfairly penalize individuals ....
... [I]n today's world of high litigation costs, massively complex
federal requirements, and erratic but sometimes punishing jury verdicts,
290. See generally Vlzquez, supra note 16.
291. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (emphasis added).
292. See generally, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994); McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Bev. and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
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such an approach seems neither very practical, politically feasible, nor
likely to contribute to harmonious federalism.294
In situations in which Congress may constitutionally regulate state activity,
limiting the vehicles for enforcement in this way looks unwieldy, if not
perverse.
The case for access to state court does not rest solely upon practical
considerations. A powerful argument based on constitutional structure also
favors less-than-absolute immunity. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law
trumps state law; therefore, any state law standing in the way of the full
enforcement of the federal mandate should be preempted.295 Although the
Eleventh Amendment carves out ajurisdictional exception to this principle,
imposing a requirement on state courts to hear these suits affirms the substan-
tive supremacy of federal law. Indeed, Congress recognizes the possible dual
nature of state immunity when it makes states substantively liable in one part
of a statute while abrogating their immunity from suit in federal court in
another separate part.296 The point of this distinction between federal legisla-
tive and federal judicial power is that the states are well-equipped to defend
their interests in Congress, whose members are elected from the states and
who are politically accountable to their electorates. 297 By contrast, there are
no similar structural restraints on Article IIIjudges. Accordingly, it is appro-
priate to curb federal judicial power, as the Court did in Seminole Tribe, while
recognizing broad Congressional power to subject states to suit in their own
courts .
2 9 8
This view is grounded in both logic and precedent. We note that in
recent cases the Court has consistently resorted to the Tenth Amendment and
principles of federalism to adjudicate complaints that Congress cannot force
the states to comply with federal law. The Court has not yet used the Eleventh
Amendment as its vehicle for crafting rules of substantive immunity. For
example, after discussing Congress's power to force states to comply with
federal overtime and minimum wage legislation in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,299 the Court held that state and local govern-
294. Meltzer, supra note 160, at 48.
295. Id. at 57.
296. Id.
297. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954).
298. Cf Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation ofPowers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARV.L.REV.
682,712-13 (1976) (arguing, more ambitiously than we do here, for broad Congressional power
to subject states to suit in federal court).
299. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
INTELLECTUAL PROPER7YMISAPPROPRLATION
ments cannot constitutionally avoid compliance with federal law: Congress
can force the states against their will to comply with federal law. °0 This
holding has been recently amplified in New York v. United States,0 1 which
held that Congress can apply laws of general applicability againstthe states. 02
Congress may not single out and "commandeer" a state legislature or its
executive branch, but it may treat a state just like it treats other actors in the
market. Granted, the Court may have assumed that suits against government
officials in their personal capacity were the only vehicle to obtain retrospec-
tive relief, but we have already noted how unsatisfactory such a regime would
be. More importantly, there is no hint in these cases that the states could in
any way avoid enforcement of valid laws against them as official entities.
Another relevant line of cases, culminating in Printz v. United States,3 3
held that Congress can force state courts to hear claims based on the violation
of federal rights. In Printz, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court noted that
Article Il of the Constitution establishes a Supreme Court, but leaves the
creation of lower federal courts to the discretion of Congress.3" The logical
conclusion is that "the Constitution was originally understood to permit
imposition of an obligation on statejudges to enforce federal prescriptions.""3 5
It is beyond doubt that a state normally must stand willing to adjudicate
federal statutory and constitutional claims brought in its courts." 6
Also noteworthy are the cases in which state courts refused to entertain
suits brought to enforce a federal law. The Court has permitted such refusal
for neutral reasons, like the inconvenience of the forum.0 7 Yet the Court has
consistently reversed state court refusals to adjudicate federal claims in cases
in which the state court's reasons amount to an assertion that there is a con-
300. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554-57 (1985).
301. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
302. NewYorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (concluding that Congress may
not force state to make Hobson's choice between building radioactive waste dump or taking
legal title to all low-level radioactive waste within its borders).
303. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (finding that Congress may not force unwilling local sheriffs
to conduct background checks on gun purchasers).
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
305. Printz, 117 S. Ct at2371; see id. at2370 n.1 ("[A] state court must entertain a claim
arising under federal law 'when its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local law is appropri-
ate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws."' (quoting Second Employers'
Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1912))).
306. We do not rely heavily on this line of cases, however, as these cases do not expressly
discuss suits brought against state governments.
307. See generally, e.g., Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S.
377 (1929).
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flict between federal law and state policy. Relying on the Supremacy Clause,
the Court has declared that "the policy of... federal [law] is the prevailing
policy in every state."3 '
We predict that the Court, consistent with all these threads of doctrine,
will hold that when a claimant seeks to enforce a generally applicable federal
law against a state, it may do so in state court. We believe that as long as the
federal law is substantively valid under Garcia and New York, a state court
should have to entertain an action to enforce it. The Court seems to have
established a clear division of labor - the Tenth Amendment governs issues
of substantive immunity and the Eleventh Amendment governs issues of
jurisdictional immunity.
III Suing Officers and Municipalities Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The patent, copyright, and trademark laws all impose liability on any
person who commits an act of infringement or false advertising.3 9 Govern-
ment officials and local governments who commit violations of the federal
copyright, patent, and trademark statutes may be sued like anyone else,
although the official immunity doctrine discussed below"'0 sometimes shields
officials from liability for damages in circumstances in which other defen-
dants would be obliged to pay.
Intellectual property rights created by state law, such as trade secrets and
publicity rights, fall outside the terms of the copyright, patent, and trademark
laws. There is, however, another avenue by which these interests, as well as
violations of copyright, patent, and trademark rights, may be redressed. We
have in mind situations in which the interference is serious enough to amount
to a "deprivation" of the property in violation of the substantive component
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' For example, an
official who negligently divulges a trade secret could not be held liable
because a greater degree of culpability is required to make out a substantive
308. Testav. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,393 (1947). See generally Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356
(1990); Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
309. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) (stating that any person who commits trademark
infringement or false advertising shall be liable); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (stating that"[a]nyone
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner" shall be liable); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (Supp. 11 1996) (stating that "whoever without authority makes... any patented
invention" shall be liable).
310. See infra text accompanying notes 311-13.
311. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (distinguishing between proce-
dural and substantive due process). If the claim is that the government may procure the
property, but has not followed proper procedures, then the case may be conceived either as a
taking or as a violation of procedural due process, and the plaintiff may well be required to
bring an inverse condemnation suit in state court.
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due process violation." 2 On the other hand, cases from the land use context
suggest that when an official deliberately appropriates intellectual property,
knowing he is violating the owner's rights, a substantive due process theory
should be successful.
313
Assuming the elements of substantive due process can be proven, the
victim may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes damages or injunc-
tive relief against "every person who, under color of [state law]," violates
someone's constitutional rights.314 The advantage of bringing a § 1983 suit,
even in fact patterns that may also be framed as patent, copyright, and trade-
mark cases, 315 is that a successful plaintiff in such a suit is ordinarily entitled
to attorney's fees. 6 Such suits are almost never available against federal
officers, as they do not usually act under color of state law.
A. Lawsuits Against Officials
For purposes of § 1983, "every person" includes both government offi-
cials and local governments, but not the state itself.317 As we shall see, the
requirements for success differ depending on whether the (real) defendant is
an officer or a government. Below are some important issues that arise in
312. See generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986).
313. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1549
(1 th Cir.), vacateden banc, 42 F.3d 626 (1 th Cir. 1994) ("Deprivation of a property interest
rises to the level of a substantive due process violation if done for improper motives and
achieved through means that are arbitrary and capricious, and lacking any rational basis.");
Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City ofPhila., 5 F.3d 685,692 (3d Cir. 1993) ("A violation of substan-
tive due process rights is proven: (1) if the government's actions were not rationally related to
a legitimate government interest; or (2) if the government's actions in a particular case were in
fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive.").
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
315. The plaintiff may choose to pursue both remedies in the same complaint, of course.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994). See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTIoN 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 570-72 (2d ed. 1994). On the other
hand, there are no trebled or "statutory" damages, as in the patent and copyright statutes. The
plaintiff must prove harm in order to receive compensatory damages. See generally Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
Punitive damages are available only for egregious misconduct by an official, Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30 (1983), and are not available against local governments, City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). See Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional
Torts, 56 LA. L. REv. 841, 864-72 (1996) (arguing that punitive damages should be more
readily available in § 1983 cases as means of deterring official misconduct).
317. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979) (noting lack of clear statement
abrogating state immunity in § 1983). For similar reasons, the Court later held that one may not
sue the state under § 1983 in state court either. See generally Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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suits against officers, and that may be of particular importance in suits involv-
ing intellectual property.
1. "Official" Capacity and "Individual" Capacity Lawsuits
Although state and local governments are treated differently for purposes
of sovereign immunity law, state and local government officials are all subject
to the same rules, with one exception - when they are sued under § 1983. The
exception comes up when the plaintiff sues an officer in her "official" capac-
ity. In that event, the officer is treated, for most purposes, like the government
for whom she works.3" 8 An employee of the state government and its instru-
mentalities sued in her official capacity would be entitled to assert the state's
sovereign immunity against a suit for damages, just as though the state had
been named as the defendant. An employee of local government, sued in her
official capacity, would have no sovereign immunity shield, simply because
local governments have none. Notice, however, a confusing wrinkle in the
law: When a state official is sued in her official capacity, it remains possible
to obtain prospective relief against the official, even though such a suit would
fail on Eleventh Amendment grounds in the event that the state were the
named defendant." 9 In fact, the customary practice is to sue the official in her
official capacity, so that the injunction may continue in force when the holder
of the office is replaced.32°
When the plaintiff wishes to recover retrospective relief from an officer
of state or local government, he should sue the officer in her individual
capacity. This is so even though the suit charges that the officer committed
a constitutional violation in the course of her official duties. The distinction
between "official" and "individual" capacity suits has nothing to do with the
public or private nature of the activity.321 It relates only to the real party in
interest: A suit against an officer in her "official" capacity is a suit against the
governmental employer, subject to the rules that would apply in a suit naming
the governmental employer (except for the prospective relief wrinkle noted
above). It is up to the plaintiff to decide how to characterize the claim. For
that matter, the plaintiff may choose to sue officers in both their "individual"
and "official" capacities.
318. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("[A] plaintiff seeking to re-
cover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity
itself.").
319. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 ("[O]fficial-capacity actions for prospective relief
are not treated as actions against the State." (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14)).
320. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1125 & nn. 1-2.
321. See generallyHaferv. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYMISAPPROPRiATION
2. "Under Color Of" State Law
Officers may be sued only for constitutional violations committed "under
color of" state law. "Under color of" does not mean "authorized" by state
law."2 It simply means that the officer acted under pretense of state law,
using her state authority in some way, even if the action is illegal. The inquiry
is highly fact-specific. A professor at a state school who infringes protected
materials in her courses would act under color of state law even if state law
forbids the practice. A professor who buys a book at the local bookstore and
makes infringing copies for a private project unrelated to her job very likely
does not act under color of state law, although the result may be different if
she obtained the book from the school library in the course of her official
duties.
3. Injunctive Relief
Despite the Eleventh Amendment, the Court held in Exparte Young that
the victim of a continuing constitutional or federal statutory violation can
obtain an injunction directed at the official responsible'for the violation.3"
For example, ifa university biochemistry department were routinely violating
a patent owner's federal rights, an injunction against the responsible infring-
ing employees constitutionally could be issued. If the Court were to hold,
contrary to our analysis, that Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is unconstitutional, Ex parte Young stands as at least a partial
remedy for frustrated owners of federal intellectual property.
4. Official Immunity
When government officers perform legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial
functions, they are absolutely immune from paying damages. Legislators
alone are immune from prospective relief. We suspect these absolute immuni-
ties will have little practical importance for the protection of intellectual
property rights, as most interferences with intellectual property will arise from
the officers' exercise of executive functions of government. Everyone from
policemen to the heads of government departments to the mayor and the
governor acts in an executive capacity. These officers are always subject to
suit for prospective relief but receive a "qualified" immunity from suits for
damages. They "generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
322. Monroev. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961), overruled on other grounds byMonell
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
323. See generally Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (involving injunction against
state attorney general to prevent enforcement of unconstitutional rate-setting scheme).
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rights of which a reasonable person would have known."324 Notice that this
qualified immunity would be available in a suit under the Copyright Act as
well as in a § 1983 suit charging a constitutional violation of property rights.
One can imagine a wide variety of circumstances in which a government
employee might find qualified immunity to be a powerful shield. For exam-
ple, a very persuasive fair use3" argument can be offered on behalf of teachers
who photocopy otherwise protected materials for distribution to their students
in the form of"coursepacks. '326 Although one appellate court has found a for-
profit copyshop liable for photocopying infringing coursepacks," 7 no court
has ever found a teacher liable in a coursepack case. A teacher with a knowl-
edge of the Copyright Act and the relevant case law could reasonably con-
clude that distributing a photocopied coursepack is not a violation of federal
copyright law. Therefore, the teacher could successfully assert qualified
immunity from an infringement suit brought by the copyright owner.328
We note that the pocketbook of a state employee who is found liable is
typically protected by some sort of insurance plan or indemnification scheme.
An employee's source of indemnification for an illegal act, whether through
insurance or a contractual right to be reimbursed by the state itself, does not,
however, cause the state's immunity to rub off on the employee because such
private arrangements do not confer upon a successful plaintiff the right to
enforce the judgment against the state.329
B. Lawsuits Against Local Governments
Municipalities (and municipal officials sued, confusingly, in their "offi-
cial capacities") cannot assert either the state's sovereign immunity3 30 or
324. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
325. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (stating that fair use of copyright is not infringement).
326. See id. (stating that fair use includes making of"multiple copies for classroom use");
see also Amy E. Groves, Recent Development, Princeton University Press v. Michigan Docu-
ment Services, Inc.: The Sixth Circuit Frustrates the ConstitutionalPurposes of Copyright and
Fair Use Doctrine, 31 GA. L. REV. 325,328 (1996) (arguing that commercial copyshop should
have been afforded fair use defense in preparing professors' coursepacks).
327. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383
(6th Cir. 1996).
328. But see Better Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 904 F. Supp. 540, 553 (S.D. W. Va.
1995) (finding that state attorney general was not entitled to qualified immunity when unlawful-
ness of his incorporation of state agency with name similar to plaintiffs "should have been
apparent to him" in light of existing law), afPd sub nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 689 (1998).
329. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.5.2, at 394-95 & n.22 (2d ed.
1994) (discussing lawsuits against state officers and indemnification).
330. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890); see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 133, at 1056-57.
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official immunity.33 In order to recover, the plaintiff must, however, meet
another requirement. According to the Supreme Court's ruling in Monell v.
Department of Social Services,332 a municipality is not liable under § 1983
unless the constitutional injury is inflicted during the "execution of a govern-
ment's policy or custom." '333 Governments always act through their officers.
The point of the requirement is that local governments are not liable on a
respondeat superior basis for anything their officers do in the course of their
official duties. Local governments are responsible only for those acts that fall
within the category of "policy or custom." '334
The cases on "policy or custom" can be divided into four fact patterns.
First, a city or county335 will be liable for implementing rules of general
application enacted by the city council or an agency. The city would almost
surely be liable, for example, if the board of education made a decision that
teachers should photo copy textbooks and sell them to students, rather than buy
the books. Second, the city may be liable for a "custom" involving high
officials who are aware of a widespread practice and do nothing to stop it,
although there is no written policy requiring or approving the practice.336
Such a situation may arise if, to alter our hypothetical, infringing copyrights
is common practice in the local schools, the superintendent and the school
board know about it, and no one takes effective steps to stop it. Third, a
government may be liable for unconstitutional acts committed by its employ-
ees if the injuries are caused by "inadequate training," '3 or, perhaps, "inade-
quate hiring" by recklessly hiring a dangerous employee.338 Although the
typical cases arise in the context of physical injuries inflicted by police
officers and jailers, it may be possible to construct a lawsuit against a city for
failure to train its employees how to deal appropriately with intellectual
property as well.
331. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1980).
332. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
333. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ("[I]t is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.").
334. Id.
335. For purposes of the rule discussed in this section, cities and counties are equivalent.
336. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 329, § 8.5.2, at 453-54 (discussing establishment of
municipal liability through demonstrating existence of "custom").
337. See generally, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
338. The Court found that the evidence failed to justify the application of such a theory,
but did not wholly reject the theory itself, in the recent case Board of the County Comm'rs v.
Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388-94 (1997).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 849 (1998)
A fourth principle is less well-defined. Supreme Court cases hold that a
city may be liable in the absence of a widespread policy or custom if the
official who acts is the city's "policymaker" in a given domain.339 If so, then
his action in that domain will be attributed to the city. In Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati,340 for example, the local prosecutor told deputies to enter a room
without a warrant.34' The Court held that the prosecutor was the county's
policymaker as to police searches, so that the county could be liable for his
action.342 For the sake of illustrating the limits of this principle, it is instructive
to compare Pembaur with City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,343 in which the
plaintiffwas fired by a mid-level city bureaucrat, allegedly for constitutionally
impermissible reasons.3" Because the firing was subject to review at a higher
level, and there was no indication of unconstitutional motives on the part of the
reviewers, the Court held that the former employee could not sue the city.345
The Court's most recent foray into this area is a 1997 case, McMillian v.
Monroe County,346 in which it stressed the role of state law in determining
who is a "policymaker" for the purpose of the "single act" principle. 7
Although state law could not answer the question, the Court stated that the
"inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law," in the sense thatthe Court's
"understanding of the actual function of a governmental official ... will
necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official's functions under
relevant state law."34 The application of the "single act by a policymaker"
principle to intellectual property cases, then, is likely to vary depending on the
actor, and may vary from one state to another depending on state law. Perhaps
the "policy or custom" test of Monell would be satisfied if a powerful mayor
or city manager ordered all municipal secretaries to make unauthorized copies
of a new word processing program.
1V. Conflicts Between Federal and State Jurisdiction
Remedies for governmental intrusions on intellectual property are avail-
able under federal statutory and constitutional law, as well as under state
339. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
340. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
341. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1986).
342. Id. at 485.
343. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
344. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 116 (1988).
345. Id. at 127.
346. 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
347. McMillian v. Monroe County, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 1736 (1997) (holding that under
Alabama law, county sheriff is state, not county, policymaker).
348. Id. at 1737.
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condemnation law. Either the government or the property holder may be the
plaintiff. Suit may be brought in either federal or state court. This complex
remedial landscape gives rise to problems ofjurisdictional coordination: May
the property owner sue in federal court under § 1983 or under the intellectual
property statutes even ifa state remedy for inverse condemnation is available?
The answer to the forum issue may vary depending on whether the
federal suit is brought under § 1983 or the intellectual property statutes. In
any case, keep in mind that this is not merely a dry procedural issue. The
remedies may differ depending on the forum, and the differences between
federal and state judges may even produce systematically different outcomes
on the merits of close cases. Accordingly, an overarching policy issue here
should be noted: In addition to the specific considerations identified in the
ensuing paragraphs, one's view of the choice between federal and state courts
will be influenced, in part, on ajudgment as to whether the property owner or
the defendant government or officer ought to get the benefit of any litigating
edge that comes with having the case adjudicated in a forum that will likely
be sympathetic to his interests.
A. Section 1983 Litigation
It is useful to distinguish between § 1983 suits against governments and
those brought against individual officers. We begin with suits against govern-
ments. Recall that these suits are possible only when the challenged action
meets the "policy or custom" test of Monell."9
1. Lawsuits Against Governments
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,35 Hamilton Bank charged that the Planning Commission had taken its
property by unconstitutionally interfering with its efforts to develop land and
sued the Planning Commission in federal court under § 1983 to recover the
value of the land.35' The Court rejected the bank's Just Compensation Clause
theory of recovery for lack of ripeness, citing two reasons. First, a regulatory
taking claim "is not ripe until the government entity charged with implement-
ing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of
the regulations to the property at issue."35 Here, the plaintiff had not sought
variances that would have allowed it to develop the property according to its
349. See supra text accompanying note 333.
350. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
351. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 182
(1985).
352. Id. at 186.
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proposed plat."'3 Second, "a property owner has not suffered a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for
obtaining such compensation." '354 The bank went wrong by attempting to sue
in federal court under § 1983 rather than bringing an inverse condemnation
action under state law in state court. 55
The Court went on to consider the viability of the case when conceived
as a claim that the Planning Commission had deprived the bank of its property
without due process of law. This theory, too, was "premature." '356 Viewed in
this way, the case would depend on whether the regulation was "so onerous
that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property."357 That inquiry
would turn largely "upon an analysis of the effect the Commission's applica-
tion of the zoning ordinance.., had on the value of [the bank's] property and
investment-backed profit expectations."358 As with the takings claim, that
effect could not be measured until the bank applied for variances.359
Does Williamson County require persons claiming violations of intellec-
tual property rights to bring inverse condemnation actions in state court before
seeking federal relief under § 1983? If the plaintiff frames the § 1983 case as
a violation of the Takings Clause, the second prong of the Court's response
to the Williamson County plaintiff's takings theory seems equally applicable
here. Evidently, any takings claim is premature until the state has failed to
adequately compensate,360 and one must always pursue the state court inverse
condemnation action as a means of obtaining compensation.
Suppose the plaintiff frames the case as a deprivation of property without
due process of law.36' Williamson County may not require deference to state
353. Id. at 188.
354. Id. at 195.
355. Id. at 195-96.
356. Id. at 199.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 200.
359. Id.
360. Cf Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) ("[T]aking claims against the Federal
Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided
by the Tucker Act." (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985))).
361. The difference between the two claims is not just procedural. In the "regulatory"
context, the plaintiff is hard-pressed to win a "takings" claim because he must show that he has
lost all beneficial use of the property. See supra text accompanying note 98; see also First
English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 329 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In principle, a due process claim should be successful if the plaintiff can show a
deprivation of some of his bundle of property rights, even if he is left with some use of the
property.
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inverse condemnation law in such a case. 62 The Court found this claim to be
premature solely because of the bank's failure to apply for variances, a
rationale that is applicable only to regulatory takings like the one at issue.
The rationale is out of place in the context of most violations of intellectual
property rights, which are more like possessory takings.363 Note that the Court
refused to put the due process claim in the same hopper with the takings
claim. In contrast to its treatment of the takings claim, it did not go on to
require the plaintiff to resort to state courts as a prerequisite to asserting the
due process claim in federal court.
This is hardly the sole plausible reading of how Williamson County
applies to intellectual property cases. The materials are at hand to support an
argument that the intellectual property plaintiff must proceed in state court,
even if he frames his federal case as a violation of due process. In ruling that
the takings issue was not ripe, the Court actually relied on two due process
cases, Parratt v. Taylor" and Hudson v. Palmer.365 In Hudson, the Court
held that in the event of a "random and unauthorized" deprivation of property
by an officer, the violation of the Due Process Clause is not complete "unless
or until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the
property loss." '366 If this rationale prevails in the event of "random and unau-
thorized" deprivations for which relief is sought under a due process theory,
and if it prevails in the event of a deliberate deprivation for which relief is
sought under a takings theory, then it may well prevail in the event of a
deliberate deprivation for which relief is sought under a due process theory.367
In Zinermon v. Burch,36 the Supreme Court limited the Parratt principle
to the context ofprocedural due process. 69 That is, the rule that the constitu-
In the possessory takings context, however, the difference between the two theories seems
more a matter of forum and remedy than the overt content of the right.
362. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1547
(1 1th Cir. 1994) ("A property owner's [due process] rights are violated the moment a govern-
mental body acts in an arbitrary manner and applies that arbitrary action to the owner's
property."), vacated en bane, 42 F.3d 626 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 105-11.
364. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
365. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
366. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984).
367. Some lower courts hold that, in the regulatory context, the due process claim
collapses into the takings claim, which, in turn, is covered by the Williamson County takings
rule. A recent example is Villas ofLake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610 (1 th Cir.
1997). It is not clear why the court limited its ruling to the regulatory context. See id. at 613.
The reason may be that it thought possessory takings present a more serious threat to property
rights. See id. at614.
368. 494U.S. 113 (1990).
369. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-30 (1990).
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tional violation is not complete applies only when the plaintiff concedes that
the government may deprive him of liberty or property, but objects to the lack
of procedural protections accompanying the deprivation. By contrast, the
obligation to pursue state remedies does not apply when the plaintiff brings
or raises a "substantive" due process objection to the government's action,
claiming that, regardless of the procedure followed, the government may not
inflict the injury of which he complains. 7 But confining Parratt in this way
presents no serious obstacle to the extension of the Williamson County rule,
because governments are always allowed to take property for public use, so
long as they pay just compensation. Framing a taking as a due process viola-
tion cannot conceal the nature of what the government actually has done, and
what it has the power to do. There may be "substantive" due process limits
on what the government can do,37' but they do not include curbs on taking
property for public use.
Nor does the application of the Parratt and Hudson doctrine to "random
and unauthorized" acts serve to foreclose a rule requiring resort to state courts.
The Court in Williamson County relied on Parratt and Hudson for the propo-
sition that certain circumstances may warrant a requirement ofpostdeprivation
resort to state procedures. One such circumstance is the "random and unau-
thorized" nature of the deprivation, for then "it would be impossible or im-
practicable to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation."372
Another circumstance, the Court reasoned, is the nature of the right granted
by the Takings Clause, which is merely just compensation before or after the
taking.373 Again, framing the claim as procedural due process does not change
the nature of the right at stake. The reality that the state is entitled to procure
the property and pay for it afterward may well be a sufficient justification for
obliging the plaintiff to pursue the inverse condemnation claim, whether the
plaintiff has styled the federal case as a taking or as a violation of due process.
2. Lawsuits Against Officers
Now consider cases in which an officer deprives someone of intellectual
property rights in circumstances that would not support a "policy or custom"
370. See id. at 125. For further discussion of the difference between procedural and
substantive due process, see Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and
the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201, 215-21 (1984).
371. For arguments thatthere are such substantive due process limits, see generally Michael
Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 617 (1997); David H. Armistead, Note, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public
Officials'Power to Terminate State-Created Property Interests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769 (1995).
372. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195
(1985).
373. Id. at 195-96.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYMISAPPROPRIATION
suit against the local government. 74 In that event, the Takings Clause seems
to be inapplicable. The clause not only recognizes an individual's right to just
compensation, it also authorizes the government to assume control of private
property. The premise of the Takings Clause is that the sovereign may,
deliberately or otherwise, take private property for public use.375 That power
is not granted to officers acting under pretense of state authority but without
genuine authorization from the government. When an officer injures property
rights without the backing of his governmental employer, he may be sued for
a violation of rights "under color of" state law,376 yet the special rules that
arguably channel takings and due process suits against local governments into
state court would not apply.
B. Lawsuits Under the Intellectual Property Statutes
The foregoing analysis of the availability of § 1983 suits may apply
equally here. For that matter, the Supreme Court may broaden the Williamson
County holding into a rule that all possessory takings claims, including
intellectual property claims, must be pursued in state court inverse condemna-
tion suits before the property owner brings a § 1983 action. Still, some
considerations are distinctive to the context of litigation under the intellectual
property statutes. Whatever may be true of § 1983 litigation, there are argu-
ments in favor of allowing suits under the intellectual property statutes to go
forward in federal court.
First, § 133 8's exclusive federal jurisdiction over -patent and copyright
manifests a strong congressional preference for federal court adjudication of
these intellectual property claims. More importantly, the abrogating legisla-
tion, which broadly protects intellectual property rights against state inva-
sions, unambiguously demonstrates that Congress wanted plaintiffs to have
access to federal court in such cases.3" Assume that courts appropriately
apply the ripeness rule of Williamson County to § 1983 cases for deprivations
374. The discussion here is not limited to officers of local governments. An officer who
works for an "arm of the state" may also trample on intellectual property rights without the
authority of the state to back him up. The ensuing discussion is, of course, applicable to § 1983
suits against such an officer.
For that matter, there are circumstances in which private persons act "under color of' state
law and hence may be sued under § 1983, such as when they conspire with state officers to
violate the victim's constitutional rights. See generally, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24
(1980).
375. SeeNICHOLsONEMINENTDOMArN § 1.11 (Julius L. Sackman & Russell D. Van Brunt
eds., 3d ed. 1950). See, e.g., First English Evangelical Luth. Church v. County of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 314-16 (1987).
376. See supra text accompanying note 322.
377. See supra notes 1-3.
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of property without due process. In such cases, a deference rule may be
appropriate, because there is no specific congressional intent to the contrary.
In the context of the intellectual property statutes, however, the ripeness rule
may be inapplicable, because the claim is for infringement, not for a taking or
a deprivation of property without due process. In a statutory action for
infringement, the availability of a state remedy may simply be irrelevant.
Williamson County'sjudge-made ripeness rule channelling cases to state court
would have to fall before the authority of Congress to allocate jurisdiction,
unless of course it is a rule of constitutional dimension. As to this issue of the
pedigree of the ripeness requirement, Williamson County offers no guid-
ance.
378
C. Must the Federal Court Defer to State Proceedings?
Suppose we are right in asserting that some federal suits for deprivation
of intellectual property may be maintained in spite of the potential obstacles
presented by Williamson County. A further forum allocation issue must be
examined. Recall that the government remains free to institute a condemna-
tion action in its own courts. Accordingly, two lawsuits raising the same
issues may unfold at the same time in the federal and state courts. For exam-
ple, in response to a business filing an action for trademark infringement
against a state in federal court, a state might institute the proper state proceed-
ings to pay restitution for a temporary deprivation of the business property.
Should the federal court defer to the state court?
The Supreme Court did sometimes require federal courts to defer to
pending state litigation. In particular, Younger v. Harris379 and its progeny
direct federal courts to dismiss cases brought by persons who are defendants
in pending state civil and criminal enforcement proceedings against them, if
their federal claims could be raised in the state courts.380 The application of
the Younger rule to the sort of conflict we have posed in this section is un-
clear, because our problem contains elements that point in both directions. On
the one hand, the federal plaintiff is, as in the Younger paradigm, a state court
defendant who could raise his federal claims in state court. On the other hand,
the Court held, in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council ofNew Orleans
378. One commentator maintains that the ripeness doctrine should never have a constitu-
tional pedigree so that doctrines foreclosing federal jurisdiction due to lack of ripeness are
always subject to Congressional revision. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1987).
379. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
380. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,43-46,50 (1971); see HART& WECHSLER, supra note
133, at 1256-1308. Note that a state case is "pending" if it is filed before the federal case, or
after the federal case begins but before there have been "proceedings ofsubstance on the merits"
in federal court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
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(NOPS),38 that the Younger rule requires deference not to all state proceed-
ings, but only to state enforcement proceedings against a private defendant
who has violated state law."2 Younger was inapplicable in NOPSI because,
although there were two state proceedings pending, neither involved enforce-
ment of state law against a recalcitrant defendant. One of the state proceed-
ings was a petition for review of the rate order, brought by the utility com-
pany.383 In the other state case, the city as plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that the rate order was valid.3"'
Given the Court's holding in NOPSI, it is unlikely that the Court would
extend Younger abstention to suits to recover for governmental invasions of
intellectual property rights. The lesson of NOPSI is that Younger is not a
general principle that applies across a range of state proceedings. Instead,
Younger is a narrow rule of deference: "[T]he type of proceeding to which
Younger applies"3"5 includes "state criminal prosecutions,.., civil enforce-
ment proceedings,... and.., civil proceedings involving certain orders that
are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform theirjudicial
functions." '386 In refusing to extend Younger to require deference to the
declaratory judgment and petition to review, the Court in NOPSlemphasized
that "[s]uch a broad abstention requirement would make a mockery of the rule
that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide
a case in deference to the States."38 7 The same answer could appropriately be
given to a suggestion that Younger abstention be ordered in deference to state
condemnation proceedings.3 8 In short, we believe the state and federal cases
may go forward at the same time.
381. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
382. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366 (1989)
(stating that no deference is required when state suits are for review of rate order and for declar-
atory judgment that rate order is valid).
383. Id. at 355.
384. Id. at 356.
385. Id. at 367.
386. Id. at368.
387. Id. Note, however, that the Court here omitted any mention of the extension of
Younger to administrative proceedings, a development that seems somewhat at odds with the
"exceptional circumstances" requirement. See generally, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
388. Another, less well-defined, abstention doctrine sometimes requires federal abstention
when there are parallel federal and state proceedings, if required by "considerations of wise
judicial administration." See Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). The application of this principle depends on the circumstances of particular
cases. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 133, at 1316-23. It may well require federal
abstention in some pieces of intellectual property litigation and not in others.
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Conclusion
Do not allow the complexity of this body of law to obscure the central
point: One way or another, most victims of governmental invasions of their
intellectual property rights should be able to obtain relief, although the plain-
tiff may be obliged to make his way through a maze of remedial roadblocks
until he has found a theory that works for the circumstances of his particular
case. Among other things, plaintiffs must consider whether the suit is prop-
erly brought against an officer or a government; they should understand the
advantages of litigating in federal court and the difficulty of getting there; and
they should keep in mind the central premise of Seminole Tribe, which is that
state immunity from suit in federal court pre-dates the Eleventh Amendment
and may be abrogated only by Congress's exercise of powers granted in later
times.
The sometimes illogical doctrine results from the nature of the problems
the Supreme Court has had to face. Governmental and official immunity
reflect a set of values that is irreconcilable with governmental and official
accountability for their misuse of intellectual property belonging to others.
The Court could have resolved the tension through a flat rule denying recov-
ery, an approach it has never taken. Alternatively, it could have done away
with immunity, the direction it seemed to have taken in the pre-Seminole Tribe
cases. Instead, it has chosen to try to respect both sides of the issue, produc-
ing a doctrine that fails the test of coherence but may nonetheless afford a
remedy for most violations of intellectual property rights.
NOTES
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L Introduction
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed into law the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).' Through the ADA, Congress sought
to remove barriers that prevented individuals with disabilities from enjoying
the same opportunities as the non-disabled.2 At first glance, the ADA seemed
sufficient to provide the long-awaited rights for Americans with disabilities.3
Eight years after its enactment, however, the ADA still has not permitted
Americans with disabilities to enjoy the protections Congress intended.4 The
ambiguous language Congress incorporated into the ADA is to blame.'
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
at42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
2. See id. § 12101(b) (stating purpose of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).
Congress created the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to "provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties." Id.
3. See id. (stating purpose of ADA). Most Americans thought that the ADA could
accomplish its stated purpose of eliminating discrimination based on a disability. See Stephanie
Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the Basis
ofPsychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REv. 701,702 (1997) (describing public's anticipation, at
time of ADA's enactment, of tremendous impact ADA likely would have for individuals with
disabilities); see also Bonnie Tucker & Bruce A. Goldstein, The Americans with Disabilities
Act of1990, in AMERICANS WITH DIsABILIEs ACT: LAW AND REGULATIONS 1, 1 (lst ed. 1991)
(stating that upon ADA's enactment many considered it "Emancipation Proclamation" for
disabled and named July 26, 1990 "Liberation Day for the Disabled"). Twenty-six years prior
to the enactment of the ADA, Congress passed laws protecting citizens of the United States
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. Id. According to
Tucker and Goldstein, expansion of these civil rights to individuals with disabilities was long
overdue. Id.
4. See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible ShrinkingProtected Class: Redefining the Scope
ofDisability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 108 (1997)
(discussing inability of ADA to remedy effectively disability discrimination).
5. See id. (arguing that ADA's ambiguous terms have caused courts to raise prima facie
standards for plaintiffs). Although the heightened prima facie standard works to "weed out"
ineligible claimants, it also deprives many disabled individuals of the protection of the ADA.
Id. at 108-09.
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Congress used broad and vague terms throughout the ADA in an effort
to include all Americans with disabilities within the ADA's scope.6 Rather
than increase the rights of the disabled, however, this ambiguous language has
only confused courts and, as a result, undermined the ADA's power.7 This
Note addresses one specific area of confusion involving a seemingly funda-
mental aspect of the ADA: Who is disabled under the ADA?8 More specifi-
cally, did Congress intend to include under the ADA those individuals who
treat their impairments with medication, aid their impairments with a device,
or ease the effects of their impairments in some other fashion such that the
impairment no longer substantially limits any major life activities? The
question of what constitutes a disability has divided the United States Courts
of Appeals and has perplexed several federal district courts.9
6. See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving
Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 ViLL. L. REv. 587, 588-89 (1997) (discussing ADA's broad
definition of "disability" and narrow approach many courts use when evaluating individuals'
disabilities). Mayerson states that Congress intended to have the courts apply the ADA liber-
ally. Id. at 588. Rather than liberally construing the term "disability" so as to afford individuals
the right to have their claims heard, however, many courts apply aheightened disability standard
and dismiss claims for failure to prove a disability under the ADA definition. Id. at 589-90.
This application ofa heightened disability standard, Mayerson concludes, is contrary to the pur-
pose of the broad language ofthe ADA: to protect all individuals with disabilities from discrim-
ination. Id. Mayerson recognizes this problem of narrowjudicial interpretation of the ADA's
terms but she focuses her analysis on the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition. Id.
7. See Carolyn L. Weaver, Disabilities Act Cripples Through Ambiguity, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 31, 1991, atA16 (highlighting ambiguities within terms ofADA and potential implications
of such). Since the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, courts and commentators have
disagreed on the meaning of the term "disability." Id, The ADA and the accompanying EEOC
regulations continue this ambiguity. Neither clarifies exactly what constitutes a disability. Id.;
see also Catherine J. Lanctot,AdfHoc Decision Making andPer Se Prejudice: How Individual-
izing the Determination of"Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL.L. REV. 327,329 (1997)
(stating that until courts resolve issue of exactly who ADA covers, ADA will not have
"transformative effect" that Congress intended it to have); Locke, supra note 4, at 109 (discuss-
ing danger of ADA becoming ineffective due to ambiguities in its terminology); Noreen
Seebacher, Employers' Focus Turns to Disabilities: With Golfer's Case Making Headlines,
Many Again Question Parameters of the ADA, THE DETROrr NEws, Feb. 25, 1998, at B4
(quoting attorney Thomas Kienbaum) (noting that within definition of"disability" under ADA
there are "many gray areas, and different interpretations of them by the courts").
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining disability in broad terms). According to
this section of the United States Code:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual - (A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; 03) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.
Id.
9. See infra Part III (discussing circuit split and district court confusion).
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Part II of this Note reviews the relevant sections of Title I of the ADA,
the legislative history of Title I, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's (EEOC) efforts to implement it, and the elements of a prima facie case
under Title .10 Part III discusses the current division in the United States
Courts of Appeals as well as the confusion among the United States District
Courts regarding the appropriate metho d of analyzing an impairment that a
claimant aids with mitigating measures." Part III.A examines decisions in
which courts have not considered mitigating measures when evaluating ADA
claims. 2 Part III.B discusses decisions in which courts have incorporated the
use of mitigating measures into ADA claim evaluations. 3 Part IV considers
possible ways to remedy the division among the circuits and presents a multi-
factored guideline that could assist courts in the evaluation of ADA claims
involving mitigating measures. 4 Finally, Part V summarizes this persistent
issue and concludes that the multi-factored guideline is the best approach to
assessing impairments that individuals control or aid with mitigating mea-
sures. 15
IL Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act
A. History of the ADA
Congress enacted Title I of the ADA to remove barriers that historically
have prevented qualified individuals with disabilities from becoming gainfully
employed. 6 The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
10. See infra Part II (providing overview of Title I of ADA).
11. See infra Part III (discussing confusion among courts of appeals and district courts
regarding issue of mitigating measures). "Mitigating measures" is the term the EEOC uses in
its Interpretive Guidelines to the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997) (describing
mitigating measures). The EEOC mentions medicines and assistive or prosthetic devices as
examples of mitigating measures. Id.
12. See infra Part III.A (evaluating courts of appeals and district courts decisions in which
courts have adhered to EEOC guidelines regarding mitigating measures).
13. See infra Part 1II.B (evaluating courts of appeals and district courts decisions in which
courts have concluded that courts should incorporate mitigating measures into evaluation of
substantially limiting effect of impairment).
14. See infra Part IV (proposing possible methods of solving problem of mitigating
measures and introducing multi-factored guideline).
15. See infra Part V (summarizing mitigating measure problem and multi-factored guide-
line proposal).
16. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997) (examining background of ADA and purpose
behind enactment of Title I). The ADA requires employers to give disabled individuals the
same consideration for employment as individuals without disabilities. Id.; see also Cyndy
Falgout, Businessmen Told No Need to Fear Disabilities Act, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Apr. 20,
1991, available in 1991 WL 4365943 (stating Congress's purpose in enacting ADA was to
eliminate fear-based artificial barriers to employment for qualified individuals with disabilities).
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against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees,... [nor any] other terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment."' 7 The employment provisions of the ADA originated
in Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), which, prior
to the enactment of the ADA, was the primary statutory protection for individ-
uals with disabilities. 8 The primary purpose of Title V of the Rehabilitation
Act was to prohibit disability discrimination by federally funded employers.' 9
Although the Rehabilitation Act is an important civil rights statute for the
disabled, it was unsuccessful in fully remedying discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." Its scope was too limited to address adequately
the widespread discrimination affecting Americans with disabilities." In
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994) (governing employment practices for federally
funded entities). Sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibit
employment discrimination based on an individual's disability by any entity that receives
federal funds or is an executive agency. Id.; see also Jane West, The Evolution of Disability
Rights, in IMPLEMENTINGTHEAMEmCANS WiTHDIsABzriEs ACT 3,10-13 (Lawrence 0. Gostin
& Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (describing legislation leading up to enactment of ADA). This
Note discusses only legislative acts pertaining to the employment of individuals with disabili-
ties. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 addresses this issue. 29 U.S.C. § 791
(1994). It prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified persons with disabilities." Id.;
see also Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements ofthe ADA, in IMPLEMENTINGTHE
AMERIcANsWITHDisABiLrrmEsACT35, 37 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993)
(discussing substantive and procedural basis for ADA).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (describing prohibitions against discrimination as applied to
federally funded employers).
20. See H.R. RrP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32-33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267,314 (1990) (citing Louis Harris poll that documents persistence of disability discrimination
even after enactment of Rehabilitation Act of 1973). According to the Louis Harris poll, two-
thirds of all disabled persons of working age are not employed and of that group 66% said they
would like to have a job. Id By citing this poll in the CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS, Congress
evidenced its concern that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was not alleviating the employment
discrimination of disabled individuals. See also Robert L. Mullen, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: An lntroductionforLawyers and Judges, 21 LAND& WATERL. REv. 175, 177
(1994) (noting conclusion of National Council on the Handicapped that federal laws and
programs existing prior to ADA over-emphasized income support and under-emphasized
initiatives to encourage independence and self-sufficiency); Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct andSome Initial Thoughts as to Its ConstitutionalImplica-
tions, l IST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 185,189-97 (1992) (outlining deficiencies ofRehabilitation
Act of 1973 for protection of disabled individuals). Rains cites several limitations of the
Rehabilitation Act that created the need for the ADA: (1) Congress limited the Act's scope to
federally funded employers; (2) the Act lacked enforcement mechanisms; and (3) Congress did
not adequately fund the Act resulting in the inability of the included employers to comply with
the Act's mandates. Id. at 189-91.
21. See Rains, supra note 20, at 189-191 (discussing deficiencies of Rehabilitation Act).
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response to the Rehabilitation Act's shortcomings, Congress enacted the
ADA.22
Congress incorporated much of the language of the employment provi-
sions of the Rehabilitation Act into Title I of the ADA.' In the ADA, how-
ever, Congress expanded the Rehabilitation Act's protections to include indi-
viduals with disabilities employed in the private sector.24 Additionally, the
ADA added explicit enforcement mechanisms that the Rehabilitation Act
lacked.' These modifications reflect Congress's effortto broaden the already
existing protections for individuals with disabilities.26
B. Assistance in Interpreting the ADA
Congress realized that its use of broad language in the ADA rendered the
ADA unenforceable as written.27 In an attempt to remedy this problem, Con-
gress ordered the EEOC to promulgate regulations to clarify the provisions of
the ADA for courts and claimants. 8 On July 26, 1991, one year after the
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (describing tremendous need among disabled for pro-
tection from discrimination); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (1997) (explainingthatEEOC implementation
provisions for ADA do not apply lesser standard than that of Rehabilitation Act, indicating that
Congress intended to increase rights of disabled); see also Mullen, supra note 20, at 177 (dis-
cussing shortcomings of prior disability discrimination legislation that created need for ADA).
23. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 37 (discussing origin of ADA). Congress incorpo-
rated much of the language of the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA in an effort to minimize the
litigation concerning the application of the ADA. Id. Congress intended courts to apply the
case law already developed under the Rehabilitation Act to ADA claims. Id.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994) (defining "employer" to include private employers);
Rains, supra note 20, at 190 (noting modifications of provisions of Rehabilitation Act which
Congress incorporated into ADA).
25. See Rains, supra note 20, at 189-191 (discussing shortcomings of Rehabilitation Act
that Congress intended to remedy by enacting ADA). The Rehabilitation Act did not delegate
the duty to enforce its provisions. Id. at 190. In contrast, Congress explicitly charged the
EEOC with implementing and enforcing the terms of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
26. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (1997) (stating that under ADA, courts are to apply same or
greater standard than that applied under Title V of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
27. See John Parry, Title I - Employment, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIEs AcT 57, 58 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (documenting
criticisms of ADA as "too broad," "confusing," and "hard to interpret"). This broad language,
Parry states, although confusing, may have been necessary. Id. In civil rights legislation, he
states, often one must sacrifice certainty in a law's application in order to obtain the desired
individualized remedies under the law. Id.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (conferring upon EEOC duty to issue regulations to
carry out Title I of ADA); see also Mullen, supra note 20, at 186 (stating that Congress gave
EEOC duty to promulgate rules and regulations to supplement ADA); Tucker & Goldstein,
supra note 3, at 3 (stating that Congress requires EEOC to promulgate regulations to carry out
Title I of ADA as well as oversee and enforce all employment provisions under ADA).
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enactment of the ADA, the EEOC issued the requisite regulations.29 The
EEOC's regulations are binding on courts if, as stated in Chevron USA. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Congress mandated the regula-
tions and the resulting regulations constitute a permissible construction of the
statute.
3'
Concurrent with the issuance of these regulations, the EEOC published
interpretive guidelines.32 The EEOC designed the interpretive guidelines to
provide further assistance to claimants, courts, and covered entities in inter-
preting the terms of the ADA.33 Unlike the regulations, Congress did not
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1997). The EEOC issued regulations in accordance with the
Congressional mandate outlined in the ADA. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (directing
EEOC to issue regulations).
30. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
31. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (determining that appropriate standard of review for agency statutory interpretations
made under congressionally delegated authority is two-part test); see also E. Livingston B.
Haskell, Note, "Disclose-or-Abstain" Without Restraint: The Supreme Court Misses the Mark
on Rule 14e-3 in United States v. O'Hagan, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 199, 206-08 (1998)
(discussing Chevron test). In Chevron, the Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the term "source" as used in the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. The Court's task in Chevron was to determine if
courts must adhere to an agency's interpretation of a statute. Id. The interpretation in question
in Chevron arose from the Clean Air Act. Id. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Congress required any company that produces a major new "source" of air pollutants to go
through an extensive review process to obtain a permit Id at 850. The EPA interpreted the term
"source" to refer to the entire plant such that only new plants were subject to the elaborate review
process necessary to obtain a permit. Id at 857-58. Additions and modifications to existing
plants were, therefore, not subject to the review process. Id. The Natural Resources Defense
Council opposed this interpretation of the term "source" and claimed that it contradicted the text
and policy ofthe Clean Air Act. Id at 859. The Courtheld thatthe EPA's definition of "source"
was apermissible construction of the statute. Id. at 866. In doing this, the Court outlined a two-
part testto assist courts in the future review of agencies' statutory interpretations. Id. at 842-43.
The two-part test includes analysis of the following: (1) is the agency interpretation contrary to
a specific statute or statutory intent and (2) is the interpretation of the statute reasonable. Id. The
Court ruled that if Congress has given the agency the authority to clarify a specific provision of
a statute and the resulting agency regulation is not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute," the agency action is apermissible construction of the statute. Id. at 844. Through
the application of its newly created test, the Court concluded that: (1) the relevant provisions of
the Clean Air Act do not clearly state Congress's intent in using "source" and (2) the intent that
courts can derive from the statutory language reveals that Congress hoped to expand rather than
confine the EPA's power to regulate particular sources through enforcement of the Clean Air
Act. Id. at 861-62. Thus, the Court held that the EPA's interpretation of "source" was a
permissible construction of the statute and was binding on the courts. Id. at 866.
32. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997).
33. See id. (stating that purpose for interpretive guidance is to assist qualified individuals
with disabilities to understand their rights under ADA as well as to ease and to encourage
compliance by included employers).
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order the EEOC to create these guidelines." Rather, the EEOC issued the
guidelines independently.35 Because they are not congressionally mandated,
the EEOC interpretive guidelines do not bind courts.36 Agency action that is
not congressionally mandated is binding on courts only to the extent that they
explicitly adopts the agency's interpretation. 7 However, courts tend to defer
to nonbinding agency pronouncements because they perceive agencies as
consisting of experts whose opinions courts should not dismiss lightly.3
Thus, when evaluating an ADA claim, courts must incorporate the EEOC
regulations into their analysis but may choose not to incorporate the EEOC
interpretive guidelines.39
34. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997) (noting EEOC has duty to issue regulations but that
EEOC additionally issued interpretive guidelines because further assistance was necessary).
35. See id. (introducing EEOC interpretive guidelines and stating need for such assis-
tance). "The Commission believes that it is essential to issue interpretive guidance concurrently
with the issuance of this part in order to ensure that qualified individuals with disabilities
understand their rights under this part and to facilitate and encourage compliance by covered
entities." Id.
36. See Robert.A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 58 (1990) (stating that agency interpretations not mandated by
Congress are not binding on courts); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMzIfsTRATIvELAw TREATISE § 6.3, at 239-43 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining that when Congress
has not delegated power to agency to issue guidelines, guidelines subsequently issued are not
binding on court). Davis and Pierce state that a court is free to reject an agency position that
is reflected in an interpretive rule. Id. at 239. However, courts must adhere to a congressionally
mandated agency rule if it is a permissible construction of the statute at issue. Id. at 235.
37. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,424-26 (1977) (stating that courts are to give
agency interpretation of statutory terms "important but not controlling significance"); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971) (stating that EEOC guidelines deserve "great
deference," especially if Act and legislative history support such statutory interpretation, but
such guidelines are not binding on courts); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
(stating that when legislative body has not delegated legislative power to agency, regulations
promulgated by such agency are not binding on courts); see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
36, at 239 (stating that courts have choice either to reject explicitly or accept agency interpreta-
tion not mandated by Congress); Anthony, supra note 36, at 55 (stating that two-step evaluation
from Chevron does not apply to agency interpretations because they are not made through
formal rulemaking procedures and thus are not binding on courts).
38. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34 (noting that courts should give great deference to
EEOC interpretive guidelines if guidelines support Act and Act's legislative history); Skidmore,
323 U.S. at 140 (explaining that because EEOC guidelines come from "body of experience and
informed judgment," courts "may properly resort [to them] for guidance"); see also DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 36, at 236-39 (discussing controlling weight of non-congressionally
mandated agency interpretations). Some courts appear to give greater deference to the EEOC
interpretive guidelines than others. See infra Subparts IIl.A and III.B (discussing courts'
varying levels of deference to EEOC interpretive guidelines).
39. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 36, at 236-39 (discussing levels of deference due various
agency actions).
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C. Making a Claim Under Title I of the ADA
To survive summary judgment, an individual making a Title I claim
under the ADA must sufficiently demonstrate the following: (1) the individual
has a disability, (2) the individual is qualified for the job with or without
reasonable accommodation, and (3) the individual's employer took the ad-
verse employment action because of the existing disability." The first and
often case determinative element is whether the individual has a disability
under the ADA.41 Even though courts treat this element as crucial to the
prima facie case, the ADA's text does not describe precisely what a disability
is.42 Congress did outline within the text of the ADA the three ways that a
claimant may establish the existence of a disability: (1) demonstration of a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity;
(2) demonstration of a record of such an impairment; or (3) demonstration of
evidence that the employer regarded the claimant as having such an impair-
ment.43 Beyond this broad description, however, the ADA is silent on the
issue of what constitutes a disability.' This ambiguity forces courts to look
elsewhere for guidance-the EEOC regulations and the appended interpretive
guidelines.45
1. Impairment that Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity
First, an individual is disabled if that person has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.46 Congress so
broadly stated this first method of demonstrating a disability that courts may
wonder exactly what Congress intended by this statement. To assist the
courts, the EEOC promulgated regulations that interpret the following critical
terms within the ADA definition: "physical or mental impairment," "major
life activity," and "substantially limits."47 A "physical or mental impairment,"
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112 (1994) (discussing elements ofprima facie case under
Title I of ADA).
41. See Locke, supra note 4, at 108 (discussing importance of establishing disability).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining "disability" in broad terms).
43. Id.
44. See id. (limiting discussion of"disability" to three general ways claimant may estab-
lish disability under ADA).
45. See id. § 12116 (commanding EEOC to "issue regulations in an accessible format to
carry out this subchapter"). It is clear that Congress realized that the broad language of the
ADA left it unenforceable on its own. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1997) (interpreting Title
I of ADA); id. app. § 1630 (same).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (outlining methods of demonstrating existence of
disability).
47. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h)-() (1997) (interpreting "impairment that substantially
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according to the EEOC regulations, is any physiological, mental, or psycho-
logical disorder.48 A "major life activity" includes "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."49 And finally, an impairment is "substan-
tially limiting" if, because of it, the individual is unable to perform any of the
major life activities to a level "that the average person in the general popula-
tion can perform," or if the individual is "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which [the] individual can perform" this
activity as compared to the general population." The EEOC regulations add
to the ADA's framework and assist courts in evaluating ADA claims."
The EEOC interpretive guidelines further expand the definition of an
"impairment that substantially limits a major life activity" by providing
additional considerations and examples of impairments that can satisfy the
"substantially limits" requirement. 2 The most controversial of the additional
considerations, and the consideration subject to much debate among the
courts, is the suggestion that courts should ignore mitigating measures when
evaluating both the existence of a physical or mental impairment and the
limits a major life activity").
48. See id. § 1630.2(h) (listing disorders that constitute impairments). The regulations
include as impairments
[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or ... [a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
Id.
49. Id. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i).
50. Id. § 1630.20). The EEOC lists factors to consider in determining if an impairment
substantially limits an individual in a major life activity: "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the
impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent
or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment." Id.
51. Id. § 1630.2.
52. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (g)-(j) (1997) (interpreting ADA and EEOC definitions
of "disability" and suggesting additional considerations for use in evaluating substantially
limiting effects of disabilities). The guidelines mention that the effect ofthe impairment on the
life of an individual is the crucial factor and that a case by case determination is essential. Id.
Also, the guidelines further discuss the duration and impact of factors that the EEOC addresses
in the regulations. Id. The duration of the impairment, according to the guidelines, refers to
the length of time that the impairment itself exists. Id. The impact of the impairment includes
the residual effects of the actual impairment. Id. The EEOC cites, as examples of substantially
limiting impairments, an individual with artificial legs, a diabetic who without insulin would
lapse into a coma, and an individual who is blind. Id.
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extent to which such an impairment limits an individual's major life activ-
ities. 3 According to the guidelines, mitigating measures include, but are not
limited to, medicines and assistive or prosthetic devices. 4 The appendix to
the EEOC regulations suggests that the ADA should protect from discrimina-
tion an individual whose medically assisted impairment would substantially
limit the individual in a major life activity if left in an unaided state." This
implies that even if medical assistance alleviates or minimizes an individual's
symptoms, a court could 'still find that individual to be disabled under the
ADA. 6 Through this recommendation, the EEOC appears to advocate the
expansion of ADA coverage to individuals who, under the plain language of
the ADA, would have received protection only under the third method of
proving the existence of a disability: being regarded as having a disability. 7
2. Record of an Impairment that Substantially Limits
a Major Life Activity
An individual who either previously had, but who no longer has, an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or an individual
misclassified as having such an impairment is an individual with a record of
an impairment. 8 The ADA protects individuals with a record of an impair-
53. See id. app. §§ 1630.2(h)-j) (noting that courts should not consider mitigating mea-
sures used to alleviate impairment's effects). The EEOC interpretive guidelines provide an
example of a claim that a court should evaluate without consideration of mitigating measures.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1997). The individual in the example suffers from epilepsy
controlled with medication. Id According to the EEOC interpretive guidelines, the courts
should make their determination without considering the medication both if the underlying
illness is an impairment and if it substantially limits a major life activity. Id. Under this
rationale, the individual clearly has an impairment and if the individual can show that without
medication the epilepsy will substantially limit a major life activity, courts can consider the
individual disabled as well. Id The EEOC's interpretation suggests that an individual with
epilepsy may, although presently not suffering from any symptoms of the disorder, satisfy the
requirements for a disability. Id.. See also infra Part III (discussing circuit split on issue of
mitigating measures).
54. 29 C.F.R_ app. § 1630.2(h) (1997).
55. Id. app. § 1630.20) (1997).
56. See id. (providing example of individuals for whom medicine or medical aides
alleviate symptoms but who, according to EEOC, are still individuals with disabilities under
ADA); see also infra Parts III-V (discussing judicial reaction to EEOC appendix on mitigating
measure issue and impact of such reactions).
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2() (1997) (describing individuals who do not have substan-
tially limiting impairment but may still qualify as disabled under ADA); see also infra Part
II.C.3 (describing "regarded as" prong of disability definition).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1997). See Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEX. L.
REV. 759,770 (1992) (discussing "record of' disability). This Note focuses mainly on the first
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ment to prevent the possibility of discrimination arising from the discovery of
a record indicating a prior substantially limiting impairment.5 9 The controver-
sial provision of the EEOC interpretive guidelines that addresses mitigating
measures also applies to this method of proving the existence of a disability."
Mitigating measures should not, according to the EEOC, be a part of a disabil-
ity analysis. 1 The distinguishing factor in this methodology is that the
claimed disability existed in the past. For purposes of the EEOC's provision
on mitigating measures, however, the timing of the disability is not critical.6
The individual still must show that the impairment substantially limited a
major life activity, and thus, according to the EEOC interpretive guidelines,
the court should not integrate the mitigating measures into the evaluation.
3. Regarded as Having an Impairment that Substantially
Limits a Major Life Activity
The final method of demonstrating a disability is by establishing that the
employer regarded the individual as having a disability.' Claimants who
cannot successfully utilize the first or second method of proving a disability
method of proving a disability: an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
59. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 40 (explaining EEOC regulations regarding individu-
als discriminated against because of "record of' impairment). Examples of individuals who
may have valid claims under the "record of impairment" prong of the disability definition are
individuals who have a history of cancer or heart disease or a misdiagnosis of a learning
disability. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k)).
60. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1997) (noting that mitigating measures should not
be part of claim evaluation). This provision of the interpretive guidelines necessarily applies
to the second method of proving a disability, record of a substantially limiting impairment,
because a claim brought under this method, like the first method, involves an evaluation of the
limiting effects of an impairment. Id.
61. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1997). Although the mitigating measure provision applies
to this method of proving a disability, the case law and commentaries addressing this issue have
focused on the first method: an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
62. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1997).
63. See id. (explaining congressional intent in creating "record of disability" method of
proving disability under ADA). Congress, by creating this provision, intended to protect
individuals who suffered from a substantially limiting impairment that no longer substantially
affects their lives. Id.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994) (outlining three methods of proving existence of
disability); Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 471, 480-81 (1991) (discussing "regarded as" method of
proving disability); see also Mayerson, supra note 6, 591-98 (same). This Note focuses on the
first method of proving a disability: an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
For a thorough analysis of the "regarded as" method of proving a disability, see the above-cited
references.
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under the ADA often turnto this final option." According to the EEOC regula-
tions, a claimant who an employer regards as having a disability is an individ-
ual: (1) who has an impairment that is not substantially limiting but whose
employer treats the individual as if it is; (2) whose impairment is substantially
limiting only because of employer and employee attitudes toward the impair-
ment; or (3) who does not have an impairment but whose employer treats that
individual as if she has a substantially limiting impairment." Individuals who
aid their impairment with medication and bring their claims in a court that
adheres to the EEOC's position on mitigating measures are less likely to need
to resort to this final method of proving their disability. For these individuals,
a court that evaluates an impairment in its unaided state is more likely to find
that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.67 However, under
the EEOC's interpretation, this final method of proving a disability is still
necessary to protect those individuals who, even without consideration of
mitigating measures, do not have an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity.68 In addition, this method is necessary to protect those
individuals who do not claim to have a substantially limiting impairment but
who nonetheless have employers who treat them as if they do.69
65. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o (1997) (discussing third method ofproving disability);
see also School Bd. ofNassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,283 (1987) (stating for first time
that disability may substantially limit individual in major life activity because of attitude of
employer regarding employee's otherwise nonlimiting impairment). The Court decided Arline
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. However, case law developed under the Rehabilita-
tion Act is applicable to issues arising under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o (1997).
67. See Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir.
1997) (evaluating claimant in his unmedicated state and concluding that individual's impair-
ment substantially limited him in major life activity). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (evaluating claimants' vision impairments in their medi-
cated states and concluding that their vision impairments do not substantially limit the claim-
ants).
68. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o (1997) (discussing rationale for "regarded as" portion
of disability definition).
69. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 40 (explaining "regarded as" prong of disability
definition). The notion underlying the "regarded as disabled" aspect of the disability claim is
that the ADA should cover individuals not only because they have a substantially limiting
impairment but also because they are treated as if they do. Id. But see Mayerson, supra note
6, at 594-96 (stressing importance of separating proof requirements for actually disabled and
regarded as disabled). Mayerson focuses on courts' convergence ofthese requirements into one
standard and the implications of this convergence. Id. Mayerson stresses the importance of
keeping separate the requirements for "substantially limited" and "regarded as." Id. Three
different methods exist for demonstrating a disability in order to protect all who may feel the
impact of the stigma associated with disabilities. Id. The purpose of the "regarded as" aspect
of the disability claim was, according to Mayerson, to protect individuals without disabilities
from disability discrimination by employers. Id. at 597.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 917 (1998)
Regardless of which of the three methods the claimant uses to prove the
existence of a disability, the claimant must prove that the basis for the adverse
employment action was in fact the disability.0 It is obvious, then, that the
proof of an actual disability, record of a disability, or treatment as a disabled
individual is a crucial part of any claimant's case. At this critical phase of a
trial, claimants and courts alike need the benefit of a reliable framework to
determine what constitutes a disability and who exactly the ADA includes
within its definition. This need for certainty has proven to be most poignant
in cases in which the claimant suffers from an impairment that is no longer
substantially limiting due to the claimant's use of medication or other assistive
device.7' It is in these cases that the courts have been unable to reach a
uniform method of evaluation.72
III Dissension Among the United States Courts of Appeals
and District Courts
The United States Courts of Appeals disagree whether an individual who
has an impairment has a disability under the ADA if that individual alleviates
the effects of the impairment with medicine or other assistive devices.73
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (stating that only adverse employment actions made
because of individual's disability are subject to evaluation under ADA).
71. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,858 (1st Cir. 1998) (statingthat
statutory language is not clear regarding meaning of impairment that "substantially limits"
individual and that statute completely ignores issue of mitigating measures).
72. See infra Part III (discussing circuit split and district court confusion on issue of
mitigating measures).
73. See Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1998) (following
EEOC interpretive guidelines which recommend evaluating claimant's impairment without
consideration of mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,859-63
(1st Cir. 1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 938 (3d
Cir. 1997) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624,627-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (same), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,521 (1 th Cir.
1996) (same); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (same), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir.
1995) (same); Sherback v. Wright Automotive Group, 987 F. Supp. 433, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(same); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); Shiflett v. GE
Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same); Wilson v.
Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 905-07 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same); Sicard v.
City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-39 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Canon v. Clark, 883
F. Supp. 718, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (same); Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp. 336,
339-40 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (same). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902
(10th Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with EEOC interpretive guidelines and deciding to evaluate
claimants' disabilities with consideration of mitigating measures); Gilday v. Mecosta County,
124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Wilking v. County ofRamsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 853-
54 (D. Minn. 1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-08
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Because of this, courts are currently unpredictable forums for claimants with
such conditions, as well as for the defendant-employers in these actions.7'
The confusion arises from a disagreement over the statutory requirement that,
in order to qualify as a disability under the ADA, an impairment must substan-
tially limit a major life activity. 5 If an individual suffers from an underlying
impairment but, because she receives medical aid, she does not suffer from the
impairment's limiting effects, can the impairment still substantially limit a
major life activity? The EEOC interpretive guidelines suggest that mitigating
measures should not be a factor in evaluating an impairment and, thus, courts
could still find that a medicated impairment substantially limits an individ-
ual's major life activities.76 Some courts, however, have disagreed with the
EEOC.77 This disagreement has created a division among the circuits.78 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits all explicitly follow the EEOC guidelines and do not con-
sider mitigating measures when evaluating an individual's disability. 9 In
(D.R.I. 1997) (same); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 n.6 (E.D. Okla.
1997) (same); Gaddy ex. rel. Gaddy v. FourB Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331,336-37 (D. Kan. 1997)
(same); Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1087-88 (D. Kan. 1996) (same);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872,879-81 (D. Kan. 1996) (same), affid, 141
F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998); Schluterv. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-48 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (same); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808,813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
74. See Lanctot, supra note 7, at 328 (noting that inconsistent evaluation of ADA claims
has resulted in "patchwork of holdings, often varying from court to court, as to what set of
symptoms constitutes a disability"); Huntley Paton, ADA Still Baffling to Employers, DALLAS
Bus. J., Dec. 5, 1997, at42,44 (noting that ADA is continual source of confusion for litigants).
75. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858-60 (1st Cir. 1998)
(explaining that several interpretations of ADA's term "substantially limiting" exist); see also
Mayerson, supra note 6, at 589 (claiming judicial interpretations of "disability" under ADA are
too narrow in scope). Mayerson, however, focuses on the "regarded as" prong of the definition
of disability under the ADA. Id. Nonetheless, she supports the tenet of this Note in that she
agrees that courts' interpretation of "disability" has led to inconsistent rulings and precedents.
Id; see also Locke supra note 4, at 109 (arguing that ambiguity of ADA's terms has led to
narrowing of scope of "disability").
76. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1997) (stating that courts should not consider
mitigating measures when evaluating limiting effects of impairment).
77. See cases cited infra note 151 (listing circuit and district court decisions in which
court decided not to adhere to EEOC interpretive guidelines regarding issue of mitigating
measures).
78. See Major Depression and Other Psychiatric Disorders Under ADA: EEOC Guid-
ance, EMPLOYMENT L. UPDATE (Rutkowski & Assocs.), June 1997, § F (discussing disagree-
ment among courts regarding deference due EEOC's guidelines on mitigating measures).
79. See Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1998) (following
EEOC guidelines on issue of mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136
F.3d 854, 859-63 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136
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contrast, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
have determined that mitigating measures should be part of the inquiry when
evaluating this threshold issue.8" Similarly, the district courts in the remaining
circuits have disagreed regarding the proper standard to apply.8'
This dissension among the courts can prove to be of significant impor-
tance for ADA claimants and their employers alike. 2 Several circuits permit
easy passage through this threshold requirement, thereby affording the claim-
ant the opportunity to present her claim in court.83 However, the same claim
in a circuit that does not broadly interpret the term "disability" may not
survive a summaryjudgment motion.84 For example, if a court does not defer
to the EEOC interpretive guidelines and instead rules that a court should
consider mitigating measures in an impairment evaluation, a claimant with an
impairment aided by mitigating measures has drastically diminished odds of
surviving a summary judgment motion in that court.8 5 Likewise, a defendant-
F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th
Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102
F.3d 516, 521 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (same). The Ninth Circuit has also followed the EEOC guide-
lines and disregarded mitigating measures in ADA claim evaluations. See Holihan v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (accepting, without analysis, EEOC guidelines
that suggest courts should evaluate impairments without considering mitigating measures), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997).
80. See Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (disregarding
EEOC guidelines on issue of mitigating measures in disability determination); Gilday v.
Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
81. See cases cited supra note 73 (listing cases in which courts have evaluated and ruled
on issue of mitigating measures in disability determination).
82. See Mark Johnson, Lawsuits Expanding Scope ofDisabilities Act, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Aug. 31, 1997, at 39 (discussing implications of ambiguities in ADA). "The courts are all
over the place ... [s]omeone with diabetes in one jurisdiction is considered disabled, while if
it's controlled with medication in another jurisdiction it's not. It's very hard to divine any
guidance." Id. (quoting Stanley Kiszkiel, former regional attorney with EEOC in Miami).
83. See, e.g., Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1998)
(relying on EEOC's position on mitigating measures and, as result, permitting plaintiff to
present his claim in full); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-63 (1st Cir.
1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F. 3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir.
1997) (same); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (1lth Cir. 1996) (same);
Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same).
84. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (dis-
regarding EEOC's position on mitigating measures and, as result, denying plaintiffs' opportu-
nity to present their ADA claim); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1996) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879-81 (D. Kan.
1996) (same), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998). In all of these cases, the court dismissed
the ADA action for failure to state a claim.
85. See, e.g., Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (denying claimants opportunity to present their
claims because court did not apply EEOC guidelines and therefore evaluated claimants' impair-
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employer who knows that a court does not apply the EEOC guidelines will not
be eager to settle with such a claimant in anticipation of a summary judgment
motion in its favor. Thus, the court in which an individual brings a claim
becomes crucial to the individual's case. Congress did not intend such a
result. 6
A. Courts Should Not Consider Mitigating Measures:
Deference to EEOC Interpretive Guidelines
The courts that have chosen to give deference to the EEOC's position on
mitigating measures have done so after evaluating the language of the ADA,
its legislative history, and Congress's intent in creating the ADA.87 These
courts agree that the position on mitigating measures that the EEOC presented
in its interpretive guidelines comports with the language of the ADA and the
ADA's legislative history.88 Additionally, several courts have pointed to
overarching policy concerns that have compelled them to apply the method of
evaluation that the EEOC embodied in its interpretive guidelines.8 9
1. Legislative History and Language of the ADA
The United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. stated "if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
ments in their treated states); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 763-65 (6th Cir. 1997)
(same); Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 881 (same).
86. See Mayerson, supra note 6, at 588-89 (noting Congress intended courts to interpret
"disability" broadly).
87. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 859-61 (reviewing legislative history of ADA and Congres-
sional intent in creating ADA); Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937 (examining legislative history to
determine if EEOC guidelines are permissible construction of ADA); Harris, 102 F.3d at 521
(same); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 905-06 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(examining legislative history and finding that regardless of EEOC guidelines, ADA's legisla-
tive history dictates evaluation of impairments without considering mitigating measures);
Shiflett, 960 F. Supp. at 1028-29 (concluding EEOC interpretation is "entirely consistent" with
legislative history and ADA itself); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87,93 (D.D.C. 1997)
(findingADA legislative history dictates evaluation of impairments in their unmedicated states);
Sicard v. City ofSioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1437-38 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding legislative
history supports EEOC interpretive guidelines).
88. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which courts have agreed with EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
89. See Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87,93 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding it would be
improper to create blanket exclusion to specific groups simply because disability is easy to
correct); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 906 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(pointing to remedial nature of ADA as reason to construe ADA's terms broadly enough to
evaluate individuals without consideration of medicinal aides).
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agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. '90
Chevron binds courts to an agency's interpretation of a statute if Congress
requested such an interpretation and if the resulting interpretation is reason-
able.91 An unrequested interpretation, like the EEOC interpretive guidelines,
is not binding, but courts may defer to it nonetheless. 92 Courts have consis-
tently agreed that if an agency interpretation is a reasonable construction of
the statute, it merits adherence.93 Several courts have evaluated the EEOC
interpretive guidelines under this reasonableness test.94 To be a reasonable
construction of the ADA and thus worthy of adherence, the EEOC interpretive
guidelines must not contradict the plain language of the ADA and must find
support in the legislative history of the ADA.95
In Harris v. H& WContracting Co.,96 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the reasonableness of the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines when deciding if a disability evaluation should include an
assessment of mitigating measures. 97 The claimant in Harris suffered from
90. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
91. Id. at 843-44.
92. See Anthony, supra note 36, at 58 (discussing when courts must defer to agency
interpretation and when they may defer to agency interpretation).
93. Id. at 59-60 (discussing courts' general support of non-congressionally mandated
agency determinations if they are reasonable).
94. See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,521 (1 th Cir. 1996) (determin-
ing EEOC interpretive guidelines are reasonable construction ofADA); Wilson v. Pennsylvania
State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 904 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc
Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same).
95. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (creating test for courts to apply when evaluating
agency interpretations).
96. 102 F.3d 516 (llth Cir. 1996).
97. See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,521-22 (11 th Cir. 1996) (finding
court should not consider mitigating measures when determining disability). In Harris, the
court evaluated the ADA claim that Harris brought after H & W Contracting Company termi-
nated her. Id. at 518. Harris alleged that the termination was in response to a panic attack she
suffered following a change in the medication she took for an underlying thyroid condition
(Graves' disease). Id. To decide if Harris had an impairment that rose to the level of a disabil-
ity, the court first determined if it should consider Harris's Graves' disease in the medicated or
unmedicated state. Id. at 520. To decide this issue, the court undertook an analysis of the
following: (1) the EEOC interpretive guidelines which dictate that courts disregard mitigating
measures; (2) the plain language of the ADA; and (3) the legislative history behind the ADA's
passage. Id. at 521-22. The court reasoned that, following Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., it must adhere to a congressionally mandated agency interpre-
tation that is a reasonable construction of the statute. Id. at 521 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The EEOC's interpreta-
tion, the court reasoned, was not in direct conflict with the language of the ADA. Id. In
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Graves' disease, the symptoms of which she controlled medically.98 Prior to
analyzing Harris's claim, the court examined the EEOC interpretive guidelines
to determine if her medication should be a factor in the evaluation of her
disability." To ascertain the reasonableness of the EEOC position on mitigat-
ing measures, the court first examined the text of the ADA and compared it
to that of the EEOC interpretive guidelines." Upon review, the court found
no direct conflict between the EEOC interpretation and the language of the
ADA. 0' The court then looked to the relevant House and Senate Reports. 2
In these reports, the court discovered that Congress clearly intended to have
the courts evaluate impairments without consideration of mitigating
measures. 3 As a result of these two findings, the court concluded that the
EEOC interpretive guidelines were a reasonable construction of the ADA and
thus merited the court's deference.' 4  The Eleventh Circuit adopted the
EEOC's interpretation and chose to evaluate Harris's impairment without
consideration of the mitigating measures used to alleviate her symptoms."
addition, the legislative history of the Act directly supports the agency interpretation. Id. Thus,
the court found that it should adhere to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. Id. As a result, the
court remanded the case to the district court to evaluate Harris's Graves' disease in its unmedi-
cated state. Id. at 524.
98. Id. at 522-23. Graves' disease may involve any of the following conditions:
hyperthyroidism accompanied by goiter, exophthalmos, or myxedema. See id. at 522 (citing
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOsIs AND THERAPY, 1038-39 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 15th ed.
1987)). Without medication, the most frequent symptoms of the disease include nervousness,
increased sweating, hypersensitivity to heat, palpitations, fatigue, weight loss, weakness, and
frequent bowel movements. Id. In some extreme cases, Graves' disease can result in "thyroid
shock" which, if untreated, can cause cardiovascular collapse. Id. Because Harris controlled
her disorder with medication, the court's position on the mitigating measures issue was critical
to the viability of her claim. Id.
99. See id. at 520 (evaluating EEOC interpretive guidelines).
100. Id.at521.
101. See id. (stating"[t]here is nothing inherently illogical about determiningthe existence





105. Id. Following its decision, the court denied H & W Contracting Co. summary
judgment. Id. To avoid summaryjudgment in this instance, Harris needed only to demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 521-22. In this case and many other
similar ADA cases, the claimant must show that an issue of fact exists regarding whether an
impairment rises to the level of disability. Id. The evaluation of the issue of mitigating
measures determines whether a claimant with a treatable impairment ever has the opportunity
to present her claim. See Mayerson, supra note 6, at 589 (discussing dismissal of ADA claims
through summary judgment motions); Locke, supra note 4, at 109 (arguing that courts are
935
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In Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co.,0 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit similarly relied on the EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines in evaluating a claimant's epilepsy without considering the
medication the claimant took to control the symptoms. 0 7 The Matczak court,
like the Harris court, found the ADA's legislative history to be supportive of
the EEOC's position.' This support, the court reasoned, allowed itto adhere
to the EEOC's recommendations." 9
The Matczak and Harris decisions exemplify the notion that courts
should give deference to agency interpretations, even if Congress has not
mandated such agency action, provided that: (1) the interpretations are not in
conflict with the terms of the statute which they are expounding and (2) the
legislative history of the statute supports the interpretations."0 These courts,
raising prima facie standard for Title I ADA claims resulting in increased summary judgments
against plaintiffs).
106. 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).
107. Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933,936-37 (3d Cir. 1997)
(following EEOC interpretive guidelines and stating that courts should not consider mitigating
measures when evaluating disabilities). In Matczak, the court considered whether Matczak had
established the existence of his disability such that it should not grant summary judgment as a
matter of law. Id. at 935. Matczak was diagnosed with epilepsy thirty years before Frankford
Candy and Chocolate Company hired him as a Maintenance Supervisor in April 1993. Id. at
935. He controlled his epilepsy with medication and did not suffer from any seizures until
November 1993. Id. Following this seizure, Matczak's doctor put him on a new course of
medication for five and one-half months. Id. Although Matczak could only do limited work
during those five and one-half months, the doctor permitted him to return to a regular schedule
after the course of medication. Id. Frankford fired Matczak during this restrictive period. Id.
Matczak alleged that the firing was due to his disability (epilepsy). Id. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit overruled the district court's decision to grant Frankford summary judg-
ment by finding that Matczak had adequately shown that epilepsy substantially limits him in a
major life activity. Id. at 937. In evaluating this impairment, the court determined that mit-
igating measures, in this case the medicine controlling his seizures, should not factor into the
evaluation. Id. The court outlined two reasons for deferring to the EEOC guidelines on this
matter: (1) courts should give an agency's interpretation of its own regulations great deference
and (2) the ADA's legislative history strongly supports this method of evaluation. Id. As a
result, the court did not consider Matczak's medication and found enough evidence showing
that Matczak's epilepsy substantially limited a major life activity to preclude summary judg-
ment. Id. at 938.
108. Id. at 937.
109. See id. at 937-38 (explaining rationale for evaluating epilepsy without consideration
of medication).
110. See id. (accepting EEOC interpretation); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d
516,521 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (same); see also Anthony, supra note 36, at 59-60 (discussing author-
itative power of congressionally mandated agency interpretations versus interpretations that
Congress did not mandate).
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along with several district courts, have concluded that the EEOC's position
on mitigating measures is in accordance with Congress's intent as evidenced
by both the language of the ADA and the House and Senate Reports that
accompanied the ADA's passage."' Several courts that have concurred in this
reasoning have additionally put forth policy-based arguments in support of
their decisions to consider impairments in their unaided states."2
2. Policy Reasons in Support of the EEOC's Interpretation
Congress created Title I of the ADA to ensure the same employment
opportunities for individuals with and without disabilities."' To further this
goal, many courts reason that a broad interpretation of the ADA is neces-
sary."' They argue that because Congress intended the ADA to be a sweeping
anti-discrimination statute, courts must liberally apply the ADA's terms."'
As a result, these courts find that the only permissible way to deal with the
issue of mitigating measures is to disregard the measures when evaluating the
111. See Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937 (finding EEOC's position is in accordance with
Congress's intent); Harris, 102 F.3d at 521 (same); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept.,
964 F. Supp. 898, 905 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that "even a cursory examination of the
legislative history" indicates that EEOC patterned its guidelines on language found in congres-
sional reports); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va.
1997) (concluding that EEOC interpretation is "entirely consistent" with legislative history of
ADA and ADA itself); Siceard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-38 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (stating that legislative history supports EEOC interpretive guidelines).
112. See Arnoldv. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (lst Cir. 1998) (stating that
courts should construe ADA's terms broadly to further its remedial purpose); Fallacaro v.
Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting policy considerations that support
EEOC's position); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept, 964 F. Supp. 898, 905 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (bolstering decision with policy considerations); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp.,
960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (outlining purpose of ADA); see also Subpart II.A
(outlining history of ADA).
114. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 861 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that remedial nature of ADA
necessitates broad interpretation of it by courts). But see Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police
Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 906 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting but then disregarding policy concerns in
support of evaluating impairments in their medicated state). The court in Wilson concluded that
courts should evaluate impairments in their unmedicated states. Id. at 907. In reaching this
conclusion, the Wilson court addressed and then discredited policy arguments contrary to its
conclusion. Id. at 906-07. The greatest concern in interpreting the ADA in accordance with
the EEOC on the issue of mitigating measures is that such an interpretation will lead to the
"unwarranted expansion of disability laws beyond their intended scope." Id. at 906. The Wilson
court noted this concern but found it unconvincing. Id.
115. See id. at 861 (finding courts must apply terms of ADA broadly); Wilson, 964 F.
Supp. at 906 (finding remedial nature of ADA necessitates broad interpretation of its terms);
Shiflett, 960 F. Supp. at 1029 (finding courts' liberal application of ADA terms is proper).
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limiting effect of an impairment. 1 6 Acceptance of the EEOC's position on
this issue, these courts reason, will allow courts to apply liberally the ADA's
protections. 17
In Fallacaro v. Richardson,"' the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia addressed these policy concerns regarding the consider-
ation of mitigating measures." 9 In its evaluation of a claimant's vision
impairment claim, the court found that it should not consider corrective eye
wear. 20 It is unfair, the court reasoned, to deprive a group of individuals of
coverage under the ADA simply because their disability is one that is easy to
correct.' This reasoning, the court continued, is based on common sense.1
22
An individual does not eliminate an underlying disability by the use of a
prosthetic device or medication even though such assistance may alleviate the
impairment's effects."z If a court did choose to evaluate an underlying
impairment in its aided state, the court would unreasonably exclude from
116. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863 (finding courts should evaluate impairments in their
unmedicated states); Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 898 (finding remedial purpose of ADA dictates
evaluation without consideration of mitigating measures); Shiflett, 960 F. Supp. at 1029 (same).
117. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863 (finding courts must evaluate impairments in their
unmedicated states); Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 905-06 (concluding liberal application of ADA
requires evaluation of impairment without consideration of mitigating measures); Shiflett, 960
F. Supp. at 1029 (same).
118. 965F. Supp. 87(D.D.C. 1997).
119. See Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (following EEOC
guidelines). In Fallacaro, the court evaluated whether an individual who has corrected vision
of 20/20 but is legally blind without corrective lenses has an impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity. Id. at 90. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied Fallacaro a promo-
tion because she did not satisfy the uncorrected vision requirement of the position. Id.
Fallacaro alleged that the vision requirement was a blanket exclusion of individuals with vision
impairments. Id. The IRS stated that it based its exclusion in safety concerns and that Fallacaro
was simply medically ineligible and not handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. After
evaluating recent case law and the legislative history of both the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, the court reasoned that it would be furthering the purpose of both of the acts if it
evaluated Fallacaro's impairment in its uncorrected state. Id. at 92-94. The court, therefore,
denied the IRS's motion to dismiss and found that the IRS mustjustify its adverse employment
decision before a fact-finder. Id. at 94. The court also denied partial summary judgment to
Fallacaro and noted that simply because her vision impairment may rise to the level of a
disability did not mean that she did not have to satisfy the requirement that she was a "qualified
individual." Id. In summary, the court concluded that it should enable Fallacaro to benefit from
the provisions of the ADA and granted her an evaluation of the alleged adverse employment
action. Id.
120. Id. at 94.
121. Id. at 93.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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coverage an entire group of potentially disabled individuals at the threshold
question level. 24 Such individuals would be deprived of even the chance to
present their claims to the court." According to the Fallacaro court, it then
follows that to prevent this inequitable result, courts should evaluate the
underlying impairment rather than the temporarily corrected state of the
impairment. 26 Therefore, in its attempt to further the broad anti-discrimina-
tion policy of the ADA, the Fallacaro court ruled that it should not consider
mitigating measures when evaluating the limiting effects of an impairment. 27
The court eventually denied summary judgment for the defendant-employer
and ordered an assessment of the claimant's vision without the assistance of
corrective lenses.
In Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Department, 129 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also advanced a policy
argument in support of its decision to evaluate a claimant's vision impairment
without the aid of corrective lenses. 30 In particular, the court cited to the
generally accepted policy that because the ADA is a remedial statute, courts
should construe it broadly.' Agreeing with this proposition, the court further
124. Id.
125. Id. The court stated that the facts of this case exemplify this logic. Id. The IRS
argued that the Rehabilitation Act did not protect Fallacaro because her corrected vision did not
rise to the level of a disability. Id. However, the IRS excluded her from the special agent
position specifically because of her uncorrected vision level. Id. The court reasoned that the
factthatthe IRS considers the uncorrected vision level in its qualifications for the agentposition





129. 964 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
130. See Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964F. Supp. 898,907 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding that courts should not consider mitigating measures when evaluating impact of
impairment). The court in Wilson examined whether individuals denied positions as state
troopers due to a failure to satisfy the uncorrected visual acuity requirement can bring a claim
under the ADA. Id. at 900. The police department argued that because Wilson can see clearly
with corrective lenses his impairment does not substantially limit him in any major life activi-
ties. Id. at 902. The court disagreed with this rationale and denied the police department's
motion for summaryjudgment. Id at 908-09. According to the court, the EEOC guidelines and
the legislative history on the issue supported its decision to evaluate Wilson's vision without
consideration of his corrective lenses. Id. at 905. The court found that a claimant who does not
currently experience the adverse effects of his impairment because of medication should still
have the opportunity to present his ADA claim to a fact-finder. Id.
131. See id. at 906 (discussing remedial nature of ADA) (citing Heilweil v. Mt. Sinai
Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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explained that a broad interpretation of the ADA necessarily entails a liberal
application of its protections.'32 Such a liberal application, the court reasoned,
includes the evaluation of an individual's impairment in its unmedicated
state.'33 The court recognized that this was the best way to ensure coverage
of all individuals with disabilities.'34 This broad application will likely result
in coverage of individuals who are not obviously substantially impaired.'35
The court recognized that the public may not think of these individuals as
being disabled.'36 However, it reasoned that societal intuition should not
dictate nor interpret the ADA.'37 Instead, looking to Congress's intent to
create a broadly sweeping remedial statute, the court discovered that an
evaluation of an impairment in its unaided state is proper.'38 The Wilson
court, in its conclusion on this issue, decided that corrective eye wear should
not be a consideration in evaluating a vision impairment.'39
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit added yet
another policy argument in support of the EEOC's position on mitigating
measures' 4 In Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,'41 the First Circuit
reasoned that an evaluation of a claimant's impairment in its medicated state
would result in different treatment of individuals who are financially able to
treat their impairment. 142 For example, courts will evaluate an individual who
132. Id. at 907.
133. See id. (concluding that courts should not interpret "substantially limits" so narrowly




136. See id. at 906-07 (giving example of individual confined to wheelchair as compared
to individual who can alleviate impairment by putting on eyeglasses).
137. Id. at 907.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 906-07 (concluding that corrective lenses should not be consideration when
deciding if impairment substantially limits major life activity). The court first determined
whether the EEOC guidelines were a reasonable construction of the ADA and worthy of the
court's deference. Id. at 904-05. The language of the EEOC and the legislative history of the
Act convinced the court that the EEOC's position on the issue of mitigating measures was
reasonable. Id. at 905. The court supplemented its conclusion with the policy argument stated
in the text of this Note. See supra notes 129-138 and accompanying text (outlining policy
argument).
140. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,861 (lstCir. 1998) (expressing
policy in support of EEOC guidelines regarding mitigating measures).
141. 136 F.3d 854 (lst Cir. 1998)
142. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,861 (1 st Cir. 1998) (supporting
EEOC interpretive guidelines on issue of mitigating measures). InArnold, the court had to deter-
mine if Arnold had a disability under the ADA and, if he did, whether the United Parcel Service
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cannot afford medication that may fully alleviate her symptoms in her un-
treated state.'43 On the other hand, courts will evaluate in her treated state an
individual who can afford the medication and uses it.'" Under this rationale,
courts will treat less favorably under the ADA individuals who are more
financially secure. 4 Congress did not, according to the court in Arnold,
intend this inequitable result. 46 The Arnold court suggests that the only
equitable remedy is to evaluate all claimants' impairments in their unmedi-
cated states.' 47
After analyzing the legislative history of the ADA and the policy consid-
erations involved in its enactment, these courts have concluded that the sug-
gestions of the EEOC interpretive guidelines properly interpret the ADA .
48
Thus, according to these courts, a court should disregard mitigating measures
when evaluating impairments. 149 Because of this broad interpretation of the
ADA, individuals with impairments aided by medication or other assistive
devices who bring their claims in these courts can expect to have the opportu-
nity to present their claim fully. 5 Not all courts, however, have accepted the
EEOC's position on the issue of mitigating measures.
(UPS) denied him employment because of his disability. Id. at 856. Arnold suffered from
insulin-dependent diabetes which he controlled through daily injections ofinsulin and aregimen
of diet and exercise. Id. Arnold alleged that he is disabled under the ADA because, according
to his doctor's reports, he would die without his medication. Id. The court evaluated the
legislative history of the ADA, the plain statutory language of the ADA that addresses the
"substantially limiting" requirement, and the policy considerations for and against the courts'
consideration of mitigating measures in the evaluation of a claimant's impairment. Id. at 857-
863. The court concluded that all ofthese sources support the theory that courts should disregard
mitigating measures when evaluating a claimant's impairment. Id. at 863. In addition, the court
noted that the EEOC interpretive guidelines support this application of the ADA. Id. at 863-64.
The court realized that the EEOC interpretive guidelines do not have controlling weight but
concluded, nonetheless, that because the guidelines are reasonable and consistent with the
remedial purpose of the ADA, they were worthy of the court's deference. Id. at 864. As a result
of its evaluation, the court concluded that it should not consider mitigating measures when
evaluating impairments for an ADA claim. Id. at 866. The Arnold court, however, limited its
holding to the particular medical condition in question in this claim, diabetes mellitus. Id.





148. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which courts have agreed with EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
149. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing court decisions which adhere to EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines on issue of mitigating measures).
150. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998)
(remanding claim to lower court to determine ADA claim on presented facts); Matczak v.
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B. Courts Should Consider Mitigating Measures:
Non-Deferential Treatment of the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines
Similar to the courts that have explicitly followed the EEOC's position
on mitigating measures, the courts of appeals and district courts that have
chosen not to adhere to the EEOC interpretive guidelines have done so only
after a thorough evaluation of both the language of the ADA and its legislative
history.15 ' These courts, however, have concluded that the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines are not a reasonable construction of the ADA. 152 In support of
their decisions to disregard the EEOC's position on mitigating measures, these
courts consistently have put forth two basic arguments: (1) the language of
the EEOC interpretive guidelines regarding mitigating measures directly
conflicts with the plain language of the ADA'53 and (2) the EEOC's directions
to evaluate the effects of an impairment without considering the measures
used to alleviate its effects conflict with other provisions of the EEOC inter-
pretive guidelines. 
15
1. Conflict Between the Language of the EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines and the Plain Language of the ADA
To accept that the EEOC interpretive guidelines are a reasonable con-
struction of the ADA, courts must find that the guidelines do not contradict
Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Harris v. H
& W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996) (same).
151. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
EEOC interpretive guidelines provision on mitigating measures were neither consistent with text
of ADA nor with other provisions of interpretive guidelines); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124
F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3
(5th Cir. 1996) (same); Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 853-54 (D. Minn.
1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-08 (D.R.I. 1997)
(same); Gaddy ex. reL Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (D. Kan. 1997)
(same); Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1087-88 (D. Kan. 1996) (same);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879-81 (D. Kan. 1996) (same), afj'd,
141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
152. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts explain their rationale
for disagreeing with EEOC interpretive guidelines on issue of mitigating measures).
153. See cases citedsupra note 151 (listing cases in which courts found EEOC interpretive
guidelines in conflict with plain language of ADA).
154. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 903 (10th Cir. 1997) (evaluating
legislative history of ADA as well as language included in Act itself in course of considering
appropriate method of evaluating mitigated impairments); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d
760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-
08 (D.R.I. 1997) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880-81 (D.
Kan. 1996) (same), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
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the ADA's plain language. 155 Not all courts have found this to be true. 56 To
many, the EEOC guidelines directly contradict the language of the ADA. 7
If such a conflict exists, then the guidelines are neither reasonable nor worthy
ofjudicial deference.'58
In Gilday v. Mecosta County,159 for example, a divided United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the EEOC's position on
mitigating measures directly contradicts the ADA's requirement that an
impairment be substantially limiting. 6° The claimant in Gilday suffered from
diabetes, which he controlled with a prescribed regime of medication, diet,
155. See DAviS &PIERCE, supra note 36, at 239-43 (discussing necessary requirements for
court to find agency interpretation is reasonable construction of statute).
156. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (finding EEOC guidelines directly at odds with plain
language of ADA); Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (same); Hodgens, 963 F. Supp. at 107-08 (same);
Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 880-81 (same).
157. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
EEOC guidelines directly at odds with plain language ofADA); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124
F.3d 760,767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102,
107-08 (D.RI. 1997) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880-81
(D. Kan. 1996) (same), affrd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
158. See DAVIS& PIERCE, supra note 36, at 239-43 (explaining that courts do not have to
adhere to unreasonable agency interpretations of statute); Anthony, supra note 36, at 58 (ex-
plaining deference due non-congressionally mandated agency interpretations).
159. 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
160. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,766 (6th Cir. 1997) (deciding mitigat-
ing measures should be part of evaluation of impairment's substantially limiting impact). In
Gilday, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether Gilday presented
sufficient evidence of a disability to avoid summary judgment on his claim. Id. at 761. In
particular, the court had to decide if a diabetic who controls the symptoms of his disease with
medication can still satisfy the requirements of a disability under the ADA. Id. Kevin Gilday
was an emergency medical technician for 16 years until Mecosta County terminated him for
"conduct unbecoming a paramedic" and several instances of rudeness to co-workers and
patients. Id. Gilday alleged that Mecosta County terminated him because of his diabetic
condition. Id. Mecosta County, he alleged, should have accommodated his diabetic condition
by permitting him to be in a less chaotic atmosphere. Id. Such accommodation, he claimed,
would have prevented the sudden alterations in his blood sugar that often resulted in his hostile
behavior. Id. Thus, Gilday requested that the court adhere to the EEOC interpretive guidelines
and consider his diabetes in its unmedicated state, the state in which it is substantially limiting.
Id. Judge Kennedy, writing the majority opinion on this issue, concluded that the EEOC's
interpretation is in direct conflict with the ADA and therefore is not a reasonable construction
of the statute. Id. at 767. The ADA requires that an impairment be substantially limiting to be
a disability. Id. The EEOC's method of evaluation allows coverage of an individual whose
impairment does not actually substantially limit her activities. Id. This, Judge Kennedy
reasoned, is an impermissible construction of the ADA. Id. This issue divided the court with
Judges Kennedy and Guy agreeing that the EEOC's interpretation was not a permissible one.
Id. at 768. All three judges, however, concurred that in this case, a material issue of fact did
remain. Id. at 766. Thus, the court remanded Gilday's claim for further proceedings. Id.
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and exercise.' In determining the summaryjudgment issue, all three judges
on the panel concurred that a material issue of fact remained. The judges
did not, however, concur on the issue of how to evaluate a medicated impair-
ment under the ADA.
163
Judge Kennedy, joined by Judge Guy, concluded that the court must
evaluate an individual's impairment in light of the mitigating measures the
individual uses to alleviate its effects."6 Judge Kennedy pointed to a direct
conflict between the EEOC interpretive guidelines and the ADA to support
her conclusion.165 Under the express terms of the ADA, an impairment does
not rise to the level of a disability unless it substantially limits a major life
activity."6 The related provision of the EEOC interpretive guidelines suggests
that courts partake in the substantially limiting evaluation without consider-
ation of mitigating measures. 67 If a court chooses to follow the EEOC's
recommendation, an impairment that does not substantially limit an individual
because of the medication used to treat it may still constitute a disability under
the ADA. 6 This interpretation, according to Judge Kennedy, essentially
eliminates the substantially limiting requirement of the ADA.'69 Judge
Kennedy concluded that the EEOC's interpretive guidelines are clearly at
odds with the statutory language of the ADA. 7
161. See id. at 761 (describing Gilday's condition). Gilday suffered from non-insulin
dependent diabetes. Id. He treated this condition with oral medication, blood sugar monitoring,
and a restricted diet. Id.
162. Id. at 766. With or without consideration of mitigating measures, all threejudges on
the panel agreed that, in this case, the plaintiff had presented a material issue of fact regarding
the existence of a disability. Id. In other words, Judges Kennedy and Guy found that Gilday's
impairment in its aided state may still substantially limit a major life activity. Id.
163. See id. (showing contrasting opinions among judges). The majority opinion of the
court remanded the claim for further consideration. Id. All three judges concurred that, with
or without consideration of mitigating measures, Gilday had presented a material issue of fact
regarding the substantially limiting nature of his impairment. Id. Judge Moore wrote the
opinion for the court on this issue. Id. at 766. Judge Kennedy, however, wrote the opinion for
the court on the issue of mitigating measures, finding that courts should consider mitigating
measures when evaluating the limiting effects of an impairment. Id.
164. Id. at 766-68.
165. Id. at 767.
166. See id. at 766-67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (1994)) (discussing ADA's defini-
tion of disability).
167. See id. at 767 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)) (discussing assistance of
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Judge Kennedy recognized that the ADA's legislative history appears to
support the EEOC's position."' However, she noted that when the actual text
of the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to look to the legislative history
for clarification. 72 According to Judge Kennedy, the statutory language on
this issue was clear: an impairment must actually substantially limit a major
life activity in order to rise to the level of a disability.73 Judge Kennedy
concluded, and Judge Guy concurred, that courts should not adhere to the
EEOC interpretive guidelines on the issue of mitigating measures. 74
2. Internal Inconsistencies of the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines
An agency's interpretation of a statute is unreasonable if the interpreta-
tion itself is internally inconsistent or is inconsistent with other agency
positions on that statute.'75 In such situations, courts arejustified in disregard-
ing agency interpretations. 76 Many courts have determined that the EEOC's
position on mitigating measures does not coincide with its interpretation of
other aspects of the ADA including, in particular, what constitutes a substan-
tially limiting impairment.'77 This internal inconsistency has led these courts
to disregard the EEOC interpretive guidelines and to formulate for themselves
the correct method of evaluating claims aided by medication. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Sutton v.
UnitedAir Lines, Inc., 179 addressed this internal tension inthe EEOC interpre-
171. Id.
172. See id. (explaining when courts should use legislative history to interpret statutes)
(citing Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 36, at 108 (describing when courts should follow
agency's interpretation).
176. See id. (stating that courts do not have to follow unreasonable agency interpretation);
Anthony, supra note 36, at 54-58 (same). If an agency interpretation is internally inconsistent,
the courts can determine that it is an unreasonable interpretation and not worthy of deference.
Id.
177. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
EEOC's position on mitigating measures does not coincide with its position on "substantially
limiting" requirement); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 108 (D.R.I.
1997) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan. 1996)
(finding EEOC's position on mitigating measures contradicts its own example of individual who
satisfies "regarded as" disabled prong of disability definition), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir.
1998).
178. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (disregarding EEOC position on mitigating measures);
Hodgens, 963 F. Supp. at 108 (same); Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 881 (same).
179. 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
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tive guidelines. 8 ° The claimants in Sutton contested United Air Lines's
(United) decision not to hire them.'81 The parties stipulated that United failed
to hire the claimants because of their uncorrected visual acuity levels.12 In
deciding whether to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, the court
directly addressed the issue of mitigating measures.'
The Sutton court concluded that it should evaluate vision impairments
and other correctable impairments in light of the assistive devices that the
180. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 901-02 (10th Cir. 1997) (deciding
that individuals who suffer from vision impairment that is correctable with lenses are not
disabled for purposes of ADA because, with lenses, they are not substantially limited in major
life activity). In Sutton, two regional commercial airline pilots brought a claim against United
Air Lines (United) for violation of the ADA following United's failure to hire them because
of their uncorrected vision level. Id. at 895. According to United's policy, a pilot must have
uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better in each eye. Id. The plaintiffs in this action were twin
sisters who both have uncorrected vision of 20/200 in their right eyes and 20/400 in their left
eyes. Id. Both, however, had corrected vision of 20/20. Id. The plaintiffs argued that,
according to the EEOC interpretive guidelines, the court should evaluate their vision in its
uncorrected state. Id. With such an evaluation, the court would most likely have found that
their vision impairment substantially limited the major life activity of seeing. Id. Thus, they
argued, they had a disability under the ADA and were entitled to the ADA's protection. Id. The
court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument and in turn disregarded the EEOC interpretive
guidelines on the matter. Id. at 901. The court found that it should not adhere to the portion
of the EEOC interpretive guidelines that addresses the issue of mitigating measures in the
"substantially limiting" test because: (1) it is in direct conflict with the ADA and (2) it is
internally inconsistent with other portions of the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. Id. at 902.
The ADA requires that, in order to rise to the level of a disability, an impairment must substan-
tially limit the individual in a major life activity. Id. If a court does not consider mitigating
measures in the assessment of the impairment, it cannot truly evaluate the actual impact of the
disability. Id. According to the court, Congress did not intend this type of assessment. Iad
Additionally, the court pointed out that the EEOC itself mentions within another section of its
own interpretive guidelines that the impact of an impairment is not contingent on the name of
the diagnosis but rather on the actual effect that the impairment has on the individual's life. Id.
(quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) 1-2 (1997)). Thus, even within its own guidelines, the
EEOC recognizes that the hypothetical effects of an impairment that may arise without the use
of the mitigating measures are not the effects that the court should analyze for purposes of
determining who has a disability under the ADA. Id. In accordance with this rationale, the
court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the action and found the claimants, whose
corrected vision was 20/20, were not individuals with disabilities under the ADA. Id.
181. Id. at 895.
182. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' allegations of ADA violation). The claimants both
suffered from a visual impairment of 20/200 in their right eyes and 20/400 in their left eyes. Id.
United's policy required pilots to have an uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better. Id.
183. See id. at 901 (explaining that its decision on mitigating measures issue will have
determinative effect on case). The court recognized the existing division among courts on this
issue, especially within the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 901 nn.7-8. As a result, it attempted to
evaluate thoroughly the issue and create a precedent for the district courts within the Tenth
Circuit to follow. Id. at 901-03.
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claimant used to alleviate the impairment's effects.' In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court first looked to the EEOC interpretive guidelines."'5 Upon
examination, the court discovered that the guidelines themselves were incon-
sistent on this issue.186 In particular, the court noted that the EEOC's position
on mitigating measures contradicts its position on what constitutes a "substan-
tially limiting" impairment.8 7 In its interpretive guidelines, the EEOC ex-
plained that Congress intended the determinative factor of a substantially
limiting analysis to be the actual effect that an impairment has on an individ-
ual. "'88 The court found that the EEOC specifically stated that the diagnosis
or name of an impairment should not be dispositive on the issue of whether
it substantially limits an individual.'89 The actual effect is most important. 9 '
Additionally, the EEOC advocated a case-by-case analysis to assess the actual
impact of the impairment on the individual.'9 '
The Sutton court noted that the EEOC continued its explanation of the
"substantially limiting" requirement in a contradictory fashion. 92 The EEOC
stated that in the evaluation of an impairment's limiting effect mitigating
measures should not be a consideration. 93 In suggesting this, the court
reasoned, the EEOC recommended that courts evaluate the effects of an
impairment that might occur without medication - in other words, the hypo-
thetical impact of an impairment.'94 This method of evaluation, the Sutton
court reasoned, is totally inconsistent with the EEOC's prior statement that the
actual effect on the individual's life is the determinative factor in assessing
whether or not the impairment is substantially limiting. 9' Because of this
underlying tension within the EEOC guidelines, the Sutton court did not
adhere to the recommendations contained in the guidelines.'96 Instead, the
184. See id. at 902 (deciding to evaluate claimants' visual impairmentin its corrected state).
185. See id. (evaluating EEOC guidelines on mitigating measures).
186. See id. (stating tension in EEOC guidelines undermines the guidelines' credibility).
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
189. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
190. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
191. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)) (discussing EEOC's preference for case by
case analysis of ADA claims).
192. Id.
193. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)) (discussing EEOC's position on
mitigating measures).
194. See id. (pointing out inevitable result of adherence to EEOC's position: courts will
permit hypothetical limits of impairments to raise impairment to level of disability).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Sutton court applied what it considered to be the plain language of the ADA:
an impairment must substantially limit a major life activity. 97 This plain
language, the court concluded, necessarily dictates an evaluation of an
impairment in its medicated state.' 9
The Sutton court, along with several district courts, concluded that the
underlying tension of the EEOC interpretive guidelines made the EEOC's
position an unreasonable construction of the ADA. 99 As a result, these
courts chose not to adhere to the agency's instructions to disregard mitigat-
ing measures in their evaluations.2 0 Instead, these courts concluded from
the plain language of the ADA that courts should incorporate mitigating
measures into the evaluation of an impairment.20'
The courts described in this section have concluded that courts should
incorporate into their impairment analysis mitigating measures which the
claimant uses to alleviate the symptoms of her impairment. 2 According to
these courts, the plain language of the ADA and certain sections of the
EEOC regulations dictate such a decision.20 3 This conclusion has placed
these courts directly at odds with the courts that have chosen to disregard
mitigating measures in impairment evaluations, creating a division among
the circuits and confusion among litigants. Clearly, this issue must be
resolved.
IV A New Approach: A Multi-Factored Guideline to the
Mitigating Measures Analysis
After evaluating the legislative history, the plain language of the ADA,
and the information disseminated by the EEOC, courts are still in disagree-
ment about whether they should disregard mitigating measures when evalu-
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. (finding internal inconsistencies within EEOC interpretive guidelines); see
also Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-08 (D.R.I. 1997) (same);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880 (D. Kan. 1996) (same), aff'd, 141
F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
200. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts decided EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines were not reasonable construction of ADA and therefore not worthy of court's
deference).
201. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which courts adhere to EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines).
202. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts disregarded EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
203. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts disregarded EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
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ating an ADA claim." 4 It is unclear which courts are right: the courts in
which mitigating measures are not a consideration or the courts that find the
use of mitigating measures an integral part of the impairment analysis. An
evaluation of the decisions on either side of the disagreement demonstrates
that neither approach is entirely correct.
One commentator, Professor Catherine J. Lanctot, builds. upon the
notion that neither the EEOC's position on mitigating measures nor the
position ofthe courts in opposition to the EEOC's position is correct.20 5 As
a solution, Lanctot proposes the creation of a "per se disability" list.
2 6
According to Lanctot, certain impairments, such as insulin-dependent
diabetes or the HIV infection, should constitute per se disabilities for pur-
poses of an ADA claim evaluation. 207 The instance of these impairments
alone satisfy independently the threshold question of whether or not an
individual has a disability, regardless of whether the individual uses mitigat-
ing measures. 208 According to Lanctot, an evaluation of these per se disabili-
ties should incorporate the use of mitigating measures for the limited pur-
poses of determining the individual's qualifications for the position in
question, an evaluation that takes place after a determination that the indi-
vidual has a disability.209 It is at that point in the court's analysis, Lanctot
suggests, that an individual should present her use of mitigating measures
to show that, with the assistance of the mitigating measure, she is a qualified
individual with a disability.
210
Although this approach may be helpful in a court's analysis of impair-
ments that are included in a per se disability list, this proposal is too limited
in its scope to be a useful solution to the overall problem of mitigating
measures. Lanctot limits her proposal to the analysis of what she considers
"per se disabilities. 21' She does not address whether courts should consider
204. See supra Part III (discussing confusion among Courts of Appeals as well as district
courts regarding mitigating measures).
205. See Lanctot, supra note 7, at 333 (discussing need to recognize certain impairments
as per se disabilities which would eliminate need for courts to analyze these impairments under
"substantially limiting" test).
206. See id. (proposing list of per se disabilities).
207. See id. at 333-36 (stating need to recognize per se disabilities such as diabetes and
HIV infection).
208. See id. (describingproposalfor"persedisability" list). Lanctotsuggeststhatbecause
prejudice against individuals is not fact-specific for certain disabilities, the evaluation of these
same disabilities should not be fact-specific. Id. at 337.
209. Id. at 337.
210. Id.
211. See id. (discussing per se disabilities).
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mitigating measures when.evaluating impairments that do not make her list
of per se disabilities. Furthermore, Lanctot fails to note Congress's and the
EEOC's original hesitation in making a list of automatically included
disabilities.2" 2 Both the EEOC and Congress recognized the importance of
individualized analyses of disabilities.213 Categorization of impairments,
Congress reasoned, precludes courts from performing this desired individual
analysis.2"4 Thus, Lanctot's per se disability list is not likely to be an ap-
proach that Congress would favor. Even if Congress accepted Lanctot's
proposal, her approach is still too limited to solve the general problem when
evaluating any claimant who uses mitigating measures.
A solution to the mitigating measures issue that would be a useful tool
for the courts should do the following: (1) address all situations in which
mitigating measures might play a role; (2) comply with the purpose of Title
I of the ADA; and (3) be easily applied by the courts. An approach to the
mitigating measures issue that satisfies these criteria and that, if used, might
remedy the division in the Courts of Appeals is the following multi-factored
guideline that incorporates a three-part test. The multi-factored guideline
allows courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if they should include
a particular mitigating measure in the impairment evaluation.215 It works by
directing courts to evaluate each mitigating measure's reliability, effective-
ness, and potential for unreliability and ineffectiveness for the claimant.
212. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997) (explaining that nature of disability necessitates
case by case evaluation). In her evaluation, Lanctot cites to individuals who attempted to have
such a list of specific disabilities incorporated into the ADA. See Lanctot, supra note 7, at 333
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 33).
213. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (stating that "the case by case approach is essential").
214. Id. The Supreme Court also hesitates to recognize "per se" disabilities. In Bragdon
v. Abbott, the Supreme Court evaded the task of determining if HIV is a per se disability.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Rather, the court found that the effects of the
disorder substantially limited the claimant in the major life activity of reproduction. Id. Thus,
the Court avoided the need to determine if HIV, and potentially many other impairments, are
"per se" disabilities.
215. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (outlining factors for courts to consider when deter-
mining if impairment is substantially limiting). The multi-factored guideline is structured after
and can be compared to the three-part analysis the EEOC created for courts to assist them in
deciding whether or not the effects of an impairment are substantially limiting. Id. According
to the EEOC regulations, when evaluating the limiting effects of an impairment the courts
should consider the following three factors: "(1) the nature and severity of the impairment,
(2) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) [t]he permanent or long term
impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of, or resulting from, the impairment."
Id. Both this three-part analysis and the proposed multi-factored guideline provide courts a
method of evaluation which permits them to consistently rule on issues that are inherently case
specific.
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Courts should consider each factor equally; no one factor should determine
independently whether a court should consider the mitigating measure in the
impairment evaluation.
This approach is rooted in the basic premise that some, but not all,
mitigating measures should be a part of a court's impairment analysis.2"6 In
general, courts should include mitigating measures that are so infallible and
reliable that, because of them, the underlying impairment essentially never
impacts the claimants. On the other hand, courts should not include in their
impairment evaluations those mitigating measures that are not fully effective
or reliable. These mitigating measures more easily allow for a surfacing of
the symptoms of the underlying impairment. The factors incorporated into
the three-part guideline should ease the courts' analysis of the distinction
between those types of mitigating measures. The factors address the attrib-
utes of the mitigating measure itself as applied to a specific individual's
impairment. In particular, the courts should consider the following factors
when evaluating a mitigating measure: (1) effectiveness of the mitigating
measure; (2) reliability of the mitigating measure; and (3) potential unreli-
ability and ineffectiveness of the mitigating measure. These three factors
should enable the courts to distinguish between mitigating measures that
should be a part of the impairment analysis and those that should not.
A. Effectiveness of the Mitigating Measure
When evaluating the specific treatment used to limit the effects of an
underlying impairment, the court should first look at the effectiveness of the
mitigating measure for the claimant. How effective is this mitigating mea-
sure? Does it alleviate all or most of the individual's symptoms? If the
individual uses a mitigating measure that is not truly effective in alleviating
symptoms, a court should not include it in the impairment evaluation. But
if the mitigating measure alleviates all of the effects of the underlying
impairment, a court should evaluate the impairment in its medicated state.
For example, a court should disregard corrective eye wear when evaluating
an individual's vision impairment if the individual can demonstrate that,
even with the corrective lenses, the individual still suffers from the effects
of the underlying impairment.2"7 Another example is an individual who
216. See id. (stating that courts should disregard all mitigating measures). The multi-
factored approach is not as broad. The multi-factored approach necessarily implies that courts
should disregard only some mitigating measures.
217. See Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (evaluating vision
impairment in its unmedicated state), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 693 (1998); Fallacaro v. Richard-
son, 965 F. Supp. 87,91 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964
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suffers from insulin-dependent diabetes. Although the individual may be
able to regulate blood sugar with the insulin, she may, in certain situations,
still not be able to control the effects of the diabetes." 8 Therefore, for this
individual, the insulin treatment is not totally effective. Courts should not
disqualify such an individual from ADA coverage because of inconsistently
effective insulin treatment. If the treatment is not effective, courts should
evaluate the impairment in its unmedicated state.
B. Reliability of the Mitigating Measure
A second factor to consider is the reliability of the mitigating mea-
sure. What is the likelihood that the mitigating measure will become an
insufficient method of alleviating the claimant's symptoms? Again, con-
sider a claimant with a vision impairment who wears corrective lenses. 9
How frequently has the claimant's impairment been substantially limiting
because, for example, something knocked her glasses off? How likely
is this occurrence? If it is very likely, then it would be unreasonable to
consider the claimant's vision in its corrected state. The mitigating mea-
sure she uses is not reliable enough. In the case of the insulin dependent
diabetic considered above, the reliability of the treatment is closely related
to the effectiveness of such a treatment.22 It is possible that the insulin may
not be effective in certain situations. In that case, the insulin is neither
effective nor reliable and the courts should not evaluate the diabetes in its
medicated state.
F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d
893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that courts should evaluate vision impairments in
corrected state); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1080-81 n.6 (E.D. Okla. 1997)
(same). In the above cases, the courts would have to determine on a case-by-case basis if the
individual's corrective eye wear should be a part of the impairment evaluation. The multi-
factored guideline would prevent the inconsistency that resulted under the influences of the
EEOC interpretive guidelines.
218. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997) (evaluating ADA
claim of non-insulin dependent diabetic). The court in Gilday evaluated an insulin dependent
diabetic who claimed that, even with treatment, certain stressful situations caused a fluctuation
in his blood sugar level. Id. at 761. This, he alleged, resulted in the display of the normally
controlled adverse effects of his impairment. Id. Under the multi-factored guideline approach,
the court would evaluate Gilday's impairment in its unmedicated state. The mitigating measure
Gilday used was not effective at all times nor was it a reliable treatment. Id.
219. See supra Part IV.A (applying effectiveness factor to claimant with vision impair-
ment).
220. See supra note 160 (discussing Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir.
1997)).
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C. Potential for Ineffectiveness or Unreliability of the
Mitigating Measure
A final factor that the courts should consider is the potential that the
mitigating measure will become ineffective or unreliable in the future. For
this evaluation, the court must consider the mitigating measure as it has
worked for the general population. Does this mitigating measure tradition-
ally lose its effectiveness or become unreliable after a certain time period?
Do individuals often become immune to its ameliorative effects? This
factor is a synthesis of the first two factors and involves an assessment of
hypothetical factors. Although courts generally do not favor hypothetical
approaches, it is necessary to evaluate fully the characteristics of the mitigat-
ing measure. If a particular mitigating measure has traditionally been
effective in eliminating symptoms of an impairment but for only a limited
time period, courts should not treat it as if it eliminates the underlying
impairment. Similarly, if individuals typically become immune to the
ameliorative effects of the medication, a court should not include the medi-
cation in the impairment evaluation.
This multi-factored guideline can resolve the problem of mitigating
measures that presently divides the circuits. This approach is fair for both
the plaintiff and the employer, is consistent with the provisions of the ADA,
and is easy for courts to apply. The multi-factored guideline demands that
courts, in accordance with the ADA and the EEOC interpretive guidelines,
give individual attention to each claim. This individualized analysis protects
plaintiffs by preventing courts from imposing blanket exclusions to cover-
age. Courts cannot evaluate a claim in its medicated state if it bases its
decision to do so on general information about a mitigating measure and its
effects on particular impairments. Similarly, an employer has a benefit
under the multi-factored guideline that she did not have under the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines: courts will, in some instances, consider mitigating
measures when evaluating an impairment. Finally, this approach is not
difficult for the courts to apply. As case law applying these guidelines
develops, the multi-factored guideline will provide a workable framework
for the courts. As a result, courts will become a more predictable and fair
forum for ADA claimants and employers.
V Conclusion
Eight years after Congress enacted the ADA, courts are still uncertain
as to exactly who this anti-discrimination statute covers. The courts are
clearly fractured on this issue, particularly regarding individuals who allevi-
ate the effects of their impairment with medical devices. For these individu-
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als, the court in which they bring their claim could be the determinative
factor in their claim's success or failure. Because Congress did not intend
this result, the Supreme Court or Congress needs to resolve the persistent
issue of how courts should treat mitigating measures.
The multi-factored guideline to mitigating measures is the best ap-
proach. It allows for an individualized evaluation of the mitigating measures
involved in each plaintiff's claim but within a specific framework. Applica-
tion of this framework will eventually create a standard by which courts,
claimants, and employers can predictably evaluate the results of their claim.
The multi-factored guideline will allow courts to bypass some of the ambig-
uous language of the ADA and provide, as Congress intended, a "clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standard addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.""22
221. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994).
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L Introduction
The evolution of business organization law in recent years is striking.
Traditionally, lawyers could consistently rely on certain categorical norms.
For example, a clear difference existed between general partnerships and
limited partnerships.' Partners in general partnerships faced unlimited per-
sonal liability for partnership obligations and were expected to participate in
firm management.2 Alternatively, limited partnerships offered limited liability
for those partners who had little desire to participate in firm management.3
Such stark formal differences made application of federal securities law4 to
partnership interests relatively simple.5
Although federal securities law does not specifically mention partnership
interests in the definition of a "security," courts and commentators agree that
partnership interests should be analyzed as investment contracts, a term
included in the definition of a "security."6 In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,7 the
Supreme Court announced an investment contract test that required profits to
be derived from the "efforts of others."8 Building on Howey's "efforts of
1. Compare UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1914) § 15 [hereinafter UPA] (providing that
partners arejointly and severally liable for another partner's wrongful act or breach of trust and
jointly liable for all other partnership obligations) with UNIF. LIMITEDPARTNERSHIPACT (1916)
§ 7 [hereinafter ULPA] (providing limited liability for limited partners unless they participate
in control of business).
2. See RICHARDA. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.2, at 429 (5th ed. 1998)
(suggesting that unlimited personal liability for partnership obligations encourages each partner
to participate in firm management).
3. See Comment, The Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895, 904-05 (1936) (dis-
cussing extent to which limited partners expect to participate in firm management).
4. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-z (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(u) (1994).
5. See infra Part II.B. 1 & 2 (discussing traditional treatment of general and limited
partnership interests under securities law).
6. See Conrad E.J. Everhard, The Limited Partnership Interest: Is It a Security?
Changing Times, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 441, 444 (1992) (discussing treatment of partnership
interests under federal securities law).
7. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
8. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,301 (1946) (concluding that interests in
question are investment contracts and thus securities). In Howey, the Supreme Court created
a test for determining when an investment is an "investment contract" under the federal
securities laws. Id. The investors in Howey purchased small tracts of citrus groves consisting
of individual rows or portions thereof. Id. at 295. A single row of forty-eight trees constituted
one acre, and thirty-one of the forty-two investors bought less than five acres. Id. In addition
to a land sales contract, most investors also purchased a service contract from Howey Co. that
gave the company full discretion and authority over cultivation, harvesting, and marketing of
the investors' crops, with net profits later distributed to the investors. Id. at 296. Most of the
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others" test, lower federal courts developed presumptions that general partner-
ship interests are not securities and that limited partnership interests are
securities.9 These presumptions rely on traditional notions of the roles that
general and limited partners play within their respective firms.10
Recent changes in partnership law have uprooted traditional notions of
partnership, causing a blurring of the lines and a collision of categories so that
traditional presumptions no longer provide sufficient analytical tools when
decidingwhetherpartnership interests are securities. Generalpartnership law
no longer guarantees general partners enough control over partnership affairs
to protect their investment." Statutory norms no longer restrict limited
partners to merely passive roles.12 Moreover, the development of limited
liability partnerships (LLPs) effectively eliminates the traditional tradeoff
between partnership control and limited liability.'3 This Note considers
whether changes to partnership law and the development ofLLPs should alter
the effect of federal securities law on partnership interests.
In Part II, this Note discusses the traditional application of federal
securities law on general and limited partnership interests. Part III provides
a lengthy but necessary discussion of the changes in modem partnership law
that make traditional form-based presumptions less reliable. Specifically, Part
III discusses the increased freedom of contract available under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) and explains how this freedom enables
partnerships to create strong centralized management and stripped general
investors were professionals who lacked the "knowledge, skill and equipment necessary for the
care and cultivation of citrus trees." Id. Taking the position that substance prevails over form,
the Howey Court held that the land sales contract and the service contract taken together
constituted investment contracts under the securities laws. Id. at 299. In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Court held that an investment contract exists when there is an investment of money in
a common enterprise with an expectation of profit to be derived solely through the efforts of
others. Id. at 301. See infra Part II (discussing traditional treatment of general and limited
partnership interests under federal securities law).
9. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that general
partnership interests presumptively are not securities); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41
(9th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that limited partnership interests presumptively are securities).
10. See Michael J. Garrison & Terry W. Knoepfle, Limited Liability Company Interests
as Securities: A Proposed Frameworkfor Analysis, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 577, 617 (1996) (stating
that general partnership interests are usually not securities because owners are active partici-
pants who directly control partnership).
11. See infra Part III.A (discussing freedom of contract under Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act).
12. See infra Part III.B (discussing change in limited partnership law that allows limited
partners to exercise control over business).
13. See infra Part III.C (discussing LLPs and elimination of tradeoff between partnership
control and limited liability).
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partners. 4 In addition, Part III explains how the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (RULPA) allows limited partners to exercise control without
incurring personal liability. Part III concludes with a discussion of LLPs and
compares LLPs to general partnerships. Part IV suggests that changes in
modem partnership law remove the basis for presuming that partnership
interests are or are not securities based solely on formal categories. Further-
more, Part IV proposes a test for determining whether an interest in a general
partnership, a limited partnership, or an LLP is a security. Part V concludes
that formal categories no longer reflect economic reality and that courts
should disregard form-based distinctions when deciding whether partnership
interests are securities.
I. Federal Securities Law and the Definition of"Security"
Congress intended the federal securities laws 5 to ensure fair disclosure
of financial information to potential investors. 6 The federal securities laws
apply to transactions involving "securities" as defined in the Securities Act of
193317 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.18 According to the Supreme
14. See infra Part III.A (discussing RUPA and situation where partner has little or no
power). The term "stripped general partners" refers to general partners who lack the traditional
attributes normally associated with being a partner (for example, participation in management
and control, sharing in partnership profits, and participating in decisions to admit new partners).
15. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-z (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(u) (1994).
16. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating
that fundamental purpose of statutes was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor"); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38,
40 (1941) (stating that purpose of securities law is to protect investors by requiring disclosure).
17. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit, for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (emphasis added).
18. Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
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Court, the definitions of the term "security" in the two Acts are essentially the
same."9 The definitions do not explicitly include either general or limited
partnership interests.20 Thus, to be deemed securities, partnership interests
must fall into one of the general categories enumerated in the definition of a
security.2
A. SEC v. Howey and the Investment Contract Test
Courts and commentators generally agree that when deciding whether
partnership interests are securities, applying an investment contract analysis
is proper.' In the landmark case SEC v. W. J Howey Co., the Supreme Court
developed a four-part test for identifying an investment contract.23 According
to theHowey Court, an investment contract is a contract, transaction, or scheme
in which there is an investment of money in a common enterprise with an
expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others.24 The
Court intended the Howey test to protect passive investors who lack the neces-
sary knowledge or power to protect their investments.' In formulating the
or othermineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization cer-
tificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certif-
icate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, orprivilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency,
or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security;" br any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (emphasis added).
19. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982) (stating that definition of
security in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is essentially same as definition of security in Secu-
rities Act of 1933); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,847 n. 12 (1975) (same).
20. See supra notes 17-18 (providing definition of word "security" from Securities Act
of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
21. See Everhard, supra note 6, at 444 (discussing treatment ofpartnership interests under
federal securities law).
22. See id. at 444 & n.22 (discussing investment contract analysis and its application to
partnership interests).
23. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (formulating four-part
investment contract test in deciding that interest in question is security).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 299 (stating that test embodies flexible principle capable of adaptation to
meet various schemes devised by those who seek to use other people's money with promise of
profits).
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Howey test, the Court clearly stated that the test embodies a flexible principle
that courts should adapt to new profit-making schemes when appropriate. 6
Howey involved operations by two Florida corporations, W. J. Howey
Company (Howey Co.) and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. (HI-S), that were
under direct common control and management.27 Howey Co. would plant
approximately five hundred acres of citrus groves annually, keep half for
itself, and sell the other half to the public in small tracts to finance further
development.28 HHS provided services in cultivating, developing, harvesting,
and marketing the crops that the citrus groves produced.29 When entering into
the land sales contracts with the public, Howey Co. told prospective investors
that their investment would not be feasible unless they also signed a service
contract with HHS.3" Not surprisingly, HHS acquired service contracts for
eighty-five percent of the acreage sold.31 These service contracts gave HHS
full discretion and authority over cultivation, harvesting, and marketing of the
investors' crops, with net profits later distributed to the investors.32 Most of
the investors were not Florida residents.33 Additionally, most were profes-
sionals or business people who lacked the necessary knowledge, skill, and
equipment required to care for and to cultivate citrus trees.34 According to the
Court, the people were "attracted by the expectation of substantial profits. 35
The Howey Court began its analysis by noting that the securities issue
turned on whether the land sales contract, the deed, and the service contract
collectively constituted an investment contract under federal securities law.36
The Court further noted that neither the Securities Act nor its legislative
history defined the term investment contract.37 Turning to state blue sky laws
that included the term "investment contract" prior to the enactment of federal
securities law, the Court found that state courts construed the term broadly "so
26. See id. (stating that Howey test "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits").









36. Id. at 297. The Court noted that the lower courts treated the contracts and deeds as
separate transactions and therefore determined that no investment contract existed. Id. at 297-
98.
37. Id. at 298.
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as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection."3 State courts
placed substance over form and emphasized the economic reality of invest-
ments.39 State law generally defined an investment contract as a "contract or
scheme for 'the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended
to secure income or profit from its employment." 4 The Court concluded that
adopting the state law interpretation of the term "investment contract" was
reasonable and consistent with the purposes of the Securities Act.4' In restat-
ing the test, the Court declared that an investment contract is "a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party."4 2 This broad definition embodies a flexibility designed to
include the numerous profit-making schemes that enterprising individuals
might develop.43
By cutting through legal terminology and focusing instead on economic
reality, the Howey Court found that the transactions involved were clearly
investment contracts.' The investors relied exclusively on HI-IS for any
profits derived from their investments.45 Moreover, any attempt by an inves-
tor to manage his tract individually would have been economically unfeasi-
ble.
46
Partnerships, like other business organizations, generally involve a for-
profit investment in a common enterprise. As a result, the first three parts of
Howey's test are almost always satisfied.47 The primary question when
dealing with partnership interests, then, is whether an interest meets Howey's
"solely by the efforts of others" test.48
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 298-99.
43. Id. at 299.
44. Id.
45. Id at 300.
46. Id. The Court explained that to make a profit in the citrus industry, one must take
advantage of economies of scale because care, cultivation, harvesting, and marketing expenses
for a small tract would be cost prohibitive. Id.
47. See ALANR. BRoMBERG&LARRYE. RIBsTEiN, BRoMBERGANDRIBSTEINON LIMITED
LIABILrrYPARTNERs-pSANDTHEREVISEDUNiFOIMPARTNERSH[PAcr234 (1996) [hereinafter
BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, LLPs] (stating that partnership interests "undoubtably" satisfy first
three parts ofHowey). The first three parts of Howey require (1) an investment ofmoney (2) in
a common enterprise (3) with an expectation of profit. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,
298-99 (1946).
48. BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, LLPs, supra note 47, at 234.
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Use of the word "solely" in Howey's test is problematic. If interpreted
literally, the term "solely" creates a significant loophole for those wishing to
avoid the securities laws and undermines protection of investors and the spirit
of flexibility embodied in Howey.49 In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc.," the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied a liber-
al interpretation to Howey's "solely by the efforts of others" test. 1 The Glenn
Turner court declared that Howey's "efforts of others" test is satisfied when
those other than the investor make the essential managerial efforts that affect
the success or failure of the enterprise. 2 The Glenn Turner interpretation of
Howey has been adopted by several other federal circuit courts53 and appar-
ently approved by the Supreme Court.' Glenn Turner and subsequent cases
49. See Jonathan M. Sobel, Note, A Rose May Not Always Be a Rose: Some General
Partnership Interests Should Be Deemed Securities Under the Federal Securities Acts, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1324 (1994) (stating that strict enforcement of"solely" requirement
is inconsistent with policy of protecting investors).
50. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating
that adherence to "solely" requirement would create unduly restrictive definition of investment
contract). Glenn Turner involved the sale of self-help plans by Dare To Be Great, Inc. (Dare),
a wholly owned subsidiary of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises (GWT). Id. at 477-78. Dare sold
five different plans varying in price and in contents, all of which purported to improve the self-
motivation and sales ability of the purchaser. Id. at 478. If a buyer purchased one of the three
most expensive plans, he obtained the right to sell plans to others and to retain a portion of the
purchase price. Id. The SEC brought suit seeking to enjoin Dare from selling the plans on the
ground that Dare was allegedly violating federal securities law. Id. at 477. The district court
granted the injunction and GWT appealed, arguing that the plans were not securities. Id. at 476.
The Glenn Turner court, after reciting the fraudulent excesses Dare employees would undertake
to pressure prospective purchasers into buying, noted that the remedial nature of federal
securities law called for broad interpretation of the term security. Id. at 482. The court found
that Dare's plans easily satisfied the first three parts of the investment contract test established
in Howey, but that the "solely" requirement in the "efforts of others" test was problematic. ld.
In noting that strict interpretation of the word "solely" would result in an "unduly restrictive"
interpretation of what is or is not an investment contract, the court opted for a more "realistic
test." Id. Thus, the court decided that the "efforts of others" test is satisfied where the "efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential man-
agerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." Id. With the test restated,
the court deemed plans sold by Dare to be investment contracts, and thus securities. Id.
52. Id. at 482.
53. See Sobel, supra note 49, at 1325 n.59 (citing numerous cases adopting Glenn Turner
analysis).
54. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979) (citing
United Hous. Found v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) and stating that "touchstone of the
Howey test is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others");
Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (stating that "touchstone [of cases defining securities] is the presence
of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
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suggest that an investment contract exists when there is an investment in a
common venture with a reasonable expectation that profits will come primar-
ily or substantially from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.5
B. Traditional Securities Law Analysis of Partnership Interests
1. General Partnership Interests as Securities
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether general partnership
interests orjoint venture interests are securities; however, several other courts
have discussed the issue. 6 In Williamson v. Tucker," the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that certain joint venture interests were
not securities under federal securities law. 8 The investors in Williamson pur-
chased interests in real estate development projects in the form of three joint
ventures. 9 Although the promoter agreed to perform all management duties
with respect to the property, the joint venture agreements granted each inves-
tor some managerial power.6 The Williamson court stated that joint venture
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others"). Note that both Forman and
Daniel omit the word "solely" in their restatements ofthe Howey test. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561;
Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. However, the Forman Court expressed no opinion as to the holding
in Glenn Turner. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
55. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 616 (stating that question is whether
investors are relying "primarily" on efforts of others); Elaine A. Welle, Limited Liability
Companies as Securities: An Analysis ofFederal and State Actions Against Limited Liability
Companies Under the Securities Laws, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 425, 446 (1996) (declaring that
interest may be security if profits come "substantially" from efforts of others).
56. See Stephen G. Christianson, Annotation, What is "Investment Contract" within
Meaning of§ 2(1) of Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS § 77b(1)) and § 3(a)(10) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS § 78c(a) (10)), Both Defining Term Security as Including
Investment Contract, 134A.L.R. FED. 289,325-28 (1996) (discussing several cases determining
whether general partnership interests are securities).
57. 645 F.2d 404(5th Cir. 1981).
58. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 421 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that courts
ruling on issue of whether general partnership interests are securities have held that such
interests generally are not investment contracts under securities laws). The Williamson court
explained that general partnership interests are traditionally not securities because general
partners and joint venturers "have the sort of influence which generally provides them with
access to important information and protection against a dependence on others." Id at 422.
Furthermore, an "investor who is offered an interest in a general partnership or joint venture
should be on notice.., that his ownership rights are significant, and that the federal securities
acts will not protect him from a mere failure to exercise his rights." Id
59. Id. at 408.
60. Id. at 408-09. Each agreement required unanimous consent ofthe venturers to confess
ajudgment; to make execute, or deliver any commercial paper; to borrow money in the joint
venture's name; to use joint venture property as collateral; and to amend the joint venture
agreement. Id. Joint venturers also had power to remove the manager by a vote of 60% or 70%
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and general partnership interests are presumptively not securities because
investors in such entities normally have broad managerial powers."' The court
cautioned, however, that substance might prevail over form in some cases. 2
In focusing on the "efforts of others" part of Howey's test, the Williamson
court found that a general partnership or joint venture interest might be an
investment contract, and thus a security, if the investor can establish that:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands ofthe
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would
a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced and
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently
exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer
is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager ofthe enterprise or
otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers. 3
In finding that none of the factors from this disjunctive test were present, the
court held that the joint venture interests in question were not securities.'
The Williamson court placed great importance on the power that the
agreement granted to the joint venturers.65 The joint venturers purportedly
purchased their interests with the expectation that they would not exercise
managerial control, but the agreement nonetheless authorized such control."
In addition, the court stressed the high degree of business acumen possessed
by the joint venturers as evidence of their ability to exercise genuine manage-
rial control over the enterprise.67 Finally, in reference to the third alternative
of its test,68 the court noted that the plaintiffs did not assert that the promoter
in interest. Id. at 409. It is not clear whether the joint venturers ever actually exercised their
powers. Id.
61. Id. at 422.
62. See id. (stating "that the mere fact that an investment takes the form of a general
partnership orjoint venture does not inevitably insulate it from the reach of the federal securities
laws"). The court provided three examples of when partnership powers may be inadequate to
protect a partner from dependence on others: (1) ifthe partner irrevocably delegates his powers,
(2) if the partner is incapable of exercising his powers, or (3) if the partner is so dependent on
the particular expertise of the promoter or manager that he has no reasonable alternative but to
rely on that person. Id. at 422-23.
63. Id. at 424.
64. Id. at 425-26.
65. See id. at 424 (explalning that agreement grantedjoint venturers ultimate control even
though they did not expect to exercise control).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 425 (noting high degree of business experience and knowledge of joint
venturers). The court noted that among thejoint venturers were three top executives, including
the Chairman of the Board and the President of Frito-Lay, Inc. Id.
68. Id. at 424. The third alternative for determining whether a joint venture (or partner-
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had unique entrepreneurial or managerial skills or that their dependence on the
promoter was so great that they could not reasonably replace him.69 Thus, the
interests in Williamson were not securities."
Williamson created a workable but somewhat rigid test for determining
when partnership interests are securities.71 Although widely regarded as
authoritative, Williamson has been modified by some circuits72 and rejected
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Goodwin v.
Elkins & Co.73 The Goodwin court relied on state partnership law and the
ship) interest is a security is whether the venturer "is so dependent on some unique entrepre-
neurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers." Id
69. Id. at 425. Here, the court injected a reasonableness standard into its third alternative
determination by requiring plaintiffs to allege that they were "incapable, within reasonable
limits, of finding a replacement manager." Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 425-26.
71. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 619 (criticizing Williamson for placing
"undue emphasis on the legal aspects of general partnerships," and asserting that rigid William-
son test requires "a lack of sophistication or a type of dependence on unique skills that will
rarely be present in an investment setting"); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and
the Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships, 42 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 49-50
(1992) [hereinafter Ribstein, Private Ordering] (asserting that "Williamson comes very close
to holding that a bona fide general partnership interest is per se not a security even if the Howey
factors are satisfied").
72. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir.
1990) (adopting only part one of Williamson test which focuses simply on whether partnership
agreement grants sufficient power to partners, and not on whether partners actually exercise
those powers); Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1988) (explicitly adopting first part
of Williamson test and rejecting parts two and three). Note, however, that the Ninth Circuit
effectively overruled Matek in Hocking v. DuBois, 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989), and con-
firmed the effect of Hocking in Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992).
Under Holden, the Ninth Circuit now applies all three parts ofthe Williamson test to determine
whether general partnership interests are securities. Holden, 978 F.2d at 1119. The Holden
court stated that the heart of the inquiry is
whether, although on the face of the partnership agreement the investor theoreti-
cally retains substantial control over the investment and an ability to protect the
investment from the managing partner or hired manager, the investor nonetheless
can demonstrate such dependence on the promoter or on a third party that the
investor was in fact unable to exercise meaningful partnership powers.
Id.
73. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that general
partnership interest involved therein was not investment contract). Although the three judge
panel in Goodwin was unanimous in its decision that the partnership interests involved were not
securities, each judge penned a separate opinion. 1d. at 100, 111, 113. Goodwin, a former
general partner of defendant Elkins & Co., brought suit alleging a violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 100. Goodwin asserted that the partnership agreement gave him
so little power that he was in effect a limited partner. Id. at 103. In the opinion announcing the
judgment of the court, Judge Garth held that even if Goodwin could prove the partnership
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powers given to the partners in the partnership agreement to find that the
paitnership interest at issue was not a security.74 Although the three judge
panel in Goodwin unanimously agreed that the general partnership interest
involved was not a security, the judges differed in their reasoning. Judge
Garth, delivering the opinion of the court, decided that general partnership
interests are never securities because of the inherent power that state partner-
ship law vests in partners. 75 In separate concurrences, Chief Judge Seitz and
Judge Becker confined their analyses to the power distribution in the partner-
ship agreement. 6 Other federal courts have not adopted Judge Garth's per se
rule that general partnership interests are not securities, but instead employ
either all or part of the Williamson test and apply a rebuttable presumption
that general partnership interests are not securities.'
2. Limited Partnership Interests as Securities
In contrast to general partnership interests, courts generally presume that
limited partnership interests are securities. 7' The rationale for this presump-
tion is simple. A limited partnership, like most other business entities (includ-
ing general partnerships), almost always involves an investment of money in
agreement restricted his powers, his partnership interest would not be a security. Id. Judge
Garth reasoned that because state partnership law endows general partners with certain "powers,
rights, and responsibilities," their interests cannot be securities under the Securities Act. Id. at
104. In separate concurring opinions, Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Becker disagreed with the
breadth of Judge Garth's opinion and based their decisions that Goodwin was not a security
holder solely on power granted in the partnership agreement. Id. at 112. Chief Judge Seitz and
Judge Becker agreed they "need not decide here whether a general partner's rights and responsi-
bilities under the Pennsylvania Uniform Partnership Act are sufficient to prevent a general
partner's interest from being treated as a security for purposes of federal law." Id.
74. See supra note 73 (discussing Goodwin and differences in judges' opinions).
75. See Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 103 (declaring that law extends role of general partner well
beyond permitted role of passive investor); see also Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 71,
at 41-45 (arguing for per se rule that general partnership interests are not securities so as to
promote private ordering).
76. Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 111-13 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); id. at 113-14 (Becker, J.,
concurring).
77. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918,924-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
Williamson factors and finding that interest is security when investor was "practically depend-
ent" on manager); Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1460-61 (effectively overruling Matek v. Murat and
adopting three-prong test set out in Williamson). But see Banghart, 902 F.2d at 808 (adopting
only part one of Williamson test, which focuses simply on whether partnership agreement grants
sufficient power to partners, and not on whether partners actually exercise those powers). For
a general discussion of the approaches that courts take when deciding whether general partner-
ship interests are securities, see Sobel, supra note 49, at 1327-44.
78. See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that limited
partnership interest is generally security because, by definition, limited partnerships involve
investments where profits are derived from efforts of others).
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a common enterprise with an expectation of profit, and thus a limited partner-
ship interest usually satisfies the first three parts of Howey. 9 General and
limited partnerships are, however, distinguished by the fourth part ofHowey's
test - whether profits derive primarily from the efforts of others.8" In general
partnerships, partners expect to participate equally in the management and in
the conduct of the business." Typically, however, a limited partner does not
participate in management and, historically, could lose his limited status and
incur personal liability for partnership obligations by participating in control
of the enterprise.82 Therefore, limited partners usually do not participate in
control of the business and thus rely on the efforts of others for a return on
their investment.83
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Youmans v. Simon,84 limited partners simply do not have the kind of authority
79. See supra note 8 (discussing Howey). The first three parts of Howey's test require
(1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with an expectation ofprofits. SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
80. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing original "solely" require-
ment in Howey's fourth part, subsequent liberal interpretations by lower courts, and apparent
approval by Supreme Court).
81. See UPA (1914) § 18(e) (providing default rule that partners share equally in man-
agement); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHMP ACT (1996) § 401(f) [hereinafter RUPA] (providing
default rule that partners share equally in management). RUPA incorporates the limited liability
partnership amendments adopted in 1996. Note, however, that both UPA and RUPA provide
that an agreement among the partners may alter the general rule regarding management rights.
UPA § 18; RUPA § 103(a). See also POSNER, supra note 2, at 291 (suggesting that unlimited
liability encourages general partners to participate in firm management).
82. See ULPA (1916) § 7 (providing that limited partner may become liable as general
partner if he "takes part in the control of the business"); REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT (1976) § 303(a) [hereinafter RULPA] (providing that limited partner is not liable for
partnership obligations unless he participates in control of business). RULPA did, however,
significantly increase the ability of limited partners to participate in the control of the business.
Under RULPA, a limited partner participating in control is only liable "to persons who transact
business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner." RULPA § 303(a). Limited partners may
now participate in management with impunity so long as they disclose to third parties their
limited partner status. Id; see RULPA § 303 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998) (eliminating all
language in current Section 303 and providing limited liability for limited partners "even if'
they participate in management and control). The tentative draft for RULPA Section 303
provides in part: "(a) A limited partner is not liable for a debt, obligation or other liability of the
limited partnership solely by reason of being a limited partner, even if the limited partner
participates in the management and control of the limited partnership." RULPA § 303 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1998).
83. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 626 (stating that limited partnership
interests generally are securities because limited partners generally are passive investors). As
a result, a limited partnership interest is generally a security.
84. 791 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1986).
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that general partners possess." The Youmans court stated that limited part-
ners' positions are analogous to those of corporate stockholders because
limited partners have limited liability, cannot dissolve the partnership, cannot
bind other partners, and have no authority to actively manage the partner-
ship.86 Supported by the weight ofjudicial authority, the principle that limited
partnership interests are presumptively securities is very strong."
In Rodeo v. Gillman,8" the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit provided an example of investment contract analysis of limited part-
nership interests.8 9 In Gillman, the plaintiffs purchased limited partnership
interests in several apartment buildings."° A few years later, the plaintiffs
brought suit against the managing general partners alleging, among other
things, federal securities law violations.9 The trial court granted the defen-
dants' motion for summary judgment.92 On appeal, the defendants contended
85. See Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that limited
partnership interests are securities within statutory definition). In Youmans, a physician who
participated in several real estate joint ventures brought suit alleging federal securities law
violations. Id. at 343-44. After discussing Howey and the Williamson factors, the court looked
to the economic reality of the investments to determine whether the joint venture interests were
securities. Id. at 345-47. Of the two joint ventures discussed, the court found the Dickinson
Apartment Project Venture was not a security because the investors held a 63% interest and
could terminate the joint venture by majority vote. Id. at 346. The Bidco-Tomball Joint
Venture was a security because the investors lacked management power, had no power to
dissolve the venture, and could not remove the managing venturer. Id. at 347. The court drew
a clear distinction between treatment of general partnership interests and limited partnership
interests, and suggested that limited partnership interests are always securities because limited
partners are passive investors. Id. at 346. But see supra note 82 (discussing impact of RULPA
Section 303 and increased power for limited partners if they disclose limited status).
86. Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346.
87. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 626-27 (discussing treatment of limited
partnership interests under federal securities law).
88. 787 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1986).
89. See Rodeo v. Gillman, 787 F.2d 1175, 1177-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (deciding that limited
partnership interest is security even if accompanied with option to purchase enterprise). In
Gillman, the plaintiffs purchased limited partnership interests in apartment buildings and later
brought securities fraud allegations when the deal went sour. Id. at 1175. The plaintiffs held
an option to buy the general partners' interests, but never executed that option. Id. at 1176. In
deciding that the plaintiffs' limited partnership interests were securities, the court drew a
distinction between potential control and actual control. Id. at 1177. The court stated that
potential managerial control is not enough to take a limited partnership interest outside the reach
of securities law. Id. at 1178.
90. Id. at 1175. The investors, in addition to their limited partnership interest, obtained
an option to buy out the general partners. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendants after concluding that such an option gave plaintiffs enough control over the invest-
ment to remove their interest from protection under the securities laws. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. (granting defendant's summary judgment motion because plaintiffs' option to
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that the plaintiffs' limited partnership interests were not securities because the
plaintiffs held an option to buy the general partners' interests and thus had
ultimate control over management of the apartments.93 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the defendants' argument and noted that complete passivity is not a
requirement for an individual to be a security holder.94 The court, in finding
that the investors' limited partnership interests were securities, noted a differ-
ence between potential control and actual control.95 According to the court,
"[p]otential managerial control - even if easily assumed - is not enough to
take a limited partnership [interest] out of the reach of the securities laws."96
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp97 found that a limited partnership interest
was not a security.98 Steinhardt involved a highly structured securitization
transaction that required defendant Citicorp to create a limited partnership,
Bristol Oaks, L.P. (Bristol), that would serve as an investment vehicle for
issuance of both debt and equity securities to investors.99 Bristol issued equity
securities in the form of limited partnership interests.00 Bristol had one
buy general partners' interests removed plaintiffs' limited partnership interests from protection
under securities law).
93. Id. at 1176.
94. See id. at 1177 (stating that "we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts were
intended to cover only 'passive investors' and not privately negotiated transactions involving
the transfer of control to entrepreneurs" (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
692 (1985))).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1178; see Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 627 (analyzing previous
Seventh Circuit opinion Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978)). Goodman sug-
gested that a party can overcome the presumption that limited partnership interests are securities
by showing a "significant degree of managerial control" by the limited partners. Garrison &
Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 627. The presumption may be overcome if the limited partners are
not relying on the general partners' managerial efforts to obtain profits from the enterprise. Id.
at 627-28.
97. 126 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 1997).
98. See Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that
limited partner retained pervasive control and cannot be passive investor for purposes of
investment contract analysis). In Steinhardt, defendant Citicorp created a limited partnership
for the purpose of engaging in a securitization transaction. Id. at 146. Steinhardt was a limited
partner with a 98.79% ownership interest. Id. at 145. The Limited Partnership Agreement
(LPA) restricted the managing partner's right to take material actions without the consent of a
majority of the partners. Id. at 153. Because Steinhardt alone constituted a majority of the
partners, Steinhardt's consent was a prerequisite for material action. Id. at 154. Steinhardt
could also remove and replace the general partner without notice. Id. Because of the power
provided to Steinhardt under the LPA, the court deemed Steinhardt's interest significant and
thus, not a security. Id. at 155.
99. Id. at 146.
100. Id. Bristol issued debt securities in the form of nonrecourse bonds. Id.
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general partner and two limited partners. 1 ' Steinhardt, the party alleging
securities laws violations, was a limited partner with a 98.79% ownership
interest in Bristol.' In deciding whether Steinhardt's limited partnership
interest in Bristol constituted an investment contract, and thus a security, the
court focused on the Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) to determine who
exercised control in generating profits. 3 The LPA restricted the managing
partner's right to take material actions without the consent of a majority of the
partners."° Because the LPA defined "Majority of the Partners" as partners
holding more than a fifty percent interest in Bristol, Steinhardt alone consti-
tuted a majority.'05 Thus, Steinhardt had to consent before Bristol could take
any material action.0 6 Steinhardt also had the power to remove and to replace
the general partner without notice. 7 Given these facts, the court held that
Steinhardt's powers under the LPA "were not nominal, but rather, were
significant and, thus, directly affected the profits it received from the Partner-
ship."'0 8 Therefore, Steinhardt's limited partnership interest was not an
investment contract. 0 9
III Modem Partnership Law
As illustrated above, specific factual circumstances are very important
in determining whether a partnership interest is a security. Some courts,
however, invariably approach securities cases with preconceived notions that
a partnership interest is or is not a security based solely on the type of partner-
ship involved."0 This Part discusses the minutiae of modern partnership law
and demonstrates that changes in the law provide significant flexibility in
forming partnerships. This flexibility masks formal categories such that
distinctions based solely on form have little basis. Thus, courts should re-
examine whether traditional notions of partnership provide an adequate frame-
work for securities law analysis.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 145.
103. Id. at 153-54.
104. Id. at 153.
105. Id. at 154.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 155.
109. Id.
110. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984) (suggesting that
general partnership interests are per se not securities because of power provided in state partner-
ship law).
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A. General Partnerships Under RUPA
Until recently, the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) provided the basic
format from which states derived their partnership statutes. Adopted in 1994,
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) is in many ways similar to
UPA."' There are, however, some significant differences. UPA Section 18
contains default rules that establish the rights and duties of partners in relation
to the partnership and makes those rules subject to modification by the part-
nership agreement."' Under UPA Section 18, only certain rights and duties
are subject to change by the partnership agreement and other duties, such as
a partner's fiduciary duty, are nonwaivable."' In contrast, RUPA Section 103
clearly grants broad contractual freedom followed by a short, exhaustive list
of rights and duties that the partnership agreement may not modify."
111. Similarities between UPA and RUPA include the following: (1) the definition of
"partnership" in UPA Section 6 and in RUPA Section 101(6), (2) rules governing partnership
formation in UPA Section 7 and in RUPA Section 202, and (3) characterization of partner's
interest as personal property in UPA Section 26 and in RUPA Section 502.
112. See UPA(1914) § 18 (providing that"[t]he rights and duties ofthe partners in relation
to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them," by rules in
Section 18).
113. See Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (lst Cir. 1991) (stating that fiduciary duty
ofpartners is integral part of partnership and that words of partnership agreement cannot negate
fiduciary duty).
114. RUPA (1996) § 103. Section 103 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the partners and
between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement.
To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] gov-
erns relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership.
(b) The partnership agreement may not:
(1) vary the rights and duties under Section 105 except to eliminate the duty
to provide copies of statements to all of the partners;
(2) unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records under Section
403(b);
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 603(b)(3), but:
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of
activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreason-
able; or
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the partner-
ship agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material
facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of
loyalty;
(4) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 404(c) or 603(b)(3);
(5) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section
404(d), but the partnership agreement may prescribe the standards by which the
performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable; ...
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RUPA's break from the statutory regime of UPA is subtle, yet important.
The provisions in UPA Section 18 were clearly subject to change by the
partnership agreement." 5 Other sections, such as UPA Section 20, which
deals with a partner's right to demand information concerning the partnership,
did not mention the partnership agreement." 6 UPA's silence about whether
some provisions were subject to change resulted in inconsistent court deci-
sions." 7 RUPA attempts to correct this flaw by clearly identifying provisions
the partnership agreement may modify."' This clarity confirms the ability to
create partnerships with strong centralized management where some partners
have virtually no power to participate in management." 9 This lack of power
reduces the ability of partners to protect adequately their investments and thus
implicates securities law because insufficient power suggests reliance on the
efforts of others. 2°
One primary safeguard protecting partners under the UPA regime was the
requirement of unanimous consent for undertaking extraordinary matters.'
Extraordinary matters include amending the partnership agreement and other
matters outside the ordinary course of the partnership's business.' Although
UPA did not specifically provide rules regarding extraordinary matters, courts
routinely required the partners' unanimous consent for extraordinary actions. "
RUPA allows partnerships to eliminate completely the unanimous consent
requirement for extraordinary matters. 24 Eliminating a general partner's
(10) restrict rights of third parties under this [Act].
Id.
115. See supra note 112 (providing language from UPA Section 18).
116. UPA § 20. Section 20 provides: "Partners shall render on demand true and full
information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner or the legal representative of
any deceased partner or partner under legal disability." Id.
117. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT 21 (1996) (stating that UPA silence held to
preclude modification in some situations but not in others).
118. Id.
119. See infra notes 121-159 and accompanying text (discussing creation of stripped
general partners).
120. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing "efforts of others" test).
121. See RUPA (1996) § 401 cmt. 11 (discussing extraordinary matters and general treat-
ment under UPA).
122. See id. (equating "extraordinary matters" with matters outside ordinary course of
partnership business and amendments of partnership agreement).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. See id. § 4010) (providing that "act outside the ordinary course of business of a
partnership and an amendment to the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the
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ability to halt extraordinary matters is the first step toward creating a stripped
general partner.
In addition to the unanimous consent rule for extraordinary matters, all
other rights and duties enumerated in RUPA Section 401 are subject to modi-
fication or complete elimination." Applying the broad freedom of contract
granted in RUPA Section 103 to the rights and duties in RUPA Section 401,
a partnership agreement may, among other things, eliminate a partner's right
to share in partnership profits, 26 eliminate a partner's right to participate in
the management and conduct of the business, 27 and eliminate the unanimous
consent requirement for adding new partners.'28 RUPA clearly provides tools
that allow a partnership to eliminate the essential attributes normally associ-
ated with general partners. Indeed, under RUPA, a partnership can completely
strip a partner of meaningful partnership powers and yet the partner could
remain personally liable for partnership obligations.'29
consent of all of the partners"). But see id § 103 (providing broad rule that all default rules in
RUPA are subject to change or elimination if not included in Section 103(b)). The unanimous
consent rule in Section 401(j) is not among those provisions enumerated in Section 103(b). Id.
125. See id. § 103 (providing broad general rule that default rules in RUPA are subject
to modification or elimination and excepting no RUPA Section 401 provisions from general
rule).
126. See id § 401(b) (providing that each partner is entitled to share equally in partnership
profits).
127. See id. § 401(f) (providing that each partner has equal management rights).
128. Seeid. § 401(i) (providingthatallpartnersmustconsentforpersontobecomepartner).
129. See id. § 306(a) (stating that"all partners are liablejointly and severally for all obliga-
tions of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law"). Notwith-
standing joint and several liability of partners authorized under RUPA Section 306, RUPA
places restrictions on a judgment creditor's access to assets of partners. Id. § 307(d). RUPA
Section 307 provides in part:
(c) A judgment against a partnership is not by itself ajudgment against a partner.
Ajudgment against apartnership may notbe satisfied from a partner's assets unless
there is also a judgment against the partner.
(d) A judgment creditor of a partner may not levy execution against the assets of
the partner to satisfy ajudgment based on a claim against the partnership unless the
partner is personally liable for the claim under Section 306 and:
(1) ajudgment based on the same claim has been obtained against the partner-
ship and a writ of execution on thejudgment has been returned unsatisfied in
whole or in part;
(2) the partnership is a debtor in bankruptcy;
(3) the partner has agreed that the creditor need not exhaust partnership assets;
(4) a court grants permission to thejudgment creditor to levy execution against
the assets of a partner based on a finding that partnership assets subject to
execution are clearly insufficient to satisfy the judgment, that exhaustion of
partnership assets is excessively burdensome, or that the grant of permission is
an appropriate exercise of the court's equitable powers; or
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In addition to allowing the partnership agreement to restrict a partner's
power, RUPA allows restrictions on a partner's right to access information.13 '
RUPA Section 403(b) provides that a partnership shall provide its partners
access to the partnership's "books and records."' 1 A partnership may not
unreasonably restrict such access to "books and records."13 1 RUPA Sec-
tion 403(c) provides partners with rights to access any information concerning
the partnership's "business and affairs" unless the demand or information
requested is unreasonable or improper.33 However, RUPA Section 403(c) is
conspicuously absent from the RUPA Section 103(b) list of provisions not
subject to change by the partnership agreement.'34 Although the common law
may independently provide partners with the right to access business informa-
tion,'35 RUPA, on its face, clearly allows elimination of a partner's right to
access information concerning the partnership's business and affairs. 36
Partnerships may also restrict a partner's power by filing statements of
partnership authority pursuant to RUPA Section 303.' The purposes of
(5) liability is imposed on the partner by law or contract independent of the
existence of the partnership.
Id. § 307(c)-(d).
130. Id. § 103(b). Section 103(b) expressly prohibits an unreasonable restriction on a
partner's rightto access "books and records" underRUPA Section 403(b), but does notprohibit
restrictions on a partner's rightto access information concerning the partnership's "business and
affairs" under RUPA Section 403(c).
131. Id. § 40 1(b). Section 40 1(b) also provides access to a partner's agents and attorneys,
and former partners and their agents -and attorneys for the period during which they were
partners. Id. For a discussion of what the term "books and records" includes, see HILLMAN ET
AL., supra note 117, at 130-31 (concluding that "books and records" includes records beyond
mere financial records).
132. RUPA(1996) § 103(b)(2).
133. Id. § 403(c). The partner or partnership subject to the demand for information bears
the burden of showing that the demand is unreasonable or improper. Id § 403 cmt. 3.
134. See id. § 103(b) (omitting RUPA Section 403(c) from list of provisions not subject
to modification by partnership agreement).
135. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 117, at 138-40 (discussing whether RUPA rules
displace common law disclosure obligations); see also Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure
Obligations of Partners Inter Se Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994: Is the
Contractarian Revolution Failing?, 36 WM. &MARYL. RaV. 1559, 1613-15 (1995) (arguing
that RUPA does not completely displace common law disclosure obligations of partners).
136. See RUPA § 403(c) (providing that partnership shall furnish partner with information
concerning partnership business and affairs). But see RUPA § 103 (providing broad rule that
all default rules in RUPA are subject to change or elimination if not included in Section 103(b)).
The information rights provision in Section 403(c) is not among those provisions enumerated
in Section 103(b). Id.
137. See id. § 303(a)(2) (providing that partnership may file statement of partnership
authority that states authority or limitations on authority of its partners to enter into transactions
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RUPA Section 303 are threefold: it creates a system for filing standard
business documents,138 it binds the partnership to extraordinary grants of
authority to partners in real property transfers,'39 and it binds third parties to
restrictions on authority of partners. 40 A partnership may file a statement that
grants or limits the authority of some or all of its partners to transact with third
parties on behalf of the partnership.' 4' Statements of partnership authority
memorialize grants or restrictions of authority so as to provide certainty to
third parties. 4 1 Statements of authority also impact the rights and remedies
of third parties who transact with partners named in a statement. In real
property transfers, statements of authority, if properly filed, provide third
parties with constructive notice that certain partners have no authority to
transfer real property on behalf oftie partnership.4 3 In all other transactions
with partners, a third party's remedy is curtailed only if he has actual notice
of a limitation contained in a filed statement.'"
One might think it unlikely that a prospective general partner would sign
a partnership agreement providing almost no power with which to protect his
partnership interest. In some very large partnerships inwhich prospective
partners have weak bargaining positions, they must agree, however, to have
limited power if they want to become a partner. The partnership agreement
on behalf of partnership).
138. See HILLMAN T AL., supra note 117, at 94 (noting that filing system allows third
parties to record instruments to protectthemselves when dealing with partnerships and provides
assurance to third parties that partner has actual authority to act on behalf of partnership).
139. See'id. (noting that third parties have statutory right to rely on statements granting
partners extraordinary authority to act for partnership).
140. CompareRUPA(1996) § 303(e) (providingthatthird parties have constructivenotice
of limitation on partner's right to transfer real property if statement of authority is properly
filed) with RUPA § 303(f) (providing general rule that statement of authority does not impart
constructive notice on third parties).
141. RUPA § 303(a)(2).
142. See HILLMAN FT AL., supra note 117, at 94 (stating that third parties (for example,
lenders, landlords, and sellers) often require partnerships to submit names of all partners with
authority to bind partnership and that filing system eliminates this step and binds partnership
to authority granted in statement).
143. RUPA § 303(e). Section 303(e) provides:
A person not a partner is deemed to know of a limitation on the authority of a part-
ner to transfer real property held in the name of the partnership if a certified copy
of the filed statement containing the limitation on authority is of record in the office
for recording transfers of that real property.
Id.
144. See id. § 303(f) (providing general rule that third parties are "not deemed to know of
a limitation on the authority of a partner merely because the limitation is contained in a filed
statement").
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in Simpson v. Ernst & Young'45 provides a particularized example of how a
partnership can strip a partner of the essential attributes traditionally associ-
ated with general partners.'46
The Simpson case involved the merger of two large accounting firms,
Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young & Co., forming a 2200 partner mega-firm
styled Ernst & Young.4 7  Simpson, a former managing partner of Arthur
Young's Cincinnati office, became a partner in Ernst & Young and served as
Director of Entrepreneurial Services in Cincinnati. 48 The partnership struc-
ture of Ernst & Young involved a highly centralized management scheme and
included general partners with little or no voice in the firm. 49 The court held
that for the purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Simpson
was in economic reality an employee and not a partner. 50
Of particular interest to the court was the firm's Management Commit-
tee.'5 ' The Management Committee consisted often to fourteen members who
exercised exclusive control over the firm's business and affairs, including the
145. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
146. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996) (comparing
partnership agreement to principles codified in UPA and concluding that lack of indicia of
ownership qualifies partner as employee for purposes of Employee Retirement Income Security
Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims). In Simpson, the Sixth Circuit
determined relevant factors for distinguishing between an "employee" and a "partner" for
purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. at 444. The plaintiff, a general partner at Ernst & Young,
brought suit alleging damages pursuant to ERISA and ADEA. Id. at 438. Ernst & Young
raised as a defense Simpson's status as a "partner." Id. Although Simpson signed a document
titled "Partnership Agreement," he argued that in reality he was merely an employee entitled to
protection under federal law. Id. at 440. The Simpson court engaged in a behind-the-docu-
ments analysis in determining whether Simpson qualified as an employee. Id. at 444. In
reaching its conclusion, the court enumerated several common lav attributes of partners as
codified in the Uniform Partnership Act. Id. These attributes included the following: (1) the
rightto participate in management, (2) the rightto act as an agent of other partners, (3) personal
liability, (4) a fiduciary relationship among partners, (5) using the term "co-owners" to indicate
each partner's "power of ultimate control," (6) participating in firm profits and losses, (7) an
investment in the firm, (8) part ownership of the firm's assets, (9) meaningful voting rights,
(10) the ability to control and operate the business, (11) compensation calculated as a percent-
age of the firm's profits, (12) employment security, and (13) other similar indicia of ownership.
Id. After finding most of these attributes missing, the court decided that Simpson qualified as
an employee and could bring suit under ERISA and ADEA. Id.
147. Id. at 440, 445.
148. Id. at440.
149. Id. at 441.
150. Id. at 444.
151. Id. at441-42.
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admission and discharge of all personnel. 52 In addition, the Management
Committee was a self-perpetuating entity, with the Committee appointing its
chairman and, in turn, the chairman appointing its new members.
5 3
In addition to creating a strong centralized management scheme, the
partnership agreement also curtailed almost all "meaningful attributes" of
Simpson's status as a partner.154 For example, the trial judge found that
Simpson had no authority to participate in decisions to admit or discharge new
partners, 5 5 participate in decisions regarding partner compensation,156 vote for
members or the chairman of the Management Committee, 57 or share in the
firm's profits. 8 Clearly, Simpson lacked the kind of authority that general
152. Id. A centralized management structure is permissible under RUPA because the
default rule that provides partners with equal management rights is subject to change by the
partnership agreement. RUPA (1996) § 103.
153. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 1996).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 441. This runs contrary to the default rule in RUPA Section 401(i) which
provides that all partners must consent to admission of new partners. RUPA § 401(i). This
default rule is, however, subjectto modification or elimination pursuantto RUPA Section 103.
See id. § 103(b) (providing exhaustive list of things partnership agreement may not do and not
including RUPA Section 401(i)).
156. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441. Participating in decisions regarding partner compensation
might be among the powers normally given to partners to participate in the firm's management
and control. See RUPA § 401(f) (providing each partner with equal rights in management and
conduct of partnership's business). The rule in RUPA Section 401(f) is, however, subject to
modification or elimination pursuant to RUPA Section 103. See id. § 103(b) (omitting RUPA
Section 401(f)).
157. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441. There is nothing inherently suspect about a management
committee controlling firm operations. In large law and accounting firms with hundreds of
partners, requiring each partner to vote on every management decision would be impractical.
Administrative feasibility and economic efficiency problems force some centralization of man-
agement in large firms. Often in these cases, partners vote for management committee members
and thus participate in management through their representatives. In Simpson, however, the
partnership agreement even removed Simpson's power to vote for management. Id. at 441-42.
RUPA Section 103(b) places no restrictions on the degree to which the partnership agreement
may curtail a partner's right to participate in management and control. RUPA § 103(b).
158. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441. The default rule in RUPA Section 401(b) entitles each
partner to an equal share of the firm's profits. RUPA (1996) § 401(b). This rule is, however,
subjectto modification pursuantto RUPA Section 103. Id. § 103(b). In large partnerships, there
are inevitably some partners with more seniority than others, and thus some partners earn a greater
share of the firm's profits. Modifying a partner's share of profits is common, but entirely
eliminating a partner's right to profits is problematic. At least one commentator has questioned
the Simpson court's factual determination that Simpson did not share in the firm's profits. See
Sixth Circuit Holds that Partners in an Accounting Firm are Employeesfor Purposes ofERISA
and the ADEA, 6No. 1 ERISA LMG. REP. 16, 18 (1997) (discussing Simpson's compensation
scheme and suggesting that he did share in firm profits). According to this article, Simpson
received a fixed "salary" and an additional "allocation" at year's end based on firm profits. Id.
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partners traditionally hold. Although Simpson may be an extreme case, the
degree to which the Ernst & Young partnership agreement restricted Simp-
son's authority provides a clear example of a stripped general partner.
In summary, this section illustrates the subtle changes in modem general
partnership law that enable partnerships to modify drastically or to even
eliminate those essential attributes traditionally associated with being a
general partner. For example, a partnership agreement may eliminate a part-
ner's right to vote on important business decisions, eliminate his right to share
in profits, and eliminate his access to information concerningthe partnership's
business and affairs. General partnership law provides partnerships with
maximum flexibility to shape management and organizational structure in
almost any way imaginable. Flexibility, however, may solve some problems
while creating others not imagined. 59
B. Limited Partnerships Under RULPA
Limited partnerships developed to allow noncorporate profit-sharing
investors to limit their liability to the amount they contributed to the firm. 60
Initially, limited partnership statutes permitted limited partners to obtain lim-
ited liability and to participate in management.' Thereafter, courts looked
toward limited partnerships with skepticism because conventional wisdom
suggested that those participating in profits during prosperity should likewise
suffer losses upon failure. 62 To provide some certainty in this area, the Com-
mittee on Commercial Law drafted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(ULPA) in 19 16.163 ULPA clarified limited partnership law significantly, but
its control provision proved somewhat vague.' ULPA provided that a lim-
ited partner exercising control might be treated as a general partner, but did
not define the word "control."1
65
159. Potential problems might include actions under employment discrimination laws or
actions for securities fraud under federal or state securities laws.
160. See Comment, supra note 3, at 895-96 (providing brief history of limited partner-
ships).
161. See id. (discussing first limited partnership statute, which was enacted in New York
in 1822).
162. See id. (discussing degree to which courts scrutinized limited partnership formation
and required strict adherence to statutory provisions to maintain limited partnership status).
163. 3 ALANR BROMBERG&LARRYE. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERGAND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNER-
SHIP 11:20 (1988) [hereinafter BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP]. The Committee on
Commercial Law wrote ULPA and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws presented it. Id.
164. ULPA (1916) § 7. Section 7 provides: "A limited partner shall not become liable as
a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner,
he takes part in the control of the business." Id
165. Id. For an in-depth discussion of activities that may or may not result in loss of
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The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 and the 1985
amendments thereto (collectively RULPA) clarify the meaning of control.
166
Under RULPA, a limited partner may still be treated as a general partner if he
participates in control of the firm, but the limited partner is only liable to
those third parties who reasonably believe that the limited partner is a general
partner. 67 Furthermore, for the limited partner to lose limited status, third
parties must base their reasonable beliefs upon the limited partner's con-
duct.168 Thus, the clear import of RULPA is that a limited partner may control
the business without incurring personal liability so long as he notifies third
parties with whom he is dealing that he is not a general partner.
169
The latest proposed revision to RULPA would further encourage limited
partners to participate in firm management. A proposed draft of RULPA
Section 303 entirely eliminates previous language and provides instead that
a limited partner is not liable for partnership obligations "even if" he partici-
pates in management and control. 7 ' The current trend of allowing limited
partners to participate actively in firm management undermines the traditional
tradeoff between control and liability and serves to blur distinctions between
general and limited partnerships. Blurred distinctions between general and
limited partnerships suggest thattraditional presumptions applied in securities
law analysis may no longer be valid.'
C. Limited Liability Partnerships Under RUPA
1. Background
The recent advent of limited liability partnerships (LLPs) coupled with
the freedom of contract permitted under RUPA effectively eliminate the
traditional tradeoff between control and liability. Both the corporate and
traditional limited partnership forms exemplify this tradeoff. A corporation's
limited status for participation in "control," see 3 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIn, PARTNERSHIP, supra
note 163, at 15:116-15:130.
166. See RULPA (1976) § 303(b) (providing list of activities that do not qualify as
participating in control).
167. Id. § 303(a).
168. Id.
169. Id. In addition, RULPA also provides a nonexhaustive list of activities that do not
qualify as participating in the control of the business. Il § 303(b).
170. Id. § 303(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
171. See supra Parts II.B.1-2 (discussing traditional treatment of general and limited
partnership interests under federal securities law). Traditionally, courts presume that limited
partnership interests are securities and that general partnership interests are not securities. See
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that general partnership
interests presumptively are not securities); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir.
1980) (suggesting that limited partnership interests presumptively are securities).
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shareholders have limited personal liability and risk nothing beyond their
initial investment.'72 Traditionally, in exchange for limited liability, the share-
holders give up their right to manage directly corporate affairs and instead
must exercise their power by electing directors. 73 Limited partners obtain
limited liability by giving up management rights in the business. 74 Tradition-
ally, if a limited partner went beyond his rights and participated in the control
of the business, he lost limited status and became personally liable for partner-
ship obligations. 75 In contrast to corporations and limited partnerships, LLPs
provide partners with limited liability 176 without restricting management
rights.
177
172. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1984) [hereinafter MBCA] (providing that
shareholder is not personally liable for corporate obligations, but may become liable by reason
of his own acts or conduct).
173. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (1993) (stating that power
to elect directors is power most central to shareholder's role). The MBCA allows corporations
to change this traditional separation between shareholders and managers in a corporation.
MBCA § 7.32. The MBCA authorizes shareholder agreements among the shareholders that
eliminate entirely the board of directors, thereby permitting direct shareholder mangement-
Id. § 7.32(a)(1). Obviously, administrative feasibility limits such a management scheme to
closely held corporations.
174. ULPA (1916) § 7; RULPA (1976) § 303(a). Modem limited partnership statutes
further erode the traditional tradeoff between control and liability in limited partnerships. See
supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing degree to which limited partner may
participate in control of firm).
175. See ULPA § 7 (providing for loss of limited status if limited partner participates in
control of business). Butsee RULPA § 303 (replacing ULPA Section 7). RULPA Section 303
adopted the idea that a limited partner forfeits limited status by participating in control of the
business. Id. § 303(a). However, RULPA Section 303 declares that a limited partner participat-
ing in control of the business "is liable only to persons who transact business with the limited
partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited
partner is a general partner." Id. This language takes much of the bite out of the traditional
tradeoff between control and liability and suggests that a limited partner may engage in
unlimited control without fear of losing limited status as long as he discloses to third parties that
he is a limited partner and not a general partner. Furthermore, a proposed revision to RULPA
Section 303 would provide limited liability for a limited partner "even if" he participates in the
management and control of the firm. RULPA § 303(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
176. RUPA (1996) § 306(c) provides:
An obligation of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited liability
partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation
of the partnership. A partner is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way
of contribution or otherwise, for such a partnership obligation solely by reason of
being or so acting as a partner. This subsection applies notwithstanding anything
inconsistent in the partnership agreement that existed immediately before the vote
required to become a limited liability partnership under Section 1001(b).
Id.
177. See id. § 401(f) (providing that each partner has equal rights in management and
conduct of partnership). This rule, however, is merely a default rule and is subject to modifica-
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LLPs originated in Texas in response to the savings and loan crisis and
several lawsuits imposing personal liability on partners in various law and
accounting firms. 17 Although styled as "limited liability partnerships," LLPs
are simply general partnerships that obtain limited liability for their partners
by filing a registration in their respective state. 179 Proving to be very popular
among state legislatures, LLP provisions have been enacted in almost every
state and in the District of Columbia.' In most of these states, any general
partnership may register as an LLP, but California, Nevada, New York, and
Oregon limit LLP election to partnerships that provide professional serv-
ices.' Because LLP statutes may vary from state to state, this Note focuses
its discussion on the 1996 Limited Liability Partnership amendments to RUPA.
A general partnership may become an LLP pursuant to RUPA Sec-
tion 1001 by filing a statement of qualification.' Upon filing the statement
of qualification, the LLP must include in its name words identifying its
limited liability status.' Although uniform in name, the nature of the liability
shield afforded partners in LLPs varies from state to state.'" Over the past
five years, three generations of LLP statutes have evolved with ever broaden-
tion by the partnership agreement; see also id. § 103(a) (providing that relations among partners
and between partners and partnership are governed by partnership agreement); supra Part III.A
(discussing provisions under RUPA subject to modification or elimination).
178. See HILLMAN r AL., supra note 117, at 301 (stating that LLPs developed in response
to Resolution Trust Corporation and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation holding lawyers
and accountants liable for losses caused by failed savings and loan associations).
179. See RUPA § 1001 (authorizing statements of qualification enabling partnerships to
become LLPs).
180. As of January 1998, Arkansas, Vermont, and Wyoming were the only states that had
not adopted limited liability partnership provisions.
181. See CAL. CORP. CODE §16101(6) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (providing that only
accounting firms, law firms, and firms related to registered accounting or law firms may register
as limited liability partnerships);NEv. REv. STAT. § 87.020(7) (1997) (providing that only firms
formed for purpose of rendering professional services may register as limited liability partner-
ships);N.Y. PARTNERSHIPLAw, § 121-1500(a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997) (providing that
only firms authorized to render professional services in New York may register as limited
liability partnerships); OR. REv. STAT. § 68-110(3) (1995) (providing that registration as limited
liability partnership is permissible if firm provides professional services or is affiliated with
domestic or foreign limited liability partnership that provides related or complementary
services).
182. See RUPA (1996) § 1001 (providing rules for filing and content requirements for
statements of qualification).
183. See id. § 1002 (providing that name of LLP must end with "Registered Limited
Liability Partnership," "Limited Liability Partnership," "R.L.L.P.," "L.L.P.," "RLLP," or
"LLP").
184. See Carol J. Miller, LLPs: How Limited is LimitedLiability?, 53 J. Mo. B. 154, 154
(1997) (discussing nature of limited liability shield and noting evolution from narrow to broad
shield).
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ing liability shields." 5 RUPA includes the third generation comprehensive
liability shield giving partners protection from direct or indirect liability for
partnership debts and obligations whether arising from tort, contract or
otherwise. 6 This broad liability shield does not, however, protect a partner
from liability stemming from his own negligence, malpractice, misconduct,
or wrongful acts." 7
2. Comparison of LLPs to General Partnerships
RUPA defines an LLP explicitly as a "partnership" that has achieved
limited liability by filing a statement of qualification. 8 Thus, RUPA's default
rules for general partnerships apply equally to LLPs and provide for many sim-
ilarities between general partnerships and LLPs. There are, however, some
important differences. Unlike a general partnership, forming an LLP requires
certain formalities and thus formation cannot occur inadvertently. 9 The most
important difference between general partnerships and LLPs, however, is the
limited liability shield, which may affect other aspects of the partnership.'
Obtaining limited liability will likely affect the distribution of partners'
management rights in the partnership agreement. 9 ' Conventional wisdom
suggests that partners with limited liability are less concerned with active
participation in the management and in the control of the business. Thus,
becoming an LLP may encourage centralization of management."9 LLP
185. Id. First generation statutes provided a liability shield for non-negligent partners who
had no notice or knowledge of the misconduct that created the liability for the partnership. Id.
Thus, these first generation statutes did not entirely shield partners from others' negligence. Id.
at 155. Second generation statues broadened the liability shield to protect partners from liability
stemming from another partner's misconduct. Id. These statutes also included protection from
indirect liability by way of contribution or indemnification. Id. Third generation statutes
provide an even broader shield protecting partners from personal liability for all partnership
debts and obligations. Id.
186. See RUPA § 306(c) (providing for broad limited liability shield). For the exact
language of RUPA Section 306(c), see supra note 176.
187. See id. § 306 cmt. 3 (stating that partners remain personally liable for their own mis-
conduct).
188. Id. § 101(5).
189. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, LLPS, supra note 47, at 17 (discussing formalities such
as registration and name requirements).
190. See id. at 22 (noting that express statutory differences may support other differences
between general partnerships and LLPs).
191. See id. at 77-85 (suggesting changes partners should consider making to partnership
agreement upon obtaining LLP status).
192. See id. at 82 (noting that LLP registration does not require restructured management
rights but may justify judicial enforcement of centralized management schemes). Professors
Bromberg and Ribstein point out, however, that an LLP should be careful to not jeopardize its
status as a partnership under employment discrimination, tax, and securities law. Id. at 82-83.
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registration may also encourage partnerships to reallocate profit distribution
plans to reflect increased risk to partners in more liability-prone practice
areas.19 The increased flexibility provided in modem partnership law and the
development of limited liability partnerships serves to blur form-based distinc-
tions between business entities.19 It is now possible to have general partners
with almost no power and limited partners exercising pervasive control with-
out incurring personal liability.'95 Part IV discusses the effect this flexibility
has on investment contract analysis.
1. Investment Contract Analysis Under Modem Partnership Law
A. Diminished Importance of Formal Categories
The Supreme Court often emphasizes the importance of economic reality
in defining the word "security."'9 6 In carrying out the Supreme Court's direc-
tions, the Fifth Circuit, in Williamson v. Tucker,'97 developed a test designed
to allow substance to prevail over form in some situations.198 However, the
Providing partners with strong management and voting rights will likely preserve treatment as
a partnership under these other statutes. Id
193. See id. at 83 (discussing impact of LLP election on profit sharing ratios).
194. See supra Part III.A (discussing freedom of contract under RUPA and creation of
general partners with little or no managerial control); see also supra Part III.B (discussing
changes to RULPA that allow limited partners more ability to exercise control without losing
limited liability).
195. See supra Parts III.A-III.B (discussing changes in law that affect traditional tradeoff
between control and liability in partnerships).
196. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967) (stating that in defining security,
"form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality");
SEC v. W. J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (discussing definition of investment
contract under state law and stating that "[florm was disregarded for substance and emphasis
was placed upon economic reality").
197. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981). As discussed above in Part II.B.1, Williamson involved
the purchase ofjoint venture interests in real estate development projects. 1d. at408. Foradis-
cussion of the facts and the result in Williamson, see supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
198. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981) (providing three part
test). The Williamson court found that a general partnership or joint venture interest might be
deemed an investment contract, and thus a security, if the investor can establish that:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the partner
or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a limited
partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable
in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or
venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot
replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership
or venture powers.
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Williamson court explicitly acknowledged the importance it placed on form.'99
The court stated that a general partner who claims his interest is a security has
a "difficult burden to overcome" because the general partner retains substan-
tial control over his investment."' But general partners do not always retain
substantial control because RUPA permits a partnership agreement to strip a
general partner of power and to thus provide the partner with no control over
his investment.2  A partner with no power should not face a "difficult bur-
den" in proving his interest is a security. Furthermore, the first part of Wil-
liamson's test provides that a general partnership interest might be a security
if the partnership agreement distributes power "as would a limited partner-
ship."2M2 But limited partnerships do not distribute power according to any
one particular management scheme. Instead, power distribution depends on
the terms of the limited partnership agreement, and RULPA permits limited
partners to exercise significant control over partnership affairs. 0 3 The Wil-
liamson court clearly placed significant importance on formal categories, but
Part III of this Note demonstrates that form has little meaning.2
To support the assertion that the labels general partnership and limited
partnership now have little meaning, compare the underlying general partner-
ship in Simpson v. Ernst & Young"' with the limited partnership in Steinhardt
GroupInc. v. Citicorp.? In Simpson, the typical general partner could notvote
for management committee members, could not participate in compensation
decisions, could not share in firm profits, and had no part in decisions to admit
new partners.0 7 In contrast, the limited partner in Steinhardt held a 98.79%
ownership interest and retained pervasive control over the partnership.08
199. See Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 71, at 49-50 (suggesting that Williamson
comes close to establishing per se test that general partnership interests are not securities).
200. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
201. See supra Part III.A (discussing RUPA and flexibility provided to create stripped
general partners).
202. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
203. See supra Part III.B (discussing RULPA and ability of limited partners to exercise
control over partnership affairs).
204. See Park McGinty, The LimitedLiability Company: Opportunityfor Selective Securi-
ties Law Deregulation, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 369, 374 (1996) (stating that formal categories
become less useful when they mask substantive economic reality); see also supra Part III (dis-
cussing effect of modem partnership statutes).
205. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 145-158 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Simpson).
206. 126 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 1997); see supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Steinhardt).
207. See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying text (discussing degree to which partner-
ship agreement curtailed Simpson's power).
208. See Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that
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These cases demonstrate that the words general partnership and limited part-
nership have lost much of their descriptive value and now are merely labels.
Courts should abandon presumptions based entirely on these labels.
Form-based presumptions are convenient, but they make little sense.20 9
Congress designed the securities laws to provide protection for investors who
lack the ability to protect themselves.2 0 Focusing on form rather than sub-
stance undermines investor protection by providing protection to savvy
entrepreneurs who possess the knowledge to choose the favored form. When
elevating substance over form, it is necessary to determine which factors are
most important. The following section addresses this issue.
B. Modified Williamson Proposal
This Note proposes that courts should disregard formal categories and
adopt a modified Williamson test when determining whether an interest in a
general, limited, or limited liability partnership is a security. The proposed
test adopts the second and third factors from Williamson," modifies William-
son's first factor to eliminate reference to a limited partnership,212 and adds a
fourth factor focusing on the partnership's size. Thus, under this proposed
modified Williamson test, a general, limited, or limited liability partnership
interest might be a security if the investor establishes that: (1) the partnership
agreement leaves so little power in the hands of the partner that the partner
limited partnership agreement defined majority of partners as partners holding more than 50%
interest in limited partnership and thus provided Steinhardt with power to approve or disapprove
any material action). With a 98.79% ownership interest, Steinhardt alone constituted a majority
of the partners. Id. See also supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text (discussing power
given to Steinhardt under Limited Partnership Agreement).
209. At least one commentator proposes a "private ordering" approach that would adopt
aper se rule that general partnership interests are not securities. See Ribstein, Private Ordering,
supra note 71, at 41-42 (stating that under private ordering approach, general partnerships
would be per se non-securities whether or not partners need protection of securities laws). The
convenience of Professor Ribstein's approach is apparent in that it provides much certainty in
this field of law. Although certainty is an important consideration, it is not the only consider-
ation. Placing so much emphasis on the general partnership label may eviscerate protections
provided by securities law to unwary investors.
210. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating
that fundamental purpose of statutes was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor"); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38,
40 (1941) (stating that purpose of securities law is to protect investors by requiring disclosure).
211. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981) (providing three part
test). Part two ofthe Williamson test deals with a partner's knowledge or experience concerning
partnership business. Id Part three deals with a partner's reliance or dependence on the unique
entrepreneurial ability of a manager or promoter. Id.
212. See id. (providing in first part of test that partner may be security holder if partnership
agreement distributes power as would limited partnership).
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cannot adequately protect his partnership interest;2"3 or (2) the partner has so
little knowledge or experience with the partnership's business that he is
incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership powers;2. 4 or (3) the
partner is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability
of the promoter or manager that the partner cannot reasonably replace the
manager or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers;215 or (4) the
partnership is so large and the partner's interest so small that he effectively
has no influence over essential managerial functions.216 The following sub-
sections discuss each modified Williamson factor separately.
1. Partnership Agreement
Part one of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partner-
ship interest might be a security if the investor establishes that the partnership
agreement leaves so little power in the hands of the partner that the partner
cannot adequately protect his partnership interest. Looking to the power given
to partners in the partnership agreement is the logical starting point in a
securities analysis because the partnership agreement provides the law for that
partnership.2"7 Consider the partnership agreement in Simpson v. Ernst &
213. See BROMBERG &RIBsTEIN, LLPS, supra note 47, at 239 (stating that relevant factor
in securities analysis is whether partnership agreement restricts partners' rights too tightly).
214. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (suggesting that lack of
partner expertise in partnership's business is factor weighing in favor of finding that interest is
security); see also SEC v. Telecom Mktg., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(finding that general partnership interests are securities where evidence suggests defendants
targeted investors because of their ignorance of law, accounting, and wireless cable television
industry); Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422-23 (stating that when partner "is so dependent on the
particular expertise of the promoter or manager that he has no reasonable alternative to reliance
on that person, then his partnership powers may be inadequate to protect him from dependence
on others" and therefore implicate securities law); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, LLPS, supra note
47, at 239 (stating that whether partner's lack of knowledge of partnership's business is too
great is relevant factor in securities analysis).
215. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding
investment contract where investor relied on expertise of promoter to successfully operate
business).
216. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at423 (stating that sale of interests to large numbers dilutes
single partner's role to level similar to shareholder in corporation); see also BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, LLPS, supra note 47, at 239 (stating that whether "partners are too numerous" and
whether their "interests are too small" are relevant factors in securities analysis); Chris Walters,
Comment, Application of Investment Contract Analysis to Partnership Interest and Dual
Regulation Under Federal and Kansas Securities Laws, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1275, 1291 (1997)
(asserting that large number of partners reduces ability of single partner to influence firm
management).
217. See RUPA (1996) § 103(a) (providing that relations among partners and between
partners and partnership are governed by partnership agreement).
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Young.218 Simpson provides a clear example of a partnership agreement that
would satisfy the first part of the modified Williamson test.
The partnership agreement in Simpson severely restricted Simpson's
power and hampered his ability to protect his partnership interest.219 Three
key factors support classifying Simpson's partnership interest as a security.
First, the agreement established a very strong centralized management struc-
ture in which a management committee exercised exclusive control over the
firm's business and affairs." Generally, using a management committee in
a large firm is not problematic because economic efficiency and administra-
tive feasibility require some centralization ofmanagement. 22' But in Simpson,
the Management Committee was a self-perpetuating entity in which members
of the committee appointed its chairman and the chairman, in turn, appointed
its members.' Because partners did not vote for Management Committee
members, the committee was hardly a representative body. Second, the part-
nership agreement gave Simpson no right to participate in decisions to admit
or discharge new partners.' This factor is important because admission of
new partners impacts the success of the enterprise and thus supports the
assertion that Simpson relied on others to make essential managerial decisions
that affected the success of the firm. 4 Third, the partnership agreement
curtailed Simpson's right to inspect partnership books and records.' Re-
218. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996). See supra notes 145-158 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Simpson and power held under partnership agreement).
219. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
Simpson's lack of power within partnership). According to the trial judge, Simpson had no
authority to (1) participate in admission or discharge of partners, (2) participate in determining
partner compensation, (3) vote for Management Committee members or its chairman, (4) partic-
ipate in firm profits or losses, (5) examine books and records unless authorized by the Man-
agement Committee, (6) sign promissory notes for the firm or pledge, assign, or transfer his
partnership interest, (7) access various client accounts, or (8) participate in annual performance
reviews. Id.
220. See id. at 441 (discussing Ernst & Young's Management Committee).
221. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 163, at 6:60 (stating that
centralization of management is common in large partnerships where there are too many
partners for each to participate effectively in daily decision making).
222. See Simpson, 100 F.3d at441 (discussingErnst& Young'sManagementCommittee).
223. See id. (reiterating trial court's findings of fact).
224. See SECv. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir. 1973) (restating
"efforts of others" test and providing that interest is security where those other than investor
make undeniably significant and essential managerial efforts that affect success of enterprise).
225. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that
Simpson had no right to "examine books and records of the firm except to the extent permitted
by the Management Committee"). Under RUPA, a partnership may restrict its partners' rights
to access books and records as long as the restriction is reasonable. RUPA (1996) § 103(b)(2).
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stricting a partner's right to information hampers his ability to protect ade-
quately his partnership interest.
In contrast to the agreement in Simpson, a general or limited liability
partnership agreement that largely adopts the RUPA default provisions easily
satisfies the first part of the modified Williamson test. 2 6 Such a partnership
agreement provides each partner with equal voice in management and unfet-
tered access to partnership information.2 7 In addition, all partners have to
consent to admitting new partners into the partnership. 28 An interest in this
partnership is probably not a security because a partnership agreement that
gives its partners significant powers provides persuasive evidence that part-
ners are not relying primarily on the efforts of others for their profit.29
Like general and limited liability partnership interests, a limited partner-
ship interest will likely not be a security when the partnership agreement
provides the limited partner with power sufficient to protect his investment. '
One of the most extreme examples of this power is when the partnership
agreement gives a limited partner the right to remove and to replace a general
or managing partner without cause." Such power provides limited partners
with significant control because managers must be responsive to the limited
partners or face removal."2 In small limited partnerships, removal power is
probably enough to take the limited partnership interests outside securities law
protection. 3 But in large limited partnerships, the right to remove a general
partner becomes attenuated and has little practical effect and thus should not
rule out classification of limited partnership interests as securities." In some
226. See RUPA § 401 (providing default rules regarding partners' rights and duties).
227. See id. § 401(f) (providing that each partner has equal rights in management and
conduct of partnership); see also id. § 403 (providing partner with right to access partnership
books and records and other information concerning partnership's business and affairs).
228. See id. § 401(i) (providing that person may become partner only with consent of all
partners).
229. If a partner does not rely on the efforts of others to obtain profit, his partnership
interest is not an investment contract and, thus, not a security. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (announcing investment contract test and including "efforts of
others" prong).
230. See Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that
partnership agreement provided limited partner with pervasive control over partnership
management and determining that limited partnership interest was not security). For an in-depth
discussion of Steinhardt, see supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
231. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 163, at 12:147 (discussing
effects of limited partner's right to exercise control).
232. Id
233. See id. (discussing removal power and its effect on securities law analysis).
234. See id. at 12:147-48 (discussing effect of removal power in large firms).
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cases, limited partners are so reliant on the managing partner that removal,
even if authorized by the partnership agreement, is not a realistic option."5
In those cases, removal power should not preclude securities law protection."'
2. Partner's Knowledge and Expertise
Part two of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partner-
ship interest might be a security if the investor can establish that the partner
has so little knowledge or experience with the partnership's business that he
is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership powers. To some
extent, the powers provided to a partner in the partnership agreement mean
very little if the partner lacks the sophistication to use those powers."
Consider, for example, a lawyer who is a general partner in two separate
partnerships. One partnership is a law firm in which the partner and his
colleagues perform legal services. The efforts of others generate a portion of
the partner's profits, but assuming the partner has sufficient voice and access
to information, he is probably not a security holder. His expertise as a lawyer
provides him with the knowledge and ability to evaluate adequately and to
exercise some control over his investment. 8 In the second partnership, the
partner is one of several professionals who purchased an interest in a wireless
cable television business. 9 He has no intention of actively participating in
the management or operation of the business but merely expects to fund
partially a startup venture with the expectation of future profits. He also lacks
knowledge of the cable television industry and has none of the necessary
equipment to perform the required work. Even though his interest is called a
general partnership interest, in economic reality it is an investment, and fed-
eral securities laws should protect it.24
235. See id. (discussing effect of removal right where limited partners depend on special
expertise of managing partner).
236. Id.
237. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1946) (placing emphasis on
fact that partners lacked equipment or knowledge to successfully operate citrus groves).
238. See id. at 300 (suggesting that lack of partner expertise in partnership's business is
factor weighing in favor of finding that interest is security); see also SEC v. Telecom Mktg.,
Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that general partnership interests were
securities where partnership agreement indicated that partners possessed real power, but evi-
dence suggested that defendants targeted investors because of their ignorance of law, account-
ing, and wireless cable television industry).
239. See generally Telecom Mktg., 888 F. Supp. 1160 (involving securities fraud violations
and finding that general partnership interests in wireless cable television business are securities).
240. See id. at 1166 (finding that similar general partnership interest was security when
investors lacked knowledge and equipment to successfully operate partnership's business).
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The wireless cable television example above demonstrates that courts
must look not only to the investor's general business acumen, but also to the
investor's knowledge of the partnership's particular business-especially when
the partnership's business is highly specialized. InBaileyv. J. WK Properties,
Inc.,241 the court's decision turned on the specialized nature of the invest-
ment.242 Bailey involved a cattle crossbreeding venture in which the investors
purchased cattle embryos from the promoter and the promoter agreed to raise
and to market the resulting calves.243 The court decided that the plaintiffs'
interests were investment contracts because practical limitations hindered the
plaintiffs' ability to protect their investments. First, although the agreements
gave the investors significant powers,2" the investors lacked the technical
knowledge needed to successfully operate the business.245 Second, an econo-
mies of scale problem existed in that no single investor owned enough cattle to
make crossbreeding profitable.246 Thus, the investors' dependence on each
other and on the promoter limited the investors' ability to protect their invest-
ment. The court, therefore, found that the investors' interests were securities.247
241. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
242. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding
investment contract when lack of expertise of plaintiffs in cattle crossbreeding venture imposed
practical limitations on plaintiffs' ability to protect their interests). In Bailey, the plaintiffs
invested in a cattle crossbreeding program in which the plaintiffs bought embryos from the
promoter and the promoter agreed to raise the resulting calves and to market them as they
matured. Id. at 919. Although no formal partnership agreement existed, the court apparently
considered the "Purchase Agreement" and the "Management Contract" together as a singlejoint
venture, and thus applied a Williamson-type analysis focusing on investor sophistication and
reliance on the promoter (parts two and three of the Williamson test). Id. at 924-25. The two
agreements purportedly gave the investors significant control over the investment, but the court
stated that "limiting the examination to the contract itself would provide an easy loophole
through which sellers could circumvent federal securities law." Id. at 920, 922 n.6. The court
based its decisioif that the interests were securities on two practical limitations. First, the
plaintiffs had no experience in selecting embryos and had an extremely limited range of alterna-
tive sources of information. Id. at 924. Second, economies of scale prevented an individual
investor from running a successful breeding operation and required the investors to pool their
herds. Id. Based on the plaintiffs' lack of sophistication concerning cattle crossbreeding and
their reliance on the promoter, the court found that the plaintiffs' interests were investment
contracts and thus securities. Id. at 925.
243. Id. at919.
244. See id. at 920 & n.4 (discussing plaintiffs' "substantial rights" and providing language
from "Management Contract"). The investors' substantial rights included the right to direct the
promoter's activities, to choose embryos, to terminate the management agreement, and to direct
the sale of herds. Id. at 920.
245. See id. at 924 (stating that investors lacked expertise to make embryo selections and
had limited access to other sources of information).
246. See id. at 924-25 (noting that case is similar to Howey in that program required
participation of other investors with centralized coordination by promoter).
247. Id. at 925.
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The investors' lack of expertise made them dependent on the promoter. This
dependence is demonstrative of the interrelatedness between parts two and
three of the modified Williamson test.
3. Partner's Dependence
Part three of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partner-
ship interest might be a security if the investor can establish that the partner
is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot reasonably replace the manager or other-
wise exercise meaningful partnership powers. Note that this phrasing is
slightly different than the test that Williamson originally stated.24 The Wil-
liamson court did not include the word "reasonably" in its test,249 but else-
where in its opinion the court indicated that the words "cannot replace" should
be construed broadly." In discussing part three of its test, the court stated
that the investors must allege that they were "incapable, within reasonable
limits," of replacing the promoter." Such language indicates that the court
intended its test to be interpreted realistically rather than rigidly. Thus, this
Note inserts the word "reasonably" into its modified Williamson test. 2
Consider the facts in Bailey v. J W.K Properties, Inc. 3 The investors
in Bailey had the actual power to remove the promoter, but lacked the knowl-
edge or expertise to operate the business effectively. A rigid application of
part three of Williamson would have removed the protection of the securities
lawsY4 The Bailey court, however, recognized that although the investors
had the power to remove the promoter, they could not reasonably replace
him because of his special expertise and his knowledge of cattle cross-
breeding. 5
248. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981) (providing part three
of test and not including word "reasonably"). Part three of the original Williamson test stated
that an interest might be a security if the partner is so dependent on the manager that "he cannot
replace" him or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 425 (stating that plaintiffs must allege that partners were "incapable, within
reasonable limits, of finding a replacement manager").
251. Ia
252. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (stating part three ofmodified Williamson
test); see also Sobel, supra note 49, at 1349-51 (arguing for nonliteral interpretation of part
three of Williamson and suggestihg use of word "practically").
253. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990). See supra note 242 (providing facts and result in
Bailey).
254. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that
investors had power to terminate management agreement).
255. See id. at 925 (stating that under circumstances, investors could not meaningfully
exercise rights "theoretically available to them").
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4. Partnership Size
Part four of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partner-
ship interest might be a security if the investor can establish that the partner-
ship is so large and the partner's interest is so small that he effectively has no
influence over essential managerial functions. Although it did not include this
factor in its test, the Williamson court recognized that firm size may be a factor
in an investment contract analysis. 6 According to the Williamson court, at
some point a partnership becomes so large that a partner's vote is more like
a shareholder's vote in a corporation. As the number of partners in a partner-
ship increases, each partner's vote becomes very attenuated, thus causing
partners to rely substantially on others to make managerial decisions. 7 This
implicates Howey's "efforts of others" test and suggests that the partners'
interests are securities.
C. General Comments Concerning Treatment of Limited Liability
Partnership Interests
No federal courts have addressed the treatment of LLP interests under
federal securities law. Surprisingly, commentators have written very little
concerning this topic. The consensus among those broaching the issue is that
courts should treat LLP interests like general partnership interests because
LLPs are simply general partnerships that elect to obtain limited liability for
their partners. 8 But the freedom of contract provided in modem partnership
256. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "at some
point there would be so many partners that a partnership vote would be more like a corporate
vote, each partner's role having been diluted to the level of a single shareholder in a corpora-
tion"); see also SECv. Telecom Mktg., Inc., 888 F. Supp 1160, 1166 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (suggest-
ing that large number of partners dilutes power such that no partner can exercise meaningful
partnership control); BROMBERG & RiBsTEIN, LLPS,supra note 47, at 239 (stating that number
of partners is factor to consider when determining whether partnership interest is security);
Walters, supra note 216, at 1291 (1997) (stating that large number of partners decreases ability
of single partner to influence operation of essential managerial functions).
257. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423 (stating that sale of interests to large numbers dilutes
single partner's role to level similar to shareholder in corporation); Walters, supra note 216, at
1291 (asserting that large number of partners reduces ability of single partner to influence firm
management).
258. See BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, LLPs, supra note 47, at 236-37 (suggesting that LLP
interests should notbe differentiated from general partnership interests for purposes of investment
contract analysis); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures for Unincorporated Firms, 64
U. IN. L. REv. 319,347-50 (1996) [hereinafter Ribstein, Futures] (discussing treatment ofLLC
and LLP interests under securities law and suggesting that LLP interests should be non-securi-
ties because LLPs operate under default partnership rule ofequalmember participation); George
G. Yearsich et al.,SecuritiesLaw Aspects ofPartnerships, LLCs, andLLPs, SB85 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
813, 861-62 (1997) (suggesting that courts will likely treat LLPs like general partnerships).
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law makes such categorical grouping based entirely on form an inappropriate
classification. 9 With the addition of limited personal liability, one could
fashion a partnership agreement that makes an LLP more analogous to a
closely held corporation than to a traditional general partnership.
As with general and limited partnership interests, deciding whether an
LLP interest is a security should depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. Some might suggest that the mere presence of limited liability
creates a presumption that securities law ought to apply. Clearly, limited
personal liability may encourage partners to take a less active role in manag-
ingpartnership affairs, thus leadingto centralization of management- a factor
in investment contract analysis. ° It is true that limited personal liability may
have an impact on a partner's conduct with respect to the partnership, but it
is the partner's conduct - whether he has the power and ability to protect his
interest- that should factor into the securities analysis, not the mere presence
or absence of limited liability.
Some might suggest that courts should treat LLPs and limited liability
companies (LLCs) similarly because they are both unincorporated limited
liability entities. This argument has merit because LLP and LLC enabling
statutes provide enough flexibility so that the two entities may sometimes
appear functionally equivalent.26' However, this same flexibility permits
entrepreneurs to create LLPs and LLCs that are drastically different.262 Thus,
a strict comparison to LLCs is also not appropriate. The ability to alter
significantly entity attributes undermines categorical form-based classifica-
tions and counsels for fact-sensitive case-by-case analysis.
V Conclusion
In analyzing whether a partnership interest is a security, courts apply the
investment contract test announced in Howey and its progeny.263 Generally,
a partnership interest is a security if an expectation exists that profits will
derive primarily or substantially from the efforts of others." In applying
259. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing features of RUPA and RULPA that permit
flexibility and blur distinctions between business forms).
260. See Walters, supra note 216, at 1292 (discussing structure of management as factor
in investment contract analysis).
261. See generally Ribstein, Futures, supra note 258 (providing discussion of differences
and similarities between LLPs and LLCs).
262. See id. at 321-27 (discussing differences between LLPs and LLCs).
263. See supra Part II.A (discussing development and interpretation of Howey's "efforts
of others" test).
264. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing liberal interpretation of
"efforts of others" test).
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Howey's test, courts developed presumptions that general partnership interests
are not securities and that limited partnership interests are securities.26
Modem partnership law removes the foundation upon which courts based
these presumptions.266 RUPA permits the partnership agreement to change or
to eliminate most of the default partnership rules thereby creating partners that
have little or no power to participate meaningfully in firm management.267
RULPA permits limited partners to become more active in firm management
without sacrificing limited liability.268 Formal categories now mask economic
realities and diminish the appropriateness of form-based distinctions.
This Note proposes that with regard to general, limited, and limited
liability partnerships, courts should diminish the importance of formal catego-
ries when conducting an investment contract analysis. In doing so, courts
should apply the proposed modified Williamson test as discussed above in Part
IV. Under the modified Williamson test, a general, limited, or limited liability
partnership interest might be a security if the investor can establish that:
(1) the partnership agreement leaves so little power in the hands of the partner
that the partner cannot adequately protect his interest in the partnership, or
(2) the partner has so little knowledge or experience with the partnership's
business that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership powers,
or (3) the partner is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or manage-
rial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot reasonably replace the
manager or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers, or (4) the
partnership is so large and the partner's interest is so small that he effectively
has no influence over essential managerial functions.269 By implementing this
test and by placing economic substance over formal categories, courts can
more readily achieve the purposes of federal securities law.
265. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that general
partnership interests presumptively are not securities); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41
(9th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that limited partnership interests presumptively are securities).
266. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing flexibility of RUPA and RULPA).
267. See RUPA (1996) § 103(a) (providing general rule that partnership agreement may
modify or eliminate default rules provided in RUPA). See supra Part III.A for detailed dis-
cussion of freedom to contract provided in RUPA.
268. See supra Part II.B (discussing changes in limited partnership law that allow limited
partners to exercise control over partnership affairs without incurring personal liability).
269. See supra Part IV.B (discussing application of modified Williamson test).
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